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INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES AND FRAMEWORKS

Cross-cutting

Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

- **Convenors and/or authors**: UN.
- **Type:** Framework/strategy (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **Dates:** Adopted, September 2015**.**
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**: (goals and targets:)
  - 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere
    - By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day
    - By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions
    - Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable
    - By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance
    - By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters
    - Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions
    - Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions
- 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
    - By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round
    - By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving, by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under 5 years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and older persons
    - By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment
    - By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively improve land and soil quality
    - By 2020, maintain the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species, including through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at the national, regional and international levels, and

promote access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, as internationally agreed
    - Increase investment, including through enhanced international cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services, technology development and plant and livestock gene banks in order to enhance agricultural productive capacity in developing countries, in particular least developed countries
    - Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round
    - Adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives and facilitate timely access to market information, including on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme food price volatility
- 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
    - By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births
    - By 2030, end preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age, with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at least as low as 12 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as low as 25 per 1,000 live births
    - By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases
    - By 2030, reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and wellbeing
    - Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol
    - By 2020, halve the number of global deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents
    - By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes
    - Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all
    - By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination
    - Strengthen the implementation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all countries, as appropriate
    - Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing countries to use to the full the provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all
    - Substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially in least developed countries and small island developing States
    - Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks
- 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all

- By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes
- By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education so that they are ready for primary education
- By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university
- By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship
- By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations
- By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy
- By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development
- Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all
- By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries
- By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least developed countries and small island developing States

- 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
  - End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere
  - Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation
  - Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation
  - Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate
  - Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life
  - Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences
  - Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws
  - Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women

    - Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels
- 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
    - By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all
    - By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations
    - By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally
    - By 2030, substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity
    - By 2030, implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate
    - By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes
    - By 2030, expand international cooperation and capacity-building support to developing countries in water- and sanitation-related activities and programmes, including water harvesting, desalination, water efficiency, wastewater treatment, recycling and reuse technologies
    - Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management
- 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
    - By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services
    - By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix
    - By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency
    - By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology
    - By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with their respective programmes of support
- 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
    - Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries
    - Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors
    - Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services
    - Improve progressively, through 2030, global resource efficiency in consumption and production and endeavour to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation,

in accordance with the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production, with developed countries taking the lead
    - By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value
    - By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training
    - Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms
    - Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment
    - By 2030, devise and implement policies to promote sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products
    - Strengthen the capacity of domestic financial institutions to encourage and expand access to banking, insurance and financial services for all
    - Increase Aid for Trade support for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, including through the Enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries
    - By 2020, develop and operationalize a global strategy for youth employment and implement the Global Jobs Pact of the International Labour Organization
- 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation
    - Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and transborder infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all
    - Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly raise industry's share of employment and gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries
    - Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable credit, and their integration into value chains and markets
    - By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities
    - Enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in particular developing countries, including, by 2030, encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the number of research and development workers per 1 million people and public and private research and development spending
    - Facilitate sustainable and resilient infrastructure development in developing countries through enhanced financial, technological and technical support to African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States
    - Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries, including by ensuring a conducive policy environment for, inter alia, industrial diversification and value addition to commodities

    - Significantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020
- 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries
    - By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average
    - By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status
    - Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard
    - Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality
    - Improve the regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen the implementation of such regulations
    - Ensure enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions
    - Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies
    - Implement the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, in accordance with World Trade Organization agreements
    - Encourage official development assistance and financial flows, including foreign direct investment, to States where the need is greatest, in particular least developed countries, African countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with their national plans and programmes
    - By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent
- 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
    - By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums
    - By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons
    - By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries
    - Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world's cultural and natural heritage
    - By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations
    - By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management
    - By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities
    - Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning

    - By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels
    - Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resilient buildings utilizing local materials
- 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
    - Implement the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns, all countries taking action, with developed countries taking the lead, taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries
    - By 2030, achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources
    - By 2030, halve per capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reduce food losses along production and supply chains, including post-harvest losses
    - By 2020, achieve the environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with agreed international frameworks, and significantly reduce their release to air, water and soil in order to minimize their adverse impacts on human health and the environment
    - By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse
    - Encourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate sustainability information into their reporting cycle
    - Promote public procurement practices that are sustainable, in accordance with national policies and priorities
    - By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature
    - Support developing countries to strengthen their scientific and technological capacity to move towards more sustainable patterns of consumption and production
    - Develop and implement tools to monitor sustainable development impacts for sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products
    - Rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in accordance with national circumstances, including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies, where they exist, to reflect their environmental impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse impacts on their development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected communities
- 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
    - Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries
    - Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning
    - Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning
    - Implement the commitment undertaken by developed-country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation and fully operationalize the Green Climate Fund through its capitalization as soon as possible

- Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities

- 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
  - By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution
  - By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration in order to achieve healthy and productive oceans
  - Minimize and address the impacts of ocean acidification, including through enhanced scientific cooperation at all levels
  - By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics
  - By 2020, conserve at least 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, consistent with national and international law and based on the best available scientific information
  - By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade Organization fisheries subsidies negotiation16
  - By 2030, increase the economic benefits to small island developing States and least developed countries from the sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture and tourism
  - Increase scientific knowledge, develop research capacity and transfer marine technology, taking into account the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of Marine Technology, in order to improve ocean health and to enhance the contribution of marine biodiversity to the development of developing countries, in particular small island developing States and least developed countries
  - Provide access for small-scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and markets
  - Enhance the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources by implementing international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources, as recalled in paragraph 158 of “The future we want”
- 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
  - By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements
  - By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and substantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally
  - By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world

- By 2030, ensure the conservation of mountain ecosystems, including their biodiversity, in order to enhance their capacity to provide benefits that are essential for sustainable development
- Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species
- Promote fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and promote appropriate access to such resources, as internationally agreed
- Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products
- By 2020, introduce measures to prevent the introduction and significantly reduce the impact of invasive alien species on land and water ecosystems and control or eradicate the priority species
- By 2020, integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts
- Mobilize and significantly increase financial resources from all sources to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity and ecosystems
- Mobilize significant resources from all sources and at all levels to finance sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to developing countries to advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation
- Enhance global support for efforts to combat poaching and trafficking of protected species, including by increasing the capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood opportunities

- 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
  - Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere
  - End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children
  - Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
  - By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime
  - Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
  - Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
  - Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decisionmaking at all levels
  - Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance
  - By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration
  - Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements
  - Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime
  - Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development
- 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development
  - Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection
  - Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for official development assistance (ODA/GNI) to developing

countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries

- Mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources
- Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress
- Adopt and implement investment promotion regimes for least developed countries
- Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism
- Promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed
- Fully operationalize the technology bank and science, technology and innovation capacity-building mechanism for least developed countries by 2017 and enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology
- Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the Sustainable Development Goals, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation
- Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization, including through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda
- Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the least developed countries' share of global exports by 2020
- Realize timely implementation of duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis for all least developed countries, consistent with World Trade Organization decisions, including by ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from least developed countries are transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating market access
- Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence
- Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development
- Respect each country's policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development
- Enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in particular developing countries
- Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships
- By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts

- By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in developing countries

African Union Agenda 2063

- **Convenors and/or authors:** African Union.
- **Type:** strategy/framework (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*
- **Dates:** Adopted January 2015.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting.
- **Aspirations:** long term.
- **Theory of Change:** See 'Chapter 6: "Making it Happen" – Implementation, Monitoring, Evaluation, Financing, Communication & Capacities for Implementation'
- **Recommendations:** (summary table of roadmap/aspirations)

Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas
A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development	A high standard of living, quality of life and wellbeing for all citizens	• Incomes, jobs and decent work • Poverty, inequality and hunger • Social security and protection, including persons with disabilities • Modern, affordable and liveable habitats and quality basic services
	Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation	• Education and science, technology and innovation (STI) driven skills revolution
	Healthy and well-nourished citizens	• Health and nutrition
	Transformed economies	• Sustainable and inclusive economic growth • STI driven manufacturing, industrialization and value addition • Economic diversification and resilience • Tourism/Hospitality
	Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production	• Agricultural productivity and production
	Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth	• Marine resources and energy • Port operations and marine transport
	Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities	• Sustainable natural resource management • Biodiversity conservation, genetic resources and ecosystems • Sustainable consumption and production patterns • Water security • Climate resilience and natural disasters preparedness and prevention • Renewable energy
An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance	A United Africa (Federal or Confederate)	• Frameworks and institutions for a United Africa
	Continental financial and monetary institutions established and functional	• Financial and monetary institutions
	World class infrastructure criss - crosses Africa	• Communications and infrastructure connectivity.
An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law	Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched	• Democracy and good governance • Human rights, justice and the rule of law
	Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place	• Institutions and leadership • Participatory development and local governance
A peaceful and secure Africa	Peace, security and stability is preserved	• Maintenance and preservation of peace and security
	A stable and peaceful Africa	• Institutional structure for AU instruments on peace and security • Defence, security and peace
	A fully functional and operational APSA	• Fully operational and functional APSA pillars

Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics	African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent	• Values and ideals of Pan Africanism • Cultural values and African Renaissance • Cultural heritage, creative arts and businesses
An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential offered by African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children	Full gender equality in all spheres of life	• Women and girls empowerment • Violence and discrimination against women and girls
	Engaged and empowered youth and children	• Youth empowerment and children's rights
An Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner	Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence	• Africa's place in global affairs • Partnerships
	Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development	• African capital markets • Fiscal systems and public sector revenue • Development assistance

African Union Agenda 2063 First Ten-year Implementation Plan 2014-2023

- **Convenors and/or authors**: African Union.
- **Type:** Framework/strategy (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document. Summary document available.
- **Dates:** Adopted, September 2015.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting.
- **Aspirations:** short term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**: (from summary document)

Aspiration	Goals	Priority Areas
1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	• Incomes, Jobs and decent work • Poverty, Inequality and Hunger • Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities • Modern and Livable Habitats and Basic Quality Services
	(2) Well Educated Citizens and Skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and Innovation	• Education and STI skills driven revolution
	(3) Healthy and well-nourished citizens	• Health and Nutrition
	(4) Transformed Economies	• Sustainable and inclusive economic growth • STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition • Economic diversification and resilience • Hospitality/Tourism
	(5) Modern Agriculture for increased productivity and production	• Agricultural Productivity and Production
	(6) Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth	• Marine resources and Energy • Ports Operations and Marine Transport

Aspiration	Goals	Priority Areas
	(7) Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities	• Sustainable natural resource management • Biodiversity conservation, genetic resources and ecosystems • Sustainable consumption and production patterns • Water security • Climate resilience and natural disasters preparedness and prevention • Renewable energy
2) An Integrated Continent Politically united and based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of African Renaissance	(8) United Africa (Federal or Confederate)	• Framework and Institutions for a United Africa
	(9) Continental Financial and Monetary Institutions are established and functional	• Financial and Monetary Institutions
	(10) World Class Infrastructure crisscrosses Africa	• Communications and Infrastructure Connectivity
3) An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law	(11)Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched	• Democracy and Good Governance • Human Rights, Justice and The Rule of Law
	(12) Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place	• Institutions and Leadership • Participatory Development and Local Governance

Aspiration	Goals	Priority Areas
4) A Peaceful and Secure Africa	(13) Peace Security and Stability is preserved	• Maintenance and Preservation of Peace and Security
	(14) A Stable and Peaceful Africa	• Institutional structure for AU Instruments on Peace and Security
	(15) A Fully functional and operational APSA	• Fully operational and functional APSA Pillars
5) Africa with a Strong Cultural Identity Common Heritage, Values and Ethics	16) African Cultural Renaissance is pre-eminent	• Values and Ideals of Pan Africanism • Cultural Values and African Renaissance • Cultural Heritage, Creative Arts and Businesses
6) An Africa Whose Development is people driven, relying on the potential offered by African People, especially its Women and Youth, and caring for Children	(17) Full Gender Equality in All Spheres of Life	• Women and Girls Empowerment • Violence & Discrimination against Women and Girls
	(18) Engaged and Empowered Youth and Children	• Youth Empowerment and Children
7) An Africa as A Strong, United, Resilient and Influential Global Player and Partner	(19) Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence	• Africa's place in global affairs. • Partnership
	(20) Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development	• African Capital market • Fiscal system and Public Sector Revenues • Development Assistance

Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration

- **Convenors and/or authors**: UN.
- **Type:** Framework/strategy (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **Dates:** Adopted, December 2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting.
- **Aspirations:** short and medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**: (headline objectives only)

Objectives for safe, orderly and regular migration

1. Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies
2. Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin
3. Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration
4. Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation
5. Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration
6. Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work
7. Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration
8. Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants
9. Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants
10. Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration
11. Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner
12. Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral
13. Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives
14. Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle
15. Provide access to basic services for migrants
16. Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion
17. Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration
18. Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences
19. Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries
20. Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants
21. Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration
22. Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits
23. Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration

Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UNISDR.
- **Type:** Strategy/Framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document, *Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters*.
- **Dates:** In operation, 2005-2015.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium.
- **Theory of Change:** See chart further below.
- **Recommendations:**
    - Drawing on the conclusions of the review of the Yokohama Strategy, and on the basis of deliberations at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction and especially the agreed expected outcome and strategic goals, the Conference has adopted the following five priorities for action:
        - 1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.
        - 2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.
        - 3. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels.
        - 4. Reduce the underlying risk factors.
        - 5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.
            - In their approach to disaster risk reduction, States, regional and international organizations and other actors concerned should take into consideration the key activities listed under each of these five priorities and should implement them, as appropriate, to their own circumstances and capacities.
        - 6. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation
            - Countries that develop policy, legislative and institutional frameworks for disaster risk reduction and that are able to develop and track progress through specific and measurable indicators have greater capacity to manage risks and to achieve widespread consensus for, engagement in and compliance with disaster risk reduction measures across all sectors of society.
                - (a) Support the creation and strengthening of national integrated disaster risk reduction mechanisms, such as multi sectoral national platforms10, with designated responsibilities at the national through to the local levels to facilitate coordination across sectors. National platforms should also facilitate coordination across sectors, including by maintaining a broad based dialogue at national and regional levels for promoting awareness among the relevant sectors.
                - (b) Integrate risk reduction, as appropriate, into development policies and planning at all levels of government, including in poverty reduction strategies and sectors and multi sector policies and plans.
                - (c) Adopt, or modify where necessary, legislation to support disaster risk reduction, including regulations and mechanisms that encourage compliance and that promote incentives for undertaking risk reduction and mitigation activities.
                - (d) Recognize the importance and specificity of local risk patterns and trends, decentralize responsibilities and resources for disaster risk reduction to relevant subnational or local authorities, as appropriate.
                - (e) Assess existing human resource capacities for disaster risk reduction \at all levels and develop capacity-building plans and programmes for meeting ongoing and future requirements.

- (f) Allocate resources for the development and the implementation of disaster risk management policies, programmes, laws and regulations on disaster risk reduction in all relevant sectors and authorities at all levels of administrative and budgets on the basis of clearly prioritized actions.
- (g) Governments should demonstrate the strong political determination required to promote and integrate disaster risk reduction into development programming.
- (h) Promote community participation in disaster risk reduction through the adoption of specific policies, the promotion of networking, the strategic management of volunteer resources, the attribution of roles and responsibilities, and the delegation and provision of the necessary authority and resources.

- 7. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning
  - The starting point for reducing disaster risk and for promoting a culture of disaster resilience lies in the knowledge of the hazards and the physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities to disasters that most societies face, and of the ways in which hazards and vulnerabilities are changing in the short and long term, followed by action taken on the basis of that knowledge.
    - (a) Develop, update periodically and widely disseminate risk maps and related information to decision-makers, the general public and communities at risk11 in an appropriate format.
    - (b) Develop systems of indicators of disaster risk and vulnerability at national and sub-national scales that will enable decision-makers to assess the impact of disasters 12 on social, economic and environmental conditions and disseminate the results to decisionmakers, the public and populations at risk.
    - (c) Record, analyse, summarize and disseminate statistical information on disaster occurrence, impacts and losses, on a regular bases through international, regional, national and local mechanisms.
    - (d) Develop early warning systems that are people centered, in particular systems whose warnings are timely and understandable to those at risk, which take into account the demographic, gender, cultural and livelihood characteristics of the target audiences, including guidance on how to act upon warnings, and that support effective operations by disaster managers and other decision makers.
    - (e) Establish, periodically review, and maintain information systems as part of early warning systems with a view to ensuring that rapid and coordinated action is taken in cases of alert/emergency.
    - (f) Establish institutional capacities to ensure that early warning systems are well integrated into governmental policy and decision-making processes and emergency management systems at both the national and the local levels, and are subject to regular system testing and performance assessments.
    - (g) Implement the outcome of the Second International Conference on Early Warning held in Bonn, Germany, in 200313, including through the strengthening of coordination and cooperation among all relevant sectors and actors in the early warning chain in order to achieve fully effective early warning systems.
    - (h) Implement the outcome of the Mauritius Strategy for the further implementation of the Barbados Programme of Action for the sustainable development of small island developing States, including by establishing and strengthening effective early warning systems as well as other mitigation and response measures.

- (i) Support the development and sustainability of the infrastructure and scientific, technological, technical and institutional capacities needed to research, observe, analyse, map and where possible forecast natural and related hazards, vulnerabilities and disaster impacts.
- (j) Support the development and improvement of relevant databases and the promotion of full and open exchange and dissemination of data for assessment, monitoring and early warning purposes, as appropriate, at international, regional, national and local levels.
- (k) Support the improvement of scientific and technical methods and capacities for risk assessment, monitoring and early warning, through research, partnerships, training and technical capacity- building. Promote the application of in situ and space-based earth observations, space technologies, remote sensing, geographic information systems, hazard modelling and prediction, weather and climate modelling and forecasting, communication tools and studies of the costs and benefits of risk assessment and early warning.
- (l) Establish and strengthen the capacity to record, analyze, summarize, disseminate, and exchange statistical information and data on hazards mapping, disaster risks, impacts, and losses; support the development of common methodologies for risk assessment and monitoring.
- (m) Compile and standardize, as appropriate, statistical information and data on regional disaster risks, impacts and losses.
- (n) Cooperate regionally and internationally, as appropriate, to assess and monitor regional and trans-boundary hazards, and exchange information and provide early warnings through appropriate arrangements, such as, inter alia, those relating to the management of river basins.
- (o) Research, analyse and report on long-term changes and emerging issues that might increase vulnerabilities and risks or the capacity of authorities and communities to respond to disasters.

o 8. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels

– Disasters can be substantially reduced if people are well informed and motivated towards a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, which in turn requires the collection, compilation and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities.

- (a) Provide easily understandable information on disaster risks and protection options, especially to citizens in high-risk areas, to encourage and enable people to take action to reduce risks and build resilience. The information should incorporate relevant traditional and indigenous knowledge and culture heritage and be tailored to different target audiences, taking into account cultural and social factors.
- (b) Strengthen networks among disaster experts, managers and planners across sectors and between regions, and create or strengthen procedures for using available expertise when agencies and other important actors develop local risk reduction plans.
- (c) Promote and improve dialogue and cooperation among scientific communities and practitioners working on disaster risk reduction, and encourage partnerships among stakeholders, including those working on the socioeconomic dimensions of disaster risk reduction.

- (d) Promote the use, application and affordability of recent information, communication and space-based technologies and related services, as well as earth observations, to support disaster risk reduction, particularly for training and for the sharing and dissemination of information among different categories of users.
- (e) In the medium term, develop local, national, regional and international user-friendly directories, inventories and national information-sharing systems and services for the exchange of information on good practices, cost-effective and easy-to-use disaster risk reduction technologies, and lessons learned on policies, plans and measures for disaster risk reduction.
- (f) Institutions dealing with urban development should provide information to the public on disaster reduction options prior to constructions, land purchase or land sale.
- (g) Update and widely disseminate international standard terminology related to disaster risk reduction, at least in all official United Nations languages, for use in programme and institutional development, operations, research, training curricula and public information programmes.
- (h) Promote the inclusion of disaster risk reduction knowledge in relevant sections of school curricula at all levels and the use of other formal and informal channels to reach youth and children with information; promote the integration of disaster risk reduction as an intrinsic element of the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005–2015).
- (i) Promote the implementation of local risk assessment and disaster preparedness programmes in schools and institutions of higher education.
- (j) Promote the implementation of programmes and activities in schools for learning how to minimize the effects of hazards.
- (k) Develop training and learning programmes in disaster risk reduction targeted at specific sectors (development planners, emergency managers, local government officials, etc.).
- (l) Promote community-based training initiatives, considering the role of volunteers, as appropriate, to enhance local capacities to mitigate and cope with disasters.
- (m) Ensure equal access to appropriate training and educational opportunities for women and vulnerable constituencies; promote gender and cultural sensitivity training as integral components of education and training for disaster risk reduction.
- (n) Develop improved methods for predictive multi-risk assessments and socioeconomic cost–benefit analysis of risk reduction actions at all levels; incorporate these methods into decision-making processes at regional, national and local levels.
- (o) Strengthen the technical and scientific capacity to develop and apply methodologies, studies and models to assess vulnerabilities to and the impact of geological, weather, water and climate-related hazards, including the improvement of regional monitoring capacities and assessments.
- (p) Promote the engagement of the media in order to stimulate a culture of disaster resilience and strong community involvement in sustained public education campaigns and public consultations at all levels of society.

- 9. Reduce the underlying risk factors

- Disaster risks related to changing social, economic, environmental conditions and land use, and the impact of hazards associated with geological events, weather, water, climate variability and climate change, are addressed in sector development planning and programmes as well as in post-disaster situations.
    - (a) Encourage the sustainable use and management of ecosystems, including through better land-use planning and development activities to reduce risk and vulnerabilities.
    - (b) Implement integrated environmental and natural resource management approaches that incorporate disaster risk reduction, including structural and non-structural measures, such as integrated flood management and appropriate management of fragile ecosystems.
    - (c) Promote the integration of risk reduction associated with existing climate variability and future climate change into strategies for the reduction of disaster risk and adaptation to climate change, which would include the clear identification of climate-related disaster risks, the design of specific risk reduction measures and an improved and routine use of climate risk information by planners, engineers and other decision-makers.
    - (d) Promote food security as an important factor in ensuring the resilience of communities to hazards, particularly in areas prone to drought, flood, cyclones and other hazards that can weaken agriculture-based livelihoods.
    - (e) Integrate disaster risk reduction planning into the health sector; promote the goal of “hospitals safe from disaster” by ensuring that all new hospitals are built with a level of resilience that strengthens their capacity to remain functional in disaster situations and implement mitigation measures to reinforce existing health facilities, particularly those providing primary health care.
    - (f) Protect and strengthen critical public facilities and physical infrastructure, particularly schools, clinics, hospitals, water and power plants, communications and transport lifelines, disaster warning and management centres, and culturally important lands and structures through proper design, retrofitting and re-building, in order to render them adequately resilient to hazards.
    - (g) Strengthen the implementation of social safety-net mechanisms to assist the poor, the elderly and the disabled, and other populations affected by disasters. Enhance recovery schemes including psycho-social training programmes in order to mitigate the psychological damage of vulnerable populations, particularly children, in the aftermath of disasters.
    - (h) Incorporate disaster risk reduction measures into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes and use opportunities during the recovery phase to develop capacities that reduce disaster risk in the long term, including through the sharing of expertise, knowledge and lessons learned.
    - (i) Endeavor to ensure, as appropriate, that programmes for displaced persons do not increase risk and vulnerability to hazards.
    - (j) Promote diversified income options for populations in high-risk areas to reduce their vulnerability to hazards, and ensure that their income and assets are not undermined by development policy and processes that increase their vulnerability to disasters.
    - (k) Promote the development of financial risk-sharing mechanisms, particularly insurance and reinsurance against disasters.

- (l) Promote the establishment of public–private partnerships to better engage the private sector in disaster risk reduction activities; encourage the private sector to foster a culture of disaster prevention, putting greater emphasis on, and allocating resources to, pre-disaster activities such as risk assessments and early warning systems.
- (m) Develop and promote alternative and innovative financial instruments for addressing disaster risk.
- (n) Incorporate disaster risk assessments into the urban planning and management of disaster-prone human settlements, in particular highly populated areas and quickly urbanizing settlements. The issues of informal or non-permanent housing and the location of housing in high-risk areas should be addressed as priorities, including in the framework of urban poverty reduction and slum-upgrading programmes.
- (o) Mainstream disaster risk considerations into planning procedures for major infrastructure projects, including the criteria for design, approval and implementation of such projects and considerations based on social, economic and environmental impact assessments.
- (p) Develop, upgrade and encourage the use of guidelines and monitoring tools for the reduction of disaster risk in the context of land-use policy and planning.
- (q) Incorporate disaster risk assessment into rural development planning and management, in particular with regard to mountain and coastal flood plain areas, including through the identification of land zones that are available and safe for human settlement,
- (r) Encourage the revision of existing or the development of new building codes, standards, rehabilitation and reconstruction practices at the national or local levels, as appropriate, with the aim of making them more applicable in the local context, particularly in informal and marginal human settlements, and reinforce the capacity to implement, monitor and enforce such codes, through a consensus-based approach, with a view to fostering disaster-resistant structures.

- 10. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels
  - At times of disaster, impacts and losses can be substantially reduced if authorities, individuals and communities in hazard-prone areas are well prepared and ready to act and are equipped with the knowledge and capacities for effective disaster management.
    - (a) Strengthen policy, technical and institutional capacities in regional, national and local disaster management, including those related to technology, training, and human and material resources.
    - (b) Promote and support dialogue, exchange of information and coordination among early warning, disaster risk reduction, disaster response, development and other relevant agencies and institutions at all levels, with the aim of fostering a holistic approach towards disaster risk reduction.
    - (c) Strengthen and when necessary develop coordinated regional approaches, and create or upgrade regional policies, operational mechanisms, plans and communication systems to prepare for and ensure rapid and effective disaster response in situations that exceed national coping capacities.
    - (d) Prepare or review and periodically update disaster preparedness and contingency plans and policies at all levels, with a particular focus on the most vulnerable areas and groups. Promote regular disaster preparedness exercises,

including evacuation drills, with a view to ensuring rapid and effective disaster response and access to essential food and non-food relief supplies, as appropriate, to local needs.

- (e) Promote the establishment of emergency funds, where and as appropriate, to support response, recovery and preparedness measures.
- (f) Develop specific mechanisms to engage the active participation and ownership of relevant stakeholders, including communities, in disaster risk reduction, in particular building on the spirit of volunteerism.

International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

SUMMARY of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (Hyogo Framework)

Expected outcome, strategic goals and priorities for action 2005-2015

Expected Outcome

The substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries

Strategic Goals

- The integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning
- Development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities to build resilience to hazards
- The systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency preparedness, response and recovery programmes

Priorities for Action

Key Activities

1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction (DRR) is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation

- DRR institutional mechanisms (national platforms); designated responsibilities
- DRR part of development policies and planning, sector wise and multisector
- Legislation to support DRR
- Decentralisation of responsibilities and resources
- Assessment of human resources and capacities
- Foster political commitment
- Community participation

2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning

- Risk assessments and maps, multi-risk: elaboration and dissemination
- Indicators on DRR and vulnerability
- Data & statistical loss information
- Early warning: people centered; information systems; public policy
- Scientific and technological development; data sharing, space-based earth observation, climate modeling and forecasting; early warning
- Regional and emerging risks

3. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels

- Information sharing and cooperation; Networks across disciplines and regions; dialogue
- Use of standard DRR terminology
- Inclusion of DRR into school curricula, formal and informal education
- Training and learning on DRR: community level, local authorities, targeted sectors; equal access
- Research capacity: multi-risk; socio-economic; application
- Public awareness and media

4. Reduce the underlying risk factors

- Sustainable ecosystems and environmental management
- DRR strategies integrated with climate change adaptation
- Food security for resilience
- DRR integrated into health sector and safe hospitals
- Protection of critical public facilities
- Recovery schemes and social safety- nets
- Vulnerability reduction with diversified income options
- Financial risk-sharing mechanisms
- Public-private partnership
- Land use planning and building codes
- Rural development plans and DRR

5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels

- Disaster management capacities: policy, technical and institutional capacities
- Dialogue, coordination & information exchange between disaster managers and development sectors
- Regional approaches to disaster response, with risk reduction focus
- Review & and exercise preparedness and contingency plans
- Emergency funds
- Voluntarism & participation

Cross Cutting Issues

- Multi-hazard approach
- Gender perspective and cultural diversity
- Community and volunteers participation
- Capacity building & technology transfer

Contributing to the achievements of the internationally agreed development goals (including the MDGs)

Implementation and Follow-Up

In order to achieve the goals and act upon the priorities identified in this Framework, the following tasks have been identified to ensure implementation and follow-up by States, regional and international organizations in collaboration with civil society and other stakeholders. The ISDR partners, in particular the Inter-agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction and secretariat, are requested to assist in implementing this Framework for Action.

General Considerations

- Implementation by different stakeholders, multi-sectoral approach; participation of civil society (NGOs, CBOs, volunteers), scientific community & private sector is vital
- States primarily responsible; an enabling international environment is vital, incl. strengthened regional capacities
- Build multi-stakeholder partnerships
- Particular attention to:
  - Small island developing States: Mauritius Strategy;
  - Least developed countries;
  - Africa
- States, regional and international organizations to foster coordination among themselves and a strengthened International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)
- Follow-up integrated with other major conferences in fields relevant to DRR; reviews as appropriate

Actors

Critical tasks

States

- Designate national coordination mechanisms for the implementation and follow up, communicate to the ISDR secretariat;
- National baseline assessments of the status of DRR;
- Publish and update a summary of national programme for DRR including international cooperation;
- Develop procedure for reviewing national progress including systems for cost benefit analysis and ongoing monitoring on risk;
- Consider acceding to, approving or ratifying relevant international legal instruments and to make sure they are implemented;
- Promote the integration of DRR with climate variability and climate change into DRR strategies and adaptation to climate change; ensure management of risks to geological hazards.

Regional Organizations and Institutions

- Promote regional programmes including for technical cooperation, capacity development, the development of methodologies and standards for hazard and vulnerability monitoring and assessment, the sharing of information and effective mobilization of resources;
- Undertake and publish regional and sub-regional baseline assessments;
- Coordinate and publish reviews on progress and support needs, and assists countries in preparation of national summaries;
- Establish specialized regional collaborative centers;
- Support the development of regional mechanisms and capacities for early warning, including for tsunami

International Organizations (including UN System and IFIs)

- Engage in the implementation of the ISDR by encouraging integration of DRR into humanitarian and sustainable development fields;
- Strengthen the capacity of the UN system to assist disaster-prone developing countries in DRR and implement measures for assessment of progress;
- Identify actions to assist disaster-prone developing countries in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework, ensure their integration and that adequate funding is allocated; assist in setting up national strategies and programmes for DRR;
- Integrate actions into relevant coordination mechanisms (UNDG, IASC, RCs and UN Country Teams);
- Integrate DRR into development assistance frameworks such as CCA/UNDAF, PRSP;
- In collaboration with networks and platform support: data collection and forecasting on natural hazards and risks; early warning systems; full & open exchange of data;
- Support States with coordinated international relief assistance, to reduce vulnerability & increase capacities;
- Strengthen international mechanisms to support disaster stricken States in post-disaster recovery with DRR approach
- Adapt & strengthen inter-agency disaster management training for DRR and capacity building.

ISDR (Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction & secretariat)

- Develop a matrix of roles and initiatives in support of follow/up to the Hyogo Framework;
- Facilitate the coordination of effective actions within the UN system and other international and regional entities to support the implementation of the Hyogo Framework, identify gaps, facilitate processes to develop guidelines and policy tools for each priority area;
- In broad consultation, develop generic, realistic and measurable indicators. These indicators could assist States in measuring progress in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework;
- Support national platforms & regional coordination;
- Register relevant partnerships with Commission on Sustainable Development;
- Stimulate the exchange, compilation, analysis and dissemination of best practices, lessons learnt;
- Prepare periodic review on progress towards achieving the objectives of the Hyogo Framework and provide reports to the UNGA & other UN bodies

Resource Mobilization: States, Regional and International Organizations

- Mobilize resources and capabilities of relevant national, regional and international bodies, including the UN system;
- Provide and support the implementation of the HFA in disaster prone developing countries, including through financial and technical assistance, addressing debt sustainability, technology transfer, public-private partnership and North-South and South-South cooperation;
- Mainstream DRR measures into multilateral and bilateral development assistance programmes;
- Provide adequate voluntary financial contribution to the UN Trust Fund for DR to support follow-up activities to Hyogo Framework; review usage and feasibility for the expansion of this fund;
- Develop partnership to implement schemes that spread out risks, reduce insurance premiums, expand insurance coverage and increase financing for post-disaster reconstruction, including through public and private partnerships. Promote an environment that encourages a culture of insurance in developing countries.

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UNIDSR.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document.
- **Dates:** In operation, 2015-2030.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** cross-cutting.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** See chart further below.
- **Recommendations:**
  - Priority 1: Understanding disaster risk
    - National and local levels
      - (a) To promote the collection, analysis, management and use of relevant data and practical information and ensure its dissemination, taking into account the needs of different categories of users, as appropriate;
      - (b) To encourage the use of and strengthening of baselines and periodically assess disaster risks, vulnerability, capacity, exposure, hazard characteristics and their possible sequential effects at the relevant social and spatial scale on ecosystems, in line with national circumstances;
      - (c) To develop, periodically update and disseminate, as appropriate, location-based disaster risk information, including risk maps, to decision makers, the general public and communities at risk of exposure to disaster in an appropriate format by using, as applicable, geospatial information technology;
      - (d) To systematically evaluate, record, share and publicly account for disaster losses and understand the economic, social, health, education, environmental and cultural heritage impacts, as appropriate, in the context of event-specific hazard-exposure and vulnerability information;
      - (e) To make non-sensitive hazard-exposure, vulnerability, risk, disaster and loss-disaggregated information freely available and accessible, as appropriate;
      - (f) To promote real time access to reliable data, make use of space and in situ information, including geographic information systems (GIS), and use information and communications technology innovations to enhance measurement tools and the collection, analysis and dissemination of data;
      - (g) To build the knowledge of government officials at all levels, civil society, communities and volunteers, as well as the private sector, through sharing experiences, lessons learned, good practices and training and education on disaster risk reduction, including the use of existing training and education mechanisms and peer learning;
      - (h) To promote and improve dialogue and cooperation among scientific and technological communities, other relevant stakeholders and policymakers in order to facilitate a science-policy interface for effective decision-making in disaster risk management;
      - (i) To ensure the use of traditional, indigenous and local knowledge and practices, as appropriate, to complement scientific knowledge in disaster risk assessment and the development and implementation of policies, strategies, plans and programmes of specific sectors, with a cross-sectoral approach, which should be tailored to localities and to the context;
      - (j) To strengthen technical and scientific capacity to capitalize on and consolidate existing knowledge and to develop and apply methodologies and models to assess disaster risks, vulnerabilities and exposure to all hazards;

- (k) To promote investments in innovation and technology development in long-term, multihazard and solution-driven research in disaster risk management to address gaps, obstacles, interdependencies and social, economic, educational and environmental challenges and disaster risks;
- (l) To promote the incorporation of disaster risk knowledge, including disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery and rehabilitation, in formal and non-formal education, as well as in civic education at all levels, as well as in professional education and training;
- (m) To promote national strategies to strengthen public education and awareness in disaster risk reduction, including disaster risk information and knowledge, through campaigns, social media and community mobilization, taking into account specific audiences and their needs;
- (n) To apply risk information in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity and exposure of persons, communities, countries and assets, as well as hazard characteristics, to develop and implement disaster risk reduction policies;
- (o) To enhance collaboration among people at the local level to disseminate disaster risk information through the involvement of community-based organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

- Global and regional levels
  - (a) To enhance the development and dissemination of science-based methodologies and tools to record and share disaster losses and relevant disaggregated data and statistics, as well as to strengthen disaster risk modelling, assessment, mapping, monitoring and multihazard early warning systems;
  - (b) To promote the conduct of comprehensive surveys on multi-hazard disaster risks and the development of regional disaster risk assessments and maps, including climate change scenarios;
  - (c) To promote and enhance, through international cooperation, including technology transfer, access to and the sharing and use of non-sensitive data and information, as appropriate, communications and geospatial and space-based technologies and related services; maintain and strengthen in situ and remotely-sensed earth and climate observations; and strengthen the utilization of media, including social media, traditional media, big data and mobile phone networks, to support national measures for successful disaster risk communication, as appropriate and in accordance with national laws;
  - (d) To promote common efforts in partnership with the scientific and technological community, academia and the private sector to establish, disseminate and share good practices internationally;
  - (e) To support the development of local, national, regional and global user-friendly systems and services for the exchange of information on good practices, cost-effective and easy-to-use disaster risk reduction technologies and lessons learned on policies, plans and measures for disaster risk reduction;
  - (f) To develop effective global and regional campaigns as instruments for public awareness and education, building on the existing ones (for example, the “One million safe schools and hospitals” initiative; the “Making Cities Resilient: My city is getting ready” campaign; the United Nations Sasakawa Award for Disaster Risk Reduction; and the annual United Nations International Day for Disaster Reduction), to promote a culture of disaster prevention, resilience and responsible citizenship, generate understanding of disaster risk, support mutual learning and share experiences; and encourage public and private stakeholders to actively engage in such initiatives and to develop new ones at the local, national, regional and global levels;

    - (g) To enhance the scientific and technical work on disaster risk reduction and its mobilization through the coordination of existing networks and scientific research institutions at all levels and in all regions, with the support of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Scientific and Technical Advisory Group, in order to strengthen the evidence-base in support of the implementation of the present Framework; promote scientific research on disaster risk patterns, causes and effects; disseminate risk information with the best use of geospatial information technology; provide guidance on methodologies and standards for risk assessments, disaster risk modelling and the use of data; identify research and technology gaps and set recommendations for research priority areas in disaster risk reduction; promote and support the availability and application of science and technology to decision-making; contribute to the update of the publication entitled "2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction"; use post-disaster reviews as opportunities to enhance learning and public policy; and disseminate studies;
    - (h) To encourage the availability of copyrighted and patented materials, including through negotiated concessions, as appropriate;
    - (i) To enhance access to and support for innovation and technology, as well as in long-term, multi-hazard and solution-driven research and development in the field of disaster risk management.
- Priority 2: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk
    - National and local levels
        - (a) To mainstream and integrate disaster risk reduction within and across all sectors and review and promote the coherence and further development, as appropriate, of national and local frameworks of laws, regulations and public policies, which, by defining roles and responsibilities, guide the public and private sectors in:
            - (i) addressing disaster risk in publically owned, managed or regulated services and infrastructures;
            - (ii) promoting and providing incentives, as relevant, for actions by persons, households, communities and businesses;
            - (iii) enhancing relevant mechanisms and initiatives for disaster risk transparency, which may include financial incentives, public awareness-raising and training initiatives, reporting requirements and legal and administrative measures; and
            - (iv) putting in place coordination and organizational structures;
        - (b) To adopt and implement national and local disaster risk reduction strategies and plans, across different timescales, with targets, indicators and time frames, aimed at preventing the creation of risk, the reduction of existing risk and the strengthening of economic, social, health and environmental resilience;
        - (c) To carry out an assessment of the technical, financial and administrative disaster risk management capacity to deal with the identified risks at the local and national levels;
        - (d) To encourage the establishment of necessary mechanisms and incentives to ensure high levels of compliance with the existing safety-enhancing provisions of sectoral laws and regulations, including those addressing land use and urban planning, building codes, environmental and resource management and health and safety standards, and update them, where needed, to ensure an adequate focus on disaster risk management;
        - (e) To develop and strengthen, as appropriate, mechanisms to follow up, periodically assess and publicly report on progress on national and local plans; and promote public scrutiny and encourage institutional debates, including by parliamentarians and other relevant officials, on progress reports of local and national plans for disaster risk reduction;

- (f) To assign, as appropriate, clear roles and tasks to community representatives within disaster risk management institutions and processes and decision-making through relevant legal frameworks, and undertake comprehensive public and community consultations during the development of such laws and regulations to support their implementation;
- (g) To establish and strengthen government coordination forums composed of relevant stakeholders at the national and local levels, such as national and local platforms for disaster risk reduction, and a designated national focal point for implementing the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. It is necessary for such mechanisms to have a strong foundation in national institutional frameworks with clearly assigned responsibilities and authority to, inter alia, identify sectoral and multisectoral disaster risk, build awareness and knowledge of disaster risk through sharing and dissemination of non-sensitive disaster risk information and data, contribute to and coordinate reports on local and national disaster risk, coordinate public awareness campaigns on disaster risk, facilitate and support local multisectoral cooperation (e.g. among local governments) and contribute to the determination of and reporting on national and local disaster risk management plans and all policies relevant for disaster risk management. These responsibilities should be established through laws, regulations, standards and procedures;
- (h) To empower local authorities, as appropriate, through regulatory and financial means to work and coordinate with civil society, communities and indigenous peoples and migrants in disaster risk management at the local level;
- (i) To encourage parliamentarians to support the implementation of disaster risk reduction by developing new or amending relevant legislation and setting budget allocations;
- (j) To promote the development of quality standards, such as certifications and awards for disaster risk management, with the participation of the private sector, civil society, professional associations, scientific organizations and the United Nations;
- (k) To formulate public policies, where applicable, aimed at addressing the issues of prevention or relocation, where possible, of human settlements in disaster risk-prone zones, subject to national law and legal systems.

- Global and regional levels
  - (a) To guide action at the regional level through agreed regional and subregional strategies and mechanisms for cooperation for disaster risk reduction, as appropriate, in the light of the present Framework, in order to foster more efficient planning, create common information systems and exchange good practices and programmes for cooperation and capacity development, in particular to address common and transboundary disaster risks;
  - (b) To foster collaboration across global and regional mechanisms and institutions for the implementation and coherence of instruments and tools relevant to disaster risk reduction, such as for climate change, biodiversity, sustainable development, poverty eradication, environment, agriculture, health, food and nutrition and others, as appropriate;
  - (c) To actively engage in the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, the regional and subregional platforms for disaster risk reduction and the thematic platforms in order to forge partnerships, periodically assess progress on implementation and share practice and knowledge on disaster risk-informed policies, programmes and investments, including on development and climate issues, as appropriate, as well as to promote the integration of disaster risk management in other relevant sectors. Regional

intergovernmental organizations should play an important role in the regional platforms for disaster risk reduction;
    - (d) To promote transboundary cooperation to enable policy and planning for the implementation of ecosystem-based approaches with regard to shared resources, such as within river basins and along coastlines, to build resilience and reduce disaster risk, including epidemic and displacement risk;
    - (e) To promote mutual learning and exchange of good practices and information through, inter alia, voluntary and self-initiated peer reviews among interested States;
    - (f) To promote the strengthening of, as appropriate, international voluntary mechanisms for monitoring and assessment of disaster risks, including relevant data and information, benefiting from the experience of the Hyogo Framework for Action Monitor. Such mechanisms may promote the exchange of non-sensitive information on disaster risks to the relevant national Government bodies and stakeholders in the interest of sustainable social and economic development
- Priority 3: Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience
    - National and local levels
        - (a) To allocate the necessary resources, including finance and logistics, as appropriate, at all levels of administration for the development and the implementation of disaster risk reduction strategies, policies, plans, laws and regulations in all relevant sectors;
        - (b) To promote mechanisms for disaster risk transfer and insurance, risk-sharing and retention and financial protection, as appropriate, for both public and private investment in order to reduce the financial impact of disasters on Governments and societies, in urban and rural areas;
        - (c) To strengthen, as appropriate, disaster-resilient public and private investments, particularly through structural, non-structural and functional disaster risk prevention and reduction measures in critical facilities, in particular schools and hospitals and physical infrastructures; building better from the start to withstand hazards through proper design and construction, including the use of the principles of universal design and the standardization of building materials; retrofitting and rebuilding; nurturing a culture of maintenance; and taking into account economic, social, structural, technological and environmental impact assessments;
        - (d) To protect or support the protection of cultural and collecting institutions and other sites of historical, cultural heritage and religious interest;
        - (e) To promote the disaster risk resilience of workplaces through structural and non-structural measures;
        - (f) To promote the mainstreaming of disaster risk assessments into land-use policy development and implementation, including urban planning, land degradation assessments and informal and non-permanent housing, and the use of guidelines and follow-up tools informed by anticipated demographic and environmental changes;
        - (g) To promote the mainstreaming of disaster risk assessment, mapping and management into rural development planning and management of, inter alia, mountains, rivers, coastal flood plain areas, drylands, wetlands and all other areas prone to droughts and flooding, including through the identification of areas that are safe for human settlement, and at the same time preserving ecosystem functions that help to reduce risks;
        - (h) To encourage the revision of existing or the development of new building codes and standards and rehabilitation and reconstruction practices at the national or local levels, as appropriate, with the aim of making them more applicable within the local context, particularly in informal and marginal human settlements, and reinforce the capacity to

implement, survey and enforce such codes through an appropriate approach, with a view to fostering disaster-resistant structures;

- (i) To enhance the resilience of national health systems, including by integrating disaster risk management into primary, secondary and tertiary health care, especially at the local level; developing the capacity of health workers in understanding disaster risk and applying and implementing disaster risk reduction approaches in health work; promoting and enhancing the training capacities in the field of disaster medicine; and supporting and training community health groups in disaster risk reduction approaches in health programmes, in collaboration with other sectors, as well as in the implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) of the World Health Organization;
- (j) To strengthen the design and implementation of inclusive policies and social safety-net mechanisms, including through community involvement, integrated with livelihood enhancement programmes, and access to basic health-care services, including maternal, newborn and child health, sexual and reproductive health, food security and nutrition, housing and education, towards the eradication of poverty, to find durable solutions in the post-disaster phase and to empower and assist people disproportionately affected by disasters;
- (k) People with life-threatening and chronic disease, due to their particular needs, should be included in the design of policies and plans to manage their risks before, during and after disasters, including having access to life-saving services;
- (l) To encourage the adoption of policies and programmes addressing disaster-induced human mobility to strengthen the resilience of affected people and that of host communities, in accordance with national laws and circumstances;
- (m) To promote, as appropriate, the integration of disaster risk reduction considerations and measures in financial and fiscal instruments;
- (n) To strengthen the sustainable use and management of ecosystems and implement integrated environmental and natural resource management approaches that incorporate disaster risk reduction;
- (o) To increase business resilience and protection of livelihoods and productive assets throughout the supply chains, ensure continuity of services and integrate disaster risk management into business models and practices;
- (p) To strengthen the protection of livelihoods and productive assets, including livestock, working animals, tools and seeds;
- (q) To promote and integrate disaster risk management approaches throughout the tourism industry, given the often heavy reliance on tourism as a key economic driver.

- Global and regional levels
  - (a) To promote coherence across systems, sectors and organizations related to sustainable development and to disaster risk reduction in their policies, plans, programmes and processes;
  - (b) To promote the development and strengthening of disaster risk transfer and sharing mechanisms and instruments in close cooperation with partners in the international community, business, international financial institutions and other relevant stakeholders;
  - (c) To promote cooperation between academic, scientific and research entities and networks and the private sector to develop new products and services to help to reduce disaster risk, in particular those that would assist developing countries and their specific challenges;

    - (d) To encourage the coordination between global and regional financial institutions with a view to assessing and anticipating the potential economic and social impacts of disasters;
    - (e) To enhance cooperation between health authorities and other relevant stakeholders to strengthen country capacity for disaster risk management for health, the implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) and the building of resilient health systems;
    - (f) To strengthen and promote collaboration and capacity-building for the protection of productive assets, including livestock, working animals, tools and seeds;
    - (g) To promote and support the development of social safety nets as disaster risk reduction measures linked to and integrated with livelihood enhancement programmes in order to ensure resilience to shocks at the household and community levels;
    - (h) To strengthen and broaden international efforts aimed at eradicating hunger and poverty through disaster risk reduction;
    - (i) To promote and support collaboration among relevant public and private stakeholders to enhance the resilience of business to disasters.
- Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to "Build Back Better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction
    - National and local levels
        - (a) To prepare or review and periodically update disaster preparedness and contingency policies, plans and programmes with the involvement of the relevant institutions, considering climate change scenarios and their impact on disaster risk, and facilitating, as appropriate, the participation of all sectors and relevant stakeholders;
        - (b) To invest in, develop, maintain and strengthen people-centred multi-hazard, multisectoral forecasting and early warning systems, disaster risk and emergency communications mechanisms, social technologies and hazard-monitoring telecommunications systems; develop such systems through a participatory process; tailor them to the needs of users, including social and cultural requirements, in particular gender; promote the application of simple and low-cost early warning equipment and facilities; and broaden release channels for natural disaster early warning information;
        - (c) To promote the resilience of new and existing critical infrastructure, including water, transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, educational facilities, hospitals and other health facilities, to ensure that they remain safe, effective and operational during and after disasters in order to provide live-saving and essential services;
        - (d) To establish community centres for the promotion of public awareness and the stockpiling of necessary materials to implement rescue and relief activities;
        - (e) To adopt public policies and actions that support the role of public service workers to establish or strengthen coordination and funding mechanisms and procedures for relief assistance and plan and prepare for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction;
        - (f) To train the existing workforce and voluntary workers in disaster response and strengthen technical and logistical capacities to ensure better response in emergencies;
        - (g) To ensure the continuity of operations and planning, including social and economic recovery, and the provision of basic services in the post-disaster phase;
        - (h) To promote regular disaster preparedness, response and recovery exercises, including evacuation drills, training and the establishment of area-based support systems, with a view to ensuring rapid and effective response to disasters and related displacement, including access to safe shelter, essential food and non-food relief supplies, as appropriate to local needs;

- (i) To promote the cooperation of diverse institutions, multiple authorities and related stakeholders at all levels, including affected communities and business, in view of the complex and costly nature of post-disaster reconstruction, under the coordination of national authorities;
- (j) To promote the incorporation of disaster risk management into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes, facilitate the link between relief, rehabilitation and development, use opportunities during the recovery phase to develop capacities that reduce disaster risk in the short, medium and long term, including through the development of measures such as land-use planning, structural standards improvement and the sharing of expertise, knowledge, post-disaster reviews and lessons learned and integrate post-disaster reconstruction into the economic and social sustainable development of affected areas. This should also apply to temporary settlements for persons displaced by disasters;
- (k) To develop guidance for preparedness for disaster reconstruction, such as on land-use planning and structural standards improvement, including by learning from the recovery and reconstruction programmes over the decade since the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action, and exchanging experiences, knowledge and lessons learned;
- (l) To consider the relocation of public facilities and infrastructures to areas outside the risk range, wherever possible, in the post-disaster reconstruction process, in consultation with the people concerned, as appropriate;
- (m) To strengthen the capacity of local authorities to evacuate persons living in disaster-prone areas;
- (n) To establish a mechanism of case registry and a database of mortality caused by disaster in order to improve the prevention of morbidity and mortality;
- (o) To enhance recovery schemes to provide psychosocial support and mental health services for all people in need;
- (p) To review and strengthen, as appropriate, national laws and procedures on international cooperation, based on the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance.

- Global and regional levels
  - (a) To develop and strengthen, as appropriate, coordinated regional approaches and operational mechanisms to prepare for and ensure rapid and effective disaster response in situations that exceed national coping capacities;
  - (b) To promote the further development and dissemination of instruments, such as standards, codes, operational guides and other guidance instruments, to support coordinated action in disaster preparedness and response and facilitate information sharing on lessons learned and best practices for policy practice and post-disaster reconstruction programmes;
  - (c) To promote the further development of and investment in effective, nationally compatible, regional multi-hazard early warning mechanisms, where relevant, in line with the Global Framework for Climate Services, and facilitate the sharing and exchange of information across all countries;
  - (d) To enhance international mechanisms, such as the International Recovery Platform, for the sharing of experience and learning among countries and all relevant stakeholders;
  - (e) To support, as appropriate, the efforts of relevant United Nations entities to strengthen and implement global mechanisms on hydrometeorological issues in order to raise awareness and improve understanding of water-related disaster risks and their

impact on society, and advance strategies for disaster risk reduction upon the request of States;

- (f) To support regional cooperation to deal with disaster preparedness, including through common exercises and drills;
- (g) To promote regional protocols to facilitate the sharing of response capacities and resources during and after disasters;
- (h) To train the existing workforce and volunteers in disaster response.

Chart of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

2015-2030

Scope and purpose

The present framework will apply to the risk of small-scale and large-scale, frequent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters, caused by natural or manmade hazards as well as related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks.
It aims to guide the multi-hazard management of disaster risk in development at all levels as well as within and across all sectors

Expected outcome

The substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries

Goal

Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience

Targets

Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower average per 100,000 global mortality between 2020-2030 compared to 2005-2015	Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower the average global figure per 100,000 between 2020-2030 compared to 2005-2015	Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030	Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030	Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020	Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of this framework by 2030	Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to people by 2030

Priorities for Action

There is a need for focused action within and across sectors by States at local, national, regional and global levels in the following four priority areas.

Priority 1
Understanding disaster risk

Disaster risk management needs to be based on an understanding of disaster risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and assets, hazard characteristics and the environment

Priority 2
Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk

Disaster risk governance at the national, regional and global levels is vital to the management of disaster risk reduction in all sectors and ensuring the coherence of national and local frameworks of laws, regulations and public policies that, by defining roles and responsibilities, guide, encourage and incentivize the public and private sectors to take action and address disaster risk

Priority 3
Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience

Public and private investment in disaster risk prevention and reduction through structural and non-structural measures are essential to enhance the economic, social, health and cultural resilience of persons, communities, countries and their assets, as well as the environment. These can be drivers of innovation, growth and job creation. Such measures are cost-effective and instrumental to save lives, prevent and reduce losses and ensure effective recovery and rehabilitation

Priority 4
Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to «Build Back Better» in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction

Experience indicates that disaster preparedness needs to be strengthened for more effective response and ensure capacities are in place for effective recovery. Disasters have also demonstrated that the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, which needs to be prepared ahead of the disaster, is an opportunity to «Build Back Better» through integrating disaster risk reduction measures. Women and persons with disabilities should publicly lead and promote gender-equitable and universally accessible approaches during the response and reconstruction phases

Guiding Principles

- Primary responsibility of States to prevent and reduce disaster risk, including through cooperation
- Shared responsibility between central Government and national authorities, sectors and stakeholders as appropriate to national circumstances
- Protection of persons and their assets while promoting and protecting all human rights including the right to development
- Engagement from all of society
- Full engagement of all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local levels
- Empowerment of local authorities and communities through resources, incentives and decision-making responsibilities as appropriate
- Decision-making to be inclusive and risk-informed while using a multi-hazard approach

- Coherence of disaster risk reduction and sustainable development policies, plans, practices and mechanisms, across different sectors
- Accounting of local and specific characteristics of disaster risks when determining measures to reduce risk
- Addressing underlying risk factors cost-effectively through investment versus relying primarily on post-disaster response and recovery
- «Build Back Better» for preventing the creation of, and reducing existing, disaster risk
- The quality of global partnership and international cooperation to be effective, meaningful and strong
- Support from developed countries and partners to developing countries to be tailored according to needs and priorities as identified by them

UN Plan of Action on Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Towards a Risk-informed and Integrated Approach to Sustainable Development*
- **Dates:** Published, January 2017.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting.
- **Aspirations:** short and medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (commitments:)
    - Strengthen system-wide coherence in support of the Sendai Framework and other agreements, through a risk-informed and integrated approach
    - Build UN system capacity to deliver coordinated, high-quality support to countries on disaster risk reduction
    - UN system and related organizations have intensified their capacity to support countries integrate disaster and climate resilience into national, sectoral and local development strategies and plans and / or to develop / update national and local strategies / plans for DRR as aligned with the Sendai Framework.
    - UN system, related organizations and UN Country Teams (UNCTs) have strengthened their ability to effectively support national and local communities in early warning, preparedness, response and recovery.
    - Disaster risk and climate information that is compliant with disaggregation requirements of the Sustainable Development Goals and the Sendai Framework, informs all complete or partial UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) and other UN Development Partnership Frameworks.
    - Disaster risk reduction remains a strategic priority for UN organizations.
    - UN organizations incorporate disaster risk reduction as part of their corporate policy and programming.
    - UN organizations allocate resources to increase the level of commitment to disaster risk reduction for resilience to support implementation of the Sendai Framework.
    - UN system and related organizations have an advocacy and communications strategy on risk-informed Sustainable Development towards a larger engagement of the stakeholders in their sectoral programmes.
    - UN system and related organizations prioritize technical assistance to countries in disaster risk reduction.

Climate Change

Paris Agreement

- **Convenors and/or authors**: UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

- **Type:** Framework/strategy (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **Dates:** Agreed, December 2015; entry into force, November 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Climate change.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**: (essential elements)
    - The Paris Agreement builds upon the Convention and for the first time brings all nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so. As such, it charts a new course in the global climate effort.
    - The Paris Agreement central aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Additionally, the agreement aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change. To reach these ambitious goals, appropriate financial flows, a new technology framework and an enhanced capacity building framework will be put in place, thus supporting action by developing countries and the most vulnerable countries, in line with their own national objectives. The Agreement also provides for enhanced transparency of action and support through a more robust transparency framework.
    - Nationally determined contributions
    - The Paris Agreement requires all Parties to put forward their best efforts through nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and to strengthen these efforts in the years ahead. This includes requirements that all Parties report regularly on their emissions and on their implementation efforts.
    - In 2018, Parties will take stock of the collective efforts in relation to progress towards the goal set in the Paris Agreement and to inform the preparation of NDCs.There will also be a global stocktake every 5 years to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and to inform further individual actions by Parties.
    - Status of ratification
    - The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, thirty days after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 % of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Depositary.

World Bank Group Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience

- **Convenors and/or authors:** World Bank.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN)
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience: Managing Risks for a more Resilient Future*
- **Dates:** Published, January 2019. In operation, 2021-2025.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Climate change; ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** short term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - Objective 1: Boost adaptation financing
    - Ramping Up World Bank Group Financing Commitments
      - Disaster risk management: Expand access to high-quality hydrometeorological data and early warning systems for an additional 250 million people in at least 30 developing countries, and support 100 agencies with improved meteorological, hydrological, and/or flood forecasting systems.
      - Water security: Support at least 100 river basins with climate-informed management plans and/or improved river basin management governance and provide at least 15 million people with improved flood and drought risk management infrastructure.
      - Coastal resilience: Support at least 20 countries to adopt measures to increase their resilience to climate-related shocks and stressors in coastal areas.
      - Human development: Support at least 20 climate hot-spot countries with human development engagements (education; health, nutrition, and population; social protection and jobs) to effectively implement climate-resilience strategies.
      - Financial protection: Support at least 20 countries in their efforts to respond early to and recover faster from climate and disaster shocks with additional financial protection instruments, and reduce climate-related risks through financial sector regulatory reforms.
      - Forests and integrated landscape management: Support interventions through an integrated landscape management approach for avoiding deforestation and promoting landscape restoration or sustainable forest management for 120 million hectares of forests in 50 countries.
    - Diversifying Adaptation Financing Instruments (such as:)
      - development policy finance (policy-based lending to support climate adaptation policy reforms);
      - performance-for-results loans (loans that provide incentives for cross-sectoral solutions by emphasizing results);
      - multi-phased programmatic approaches that support longer-term planning horizons; » regional adaptation projects that address transboundary issues;
      - resilience bonds (to directly raise capital for resilience investments);
      - market-based insurance products; and » contingent and other “insurance-type” financing options (such as Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Options and products to be delivered and scaled up by the new Global Risk Financing Facility).
    - Mobilizing Private Sector Finance
      - Working with countries to create an improved enabling environment for private sector engagement in adaptation;
      - Selecting countries in which investment-ready adaptation projects already exist and private co-financing may be feasible given appropriate project design changes.

- Objective 2: Drive a mainstreamed, whole-of-government programmatic approach
  - Providing Upstream Support to Ministries of Finance and Planning
    - The WBG will scale up upstream support to Ministries of Finance and Planning to better analyze and manage climate risks and opportunities, and their growth, poverty and fiscal implications. It will do so by adapting standard analytic processes, such as macroeconomic modeling, debt sustainability analysis, poverty diagnostics, public expenditure reviews, and public procurement guidelines, to encompass climate concerns. This will include demonstrating the economy-wide benefits of early climate change adaptation actions.
    - This will be a long-term effort, since the tools needed for such analysis are still under development. WBG staff will develop and roll out new models and tools, working increasingly with officials at central government agencies. Capacity-building efforts will be scaled-up commensurately. The climate change risks and opportunities identified by these models and analyses will be better reflected in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), SCDs, and CPFs
  - Ensuring Systematic Climate Risk Management across all Sectors
    - Developing the next generation of climate change risk assessment methodologies for high-risk sectors, including World Bank climate and disaster risk screening tools, to be applied in all investment operations. Tailored sectoral notes will guide countries on how to address identified risks, at the project level and systemically.
    - Helping practitioners identify project-level climate and disaster risks, access the best available climate knowledge to quantify climate risk vulnerability of investment/target populations, devise climate-related risk management options, and maximize climate adaptation co-benefits.
    - Helping to increase systematic risk monitoring and impact evaluation throughout project implementation. On the WBG side, climate risks will be explicitly identified where applicable in results frameworks, in order to deliver better project outcomes and support greater flexibility to redesign project components as needed in the face of changing climate conditions.
    - Delivering other high-quality, high-impact analytics on emerging climate policy and research topics, to better inform sector policies, investment design, and implementation.
  - Scaling up Support to Social Resilience, Focusing on the most Vulnerable Populations
    - Risks associated with climate change combine with and exacerbate other risks, such as food insecurity, economic shocks, and migration. The WBG is committed to supporting the poorest who are most vulnerable to climate change. It will do so by focusing on interventions that target vulnerable populations, such as social protection or slum upgrading, and by ensuring that their interests are considered in decision-making processes. One priority area will be to better understand and act on the potential impact of climate change in fragile, conflict and violence (FCV) situations. The work will be integrated in the World Bank's newly mandated Risk and Resilience Assessments and crisis response platform, which represent the WBG's broader commitment to support FCV states. The WBG is also committed to expanding the integration of social resilience, gender, and citizen engagement at all phases of climate adaptation planning and investment, including upstream analytics, policy reform, project design and implementation, and training.
  - Prioritizing Cross-Cutting Solutions to Catalyze Impacts on a Large Scale (the WBG will prioritize nexus solutions in six high-potential areas:)

- The integrated landscape management nexus brings together agriculture, forestry, environment, water, and transport to improve overall productivity and sustainability measured in economic and ecological terms. One particular relevant example of this approach is integrated coastal zone management, which brings together municipalities; zoning authorities; and ministries of the environment, tourism, transport, and public works to build coastal resilience to extreme events and sea-level rise.
- The food-health-energy-water nexus builds resilience of these interrelated systems. Health is an increasingly important component of this nexus, playing a critical cross-cutting role, for instance, in understanding how water and air pollution affect health or how dietary choices affect agricultural and water practices.
- The "resilient cities" urban-water-energy nexus brings together municipalities, water utility companies, energy companies, and various line ministries to achieve greater urban climate resilience by enhancing urban service delivery, water supply quality, drainage and reuse, and emissions reduction. The World Bank Cities Resilience Program helps cities develop their financial and technical capacity to prepare for, mitigate, or prevent climate change–related disasters.
- "Triple-win" approaches seek to capture benefits from development, emissions reduction, and enhanced resilience. One example is the growing need for cooling. As extreme heatwaves become more frequent, widespread installation of fossil-fueled air conditioning will exacerbate global warming. Alternative solutions, such as installation of green roofs and street trees, reduce energy demand for air conditioning, provide green space for recreation, and help meet mitigation targets. Other examples are afforestation and climate-smart agriculture.
- Nature-based solutions (also called ecosystem-based adaptation) can deliver multiple resilience, economic, and ecological co-benefits and are often more flexible and cost-effective than traditional "hard" engineering options. WBG investments demonstrate that nature-based solutions—such as wetlands, mangroves, and coral reefs—can effectively and economically reduce risk while creating income-generating co-benefits in tourism, fishing, and housing. Although mostly local in scale, nature-based solutions often face the complexity of working across multiple levels of governance and even across borders.
- Hydromet and climate services bring together national meteorological and hydrological agencies, disaster managers, and end-users across all sectors to deliver actionable, timely, and usable climate and weather information to inform decision making.

- Objective 3: Develop a new rating system [trimmed]
  - In July 2015, the multilateral development banks agreed on a methodology to capture the volume and distribution of the incremental costs for addressing climate change vulnerabilities through projects financed by them. The resulting "Common Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Finance Tracking" has been used since then to "track finance for activities that address current and expected effects of climate change." As financing by multilateral development banks is fundamentally in support of development objectives, climate change benefits are considered complementary to development benefits and are therefore called climate change co-benefits… Although this methodology has helped provide comparable numbers across institutions, it has limitations… In response to these concerns, the WBG will develop and introduce new resilience metrics or an adaptation rating system. This system will be designed to create incentives for countries, donors, and the private sector to engage in more and better adaptation; to more effectively report on what the WBG and clients are doing; and to establish a global standard for financial markets

and public procurement. The new metrics will be developed by building on past methodological work and case studies and will complement the co-benefits methodology currently used. A key objective of the new system is to encourage countries and donors to go beyond climate-resilient projects to building systemic resilience. Projects will be rated along two dimensions of resilience: the resilience of the specific project to climate risks and the extent to which the project builds adaptive capacity and strengthens in-country climate resilience. The second dimension is important because it promotes development projects that improve resilience more broadly than simply ensuring that the individual investment is resilient. This rating methodology could be used to help countries identify priority climate resilience building actions and promote external financial flows for priority investments. Private sector investors are likely to be more interested in investments with strong ratings, particularly if they generate private benefits.

World Bank Group Climate Change Action Plan 2016-2020

- **Convenors and/or authors:** World Bank.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document.
- **Dates:** Published, 2016; in operation, 2016-20.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Climate change; ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** short term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (summary objectives only)
  - Support Transformational Policies and Institutions
    - The WBG will support countries in translating their NDCs into climate policies and investment plans into actions, and in mainstreaming climate considerations into policies and budgets, through advisory services, public expenditure reviews, and development policy operations. The objective is to help client countries strengthen their resilience and adaptive capacity, and deliver affordable and efficient services (especially energy) in a low-carbon manner and in a way that is consistent with their NDCs and global climate commitments. The WBG will work to ensure that the vulnerable are protected and will help build country capacity in this regard.
    - The WBG will scale up country-level support and global advocacy work to "get prices right", by helping clients to reform fossil fuel subsidies, put a price on carbon, deepen market-based instruments, and reform other distorting subsidies. Carbon pricing work will be extended to widen, deepen, and connect markets.
  - Leverage Resources
    - The IFC will crowd in private sector finance by significantly scaling up its own investments—from $2.3 billion to about $3.5 billion in five years. By 2020, it will mobilize at least $13 billion per year in external private sector investments through its operations.
    - To "green" the financial sector, the WBG will work with regulators, create green banking champions, provide climate credit lines, and promote continued growth and development of the green bond market.
    - The WBG will scale up financial leverage in operations for resilience and mitigation through improving the preparation, structuring, and aggregation of projects; de-risking private investments; and scaling up support for a climate-smart focus in project preparation facilities. Cross-WBG "deal teams" will focus on delivering bankable/investable projects, including through the use of blended concessional finance, for high-impact sectors—such as energy infrastructure, rooftop solar, distributed energy service companies, and resilient urban infrastructure.
    - The International Development Association (IDA) has a strong record of supporting climate change activities, and the WBG has a strong record of using blended non-IDA concessional finance, but existing funding is limited. There is an ongoing need for concessional finance, IDA and non-IDA, to accelerate the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy, build climate resilience, and meet climate targets. The WBG is counting on a strong IDA18 replenishment and significant non-IDA concessional financial support to meet the targets in this Action Plan. In the coming months, the WBG will develop an integrated approach to the mobilization and management of these different sources of funding in the context of the Forward Look initiative.
    - The WBG will focus on enhancing the effectiveness of, and helping countries gain access to, concessional climate finance. Concessional climate finance will be concentrated on the incremental cost of climate action, to redirect investment flows and maximize impact. The

WBG will work to ensure that policy options, institutional practices, and reforms are deployed to minimize the required level of concessional finance.

- Scale Up Climate Action – By 2020, the WBG will have significantly scaled up its activities with climate co-benefits in multiple sectors and increased its impact in countries through direct investments, advisory services, and the shaping of new and innovative solutions. In particular, the WBG will deepen and scale up its action in six high-impact areas, with indicative targets that represent current expectations of future demand. Achievement of these targets will be dependent as always on client demand; these targets are not commitments and will be adjusted over time. The six areas are described in the following.
    - Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency: The World Bank will use multiple instruments to de-risk renewable energy investments, with a cumulative target of adding 20 gigawatts (GW) in renewable energy generation over five years, that is, a doubling of current World Bank additions. The World Bank will "green" grids with the aim to enable the addition of 10 GW of variable renewable energy over the same period, and ensure that all energy investments are adapted to climate change. The IFC and MIGA will support grid-connected clean energy by focusing on large hydropower, wind, and solar, continuing to open new markets with "first-of" investments, and helping industrial and commercial clients expand the use of low-carbon captive power. The WBG will increase its share of energy efficiency operations and aim to invest $1 billion to promote energy efficiency and resilient building in urban areas. The World Bank will aim to mobilize $25 billion in commercial funding for clean energy over the next five years.
    - Sustainable Mobility: The WBG will help countries develop sustainable mobility alternatives and implement transport adaptation options. It will increase the share of its transport portfolio that contributes to climate mitigation and resilience. It will pursue urban mobility and low-carbon, multimodal transport operations in all regions and aim for $2 billion in lending for adaptation in the transport sector over fiscal year (FY) 16–FY20 (four times the level in the previous five-year period), with a strong focus on enhancing the resilience of the road portfolio. The WBG will also focus on improving the competitiveness and fuel efficiency of the trucking sectors, promote green freight, and lead a global coalition to develop a framework for sustainable mobility.
    - Sustainable and Resilient Cities: The WBG will further integrate climate into urban planning, by developing tools and knowledge products through the Global Platform for Sustainable Cities, and aim to roll these out in at least 30 cities by 2020. It will develop and aims to pilot in 15 cities by 2020 a city-based resilience approach that integrates infrastructure development, land use planning, disaster risk management, institutions/governance, social components, and infrastructure investment. It will incorporate principles of integrated urban water management in its urban operations. By 2020, transit-oriented development solution packages will be piloted in at least five cities. The IFC and MIGA will increase investments in municipal transport.
    - Climate-Smart Land Use, Water, and Food Security: Climate-smart agriculture profiles and investment plans will be developed by 2020 for at least 40 countries, and climate-smart agriculture programs will be delivered at scale, with a focus on hybrid seeds and carbon capture practices, high-efficiency/low-energy-use irrigation programs, livestock productivity, energy solutions for agribusiness, and mainstreaming of risk management. Under the Forest Action Plan, the WBG aims to support Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, Conservation of Forest Stocks, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks (REDD+) strategies in more than 50 countries, and develop/implement in 10 countries a large-scale, multisector program promoting "forest-smart" development and mobilizing International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/IDA/REDD+ financing. The WBG will work with its partners to improve the effectiveness of the various forest climate funds. The WBG will develop a series of area-based operations in climate-sensitive locations, using ecosystem-based adaptation, land restoration, integrated water management, and biodiversity conservation, to maximize the development benefits and the use of carbon sinks. It will implement large-scale national and transboundary programs to promote water efficiency across sectors, and improved water management. Analytical work will be further developed on the energy-water-food nexus.

- Green Competitiveness: By 2020, the WBG aims to have assisted 20 countries in enhancing their capacity to innovate in climate sectors and increase industrial competitiveness in response to climate change, including through greening global value chains and trade practices, developing eco-industrial zones, and introducing best practices for standards and labeling. The IFC will intensify its work with entrepreneurs, through incubators and private equity investments, to increase impact and grow the market in climate-smart innovation.
- Leaving No One Behind: By 2020, the WBG will aim to (i) help bring access to high-quality hydrometeorological data and early warning systems to another 100 million people in 15 developing countries; (ii) help bring adaptive social protection to an additional 50 million people; and (iii) provide five more countries coverage with integrated sovereign disaster risk financing instruments, including insurance, risk pools, and contingent finance. The Small Island States Resilience Initiative will build capacity, better use the existing fragmented funds, and mobilize increased financing for small island states. The WBG will produce a flagship report on climate change and migration/conflict. The WBG will also strengthen action on climate and health, increase its capacity to respond to the 32 IBRD and 40 IDA-eligible countries that have included health in their NDCs, and integrate climate considerations within its support for universal health care.

- Align Internal Processes and Work with Others
  - With selected partners, the WBG will create, share, pilot, and implement new and innovative solution packages that answer client countries' demands, especially those linked to their NDCs, and continue contributing to the global debate on climate and development. The WBG's internal capacity to respond will also increase. WBG country strategies will take into account climate goals and opportunities, and climate risks. The World Bank will screen all projects for climate risks and account for the social cost of carbon emissions in project evaluations; the WBG will move toward accounting for climate and carbon risks in its operations. In addition, the impact of WBG operations on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will be calculated and reported.
  - The WBG will work with others to benefit from what they do best, and ensure synergies across actors active in the field. The WBG will continue to strengthen alignment and cooperation with multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilaterals on strategies and work programs; work on mainstreaming principles and reporting with MDBs and the international development finance agencies; strengthen collaboration with leading think tanks, research groups, nongovernmental organizations, and business alliance groups, including on coordinated analytical work and country support; and build on work already started to increase collaboration with the International Monetary Fund on fossil fuel subsidies, carbon pricing, and the fiscal implications of climate change, especially for small island states.
  - Global advocacy will be stepped up on selected issues where the WBG has an established voice—carbon pricing, mainstreaming climate action, and protecting the poor and vulnerable—with a focus on "how" to deliver rather than "why."

- The WBG will align internal processes, metrics, and incentives to support the implementation of the Action Plan. Systematic Country Diagnostics and Country Partnership Frameworks will consider the risks and opportunities created by climate change and countries' climate priorities. Risk screening will be extended to IBRD operations in early 2017, after a review of existing tools and the lessons drawn from application to IDA countries, and will integrate gender considerations into the screening tools. The IFC will start screening some sectors after having tested and validated its climate impact risk screening tool; this is expected to be done by September 2016 and to lay the basis for the IFC's path forward. The WBG will continue to roll out GHG accounting and account for carbon emissions, and resulting risk, in its project evaluations. The World Bank will account for the social cost of carbon emissions in its project evaluations, and the IFC will evaluate such an approach later this year.
- Over the next 18 months, the WBG will continue to develop and mainstream metrics and indicators to measure the outcomes of WBG operations, and move monitoring and evaluation from inputs to outcomes, to incentivize a greater focus on leverage.
- Easily accessible, consolidated "one-stop-shop" data will be made available to all staff on climate impacts, NDCs, climate finance, analytic tools, and methodologies. Learning modules on climate will be expanded and mainstreamed into the World Bank's core curriculum, and support to the community of practice of climate change practitioners across the World Bank will be strengthened.
- The WBG organization is now aligned to deliver on this Action Plan. All WBG units have put in place structures to mainstream climate change into their activities and operations. The IFC has developed a Climate Business Network that includes one climate anchor from each industry department and from each region, advisory, and operational unit. The Climate Change CCSA works with all WBG units to provide targeted, cross-cutting climate support.

African Union Strategy on Climate Change

- **Convenors and/or authors:** African Union.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document.
- **Dates:** Published, May 2014.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Climate change; ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** short, medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** N/A (see throughout document).

European Union Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change

- **Convenors and/or authors:** EU.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document.
- **Dates:** Adopted, April 2013.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Climate change; ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (actions:)
    - Encourage all Member States to adopt comprehensive adaptation strategies
    - As part of the Adaptation Strategy package the Commission has provided guidelines to help Member States formulate adaptation strategies.
    - The Commission will develop an 'adaptation preparedness scoreboard', identifying key indicators for measuring Member States' level of readiness.
    - In 2017, the Commission will assess whether action being taken in the Member States is sufficient. If it deems progress insufficient, the Commission will consider proposing a legally binding instrument.
    - Provide LIFE funding to support capacity building and step up adaptation action in Europe (2014-2020)
    - A climate-action sub-programme will be created under the 2014-2020 LIFE funding programme for the environment. This will substantially increase the LIFE funds available to combat climate change.
    - Priority vulnerable areas have been identified to steer discussions with Member States on the 2014-2020 LIFE work programme.
    - Introduce adaptation in the Covenant of Mayors framework (2013/2014)
    - The Commission, will support adaptation in cities. It will do this in particular by launching an initiative, based on the model of the Covenant of Mayors, through which local authorities can make a voluntary commitment to adopt local adaptation strategies and awareness-raising activities.
    - Bridge the knowledge gap
    - The Commission will work further with Member States and stakeholders to identify adaptation knowledge gaps and the relevant tools and methodologies to address them. The findings will be fed into the programming of Horizon 2020, the EU's 2014-2020 framework programme for research and innovation, and will address the need for better interfaces between science, policy making and business.
    - The Commission will promote EU-wide vulnerability assessments, taking into account, inter alia, the cross-sectoral EU overview of natural and manmade risks that it will produce in 2013. It will in particular support the Joint Research Centre in its work on estimating the implications of climate change and undertake a comprehensive review of what global climate change will mean for the EU.
    - Further develop Climate-ADAPT as the 'one-stop shop' for adaptation information in Europe
    - The Commission and the European Environment Agency will improve access to information and develop interaction between Climate-ADAPT and other relevant platforms, including national and local adaptation portals (2013/2014).
    - Special attention will be given to cost-benefit assessments of different policy experiences and to innovative funding, through closer interaction with regional and local authorities and financial institutions.

- Work on the inclusion of the future Copernicus climate services (previously known as GMES – Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) will start in 2014.
- Facilitate the climate-proofing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Cohesion Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
- As part of the Adaptation Strategy package the Commission has provided guidance on how to further integrate adaptation into the CAP, the Cohesion Policy and the CFP. This guidance aims to help managing authorities and other stakeholders involved in programme design, development and implementation during the 2014-2020 budget period.
- Member States and regions can also use funding under the 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy and CAP to address knowledge gaps, to invest in the necessary analyses, risk assessments and tools, and to build up capacities for adaptation.
- Ensuring more resilient infrastructure
- In 2013 the Commission will launch a mandate for European standardisation organisations to start mapping industry-relevant standards in the area of energy, transport and buildings and to identify standards that need to be revised to achieve better inclusion of adaptation considerations.
- The Adaptation Strategy package provides guidelines to help project developers working on infrastructure and physical assets to climate-proof vulnerable investments.
- Drawing on the results of its Communication on Green Infrastructure, adopted in May 2013, the Commission will explore the need to provide additional guidance for authorities and decision makers, civil society, private business and conservation practitioners to ensure the full mobilisation of ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation. This will be done by the end of 2013.
- Promote insurance and other financial products for resilient investment and business decisions
- The Green Paper on the insurance of natural and man-made disasters, adopted as part of the Adaptation Strategy package, is a first step towards encouraging insurers to improve the way they help to manage climate change risks. A report on the results of the public consultation associated with the Green Paper will be published in the second half of 2013.
- The Commission's aim is to improve the market penetration of natural disaster insurance and to unleash the full potential of insurance pricing and other financial products for risk-awareness prevention and mitigation and for long-term resilience in investment and business decisions (2014-2015). A process has been launched to increase involvement of the insurance and financial sector. The results of this exercise will be disseminated via Climate-ADAPT in particular.

Ecosystem collapse

Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi Targets

- **Convenors and/or authors**: UNEP.
- **Type:** Framework/strategy (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **Dates:** Adopted October 2010.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**: (goals and targets:)
    - A. Address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss by mainstreaming biodiversity across government and society
    - By 2020, at the latest, people are aware of the values of biodiversity and the steps they can take to conserve and use it sustainably.
    - By 2020, at the latest, biodiversity values have been integrated into national and local development and poverty reduction strategies and planning processes and are being incorporated into national accounting, as appropriate, and reporting systems.
    - By 2020, at the latest, incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity are eliminated, phased out or reformed in order to minimize or avoid negative impacts, and positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity are developed and applied, consistent and in harmony with the Convention and other relevant international obligations, taking into account national socio-economic conditions.
    - By 2020, at the latest, Governments, business and stakeholders at all levels have taken steps to achieve or have implemented plans for sustainable production and consumption and have kept the impacts of use of natural resources well within safe ecological limits.
    - B. Reduce the direct pressures on biodiversity and promote sustainable use
    - By 2020, the rate of loss of all natural habitats, including forests, is at least halved and where feasible brought close to zero, and degradation and fragmentation is significantly reduced.
    - By 2020 all fish and invertebrate stocks and aquatic plants are managed and harvested sustainably, legally and applying ecosystem based approaches, so that overfishing is avoided, recovery plans and measures are in place for all depleted species, fisheries have no significant adverse impacts on threatened species and vulnerable ecosystems and the impacts of fisheries on stocks, species and ecosystems are within safe ecological limits.
    - By 2020 areas under agriculture, aquaculture and forestry are managed sustainably, ensuring conservation of biodiversity.
    - By 2020, pollution, including from excess nutrients, has been brought to levels that are not detrimental to ecosystem function and biodiversity.
    - By 2020, invasive alien species and pathways are identified and prioritized, priority species are controlled or eradicated, and measures are in place to manage pathways to prevent their introduction and establishment.
    - By 2015, the multiple anthropogenic pressures on coral reefs, and other vulnerable ecosystems impacted by climate change or ocean acidification are minimized, so as to maintain their integrity and functioning.
    - C. Improve the status of biodiversity by safeguarding ecosystems, species and genetic diversity
    - By 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water areas, and 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively and equitably managed, ecologically

representative and well connected systems of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscapes and seascapes.

- By 2020 the extinction of known threatened species has been prevented and their conservation status, particularly of those most in decline, has been improved and sustained.
- By 2020, the genetic diversity of cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and of wild relatives, including other socio-economically as well as culturally valuable species, is maintained, and strategies have been developed and implemented for minimizing genetic erosion and safeguarding their genetic diversity.
- D. Enhance the benefits to all from biodiversity and ecosystem services
- By 2020, ecosystems that provide essential services, including services related to water, and contribute to health, livelihoods and well-being, are restored and safeguarded, taking into account the needs of women, indigenous and local communities, and the poor and vulnerable.
- By 2020, ecosystem resilience and the contribution of biodiversity to carbon stocks has been enhanced, through conservation and restoration, including restoration of at least 15 per cent of degraded ecosystems, thereby contributing to climate change mitigation and adaptation and to combating desertification.
- By 2015, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization is in force and operational, consistent with national legislation.
- E. Enhance implementation through participatory planning, knowledge management and capacity building
- By 2015 each Party has developed, adopted as a policy instrument, and has commenced implementing an effective, participatory and updated national biodiversity strategy and action plan.
- By 2020, the traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and their customary use of biological resources, are respected, subject to national legislation and relevant international obligations, and fully integrated and reflected in the implementation of the Convention with the full and effective participation of indigenous and local communities, at all relevant levels.
- By 2020, knowledge, the science base and technologies relating to biodiversity, its values, functioning, status and trends, and the consequences of its loss, are improved, widely shared and transferred, and applied.
- By 2020, at the latest, the mobilization of financial resources for effectively implementing the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 from all sources, and in accordance with the consolidated and agreed process in the Strategy for Resource Mobilization, should increase substantially from the current levels. This target will be subject to changes contingent to resource needs assessments to be developed and reported by Parties.

Global Chemicals Outlook II

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UNEP.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Synthesis Report; Summary for Policymakers; full report TBD.
- **Dates:** Synthesis Report and Summary for Policymakers published March 2019; full report to be published April 2019.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium.
- **Theory of Change:** N/a.
- **Recommendations:** (summary of key findings only)
  - The size of the global chemical industry exceeded United States dollars 5 trillion in 2017. It is projected to double by 2030. Consumption and production are rapidly increasing in emerging economies. Global supply chains, and the trade of chemicals and products, are becoming increasingly complex.
  - Driven by global megatrends, growth in chemical-intensive industry sectors (e.g. construction, agriculture, electronics) creates risks, but also opportunities to advance sustainable consumption, production and product innovation.
  - Hazardous chemicals and other pollutants (e.g. plastic waste and pharmaceutical pollutants) continue to be released in large quantities. They are ubiquitous in humans and the environment and are accumulating in material stocks and products, highlighting the need to avoid future legacies through sustainable materials management and circular business models.
  - The benefits of action to minimize adverse impacts have been estimated in the high tens of billions of United States dollars annually. The World Health Organization estimated the burden of disease from selected chemicals at 1.6 million lives in 2016 (this is likely to be an underestimate). Chemical pollution also threatens a range of ecosystem services.
  - International treaties and voluntary instruments have reduced the risks of some chemicals and wastes, but progress has been uneven and implementation gaps remain. As of 2018, more than 120 countries had not implemented the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals.
  - Addressing legislation and capacity gaps in developing countries and emerging economies remains a priority. Also, resources have not matched needs. There are opportunities for new and innovative financing (e.g. through cost recovery and engagement of the financial sector).
  - Significant resources can be saved by sharing knowledge on chemical management instruments more widely, and by enhancing mutual acceptance of approaches in areas ranging from chemical hazard assessment to alternatives assessment.
  - Frontrunner companies – from chemical producers to retailers – are introducing sustainable supply chain management, full material disclosure, risk reduction beyond compliance, and human rights-based policies. However, widespread implementation of these initiatives has not yet been achieved.
  - Consumer demand as well as green and sustainable chemistry education and innovation (e.g. though start-ups) are among the important drivers of change. They can be scaled up through enabling policies, reaping the potential benefits of chemistry innovations for sustainable development.
  - Global knowledge gaps can be filled. This can be achieved, for example, by taking steps to harmonize research protocols, considering health or environmental impact information and harm caused to set priorities, and strengthening the science-policy interface through enhanced collaboration of scientists and decision-makers.

UN Secretary-General's Plan for Water Action Decade 2018-2020

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** framework/strategy (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **Dates:** launched March 2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** sustainable ecosystems.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**:
    - Facilitating access to knowledge and the exchange of good practices:
    - Host Decade campaign website as a platform to learn about the Decade and related topics, get engaged and promote Decade activities, including space for Member State activities.
    - Improve access to knowledge for Member States and other relevant actors through coordinated policy support, capacity building and improved access to reliable water data to effectively model and plan for the future.
    - Improve international scientific cooperation in fresh and marine water research, resources management, education and capacity-building through enhanced access to knowledge.
    - "Promote and enable the exchange of good practices and environmentally sound technology transfer between all stakeholders.
    - Improving knowledge generation and dissemination, including new information relevant to water-related SDGs:
    - Develop guidelines, financing mechanisms, policy advice, and integrated monitoring of progress in support of Member State implementation of water-related Sustainable Development Goals.
    - Conduct water research projects aiming to advance sustainable development.
    - Pursuing advocacy, networking and promoting partnerships and action:
    - Pursue advocacy campaigns in cooperation with public and private stakeholders and Major Groups including establishing thematic years in line with other water-related observances.
    - Promote partnership and action through multi-stakeholder platforms, agreements and partnerships.
    - Disseminate and put into effect recommendations made by eminent bodies, such as the High-Level Panel on Water, pertaining to the implementation of water-related Goals to the extent possible.
    - Strengthening communication actions for implementation of the water-related Goals:
    - Organise regular dialogues, conferences and meetings to facilitate implementation of the water-related Goals
    - Produce communication material and reports related to implementation of the water-related Goals

United Nations Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** framework/strategy (UN).
- **Output(s)**: Single document.
- **Dates:** report published, November 2015. Board established, 2004.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** ecosystem collapse; global health/pandemics.
- **Aspirations:** medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:**
    - Promote a global approach to water – While many water impacts are found at local and regional levels, climate change and the globalized economy make the strong global dimension of water increasingly evident. Globalizing forces, such as virtual water flows, increasing water scarcity, water pollution and ecological degradation, intensifying water-related disasters and persisting and emerging public health threats from the WASH crisis, which remains unresolved in many parts of the world, need to be more systematically addressed from a global perspective. is will call for greater awareness about water on the part of politicians and in the climate community, promoting action on water within national and global climate change policies. Businesses, and national and local governments have to translate their growing awareness about water risks into comprehensive strategies for action.
    - Make better use of existing international legal instruments within the water sector – Leverage the UN and UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) Water Conventions and use the Ramsar Convention as a bridge to Multilateral Environmental Agreements and between development and environment. Use the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation as a compass for the management of water services.
    - Tackle the growing urban water and sanitation crisis – With ever more people living in cities, there is a need to better document and address the many water-related challenges in and around cities. To start with, it is important that the data reported by the UN at global level more accurately reflects water-related urban trends. This is particularly true for access to drinking-water and sanitation, where the global regression seen today in urban areas is not currently being explicitly reported. In addition, it will be necessary to better establish the water sustainability risks associated with urbanization, to create awareness about them, and to take relevant action, including mitigating water-related pressures from growing urban areas on the peri-urban and rural environment. UN-Habitat should take up these challenges in its priorities for action, also with a view to the Habitat III Conference.
    - Involve the private sector more strongly in dealing with growing water-related risks – To make the 2030 water vision a reality, effective engagement with the private sector, both as an enabling partner and as a key player that needs to be held accountable, is indispensable. e key challenge of mobilizing the private sector lies at the local and national levels. Innovative approaches, such as the water stewardship concept, have to be further developed here, while also involving non-classical water stakeholders. The Global Compact and specifically its water component, the CEO Water Mandate, should support this. Governments should consider leveraging the water footprint concept by making water-use reporting mandatory for listed companies and large cities.
    - Governments must take proactive and preventive action on growing water-related risks – Governments still lagging behind must fast-track institutional reforms for better management and enhanced accountability. They must boost funding and strengthen capacities, especially in water-related statistics and administrative monitoring.

Extraordinary measures need to be considered, such as the creation of well-embedded water units within ministries of finance, in order to strengthen water financing at national and local levels, asking for water impact plans for investments to help promote funding for wastewater, and fostering inclusive multi-stakeholder partnerships to support implementation and ensure follow-up and review also from outside the government.

- The UN must adapt in order to better support Member States in addressing water-related risks – Considering that a lot of UN organizations deal with water but only as a marginal issue, nothing less than a full-scale water-cultural revolution within the UN is needed. Relevant UN organizations need to allocate (more) core funding to water and need to review their policies. It is, for example, high time that WHO endorsed water, sanitation and hygiene as primary prevention. Water-related data management within the UN needs to be improved and the respective role of UN-Water strengthened in order to address persistent and serious data inconsistencies in water-related UN communications. Efforts should be made to cooperate more closely with the OECD regarding its work on the economic, financial and governance aspects of water.
- Form high-level alliances to tackle priority water-related challenges that are ripe for action: -
- Document and take action on the world's 20 water scarcity hotspots in both North and South
- Convene a Heads of State Panel on Water for global advocacy around water resilience and adaptation
- Document and take action to reduce disaster risks and to invest in resiliency in high risk urban delta areas - Promote and scale-up toilets in schools
- De-taboo and take action on menstrual hygiene management
- Raise public awareness and take action towards sustainable management of groundwater
- Prioritize water management in post-conflict and fragile contexts, contributing to combating causes for migration and flight
- Anchor water and sanitation as a core concern in sustainable urban development
- Establish a UN Intergovernmental Committee on Water and Sanitation – Formed after appropriate consultation among UN Member States and before the first thematic review of water by the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, the Committee enables countries to discuss all freshwater and sanitation challenges regularly, to review progress towards water-related SDG targets, to guide UN actions and to make further political decisions on these matters. This Committee should work in close interaction with a structured representation of major stakeholders.
- Form a UN Scientific and Practice Panel on Water and Sanitation Mandated to gather global evidence on major challenges, water uses, their mutual impact, and water management, and to stimulate external research to close knowledge gaps, this global independent panel of scientists and practitioners regularly provides balanced, fact-based, transparent and comprehensive information, enabling Member States and the UN to make the right decisions on water and sanitation.
- Strengthen UN-Water – As the coordinating structure of UN actions on water and sanitation, UN-Water serves as the Secretariat and support entity for both the UN Intergovernmental Committee on Water and Sanitation (see Recommendation 1) and the UN Scientific and Practice Panel on Water and Sanitation (see Recommendation 2).
- Set up a comprehensive and independently reviewed global monitoring framework – Governments support UN-Water efforts to set up all the global monitoring mechanisms that are necessary to review progress on the water-related SDG targets and ensure that these mechanisms are independently reviewed on a regular basis.

- Make sure there is an independent voice – Governments and the UN system benefit from independent advice on water-related challenges, through an appropriate mechanism to be set up by the UN Secretary-General no later than 2017.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

- **Convenors and/or authors**: UNODA.

- **Type:** Framework/strategy (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **Dates:** Agreed, July 1968; entry into force, March 1970.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** WMDs.
- **Aspirations:** long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**: (articles:)
    - Article I
    - Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
    - Article II
    - Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
    - Article III
    - Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
    - Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
    - The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

- Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations
- Article IV
- Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
- All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
- Article V
- Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
- Article VI
- Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
- Article VII
- Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
- Article VIII
- Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
- Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of

Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

- Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
- Article IX
- This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.
- This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
- This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.
- For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
- The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
- This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Article X
- Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests
- Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
- Article XI

- This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

New Technologies

UN Secretary-General's Strategy on New Technologies

- **Type:** Framework/strategy (UN).
- **Dates:** report published, September 2018.
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** New technologies/access to technology.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
    - Principles
    - Protect and promote global values: UN engagement with new technologies and the policy issues they raise will be anchored in the values and obligations defined by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals. At the heart of these standards are values such as equality and equity. These should be our guiding principles in everything we do involving new technologies.
    - Foster inclusion and transparency: Our engagement must ensure that United Nations remains a trusted venue for governments, industry, academia, civil society and others to come together and make collective choices about new technologies in an open, transparent way, and based on shared values. We must become more open to new ideas and new voices, which challenge our institutional reflexes for business as usual and allow the UN to credibly engage with partners. This will include a significant role for youth, who have a unique interest in these choices, building on the work of the UN Youth Envoy.
    - Work in partnership: Effective engagement on new technologies clearly requires close partnership with a range of government, industry, academic and civil society partners. This is especially true for new technologies as the private sector is driving much of the progress.
    - Build on existing capabilities and mandates: Engagement with new technologies should be seen as a necessary component of successful mandate implementation—not a new mandate. To do this, we must add to and reinforce the significant efforts currently underway across the system alongside ongoing reform efforts.
    - Be humble and continue to learn: For many in industry, some in civil society and some governments, the UN is not an obvious interlocutor on emerging technologies. As we step up our collective engagement and even as we must remind all actors of their shared commitments and obligations, we must be prepared to acknowledge what we do not know everything in this complex field, and to incentivize an innovative culture in which both successes and failures from exposure to new technologies are a source of learning and a guide to our contribution to policy dialogues. For that reason, as I explain further in the final section, this strategy will remain a living document, and will evolve over time as we learn about how we can best engage with technology and support Member States' technological transformations.
    - Commitments (headline commitments only)
    - Deeping the UN's internal capacities and exposure to new technologies
    - Increasing understanding, advocacy and dialogue
    - Supporting dialogue on normative and cooperation frameworks
    - Enhancing UN System support to government capacity development

EU Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence

- **Convenors and/or authors:** EU.
- **Type:** framework/strategy (non-UN)
- **Output(s)**: Single document.
- **Dates:** strategy released, December 2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** new technologies/access to technology; global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:** (trimmed in some categories)
    - Strategic actions and coordination
    - By mid-2019 all Member States are encouraged to put in place - and share with other Member States and the Commission - national AI strategies or programmes or add AI dimensions in other relevant strategies and programmes20 outlining investment levels and implementation measures, taking into account this coordinated plan. The exact form, contents and governance of the national AI strategies will be up to each Member State to decide based on national characteristics.
    - Discussions between Member States and the Commission will be steered by the Member States' Group on Digitising European Industry and Artificial Intelligence (MS Group on DEI and AI), assisted on technical matters by a Sherpa Group22. The group will meet at least biannually. It will ensure coordination across different national Ministries and other stakeholders, for example from industry, academia and civil society. Dedicated Member States' groups23 will provide the necessary input in the different areas covered by the plan. The Member States and the Commission will also organise topical workshops.
    - To assess impacts, in 2019 Member States and the Commission will identify relevant investment parameters and comparable benchmarks for uptake so as to achieve common targets. Progress will be monitored annually.
    - Maximising investments through partnerships
    - In 2019, the Commission will bring together the stakeholders initially including the robotics and big data PPPs but later expanding to other involved parties, in order to develop a common strategic research and innovation agenda for AI, to be supported starting in 2020. For that, it will set up a Leaders' Group representing the stakeholders at CEO level from industry and research institutes to develop the agenda and ensure commitment at the highest level in its implementation, paving the way to a new partnership in AI (first meeting early 2019).
    - The Commission aims at making available resources for start-ups and innovators in AI and blockchain in their early stage as well as for companies in their scale-up phase, using existing instruments such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments, Horizon 2020 and the European Investment Fund. EUR 100 million should be initially mobilised in 2020. The Commission will also launch an investment support programme to facilitate portfolio development, co-investment with Member States and private investors, and in order to raise the awareness of start-ups and other companies, including both traditional and innovative SMEs, facilitating engagement in otherwise risky projects. This will help prepare for strengthening access to finance for AI under the InvestEU programme.
    - Member States can actively support the process through the participation of national promotional banks, and taking part in awareness raising support programmes.
    - The European Innovation Council will support disruptive innovation through the enhanced European Innovation Council pilot which will in particular support cutting-edge, high reward

research and innovation projects that aim to demonstrate a new technological paradigm in fields such as for example Human centric AI, through a fund totalling EUR 100 million in 2019-2020.

- Member States are encouraged to explore the implementation of innovation vouchers, small grants and loans targeting SMEs in their digital transformation, including notably the integration of AI in products, process and business models.
- From lab to market: (i) building up research excellence, (ii) establishing world-reference testing facilities and (iii) accelerating AI take-up through Digital Innovation Hubs.
- In 2019, Member States will map national AI research excellence centres and their competences and further support their EU-wide cooperation and networking through national programmes.
- The Commission plans to fund networks of AI research excellence centres with EUR 50 million in 2020 through Horizon 2020, supporting collaborative research addressing industrial and scientific challenges identified by such networks in joint research agendas.
- Member States are encouraged to mobilise their industry to be integrated in or develop synergies with the networks of AI research excellence centres
- Building on a first set of 5G cross-border corridors for connected and autonomous driving, support additional testing corridors with up to EUR 30 million in 2020 through Horizon 2020.
- Work on the development of platforms and large-scale pilots integrating AI elements in areas such as energy, healthcare, manufacturing, geo-information and agriculture. For 2019-20, the Commission will make available EUR 160 million from Horizon 2020.
- In 2019 and 2020, under the ECSEL Joint Undertaking30, AI and data analytics will be integrated in lighthouse initiatives in manufacturing, mobility and personalized medicine, with a total budget of around EUR 200 million, from components up to full systems.
- Under the Digital Europe Programme, the Commission envisages making available around EUR 1.5 billion to establish world-leading testing and experimentation sites for AI-powered products and services throughout Europe. These test sites will be identified and developed in close collaboration with Member States in 2019, who will provide a mapping of existing national test sites and will cover the whole AI supply chain from components (neuromorphic computing and quantum technologies) up to integrated applications in areas like health, mobility, energy, security, safety and industrial production.
- Member States will be encouraged to match the investments in the Digital Europe Programme so that an overall investment volume of EUR 3 billion is available. The use of other sources of funding, such as the European Regional Development Fund, will also be encouraged.
- In 2019 Member States are invited to strengthen their networks of Digital Innovation Hubs with a focus on supporting their local SME communities in the digital transformation. Member States will be asked to identify the DIHs that have AI competence.
- In 2019 and 2020 the Commission will make available more than EUR 100 million for Digital Innovation Hubs in selected, AI-relevant areas (Big Data, Smart Manufacturing). This includes activities for regions where currently few Digital Innovations Hubs exist, such as in the EU13 countries.
- In addition, the European Institute of Technology (EIT) activities will contribute to the adoption of AI by the public and private sectors. Between 2018 and 2020, the Union will invest in activities to support EIT Digital and its network of nodes across the Union. This investment will focus on the digital transformation of industries, cities, health, infrastructure, and finance, notably to adapt to the opportunities offered by AI.

- Beyond 2020, funding from the Digital Europe Programme is proposed to contribute to establishing Digital Innovation Hubs in every Member State ensuring a broad geographical representation (possibly with, on average, one in every NUTS2 region31). It is envisaged that the Union will provide up to EUR 900 million to support the development of these hubs, an amount to be matched by similar amounts from Member States. Horizon Europe is expected to enable Digital Innovation Hubs to engage further in digital transformation experiments and support up to 10 000 SMEs throughout Europe.
- Skills and life-long learning (removed)
- Data: a cornerstone for AI - Creating a Common European Data Space (removed)
- Ethics by design and regulatory framework (removed)
- AI for the Public Sector
- Building on and scaling up current investments engaged under the Digital Service Infrastructure actions in the current Connecting Europe Facility Programme and ISA2 Programme, the Union will progressively increase efforts for the take-up of AI in areas of public interest, such as healthcare, transport, security and education. Beyond 2020 under the proposed Digital Europe Programme, Member States and the Union will co-invest in the full deployment of EU-wide AI-enabled services in areas of public interest.
- In 2019, Member States and the Commission are planning to engage in peer-learning and EU-wide exchange of best practices, experiences and data64. They will work together to produce an overview of the relevant applications already in place in the Member States, their impact and added value in support of public service delivery. The Commission is also ready to assist public buyers, for instance by setting up an assistance hub for purchasing AI and cybersecurity solutions. One concrete example is the framework of the European Public Employment Services (PES) Network, where national PES will exchange best practices on AI in service delivery, in matching and automatic processes.
- Member States are encouraged to work with the Commission to identify areas for joint procurement of AI solutions, leading to efficiency gains and better value for money. One concrete example are AI-powered self-healing systems in cybersecurity where the combined buying power of the Union and all Member States can facilitate the development and scaling up of EU-developed solutions. The aim is to issue a joint report by mid-2019 to describe areas where joint procurement is envisaged. Beyond 2020 the Commission proposes to begin work under the new Digital Europe Programme.
- In 2019, the Commission is planning to offer eTranslation, the AI-enabled automatic translation service developed under the Connecting Europe Facility, to public administrations in Member States. The Commission proposals for the Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe programmes foresee investments in further developing natural language processing services and tools to enhance multilingualism in the public sector.
- In 2020, in line with the Tallinn Ministerial Declaration on eGovernment, Member States, with the support of the Commission, and in particular exploiting the role of the DIHs proposed under the next multi-annual financial framework, are encouraged to devote resources for experimentation with AI-enabled services to understand better the added value and potential impact of AI-enabled public services and policy making. AI-based solutions will also benefit the justice66 and law enforcement sectors. Another promising public application sector is the monitoring and enforcement of single market rules for goods, services and people
- Member States and the Commission are planning to continue to develop integrated earth observation and AI machine learning solutions to support evidence-based policy making, implementation and monitoring in areas such as climate change, environmental protection, agriculture, urban development, disaster response, migration, infrastructure monitoring.

- International cooperation
- The Union will reach out to its international partners and promote AI ethics guidelines internationally in the course of 2019.
- Member States and the Union are encouraged to align their international outreach efforts on AI and ensure that Europe sends consistent messages to the world.
- The Union will organise an international ministerial meeting on AI in 2019 with the aim of forging a global consensus on the ethical implications of AI.
- The Union will contribute its expertise and dedicated financial means to anchor AI more firmly in development policy. A particular focus will be given to Southern Mediterranean countries and Africa.

Charlevoix Common Vision for the Future of Artificial Intelligence

- **Convenors and/or authors:** G7.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Charlevoix Common Vision for the Future of Artificial Intelligence*
- **Dates:** Published, 2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** New technologies.
- **Aspirations:** Short, medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (commitments:)
    - Endeavour to promote human-centric AI and commercial adoption of AI, and continue to advance appropriate technical, ethical and technologically neutral approaches by: safeguarding privacy including through the development of appropriate legal regimes; investing in cybersecurity, the appropriate enforcement of applicable privacy legislation and communication of enforcement decisions; informing individuals about existing national bodies of law, including in relation to how their personal data may be used by AI systems; promoting research and development by industry in safety, assurance, data quality, and data security; and exploring the use of other transformative technologies to protect personal privacy and transparency.
    - Promote investment in research and development in AI that generates public trust in new technologies, and encourage industry to invest in developing and deploying AI that supports economic growth and women's economic empowerment while addressing issues related to accountability, assurance, liability, security, safety, gender and other biases and potential misuse.
    - Support lifelong learning, education, training and reskilling, and exchange information on workforce development for AI skills, including apprenticeships, computer science and STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) education, especially for women, girls and those at risk of being left behind.
    - Support and involve women, underrepresented populations and marginalized individuals as creators, stakeholders, leaders and decision-makers at all stages of the development and implementation of AI applications.
    - 5. Facilitate multistakeholder dialogue on how to advance AI innovation to increase trust and adoption and to inform future policy discussions.
    - Support efforts to promote trust in the development and adoption of AI systems with particular attention to countering harmful stereotypes and fostering gender equality. Foster initiatives that promote safety and transparency, and provide guidance on human intervention in AI decisionmaking processes.
    - 7. Promote the use of AI applications by companies, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises and companies from non-tech sectors.
    - Promote active labour market policies, workforce development and reskilling programs to develop the skills needed for new jobs and for those at risk of being left out, including policies specifically targeting the needs of women and underrepresented populations in order to increase labour participation rates for those groups.
    - Encourage investment in AI technology and innovation to create new opportunities for all people, especially to give greater support and options for unpaid caregivers, the majority of whom today are women.
    - Encourage initiatives, including those led by industry, to improve digital security in AI and developing technologies, such as the Internet of Things and cloud services, as well as

through the development of voluntary codes of conduct, standards or guidelines and the sharing of best practices.

- Ensure AI design and implementation respect and promote applicable frameworks for privacy and personal data protection.
- Support an open and fair market environment including the free flow of information, while respecting applicable frameworks for privacy and data protection for AI innovation by addressing discriminatory trade practices, such as forced technology transfer, unjustified data localization requirements and source code disclosure, and recognizing the need for effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.

G20 New Industrial Revolution Action Plan

- **Convenors and/or authors:** G20.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *G20 New Industrial Revolution Action Plan*.
- **Dates:** Published, 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** New technologies.
- **Aspirations:** short, medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
    - Research collaboration
    - Organize NIR-related conference and symposium to discuss industry development, technology trends, policy coordination, workforce skills requirements and promote best practices sharing and exchange of lessons learnt in implementing national technology related strategies among G20 members.
    - Encourage enterprises and relevant institutions to carry out extensive and in-depth research on R&D and application of emerging technologies.
    - Consider impacts on and challenges to social norms, ethics and workers equality (especially regarding to gender, age, social background…) caused by emerging technologies, and strengthen cooperation in risk assessment, management and communication mechanisms.
    - Release a G20 NIR Report prepared by OECD with UNCTAD and UNIDO which provides an overview of opportunities and challenges brought about by NIR.
    - Role of small and medium sized enterprises
    - Explore methods and best practices to cultivate NIR awareness and support SMEs to adopt new and cost-effective technologies and business models.
    - Encourage members to establish platforms to support SMEs digital transformation and capacity building.
    - Encourage SME-to-SME and SME-to-larger enterprise to exchange best practices for NIR technology adoption and development through initiatives, such as the World SME Forum.
    - Foster open innovation model, and encourage more collaboration among established large companies and innovative SMEs and start-ups to better adapt to NIR.
    - Employment and workforce skills
    - Highlight and conduct in-depth studies of NIR's influence on employment and social systems and give overall consideration in the long run to ensure that the benefits of technological and industrial changes are inclusive and widely shared.
    - Encourage communication and cooperation between educational and training institutions and businesses, with respect to the content of curricula and skill requirements of NIR.
    - Encourage more people, especially women and girls, to pursue studies in STEM subjects at all levels of education.
    - Encourage the disadvantaged groups in the labor force such as the unemployed youth, the disabled and the displaced, to benefit from appropriate forms of assistance in the labor market and in training to help them adjust to the changes brought by the NIR.
    - Promote policy exchanges, such as occupational safety, health protections and international labor mobility.
    - Explore methods to further facilitate talent exchange and training globally in the fields of priority sectors, such as smart manufacturing, industrial software, green manufacturing and new services.
    - Cooperation on standards

- Encourage exchanges and cooperation among private sector, enterprises, standard setting organizations and research institutions in terms of developing standards most suited to the needs of the stakeholder communities.
- Encourage private sector and enterprises to participate in conversations on standards for NIR.
- Encourage members to strengthen their cooperation and communication of conformity assessment procedures, certification and accreditation.
- New industrial infrastructure
- Explore cooperation models for G20 members on research and development of key technologies and international standards of new industrial infrastructure.
- Enhance dialogue and exchanges on best practices to design and operate new industrial infrastructure so as to share experiences.
- Intellectual property rights protection
- Deepen communication and strengthen international cooperation mechanisms for effective IPR protection through existing institutions and organizations.
- Focus on capacity building, explore methods and cooperation to increase IPR licensing and outreach to research institutes, universities and businesses and support innovators, creators and entrepreneurs to maximize the value of their work.
- Stimulate the discussion among G20 members on intellectual property issues, in particular the importance of effective protection and enforcement of IPR, in existing expert fora, including WIPO.
- Industrialization in developing countries
- Support developing countries by sharing best practices in formulating and implementing industrial development strategies and programs aligned with the NIR, with a view to reduce gaps in technological and innovative capacity, increase productivity and increase incomes around the world.
- Encourage voluntary partnerships between companies and research institutes as well as universities from G20 members and other developing countries on technologies related to NIR.
- Support efforts to promote voluntary knowledge diffusion and technology transfer on mutually agreed terms and conditions.
- Enable developing countries to optimize resource usage during their accelerated industrialization processes to promote sustainable development and social inclusion.
- Promote awareness of environment-friendly technologies, enabled by NIR and support the capacity building of environment protection for developing countries.

Global Health and Pandemics

Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-Being for All

- **Convenors and/or authors:** WHO and others (incl. UNDP, UN Women, World Bank etc.).
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Output(s):** TBD. Interim document – *Towards a Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-Being for All: Uniting to accelerate progress towards the health-related SDGs*
- **Dates:** Plan to be published, September 2019; interim document published, October 2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Gobal health/pandemics.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** TBD (see interim document for outline).

Global Influenza Strategy 2019-30

- **Convenors and/or authors:** WHO.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **Dates:** Published March 2019.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** global health/pandemics.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** Five enablers to implement the strategy: (1) countries are at the centre; (2) global influenza assets and strategies are strengthened and sustained; (3) countries, industry and civil society continue to support and implement the PIP Framework; (4) partnerships are strengthened and expanded; (5) value for money.
- **Recommendations:**
  - Strategic objective 1: Promote research and innovation to address unmet public health needs
    - Action 1A: Promote research and innovation for improved and novel diagnostics, vaccines and treatments against influenza
      - Promote the development of improved, novel and universal influenza vaccines with increased breadth of protection, longer duration of protection, enhanced effectiveness against severe disease and decreased time for production.
      - Promote the development of more effective influenza treatments, including antiviral drugs, broadly reactive monoclonal antibodies and host-response immune modulators.
      - Promote the development and use of new diagnostics, surveillance and detection methods for influenza, such as next-generation sequencing and affordable point-of-care testing.
    - Action 1B: Promote operational research for influenza prevention, control and programme delivery
      - Investigate antibody landscape data and carry out research during outbreaks, including through clinical trials, to better define how prevention and control tools can be used most effectively.
      - Assess optimal strategies for the use of the currently available vaccines and antiviral drugs, and for the use of newly approved technologies and platforms for seasonal influenza prevention and control.
      - Support national regulatory authorities (NRAs) on approval pathways for the next generation of influenza vaccines and medicines, and strengthen processes for expedited review and recommendation of products during emergencies.
    - Action 1C: Promote research to better understand the virus characteristics and host factors that drive the impact of influenza
      - Evaluate mechanisms contributing to efficient transmission of viruses circulating in animals to humans.
      - Evaluate interventions to reduce the risk of transmission of zoonotic influenza in humans.
      - Evaluate host factors that determine the vulnerability of humans to influenza viruses.
  - Strategic objective 2: Strengthen global influenza surveillance, monitoring and data utilization
    - Action 2A: Enhance, integrate and expand virological and disease surveillance
      - Strengthen and support the evolution of GISRS towards an integrated surveillance system of laboratory and epidemiological data to support assessments of severity and public health decision-making.

        - Expand the capability for rapid risk assessment, effective information sharing and intersectoral investigation of and response to zoonotic influenza cases and other respiratory disease outbreaks.
        - Advance IHR (2005) core capacity-building (laboratory, surveillance, response, risk communication and coordination including at the animal–human interface) and promote sustainability through integration of influenza priority activities into NAPHS.
    - Action 2B: Build a strong evidence base for understanding the impact and burden of influenza
        - Improve the understanding of seasonality, and the disease and economic burden of influenza, especially in LMICs.
        - Develop systems to support the real-time evaluation of burden and severity of influenza, to understand the variable impact on public health, health systems and society.
        - Promote innovative modelling and use of new data sources to improve forecasting of emergence, timing and severity of influenza, and to better understand the impact of pharmaceutical interventions and NPIs.
    - Action 2C: Develop effective influenza communication strategies across multiple sectors and between stakeholders
        - Communicate information on risk and burden of influenza and related complications to policy-makers and other key decision-makers, to enhance understanding of impact and increase political commitment.
        - Support the development of risk communications plans and educational materials for effective use of pharmaceutical interventions and NPIs, to optimize prevention and control.
        - Support policies and programmes for community engagement and social interventions for reducing and mitigating the threat of seasonal and pandemic influenza, including factors related to vulnerability beyond medical risk.
- Strategic objective 3: Expand seasonal influenza prevention and control policies and programmes to protect the vulnerable
    - Action 3A: Integrate nonpharmaceutical interventions into prevention and control programmes
        - Communicate the benefits of integrating NPIs into seasonal programmes and pandemic influenza plans to policy-makers across sectors.
        - Provide educational materials on NPIs to the public, including settings and groups at highest risk for influenza.
        - Engage with local health authorities and communities to plan for deployment of community-level NPIs – for example, school closures and social distancing measures for schools, workplaces and mass gatherings – during seasonal epidemics and pandemics.
    - Action 3B: Design and implement evidence-based immunization policies and programmes to reduce transmission and disease severity
        - Facilitate the increased use of influenza vaccines globally, including through addressing vaccine misperceptions and hesitancy, and promoting the public financing of seasonal influenza vaccines for target groups.
        - Support countries to develop and implement national seasonal immunization policies for health care workers and other target groups, as recommended by the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunization, and to monitor vaccine uptake through national databases.

        - Promote studies to estimate vaccine effectiveness in reducing severe disease and mortality in target populations by vaccine type, vaccination history, birth cohort or immune imprinting, and timing of vaccine receipt, especially in LMICs.
    - Action 3C: Design and implement evidence-based treatment policies and programmes to reduce morbidity and mortality
        - Promote the appropriate, evidence-based and effective use of currently available antiviral drugs, and integration of antiviral drugs into treatment programmes.
        - Strengthen countries' capacities for triage, clinical management and treatment of patients with severe influenza.
- Strategic objective 4: Strengthen pandemic preparedness and response for influenza to make the world safer
    - Action 4A: Strengthen national, regional and global planning to enable timely and effective pandemic readiness
        - Support countries' national planning, which includes governance and regulatory processes, and mechanisms to develop, update and exercise national influenza pandemic preparedness plans, which include both pharmaceutical interventions and NPIs.
        - Support equitable access to a sufficient supply of vaccines, antiviral drugs and treatments.
        - Support country or regional capacities to stockpile (where applicable), acquire, distribute and administer countermeasures and supplies during a pandemic.

Global Pandemic Influenza Action Plan to Increase Vaccine Supply

- **Convenors and/or authors:** WHO.
- **Type:** strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document.
- **Dates:** In operation 2006-2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global health/pandemics.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - Develop regional and national plans for seasonal influenza vaccination programmes.
    - Map the landscape: In order to assist in policy-making and to provide WHO regions, countries, donors and the vaccine industry with relevant information, WHO has undertaken a survey to "map the landscape" to assess current vaccine use, future planned increases in seasonal influenza uptake, and possible pandemic vaccine requests from countries.
    - Estimate disease burden: The lack of disease-burden data in many countries is a barrier to making evidencebased decisions on the introduction of seasonal influenza vaccine. Effective tools need to be developed to assist countries to estimate current influenza disease burden and evaluate the cost–effectiveness of seasonal influenza immunization.
    - Develop regional plans of action: In consultation with its national governments, each WHO region should prepare a plan for influenza vaccination. National immunization programmes (NIPs) should subsequently incorporate this plan, in all its aspects, to design, implement and monitor their seasonal influenza vaccine programmes. This process will help address the impediments currently faced by most countries: limited vaccine supply, shortage of financial and human resources, weak policies and infrastructure, and absence of disease-burden data to inform decision-making. In resource-poor countries the development of a plan will allow management to assess the required inputs and to analyse the cost–effectiveness. WHO will provide technical assistance to countries for the analysis of the appropriate influenza vaccination components of their national immunization programmes. Endorsement of the regional plans by countries and regional advisory bodies will provide the policy basis for implementation. As stated in the WHO–UNICEF Global Immunization Vision and Strategy (GIVS)*, NIPs will provide the framework for implementing strong seasonal influenza vaccine programmes. The strategic information on vaccine demand derived from NIPs will be important for vaccine manufacturers. It will provide a basis on which the industry can evaluate the investments required, including technology transfer, to be in position to meet the demand for seasonal vaccines. This approach will, furthermore, permit the creation of a larger infrastructure to increase vaccine supply
  - Mobilize resources for the implementation of seasonal influenza vaccination programmes.
    - Mobilize resources for resource-constrained countries: A number of countries may regard the introduction of seasonal vaccination into their NIPs as sound public health policy but be unable to afford the products because of competing public health priorities and limited management capacity. These are the major obstacles to successful implementation of yearly influenza vaccination programmes in developing countries. Nevertheless, even if the global community were to provide resources to purchase influenza vaccines in these countries, the resulting increase in demand might only be moderate – an estimated 100 million doses of seasonal vaccine. The development of regional plans will provide budget estimates for use in seeking support and discussions with donor agencies, foundations and governments. These countries will require additional resources to proceed with the introduction of seasonal influenza vaccination. The possible costs associated with the

activities described under point 4.1 – to develop an immunization policy to increase demand for seasonal vaccines – will require a minimum investment of US$ 300 million.

- Increase capacity for inactivated influenza vaccines.
  - Improve production yield of H5N1 viruses and immunogenicity of prototype H5N1 inactivated vaccine: The most direct mechanism to make more doses available is to raise the production yield and immunogenicity of H5N1-based vaccines to levels similar to those regularly obtained for seasonal influenza vaccines. Resolving the current issue of low yield could, if successful, have a significant impact on the total number of vaccine doses manufactured. The current yield of 500 million doses per year could become 1.5 billion doses so, if two doses of vaccine were needed, 750 million persons could be vaccinated instead of 250 million. Companies, researchers and institutes currently work independently of each other in attempting to increase production yields, without coordinated guidelines or a strategy to share their respective experiences. WHO plans to accelerate this search for practical solutions by creating a collaborative consortium of laboratories with the objective of developing better candidate prototype vaccine strains.
  - Build new production facilities in developing and/or industrialized countries: Establishing new production facilities will require a financial investment that is commensurate with the desired increase in vaccine supply. The major vaccine producers in industrialized countries already have plans to increase their production capacity by 280 million doses by 2009. These manufacturers may also consider further plant expansions as a result of market commitments from countries that introduce seasonal influenza programmes. Other options are to carefully assess the feasibility of transferring technology for egg-based or cell-culture production to potential new manufacturers, and to evaluate possible new vaccine suppliers in emerging industrial countries. Capital investment for the establishment of new production facilities for inactivated influenza vaccines has been estimated to be in the order of US$ 1.00 per dose. Cost–effectiveness analysis should also be conducted on the feasibility of partial conversion of veterinary vaccine production facilities to produce human influenza vaccines. In a pandemic a vaccine shortfall could lead to a public health crisis. Achieving the required production capacity to prevent a vaccine shortfall during a pandemic is critical. Countries may be required to pay for under-used capacity to assure that sufficient pandemic vaccines doses are produced within the required time frame.
- Explore formulations of influenza vaccine other than those commonly used for seasonal vaccination.
  - Conduct clinical trials with alum and MF-59 adjuvanted vaccine: Clinical trials to evaluate H5N1 influenza vaccines – formulated with adjuvants that have a proven safety record in humans and are already used for other licensed vaccines – may allow for the selection of vaccines with reduced antigen content. Within the next two years, several vaccine candidates formulated with MF-59 or alum adjuvants will be assessed in clinical trials. The outcome of these trials will provide data to evaluate the impact that using these adjuvants could have on future capacity. As an example, if one of these adjuvants were to allow for a decrease of, for example 2 to 5 parts less antigen content, this would allow for the production of 1000 to 2500 million doses – as compared to 500 million doses currently. Not taking into account any potential yield improvement, 500 to 1250 million people could then be fully vaccinated with two doses of vaccine. Coordinated funding for clinical trials will be required to accelerate the systematic and comparative evaluation of the different formulations currently under development.
  - Explore the opportunity to scale-up production of live attenuated influenza vaccines: There is preliminary evidence that live attenuated influenza vaccines (LAIVs) might be more effective than inactivated vaccines. A full review of the available data should be undertaken

to evaluate: a) the safety – especially in patients with asthma, the immunocompromised, the very young and the elderly; b) protection against homologous virus and minor variants; and c) evidence of herd immunity through vaccination of children. LAIVs may require less complex downstream processing so would be more appropriate for technology transfer. In addition, cell-culture derived production technology for LAIV is under development. LAIVs have a lower unit cost and higher production yield, estimated to be 10 times higher than for inactivated vaccines. Furthermore, the capital investment for LAIVs is lower than for inactivated vaccines – estimated to be approximately US$ 0.1 per dose. This may be attractive for some manufacturers. Veterinary vaccine plants, which use specific pathogen-free (SPF) eggs to produce influenza vaccines for poultry, could potentially undertake production. The vaccine industry should explore the possibility of establishing agreements between companies (including veterinary vaccine companies) to increase production or to transfer the LAIV technology.

  - Further evaluate whole-virus based inactivated vaccines: To further assess the advantages of this option, comparative clinical trials using splitand whole-virus vaccine formulations, together with data on comparative production yields, are needed. It is generally accepted that whole-virus vaccines are more immunogenic and may provide higher protection with less antigen content. However, the safety of these vaccines needs to be carefully documented. It is estimated that conversion to whole-virus vaccine production could increase vaccine availability by 10–50%. This would bring current production from 500 million doses to a maximum of 750 million. In addition, superior immunogenicity of whole-virus vaccines as compared to split-virus vaccines may allow for substantial antigen sparing and increase the number of doses available. While some of the aforementioned activities will be undertaken by the vaccine industry and the research community, funds may still be needed to support additional research efforts.

- Assessment of alternative delivery routes.
  - Test the intradermal route of administration: Studies with other vaccines (e.g. rabies vaccine) show that lower doses are needed when a vaccine is administered intradermally. Investment is needed to further develop and license new delivery devices, such as jet injectors or single disposable devices. Clinical trials will be needed to assess the suitability of the intradermal route to deliver influenza vaccine. Using the intradermal route could have a significant impact on vaccine use: possibly 2–5 times more vaccine could become available – that is, 1000 million doses as compared to the current estimate of 500 million doses per year. WHO is working with partners to evaluate this approach. The possible costs associated with the activities described under point 4.2 – to increase influenza vaccine production-capacity – require an investment of a minimum of US$ 2–9 billion.
- Enhance protective efficacy and immunogenicity of existing vaccine types.
  - Evaluate novel adjuvants: Currently, only two adjuvants are included in vaccines licensed for human use. Newer adjuvant molecules such as CpGs should nevertheless be explored with influenza vaccines because they may provide higher immunogenicity and thereby allow antigen to be spared. In addition, they may assist in broadening the immune response and provide protection against drifted variants of influenza virus with vaccine designed to be cross protective.
  - Assess the molecular basis of immunogenicity to design more potent vaccines: Modern approaches, including reverse genetics, should be used to study the molecular basis of the immunogenicity of HA in order to discover approaches to develop more potent vaccines. This is a technically challenging research activity and may require extensive investment in the long term.

    - Predict viral evolution: To predict future viral evolution and enhance vaccine-strain selection, modelling is considered to be a promising long-term approach in developing vaccines based on the most appropriate virus strains.
- Develop novel vaccines that induce broad-spectrum and long-lasting immune responses.
    - Develop new generation vaccines: Vaccines that induce broad immunity would protect against viruses with antigenically distinct HA molecules. This should allow for the preparation of vaccine lots in advance and would simplify the logistics of vaccine production. The development of broadly protective vaccines may also result in improved efficacy in certain high-risk groups, such as the elderly. There are several approaches that could be used for the development of such vaccines. Production of viral immunogens (HA, NA, M2, M1, NP, etc.) could be improved using baculovirus or other expression systems. Novel concepts like recombinant sub-unit, viral vectored, DNA vaccines, and virus-like particles (VLP) may offer advantages in production capacity and/or immunogenicity. These options would lead to greater availability of vaccine at lower cost.
    - Determine potential benefits of immune priming: Administration of a single dose of a pre-pandemic vaccine, such as an H5N1, to prime for an anamnestic response may allow more rapid induction of immunity with a single dose of a pandemic vaccine. Research specifically designed to address this issue needs to be conducted.
- Improve evaluation of vaccine performance.
    - Define correlates of protection: Valid animal models that reliably predict the performance of candidate influenza vaccines in humans are crucial for future vaccine development. Immunological correlates of protection in humans need to be developed; this will provide information to guide vaccine development and enable registration of vaccines based on comparative immunological data. To accomplish this, public funding and collaborative work among regulatory agencies and vaccine producers is required.
    - Standardize immunogenicity assays: Basic requirements for the evaluation of new vaccine candidates are to: a) develop standardized protocols, b) establish reference laboratories, and c) ensure the expression of antibody results in international units. Standardization will facilitate comparison of product performance. WHO, the Expert Committee on Biological Standardization (ECBS), national control laboratories, and national regulatory agencies will provide guidance and standards. The possible costs associated with the activities described under point 4.3 – research and development for new influenza vaccines – will require an investment of several hundred million US dollars over an extended period of time.

PLAN *of* ACTION *to* PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM

ADDRESSING
Drivers of Violent Extremism

Conditions Conducive & Structural Context

- Lack of Socio-Economic Opportunities
- Marginalization & Discrimination
- Poor Governance, Violation of Human Rights & Rule of Law
- Unresolved Conflict
- Radicalization in Prisons

Processes of Radicalization

- Individual Backgrounds & Motivations
- Collective Grievances and Victimization
- Distortion & Misuse of Beliefs, Political Ideologies & Ethnic and Cultural Differences
- Leadership & Social Networks

SETTING
The Policy Framework

Global Framework

United Nations Charter
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
General Assembly Resolutions
Security Council Resolutions

National PVE Plans of Action

- National Ownership
- All-of-Government
- All-of-Society

Regional PVE Plans of Action

TAKING ACTION
7 Priority Areas

- Dialogue & Conflict Prevention
- Strengthening Good Governance, Human Rights and the Rule of Law
- Engaging Communities
- Empowering Youth
- Gender Equality and Empowering Women
- Education, Skill Development and Employment Facilitation
- Strategic Communications, the Internet and Social Media

Coherent UN support

All-of-UN

UNDP Strategy Note on HIV, Health and Development 2016-2021

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UNDP.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Connecting the Dots*.
- **Dates:** Adopted, June 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global health/pandemics.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (headline actions and priorities only)
  - Action area 1: Reducing inequalities and social exclusion that drive HIV and poor health
    - Priority 1.1: Promoting gender equality and empowering women and girls
    - Priority 1.2: Inclusion of key populations at risk of HIV and other excluded groups
    - Priority 1.3: Urbanization, HIV and health
  - Action area 2: Promoting effective and inclusive governance for health
    - Priority 2.1: Enabling legal, policy and regulatory environments for HIV and health
    - Priority 2.3: Sustainable financing for HIV and health
  - Action area 3: Building resilient and sustainable systems for health
    - Priority 3.1: Implementation support and capacity development for large-scale health programmes
    - Priority 3.2: Inclusive social protection

Political Violence

United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Framework/strategy (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **Dates:** Sixth review, June 2018; first adopted, September 2006.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Political violence.
- **Aspirations:** Short and medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - 1. Reiterates its strong and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes;
  - 2. Reaffirms the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its four pillars, which constitute an ongoing effort, and calls upon Member States, the United Nations and other appropriate international, regional and subregional organizations to step up their efforts to implement the Strategy in an integrated and balanced manner and in all its aspects;
  - 3. Stresses the importance of keeping the Strategy relevant and contemporary in the light of emerging new threats and evolving trends of international terrorism;
  - 4. Affirms the importance of the integrated and balanced implementation of all pillars of the Strategy, recognizing the need to redouble efforts for even attention to be paid to and the even implementation of all the pillars of the Strategy;
  - 5. Recognizes the principal responsibility of Member States to implement the Strategy, while encouraging the further elaboration and development of national, subregional and regional plans, as appropriate, to support the implementation of the Strategy;
  - 6. Recalls the establishment of the Office of Counter-Terrorism in its resolution 71/291;
  - 7. Calls upon States that have not done so to consider becoming parties in a timely manner to the existing international conventions and protocols against terrorism, and upon all States to make every effort to conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism, and recalls the commitments of Member States with regard to the implementation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to international terrorism;
  - 8. Recalls all the resolutions of the General Assembly on measures to eliminate international terrorism and the relevant resolutions of the Assembly on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism and all resolutions of the Security Council relating to international terrorism, and calls upon Member States to cooperate fully with the relevant bodies of the United Nations in the fulfilment of their tasks, recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing these resolutions;
  - 9. Stresses the significance of a sustained and comprehensive approach, including through stronger efforts, where necessary, to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, bearing in mind that terrorism will not be defeated by military force, law enforcement measures and intelligence operations alone;
  - 10. Also stresses that, when counter-terrorism efforts neglect the rule of law at the national and international levels and violate international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law and refugee law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, they not only betray the values that they seek to uphold, but they may also further fuel violent extremism that can be conducive to terrorism;
  - 11. Encourages Member States to engage with relevant local communities and non-governmental actors, where appropriate, in developing tailored strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite recruitment to terrorist groups and the commission

of terrorist acts and to address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism;

- 12. Encourages Member States, United Nations entities, regional and subregional organizations and relevant actors to consider instituting mechanisms to involve youth in the promotion of a culture of peace, tolerance and intercultural and interreligious dialogue and develop, as appropriate, an understanding of respect for human dignity, pluralism and diversity, including, as appropriate, through education programmes, that could discourage their participation in acts of terrorism, violent extremism conducive to terrorism, violence, xenophobia and all forms of discrimination, also encourages Member States to empower youth through the promotion of media and information literacy by including youth in decision-making processes and considering practical ways to include youth in the development of relevant programmes and initiatives aimed at preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism, and urges Member States to take effective measures, in conformity with international law, to protect young people affected or exploited by terrorism or violent extremism conducive to terrorism;
- 13. Deeply deplores the suffering caused by terrorism to the victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and to their families, expresses its profound solidarity with them, and encourages Member States to provide them with proper support and assistance while taking into account, inter alia, when appropriate, considerations regarding remembrance, dignity, respect, justice and truth, in accordance with international law;
- 14. Acknowledges the importance of building the resilience of victims and their families as an integral part of a counter-terrorism strategy, and encourages Member States to include this aspect in their national counter-terrorism strategies, including by providing victims and their families with proper support and assistance immediately after an attack and in the long term and sharing on a voluntary basis best practices and lessons learned related to the protection of victims of terrorism, including regarding the provision of legal, medical, psychosocial or financial support;
- 15. Emphasizes that tolerance, pluralism, respect for diversity, dialogue among civilizations and the enhancement of interreligious and intercultural understanding and respect among peoples, including at the national, regional and global levels, while avoiding the escalation of hatred, are among the most important elements in promoting cooperation, in combating terrorism and in countering violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism, and welcomes the various initiatives to this end;
- 16. Urges all Member States and the United Nations to unite against violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism, encourages the efforts of leaders to discuss within their communities the drivers of violent extremism conducive to terrorism and to evolve strategies to address them, and underlines that States, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious bodies and the media have an important role to play in promoting tolerance and facilitating understanding, inclusive dialogue and respect for religious and cultural diversity and human rights;
- 17. Recognizes the difficulties faced by the international community in addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, and urges Member States and the United Nations system to take measures, pursuant to international law and while ensuring national ownership, to address all drivers of violent extremism conducive to terrorism, both internal and external, in a balanced manner;
- 18. Also recognizes the importance of preventing violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism and in this regard recalls its resolution 70/254 of 12 February 2016, in which it welcomed the initiative by the Secretary-General and took note of his Plan of Action to Prevent

Violent Extremism, 6 recommends that Member States consider the implementation of relevant recommendations of the Plan of Action, as applicable to the national context, encourages United Nations entities, in line with their mandates, to implement relevant recommendations of the Plan of Action, including by providing technical assistance to Member States upon their request, and invites Member States and regional and subregional organizations to consider developing national and regional plans of action to prevent violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism, in accordance with their priorities and taking into account, as appropriate, the Secretary-General's Plan of Action, as well as other relevant documents;

- 19. Urges all States to respect and protect the right to privacy, as set out in article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 7 and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 8 including in the context of digital communication, also while countering terrorism, in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights law, and to take measures to ensure that interferences with or restrictions on that right are not arbitrary or unlawful and are subject to effective oversight and to appropriate redress, including through judicial review or other legal means;
- 20. Calls upon States, while countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism, to review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the surveillance of communications, their interception and the collection of personal data, including mass surveillance, interception and collection, with a view to upholding the right to privacy, as set out in article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by ensuring the full and effective implementation of all their obligations under international human rights law;
- 21. Stresses that it is essential to address the threat posed by narratives used by terrorists and that, in this regard, the international community should consider developing an accurate understanding of how terrorists motivate others to commit terrorist acts or recruit them, and develop the most effective means to counter terrorist propaganda, incitement and recruitment, including through the Internet, in compliance with international law, including international human rights law;
- 22. Notes that terrorists may craft distorted narratives that are based on the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of religion to justify violence, which are utilized to recruit supporters and foreign terrorist fighters, mobilize resources and garner support from sympathizers, in particular by exploiting information and communications technologies, including through the Internet and social media, and also notes in this regard the urgent need for the international community to globally counter such activities;
- 23. Stresses that States should consider engaging, where appropriate, with religious authorities and community leaders with relevant expertise, including in crafting and delivering effective counter-narratives and in countering narratives used by terrorists and their supporters, and also stresses that counter-narratives should aim not only to rebut terrorists' messages but also to amplify positive narratives, provide credible alternatives and address issues of concern to vulnerable audiences who are subject to terrorist narratives;
- 24. Encourages civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to engage, as appropriate, in efforts to enhance the implementation of the Strategy, including through interaction with Member States and the United Nations system, and encourages Member States and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities) to enhance engagement with civil society in accordance with their mandates, as appropriate, and to support its role in the implementation of the Strategy;

- 25. Calls upon all Member States, given the complex global security context today, to highlight the important role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism, and urges Member States and United Nations entities to integrate a gender analysis on the drivers of radicalization of women to terrorism into their relevant programmes, to consider, when appropriate, the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women's human rights and women's organizations and to seek greater consultations with women and women's organizations when developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism;
- 26. Recognizes the need for Member States to prevent the abuse of non-governmental, non-profit and charitable organizations by and for terrorists, and calls upon non-governmental, non-profit and charitable organizations to prevent and oppose, as appropriate, attempts by terrorists to abuse the status of those organizations, while reaffirming the need to fully respect the rights to freedom of expression and association of individuals in civil society and to freedom of religion or belief of all persons;
- 27. Reaffirms the need for enhanced dialogue and coordination among the counter-terrorism officials, including among law enforcement entities and financial intelligence units, of Member States to promote international, regional and subregional cooperation and wider dissemination of knowledge of the Strategy in order to counter terrorism, and in this regard recalls the role of the United Nations system, in particular the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities), in promoting international cooperation and capacity-building as elements of the Strategy;
- 28. Calls upon all Member States, in accordance with their obligations under applicable international law, including the Charter, to deny terrorist groups safe haven, freedom of operations, movement and recruitment and financial, material or political support, which endanger national, regional and international peace and security, and to bring to justice or, where appropriate, extradite, on the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute, the perpetrators of terrorist acts or any person who supports, facilitates or participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning or preparation of terrorist acts;
- 29. Urges Member States to provide full coordination and afford one another the greatest measure of assistance, in accordance with their obligations under international law, in criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, especially with those States where, or against whose citizens, terrorist acts are committed, including obtaining evidence for the proceedings involving terrorist organizations, terrorist entities or foreign terrorist fighters, and recalls that all States must cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism on the basis of mutual legal assistance and the principle of extradite or prosecute, welcoming their efforts to elaborate on the existing extradition and mutual legal assistance mechanisms;
- 30. Calls upon Member States to prevent refugee status from being abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and also calls upon Member States to take appropriate measures to ensure, before granting asylum, that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts, while reaffirming the importance of protecting refugees and asylum seekers in accordance with States' obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law;
- 31. Urges Member States to ensure no tolerance for terrorism, regardless of the targets or motives, and reaffirms its call to refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, participating in, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities and to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that their respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or

training camps or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or their citizens;

- 32. Expresses concern over terrorist acts committed by lone terrorists in various parts of the world, acknowledges the specific challenges created by lone terrorists as they are difficult to detect, and recognizes the need to address this issue expeditiously;
- 33. Condemns the failure to take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects against the effects of attacks when using civilian objects, in particular schools and hospitals, for military purposes such as launching attacks and storing weapons, and strongly condemns the use of civilians to shield military objectives from attacks;
- 34. Encourages Member States to consider better ways to cooperate to exchange information, assist one another, prosecute those who use information and communications technologies for terrorist purposes and implement other appropriate cooperative measures to address such threats;
- 35. Expresses concern at the increasing use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters, of information and communications technologies, in particular the Internet and other media, and the use of such technologies to commit, incite, recruit for, fund or plan terrorist acts, notes the importance of cooperation among stakeholders in the implementation of the Strategy, including among Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations, the private sector and civil society, to address this issue, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and complying with international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter, and reiterates that such technologies can be powerful tools in countering the spread of terrorism, including by promoting tolerance and dialogue among peoples and peace;
- 36. Recalls Security Council resolutions 2178 (2014) of 24 September 2014 and 2396 (2017) of 21 December 2017, and reaffirms the need to strengthen efforts to address the evolving threat of foreign terrorist fighters;
- 37. Calls upon Member States to strengthen cooperation at the international, regional, subregional and bilateral levels to counter the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including through enhanced operational and timely information-sharing, recalling in this regard that Member States should notify the relevant authorities, in a timely manner, upon travel, departure, arrival or deportation of captured or detained individuals whom they have reasonable grounds to believe are foreign terrorist fighters, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2396 (2017), logistical support, as appropriate, and capacity-building activities, to share and adopt best practices to identify foreign terrorist fighters, to prevent the travel of foreign terrorist fighters from, into or through Member States, to prevent the financing, mobilization, recruitment and organization of foreign terrorist fighters, and to strengthen international and regional cooperation in information-sharing and evidence-gathering, and calls upon law enforcement and criminal justice authorities to better counter the threat of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters, to counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism and radicalization to terrorism, to enhance efforts to implement deradicalization programmes and to ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in the supporting of terrorist acts or in providing funds to terrorists is brought to justice, in compliance with obligations under international law, as well as applicable domestic law;
- 38. Calls upon all States to use applicable international instruments to which they are parties, as appropriate, as a basis for mutual legal assistance and, as appropriate, for extradition in terrorism cases, and encourages States, in the absence of applicable conventions or provisions, to cooperate where possible on the basis of reciprocity or on a case-by-case basis;

- 39. Calls upon all Member States, in accordance with their obligations under international law, to cooperate in efforts to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including by preventing the radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, preventing the movement of foreign terrorist fighters across their borders, including through enhanced border security and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, disrupting and preventing financial support to foreign terrorist fighters and developing and implementing prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, taking into account gender and age dimensions, for returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and their families, underscores in this regard the importance of a whole-of-government approach, recognizes the role that civil society organizations can play as they may have relevant knowledge of, access to and engagement with local communities, to be able to confront the challenges of recruitment and radicalization to terrorism, notes that children may be especially vulnerable to radicalization to violence and in need of particular psychosocial support, such as post-trauma counselling, while stressing that children need to be treated in a manner that respects their rights and protects their dignity, in accordance with applicable international law, and in this regard encourages all Member States to develop effective strategies to deal with returnees, including through repatriation, in accordance with relevant international obligations and national law;
- 40. Expresses concern that international networks have been established by terrorist organizations that facilitate the travel of foreign terrorist fighters to conflict zones, and calls upon all Member States to take appropriate measures to dismantle such networks, in accordance with their international obligations;
- 41. Also expresses concern at the increasing flow of international recruits to terrorist organizations, including foreign terrorist fighters, and at the threat that it poses for all Member States, including countries of origin, transit and destination, encourages all Member States to address this threat by enhancing their cooperation and developing relevant measures to prevent and tackle this phenomenon, including information-sharing, border management to detect travel, including through the implementation of obligations on the use of advance passenger information, passenger name record and biometric data, with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, calls upon Member States to make effective use of the databases of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), as appropriate, by connecting to law enforcement, border security and customs agencies through their national central bureaux, requests Member States to help to build the capacity of other Member States, upon their request, to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, notes in this regard that some Member States may require technical assistance and capacity-building support, and encourages the provision of assistance to help to address such gaps, and the consideration of the use of United Nations instruments, such as sanctions regimes, as well as cooperation;
- 42. Calls upon Member States to strengthen efforts to improve the security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets, such as infrastructure and public places, as well as resilience to terrorist attacks, in particular in the area of civil protection, and encourages Member States to consider developing or further improving their strategies for reducing risks to critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks, which should include, inter alia, assessing and raising awareness of the relevant risks, taking preparedness measures, including effective responses to such attacks, as well as promoting better interoperability in security and consequence management and facilitating the effective interaction of all stakeholders involved;
- 43. Expresses concern at the increase, in some regions, in incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups, for any purpose, including with the aim of raising funds

or gaining political concessions, notes that ransoms paid to terrorists are used as one of the sources of funding for their activities, including further kidnappings, calls upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting from ransom payments and political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages, in accordance with applicable legal obligations, and encourage s Member States to cooperate, as appropriate, during incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups;

- 44. Recognizes the need to continue to take measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, in this regard encourages United Nations entities to cooperate with Member States and to continue to provide assistance, upon their request, in particular, to help them to fully implement their respective international obligations to combat the financing of terrorism, and encourages Member States to further build the capacity of their financial oversight and regulatory systems around the world in order to deny terrorists the space to exploit and raise funds, including by cooperating with the private sector through public-private partnerships with financial institutions and by taking into account the assessments thereof by relevant entities such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate;
- 45. Calls upon Member States to engage with domestic financial institutions and share information on terrorist financing risks to provide greater context for their work in identifying potential terrorist financing activity through multiple authorities and channels, including law enforcement, intelligence, security services and financial intelligence units, and also calls upon Member States to improve the integration and utilization of financial intelligence to more effectively counter the terrorist financing threats;
- 46. Also calls upon Member States to enhance their efforts in the fight against the financing of terrorism by addressing the anonymity of transactions and by tracing, detecting, sanctioning and effectively dismantling illegal money transmitters and tackling the risks associated with the use of cash, informal remittance systems, prepaid credit and debit cards, cryptoassets and other anonymous means of monetary or financial transactions, as well as to anticipate and address, as appropriate, the risk of new financial instruments being abused for the purpose of terrorist financing;
- 47. Recognizes the importance of sharing information within and between Governments to effectively counter the financing of terrorism, calls upon Member States, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2368 (2017) of 20 July 2017, to continue to exercise vigilance over relevant financial transactions and improve information-sharing capabilities and practices within and between Governments through multiple authorities and channels, including law enforcement, intelligence, security services and financial intelligence units, and also calls upon Member States to improve the integration and utilization of financial intelligence with other types of information available to national Governments in order to more effectively counter the terrorist financing threats posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da ’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;
- 48. Calls upon all States to adopt such measures as may be necessary and appropriate, and in accordance with their obligations under international law, to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts, prevent such conduct and deny safe haven to any persons with respect to whom there is credible and relevant information giving serious reasons for considering that they have been guilty of such conduct;
- 49. Calls upon Member States to collaborate in the pursuit of developing and implementing effective counter-narrative strategies, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2354 (2017) of 24 May 2017, and the comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist narratives, 9 including those relating to foreign terrorist fighters, in a manner compliant with

their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law;

- 50. Calls upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, urges all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials, equipment and technologies related to their manufacture, and encourages cooperation among and between Member States and relevant regional and international organizations for strengthening national capacitie s in this regard;
- 51. Recognizes that improvised explosive devices are being increasingly used in terrorist activities, takes note of the work of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities) in this regard, and urges its further attention to the issue of improvised explosive devices in line with the mandates of the entities;
- 52. Recalls relevant United Nations resolutions, and reaffirms that Member States shall eliminate the supply of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, to terrorists, as well as prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in said weapons, including their diversion, to terrorists;
- 53. Calls upon Member States to establish or strengthen national, regional and international partnerships with stakeholders, both public and private, as appropriate, to share information and experience in order to prevent, protect against, mitigate, investigate, respond to and recover from damage from terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure facilities, and emphasizes the need for States able to do so to assist in the delivery of effective and targeted capacity development, training and other necessary resources, and technical assistance, where it is needed, to enable all States to develop appropriate capacity to implement contingency and response plans with regard to attacks on critical infrastructure and soft targets or public places;
- 54. Recognizes that Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and its affiliates continue to pose a widespread challenge in the fight against terrorism, encourages Member States to integrate the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime, pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999, 1989 (2011) of 17 June 2011 and 2253 (2015) of 17 December 2015, into their national and regional counter-terrorism strategies, including by proposing for inclusion on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list the names of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, reminds Member States of their obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territory do not make economic resources available to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, takes note of the significant contribution of the Office of the Ombudsperson, since its establishment, in providing fairness and transparency to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime, and stresses the need to continue efforts to ensure that procedures are fair and clear;
- 55. Encourages Member States and international and regional organizations to enhance knowledge of and support initiatives to address, in the design and implementation of global, regional and national counter-terrorism strategies, the linkages between terrorism and transnational organized crime;
- 56. Encourages all relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and forums involved in the fight against terrorism to cooperate with the United Nations system and Member States in supporting the Strategy and to share best practices, and calls for information-sharing, through appropriate channels and arrangements, on individuals and entities implicated in any type of terrorist activities, their tactics and modus operandi, supply of

weapons and sources of material or any other form of support, specific crimes related to perpetration, planning or preparation of terrorist acts, narratives used by terrorists to mobilize resources and garner support from sympathizers, including by exploiting information and communications technologies, and on the ongoing international counter-terrorism cooperation, especially among special services, security agencies and law enforcement organizations and criminal justice authorities;

- 57. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General entitled “Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” and the annexes thereto10 and the efforts deployed by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities), and underlines the importance of providing the resources necessary for the implementation of these projects; 58. Also takes note of the measures that Member States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations have adopted within the framework of the Strategy, as referred to in paragraph 51 of the report of the Secretary-General and considered at the sixth biennial review of the Strategy, on 26 and 27 June 2018, all of which strengthen cooperation to fight terrorism, including through the exchange of best practices;
- 59. Reaffirms the principal responsibility of Member States to implement the Strategy, while recognizing the need to enhance the important role that the United Nations, including the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities), plays, in coordination with other international, regional and subregional organizations, as appropriate, in facilitating and promoting coordination and coherence in the implementation of the Strategy at the national, regional and global levels and in providing assistance, upon request by Member States, especially in the area of capacity-building;
- 60. Recognizes the work done and efforts made by the relevant United Nations bodies and entities and other international, regional and subregional organizations aimed at supporting, recognizing and protecting the rights of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and urges them to step up their efforts to provide, upon request, technical assistance for building the capacity of Member States in the development and implementation of programmes of assistance and support for victims of terrorism;
- 61. Also recognizes the continued need to enhance the visibility and effectiveness of United Nations counter-terrorism activities, underlines the importance of enhancing counter-terrorism efforts undertaken by all relevant United Nations agencies and bodies in accordance with their existing mandates, and encourages the Office of Counter-Terrorism to continue its collaboration with those agencies and bodies while also ensuring overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system, with a view to maximizing synergies, promoting transparency and greater efficiencies and avoiding duplication of their work;
- 62. Welcomes the efforts of the Office of Counter-Terrorism to increase its transparency, accountability and effectiveness in enhancing cooperation within the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities), requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the Office is well organized, in order to achieve these objectives and to report on an annual basis on progress in this regard, including on transparency in the selection and funding of projects and their impact, as well as on the efficiency of shared funding arrangements, with a view to enabling a meaningful review of the United Nations counter-terrorism architecture at the seventh biennial review of the Strategy, at the seventy-fourth session of the General Assembly;
- 63. Takes note of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, a framework between the Secretary-General and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task

Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities) heads, which aims to strengthen a common-action approach to coordination and coherence in the work of the United Nations system to prevent and counter terrorism, and to strengthen support to Member States, at their request and in cooperation with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, to identify and share best practices and help in capacity-building, in the implementation of the Strategy and relevant Security Council resolutions, while ensuring compliance with international law, including international human rights law and, where applicable, international humanitarian law, and looks forward to the periodic briefings by the Office of Counter-Terrorism to Member States on the activities of the Compact entities;

- 64. Recognizes the role of the regional organizations, structures and strategies in combating terrorism, and encourages those entities to enhance interregional dialogue and cooperation and consider using best practices developed by other regions in their fight against terrorism, as appropriate, taking into account their specific regional and national circumstances;
- 65. Encourages all Member States to collaborate with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and to contribute to the implementation of its activities within the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities), including through the development, funding and implementation of capacity-building projects in order to mobilize a stronger and more systematic response to terrorism at the national, regional and global levels;
- 66. Notes with appreciation the activities undertaken in the area of capacity-building, including in the areas of countering the financing of terrorism, border control, maritime and aviation security, and preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, by United Nations entities, including the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter Terrorism Coordination Compact entities), inter alia, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL, in coordination with other relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, to assist Member States, upon their request, in implementing the Strategy, and encourages the Task Force to ensure the focused delivery of capacity-building assistance, including in the framework of the Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism Initiative;
- 67. Recalls its resolution 72/194 of 19 December 2017, and notes with appreciation the ongoing work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to support Member States in their efforts to prevent and counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations in the crime prevention and criminal justice context;
- 68. Calls upon the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, including its Terrorism Prevention Branch, to further enhance, in close consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate, its provision of technical assistance, upon request, for building the capacity of Member States to become party to and implement the international conventions and protocols related to counter-terrorism and relevant United Nations resolutions, including through targeted programmes and the training of relevant criminal justice and law enforcement officials, upon request, to develop their capacity to effectively respond to, prevent, investigate and prosecute terrorist acts, the development of and participation in relevant initiatives and the development of technical tools and publications, within its mandate;
- 69. Requests the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, whenever appropriate, to take into account in its technical assistance to counter terrorism, upon request, the elements necessary for building national capacity in order to strengthen criminal justice systems and the rule of law;

- 70. Stresses the need to continue to provide tangible capacity-building assistance to Member States in counter-terrorism matters, recognizes in this regard the need to contribute more resources for capacity-building projects, takes note of the implementation of the United Nations capacity-building implementation plan for countering the flow of foreign terrorist fighters by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities), and encourages Member States to provide financial and other assistance to the Task Force and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre needed for the effective delivery of the projects mentioned in that plan, in close consultation with Member States;
- 71. Calls for the enhanced engagement of Member States with the work of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities);
- 72. Requests the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities) to continue its positive efforts in interacting with Member States, and requests the Office of Counter-Terrorism to continue to provide quarterly briefings and to provide a periodic workplan, including the activities of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, and to provide full transparency to all Member States on its work and programmes;
- 73. Encourages the Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Global CounterTerrorism Coordination Compact entities to work closely with Member States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to identify and share best practices to prevent terrorist attacks on potentially vulnerable targets, including critical infrastructure, and recognizes the importance of developing public -private partnerships in this area;
- 74. Underscores the role, within the United Nations, of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, including in assessing issues and trends relating to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, 1624 (2005) of 14 September 2005 and 2178 (2014), in accordance with its mandate and Council resolution 2395 (2017) of 21 December 2017, and in sharing information, as appropriate, with relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, and calls upon the Office of Counter-Terrorism, all other relevant United Nations funds and programmes, Member States, donors and recipients to use expert assessments and recommendations of the Directorate as they design technical assistance and capacity - building efforts, including in furthering the balanced implementation of the Strategy across all four of its pillars, except when requested by the assessed Member States to keep selected information confidential;
- 75. Calls for greater coordination and coherence among the United Nations entities and with stakeholders, including donors, host countries and recipients of counter-terrorism capacity-building, including in developing and maintaining effective and rule of law-based criminal justice systems, and also calls for dialogue to be enhanced among all stakeholders, with a view to placing national perspectives at the centre of such capacity-building in order to strengthen national ownership, while recognizing that rule of law activities must be anchored in a national context and that States have different national experiences in the development of their criminal justice systems, taking into account their legal, political, socioeconomic, cultural, religious and other local specificities, while also recognizing that there are common features founded on international norms and standards;
- 76. Calls upon Member States and the United Nations entities involved in supporting counter-terrorism efforts to continue to facilitate the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as due process and the rule of law, while countering terrorism,

and in this regard expresses serious concern at the occurrence of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as of international refugee and humanitarian law, committed in the context of countering terrorism;

- 77. Reiterates that, given their potential status as victims of terrorism as well as of other violations of international law, all children alleged to have, accused of having or recognized as having infringed the law, particularly those who are deprived of their liberty, as well as child victims and witnesses of crimes, should be treated in a manner consistent with their rights, dignity and needs, in accordance with applicable international law, in particular obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child,11 and, bearing in mind relevant international standards on human rights in the administration of justice in this regard, urges Member States to take relevant measures to effectively reintegrate children formerly associated with armed groups, including terrorist groups;
- 78. Urges Member States to ensure that any measures taken or means employed to counter terrorism, including the use of remotely piloted aircraft, comply with their obligations under international law, including the Charter, human rights law and international humanitarian law, in particular the principles of distinction and proportionality;
- 79. Urges States to ensure, in accordance with their obligations under international law and national regulations, and whenever international humanitarian law is applicable, that counter-terrorism legislation and measures do not impede humanitarian and medical activities or engagement with all relevant actors as foreseen by international humanitarian law;
- 80. Reaffirms the primary responsibility of States to protect the population throughout their territory, and recalls in this regard that all parties to armed conflict must comply fully with the obligations applicable to them under international humanitarian law related to the protection of civilians and medical personnel in armed conflict;
- 81. Underlines the importance of multilateral efforts in combating terrorism and refraining from any practices and measures inconsistent with international law and the principles of the Charter;
- 82. Takes note of the initiative of the Secretary-General to convene the first-ever United Nations High-level Conference of Heads of Counter-Terrorism Agencies of Member States, on 28 and 29 June 2018;
- 83. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-third session, no later than May 2019, a report containing concrete recommendations and options on ways to assess the impact of and progress in the implementation of the Strategy by the United Nations entities with a view to informing discussion among Member States in advance of the seventh biennial review of the Strategy, at the seventy-fourth session of the General Assembly;
- 84. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-fourth session, no later than February 2020, a report on progress made in the implementation of the Strategy, containing suggestions for its future implementation by the United Nations system, as well as on progress made in the implementation of the present resolution; 85. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-fourth session the item entitled “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” in order to undertake, by June 2020, an examination of the report of the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 84 above, as well as of the implementation of the Strategy by Member States, and to consider updating the Strategy to respond to changes.

UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*.
- **Dates:** Report published, December 2015.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Political violence.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** See chart further below.
- **Recommendations:** (Drawn from separate document, *Recommendations on Preventing Violent Extremism*)
    - National Plans of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism
        - National plans should be developed in a multidisciplinary manner, to include countering and preventing violent extremism measures, with input from a wide range of government actors, such as law enforcement, social service providers and ministries of education, youth and religious affairs, as well as nongovernmental actors, including youth; families; women; religious, cultural and educational leaders; civil society organizations; the media; and the private sector. Analyses of local and national drivers of violent extremism form an important point of departure for developing national plans.
        - National plans should fortify the social compact against violent extremism by promoting respect for the principle of equality before the law and equal protection under the law in all government-citizen relations, and developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels, as well as ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decisionmaking. The Secretary-General encourages parliamentarians to provide the legislative foundation for national plans of action for preventing violent extremism consistent with their national and international obligations, where necessary.
        - National plans should address the issue of foreign terrorist fighters, as called for in Security Council resolution 2178 (2014). In that resolution, the Council decided that States should ensure that their legal systems provide for the prosecution of travel for terrorism or related training; and that States should also address the financing or facilitation of such activities and prevent entry or transit through their territories, including through the usage of internationally accepted databases, of any individual with respect to whom there is credible information that provides reasonable grounds for believing that this travel is undertaken for the purpose of participating in a terrorist act. The guiding principles on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters agreed at the special meeting of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, held in Madrid on 28 July 2015, could be useful in this regard.
        - National plans should prevent violent extremist and terrorist groups from trading in oil and antiquities, hostage-taking, and receiving donations, in line with Member States' obligations under Security Council resolution 2199 (2015).
        - One means of addressing many of the drivers of violent extremism will be to align national development policies with the Sustainable Development Goals, specifically ending poverty in all its forms everywhere (Goal 1); ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all (Goal 4); achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls (Goal 5); promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all (Goal 8); reducing inequality within and among countries (Goal 10); making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (Goal 11); and promoting peaceful and

inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels (Goal 16).
    - National plans should dedicate funding for implementation by government and non-governmental entities and promote public-private partnerships, where applicable. Effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for these plans are essential to ensuring that policies are having the desired impact.
- Regional Plans of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism
    - Strengthen subregional and regional organizations, including by creating and maintaining regional contact lists of focal points, monitoring the trafficking of small arms and heavy weapons, and facilitating intergovernmental communication and cooperation. Establishing early warning centres for the exchange of information on violent extremist activities could render this interaction more predictable and could thus be of additional value.
    - Enable subregional and regional organizations to provide technical assistance to Member States in the respective subregion or region in building capacity for preventing violent extremism and support effective cooperation, for example, on border management.
- Mobilizing Resources
    - Adjusting the focus of existing funds dedicated to countering terrorism and violent extremism to enable them to also address the drivers of violent extremism, and thereby ultimately using available resources more effectively
    - Identifying other funding sources across sectors and evaluating how Governments and regional and international institutions could adapt existing funds so as to expand programming that is sensitive to preventing violent extremism.
- Dialogue and Conflict Prevention
    - Ensure that, in circumstances where military action becomes necessary to counter the expansion of violent extremist groups, any such response is in full compliance with international law, in particular with the Charter of the United Nations, international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law;
    - Engage opposing parties and regional actors earlier on and seek to forge international consensus so as to give regional and United Nations diplomacy the leverage that it needs to broker solutions. Delaying engagement reduces options, and increases financial and human costs;
    - Encourage individuals to leave violent extremist groups by developing programmes that place an emphasis on providing them with educational and economic opportunities. To avert perceptions of injustice which might result from extending assistance to these perpetrators, such programmes should not draw from initiatives addressing the needs of the wider civilian population;
    - Explore opportunities to introduce alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation, arbitration and restorative justice, to resolve conflict and achieve sustainable peace;
    - Engage religious leaders to provide a platform for intra-and interfaith dialogue and discussions through which to promote tolerance and understanding between communities, and voice their rejection of violent doctrines by emphasizing the peaceful and humanitarian values inherent in their theologies. Religious leaders also have a responsibility to themselves to seek such understanding. Tolerance is not passive: it demands the active choice to reach out on a basis of mutual understanding and respect, especially where disagreement exists;
    - Preserve the heritage of cultural and religious diversity against the attempts by violent extremists to destroy manuscripts, objects and sites that are symbols of pluralism and tolerance;

- Convene regional and national dialogues on preventing violent extremism with a range of actors, encompassing youth engagement, gender equality, the inclusion of marginalized groups, the role of municipalities, and positive outreach through social media and other virtual platforms.

- Strengthening Good Governance, Human Rights and the Rule of Law
  - Review all national legislation, policies, strategies and practices aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism to ascertain whether they are firmly grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law, and whether they put in place national mechanisms designed to ensure compliance. This may also involve taking measures to strengthen the rule of law, repealing discriminatory legislation and implementing policies and laws that combat discrimination and exclusion; 2.
  - Provide access to justice for all and strengthen fair, effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels, in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; 3.
  - Foster non-discriminatory basic service provision, ensure accountability for service delivery, and extend state services to remote areas and create an environment where entrepreneurship can flourish and societies can become more peaceful, just and inclusive;
  - Strengthen the professionalism of security forces, law enforcement agencies and justice institutions; and ensure effective oversight and accountability of such bodies, in conformity with international human rights law and the rule of law. This may involve providing dedicated human rights training to security forces, law enforcement agents and all those involved in the administration of justice regarding the prohibition of incitement to hatred and, more broadly, respect for human rights within the context of measures taken to counter violent extremism and terrorism;
  - Ensure accountability for gross violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including those amounting to crimes under international law, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, through criminal procedures adhering to due-process guarantees. Accountability mechanisms should have relevant gender expertise to fulfil their mandates. In cases where national procedures are not able or are unwilling to address such crimes, the international community should support accountability efforts, including through a referral of such situations by the Security Council to the International Criminal Court or to an ad hoc tribunal, where appropriate;
  - Reform national legal frameworks and penitentiary systems to ensure the security of inmates, personnel and facilities and establish procedures to prevent and counter radicalization in prisons based on human rights and the rule of law;
  - Introduce disengagement, rehabilitation and counselling programmes for persons engaged in violent extremism which are gender-sensitive and include programmes for children to facilitate their reintegration into society. These programmes must be in full compliance with international human rights norms and standards, including the rights to freedom of movement, freedom of expression and privacy, gender equality and the principle of non-discrimination;
  - Promote the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, including through human rights-based initiatives that help eliminate the conditions conducive to violent extremism. Such programmes can be particularly helpful when one group, whatever its demographic weight, behaves monopolistically in the political and economic sectors at the expense of other groups;
  - Implement Security Council resolution 1624 (2005), promoting a comprehensive approach to incitement and violent extremism, and the Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,

hostility or violence (A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, appendix), involving all relevant actors, such as national human rights institutions, civil society, political parties and the media;
    - Prevent the subversion of the work of educational, cultural and religious institutions by terrorists and their supporters, as highlighted in Security Council resolution 1624 (2005); take appropriate measures against all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief, as exhibited in particular in the curricula of formal and non-formal educational institutions, and textbooks and teaching methods;
    - Ensure that any restrictions on freedom of expression are clearly and narrowly defined and meet the three-part test of legality, proportionality and necessity.
- Engaging Communities
    - Develop joint and participatory strategies, including with civil society and local communities, to prevent the emergence of violent extremism, protect communities from recruitment and the threat of violent extremism, and support confidence-building measures at the community level by providing appropriate platforms for dialogue and the early identification of grievances;
    - Adopt community-oriented policing models and programmes that seek to solve local issues in partnership with the community and are firmly based on human rights so as to avoid putting community members at risk. This would increase public awareness and vigilance and improve police understanding and knowledge with regard to communities, thus enhancing their ability to be proactive and identify grievances and critical issues at an early stage;
    - Develop local and family-based mentorship programmes, based on a one-to-one relationship between mentor and mentee, focusing on vulnerable individuals or those who have been convicted of or charged with criminal acts related to violent extremism;
    - Provide medical, psychosocial and legal service support in communities that give shelter to victims of violent extremists, including victims of sexual and gender-based crimes;
    - Encourage civic and professional associations, unions and chambers of commerce to reach out through their own networks to marginalized groups so as to address challenges together through inclusive dialogue and consensual politics;
    - Support the establishment of regional and global networks for civil society, youth, women's organizations and religious leaders to enable them to share good practices and experience so as to improve work in their respective communities and promote intercultural and interfaith dialogue;
    - Promote, in partnership with civil society and communities, a discourse that addresses the drivers of violent extremism, including ongoing human rights violations. Address any existing human rights violations, as a matter of both legal obligation and credibility.
- Empowering Youth
    - Support and enhance young women's and young men's participation in activities aimed at preventing violent extremism by prioritizing meaningful engagement mechanisms at the national, regional and global levels, as laid out in the 2015 Amman Declaration on Youth, Peace and Security; and provide a physically, socially and emotionally safe and supportive environment for the participation of young women and men in preventing violent extremism;
    - Integrate young women and men into decision-making processes at local and national levels, including by establishing youth councils and similar mechanisms which give young women and men a platform for participating in mainstream political discourse; 3. Foster trust between decision makers and young women and men, especially through intergenerational dialogue and youth-adult confidence-building activities and training;

    - Involve hard-to-reach young women and men, such as those from underrepresented groups, in efforts to prevent violent extremism, as laid out in the Guiding Principles on Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding;
    - Establish national mentoring programmes for young women and men, create space for personal growth in their chosen fields, and offer opportunities for community service which can enable them to become leaders and actors for constructive change;
    - Ensure that a portion of all funds dedicated to addressing violent extremism are committed to projects that address young people's specific needs or empower them and encourage international financial institutions, foundations and other donors to provide small grant funding mechanisms to women and young social entrepreneurs to enable them to develop their own ideas on strengthening community resilience against violent extremism.
- Gender Equality and Empowering Women
    - Mainstream gender perspectives across efforts to prevent violent extremism;
    - Invest in gender-sensitive research and data collection on women's roles in violent extremism, including on identifying the drivers that lead women to join violent extremist groups, and on the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on their lives, in order to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses;
    - Include women and other underrepresented groups in national law enforcement and security agencies, including as part of counter-terrorism prevention and response frameworks;
    - Build the capacity of women and their civil society groups to engage in prevention and response efforts related to violent extremism;
    - Ensure that a portion of all funds dedicated to addressing violent extremism are committed to projects that address women's specific needs or empower women, as recommended in my recent report to the Security Council on women and peace and security (S/2015/716).
- Education, Skill Development and Employment Facilitation
    - Invest in education, in particular early childhood education, from ages 3 to 8, to ensure that all children have access to inclusive, high-quality education, taking into account diverse social and cultural settings;
    - Implement education programmes that promote "global citizenship", soft skills, critical thinking and digital literacy, and explore means of introducing civic education into school curricula, textbooks and teaching materials. Build the capacity of teachers and educators to support this agenda;
    - Provide comprehensive primary through tertiary education, including technical and vocational education, and mentoring for all vulnerable people, including the displaced, by leveraging online and mobile technology;
    - Collaborate with local authorities to create social and economic opportunities, in both rural and urban locations; invest in equipping people with the skills needed to meet local labour demands through relevant education opportunities;
    - Provide young people with additional career options by fostering an entrepreneurial culture and offering entrepreneurship education, facilitating employment searches and job-matching, enacting regulations to promote the development of micro and small enterprises, easing access to finance and microcredit and increasing the range of support services such as marketing and distribution, so as to unleash the full economic potential of youth;
    - Invite the private sector and other civil society actors to contribute to postconflict reconciliation and reconstruction efforts, especially job creation, facilitation and training opportunities.
- Strategic Communications, the Internet and Social Media

- Develop and implement national communications strategies, in close cooperation with social media companies and the private sector, that are tailored to local contexts, gender sensitive and based on international human rights standards, to challenge the narratives associated with violent extremism;
- Encourage more research on the relationship between the misuse of the Internet and social media by violent extremists and the factors that drive individuals towards violent extremism;
- Promote grass-roots efforts to advance the values of tolerance, pluralism and understanding;
- Ensure that national legal frameworks protect freedom of opinion and expression, pluralism, and diversity of the media;
- Empower and enable victims to transform their loss and suffering into a constructive force for preventing violent extremism by providing them with online forums where they can tell their stories;
- Protect journalists, who play a crucial role in democratic societies, by ensuring the prompt and thorough investigation of threats to their safety, and encourage journalists to work together to voluntarily develop media training and industry codes of conduct which foster tolerance and respect.

- Supporting Member States, regional bodies and communities through the United Nations
  - Adopt an All-of-UN approach to supporting national, regional and global efforts to prevent violent extremism through the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination, as well as through existing United Nations inter-agency bodies and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and its entities, which bear the primary responsibility for supporting Member States in implementing all four pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. By adopting an All-of-UN approach through the Task Force framework, the Organization will coordinate its action more closely and help channel and share initiatives that have proved effective;
  - Integrate preventing violent extremism into relevant activities of United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions in accordance with their mandates, as well as into relevant activities of United Nations country teams in order to build the capacity of Member States through such mechanisms as the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks, the United Nations common country assessments, youth advisory Boards, the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform programming;
  - Encourage United Nations governing and executive boards to enhance the capacities of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to support Member States in developing and implementing their national plans of action for preventing violent extremism;
  - Offer capacity-building programmes aimed at strengthening national and regional capacities to develop institutional plans designed to prevent violent extremism and share good practices, and assist Member States in adopting relevant legislation and policies in close coordination with the relevant United Nations country teams, special representatives of the Secretary-General, peace operations where deployed, and entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre;
  - Launch a United Nations global communications strategy to prevent violent extremism, grounded in United Nations core values of peace, justice, tolerance and human dignity as they are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and other instruments, reinforcing these shared values around the world and supporting Member States in tailoring their own national and local communication strategies, upon their request; 6. Further strengthen early and effective action through the Human Rights Upfront Initiative to prevent or respond to large-scale violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law, at both the policy and the operational level;

- Develop a standing United Nations prevention of violent extremism platform to direct the implementation of this Plan, facilitated by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and supported by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre. This platform would coordinate policy within the United Nations system and support Member States in developing their institutional responses to violent extremism at the local, national and regional levels by sharing lessons learned. It should foster cooperation between Member States, including through South-South and triangular partnerships.
- Support Governments seeking to develop and implement education programmes that promote civic education, soft skills, critical thinking, digital literacy, tolerance and respect for diversity, including, for example, peace education modules for the use of school-age children, in order to promote the culture of non-violence;
- Launch a global awareness campaign to support victims of violent extremism and provide them with a global platform within which to share their stories by expanding the Victims of Terrorism Support Portal;
- Encourage youth exchange programmes within and among Member States, which could be further developed into global community service and global youth programmes to enhance cross-cultural understanding, promote learning of new skills and support development initiatives;
- Invite relevant private actors, including communications and social media companies, to support the prevention of violent extremism initiatives and generate creative ideas to help the international community effectively address the spread of violent extremism through the Internet;
- Develop a proposal for a Secretary-General's fund to support innovative projects aimed at preventing violent extremism, especially in the fields of communications and community empowerment.

Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UNDP.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity: A development response to addressing radicalization and violence extremism*. (UNDP's adaptation of the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.)
- **Dates:** Published, February 2017.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Political violence.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A
- **Recommendations:**
  - Strengthening local government capacities for service delivery and security
    - Limited state capacity particularly manifests itself at the subnational level where people have the most direct contact with state institutions, and where the lack of services and security becomes most apparent. Improving the quality of services and of engagement between authorities and people enhances public trust and state legitimacy that are at the root of just and peaceful societies. UNDP support focuses on strengthening the capacities of local institutions, local economic actors, and communities to develop and pursue the realization of local development outcomes that are relevant to local needs and aspirations. By grounding development choices in the needs of the people – particularly the poor, marginalized and traditionally excluded groups - and fostering transparency, accountability, participation and ownership, local governments become forefront players in combating exclusion and reverse long-held perceptions of economic and social injustice.
  - Supporting credible intermediaries to promote dialogue and re-integration
    - The more a society provides opportunities for dialogue, and for different groups to develop mutual understanding with one another, the greater the chance that trust, tolerance and respect for diversity will flourish. But many authorities today, in particular in urban communities, claim they no longer feel the pulse of their communities and lack the capacity for outreach and communication with those inclined to join the ranks of violent extremists. Conversely, many disaffected and alienated persons complain that they are no longer understood, respected, or accepted by their families, community, or state authority structures. This is partly due to the profound gaps in intergenerational communication generated by modern technology and culture. Approaches centered on an active listening of their concerns, on inclusive dialogue, and on fostering active and open participation in public processes, can have a transformative impact. But critical changes in political and social attitudes and behaviors cannot be manipulated from the outside. They have to emerge from the organic conditions of a society. This requires trusted and credible "insider mediators" able to engage relevant political, social, and civic leaderships, build dialogue across lines of tension, and convene and facilitate critical conversations. These mediators – traditional or religious leaders (women or men), civic activists, artists, teachers, media anchors etc. with legitimacy to mediate – can play an important early warning role, identifying potential signs of radicalization or recruitment by extremists. The spread of ideologies that preach intolerance for divergent opinions or lifestyles as well as increased gender-based violence are key precursors of extremism spreading into the mainstream. Building on a recently released Guidance Note on support for "insider mediation," prepared jointly with the European Union, UNDP will work with partners to develop in-depth

guidance on identifying and working with credible intermediaries in situations characterized by the risk of violent extremism.

- Promoting gender equality and women's empowerment
  - The systematic discrimination and abuse of women is a strategic and deliberate tactic of a number of violent extremist groups. As the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict has written, "extremist groups like ISIL and Boko Haram view female bodies as vessels for producing a new generation that can be raised in their own image, according to their radical ideology." Even before violent extremism has taken root, key indicators of the spread of extremist ideologies include increased discrimination against women and girls. That is why advocating for and reinforcing the equal rights of women and girls and ensuring that gender equality laws and policies are put in place and enforced, are important building blocks of an action plan to prevent violent extremism. In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia and the Middle East, women have been at the forefront of efforts to counter the political, social and cultural factors that enable violent extremism. Women are among the most powerful voices of prevention – in their homes, schools and communities - and women's organizations and movements have played a significant role in advocating for inclusion and tolerance. Women's organizations also provide alternative social, educational and economic activities for at-risk young women and men. Hence they can uniquely help build the social cohesion needed to resist the appeal of a violent extremist group. Most of the current counter-violent extremist programs however focus only on men. Women are also absent from the decision-making processes on how to address violent extremism. A closer understanding of the roles women play in relation to violence and conflict is critical to the development of tailored strategies to strengthen resilience against violent extremism and to support victims and survivors. This not only requires reaching out to natural allies such as human-rights organizations, educational institutions and policy-makers already engaged in preventing violent extremism, but also calls for engaging with religious leaders, the media, community leaders, women's organizations, security forces and the private sector to promote values in compliance with international human rights standards and norms. Investing in women's economic autonomy is also critical in preventing violent extremism as women's economic status builds their own resilience, as well as that of their families, against joining extremist groups.
- Engaging youth in building social cohesion
  - More than half of the world's population is under the age of 30, and while most youth are peaceful, they nevertheless form the backbone of the world's paramilitary and terrorist groups. Violent extremism is thus disproportionally impacting young people, as they more easily get lured into radical thinking. The vulnerability of youth seems to be increasing as families lose control over the education and lifestyle of their children, in particular because young people increasingly move to urban areas in search of jobs. When societies fail to integrate youth in meaningful ways, young people are more likely to engage in political violence. Young people however do play an important positive role. Youth are already transforming their communities, countering violence and building peace. Yet their efforts remain largely invisible due to lack of adequate mechanisms for participation, and lack of opportunities to partner with decision-making bodies. UNDP's work on youth therefore supports young men and women and their organizations as leaders and peacebuilders, as promoters of social cohesion in their communities and as actors for early warning and re-integration.
- Working with faith-based organizations and religious leaders

- UNDP's approach reflects a growing appreciation for the unique role that religion, faith, and religious communities and leaders can play in global development efforts. Religion is a source of motivation and inspiration for the vast majority of people around the world, who act in a spirit of generosity and kindness. Strategies to combat violent extremism must be rooted in a nuanced understanding of the role of religion, ideology and identity and its impact on individuals, communities and institutions. It is also important to counter the growing narrative that it is religion per se that is the cause of violence; manipulation of religious politics and fanatical ideas is the challenge. Religious leaders therefore bear a particular responsibility to help prevent violent extremism. "Intra-faith" and "inter-faith" dialogues at the regional and global levels can promote a counter-narrative to violent extremism, and also develop more concrete measures at the local and community levels that could be implemented through networks of religious organizations and institutions. Regional context needs to be taken into account.

- Working with the media to promote human rights and tolerance
  - To counter the narrative of radical groups to convince people to join their ranks, a communications strategy needs to be proactive, not only reactive to the seductive language used by extremists. UNDP will work with select partners to develop an online interactive platform for those advocating creative approaches to enhance inclusion, promotion of human rights, social cohesion and tolerance, gender equality and women's empowerment; and to reach out to and engage in dialogue with disaffected groups and individuals. The voices of women, youth, and religious leaders as well as victims, survivors and returnees are important in this approach. A communications tool-kit, including a guide for the use of social media, will be developed for use by development partners, governments, media and civic organizations in reaching out to and engaging with those susceptible to violent extremism. UNDP will partner with global and regional media to create messages of tolerance and respect for diversity and gender equality that can be launched on national and local TV, in schools, universities, sports clubs, and religious and community centers to discourage people from joining radical groups or to encourage them to disengage from these groups. The usefulness of "social marketing" approaches and "strategic communications" will also be examined to see how peaceful activism and mobilization might be promoted as a viable alternative leading to individual and collective empowerment.
- Promoting respect for human rights, diversity and a culture of global citizenship in schools
  - The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda pledges to foster inter-cultural understanding and an ethic of global citizenship, which means tolerance, respect for human rights and for different cultures, genders, religions and lifestyles. Education plays a key role in creating this ethic of global citizenship. UNDP will work with the education system including religious, public and private schools that are directly engaged in educating youth. Many religious schools operate unregulated and it is not always known whether their curricula promote global citizenship and respect for human rights or instead preach conservative sectarianism and contribute to radicalization. Experts have therefore called for the standardization of school curricula (including in religious schools) to prevent the radicalization of schoolchildren.

Youth, Peace and Security Agenda

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document.
- **Dates:** Adopted December 2015.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Political violence; crisis of legitimacy
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A
- **Recommendations:** (clauses)
  - 1. Urges Member States to consider ways to increase inclusive representation of youth in decision-making at all levels in local, national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict, including institutions and mechanisms to counter violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, and, as appropriate, to consider establishing integrated mechanisms for meaningful participation of youth in peace processes and dispute-resolution;
  - 2. Calls on all relevant actors, including when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to take into account, as appropriate, the participation and views of youth, recognising that their marginalisation is detrimental to building sustainable peace in all societies, including, inter alia, such specific aspects as:
    - (a) The needs of youth during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;
    - (b) Measures that support local youth peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve youth in the implementation mechanisms of peace agreements;
    - (c) Measures to empower youth in peacebuilding and conflict resolution;
  - 3. Stresses the importance of Security Council missions taking into account youth-related considerations including, as appropriate, through consultation with local and international youth groups;
  - 4. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to comply strictly with the obligations applicable to them under international law relevant to the protection of civilians, including those who are youth, including the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977;
  - 5. Further calls upon states to comply with the obligations applicable to them under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;
  - 6. Further calls upon Member States to comply with their respective obligations to end impunity and further calls on them to investigate and prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other egregious crimes perpetrated against civilians, including youth, noting that the fight against impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern has been strengthened through the work on and prosecution of these crimes by the International Criminal Court, ad hoc and mixed tribunals and specialized chambers in national tribunals;
  - 7. Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take the necessary measures to protect civilians, including those who are youth, from all forms of sexual and gender-based violence;
  - 8. Reaffirms that states must respect and ensure the human rights of all individuals, including youth, within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction as provided for by relevant international law and reaffirms that each state bears the primary responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity;

- 9. Urges Member States to consider specific measures, in conformity with international law, that ensure, during armed conflict and post conflict, the protection of civilians, including youth;
- 10. Urges Members States to facilitate an inclusive and enabling environment in which youth actors, including youth from different backgrounds, are recognised and provided with adequate support to implement violence prevention activities and support social cohesion;
- 11. Stresses the importance of creating policies for youth that would positively contribute to peacebuilding efforts, including social and economic development, supporting projects designed to grow local economies, and provide youth employment opportunities and vocational training, fostering their education, and promoting youth entrepreneurship and constructive political engagement;
- 12. Urges Member States to support, as appropriate, quality education for peace that equips youth with the ability to engage constructively in civic structures and inclusive political processes;
- 13. Calls on all relevant actors to consider instituting mechanisms to promote a culture of peace, tolerance, intercultural and interreligious dialogue that involve youth and discourage their participation in acts of violence, terrorism, xenophobia, and all forms of discrimination;
- 14. Urges Member States to increase, as appropriate, their political, financial, technical and logistical support, that take account of the needs and participation of youth in peace efforts, in conflict and post-conflict situations, including those undertaken by relevant entities, funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations Peacebuilding fund, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Population Fund, UN-Women, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and other relevant bodies, and actors at regional and international levels;
- 15. Stresses the vital role the Peacebuilding Commission in addressing the conditions and factors leading to the rise of radicalization to violence and violent extremism among youth, which can be conducive to terrorism, by including in its advice and recommendations for peace building strategies ways to engage youth meaningfully during and in the aftermath of armed conflict;
- 16. Encourages Member States to engage relevant local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts, address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, including by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society and adopt tailored approaches to countering recruitment to this kind of violent extremism and promoting social inclusion and cohesion;
- 17. Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the needs of youth affected by armed conflict, including, inter alia, such specific aspects as:
    - (a) evidence-based and gender-sensitive youth employment opportunities, inclusive labour policies, national youth employment action plans in partnership with the private sector, developed in partnership with youth and recognising the interrelated role of education, employment and training in preventing the marginalisation of youth;
    - (b) investment in building young persons' capabilities and skills to meet labour demands through relevant education opportunities designed in a manner which promotes a culture of peace;
    - (c) support for youth-led and peacebuilding organisations as partners in youth employment and entrepreneurship programs;

- 18. Notes its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to consider their potential impact on the population, including youth;
- 19. Invites relevant entities of the United Nations, Rapporteurs and Special Envoys and Representatives of the Secretary-General, including the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth and the Special Envoy for Youth Refugees, to improve the coordination and interaction regarding the needs of youth during armed conflicts and post-conflict situations;
- 20. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out a progress study on the youth's positive contribution to peace processes and conflict resolution, in order to recommend effective responses at local, national, regional and international levels, and further requests the Secretary-General to make the results of this study available to the Security Council and all Member States of the United Nations;
- 21. Also requests the Secretary-General to include in his reports in the context of situations that are on the agenda of the Council the measures taken in the implementation of this resolution, including information on youth in situations of armed conflict and the existence of measures relating to the prevention, partnerships, participation, protection, disengagement and reintegration of youth under this resolution;
- 22. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter

HIGH-LEVEL PANELS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS

Cross-cutting

High-level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** high-level panel (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnerships and People*
- **Dates:** Report released, June 2015; panel established, October 2014.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Political Violence.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (summary only)
  - Four essential shifts
    - Politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations
      - Lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions. Political solutions should always guide the design and deployment of United Nations peace operations. When the momentum behind peace falters, the United Nations, and particularly Member States, must help to mobilize renewed political efforts to keep peace processes on track.
    - The full spectrum of United Nations peace operations must be used more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground
      - The United Nations has a uniquely broad spectrum of peace operations that it can draw upon to deliver situation-specific responses. And yet, it often struggles to generate and rapidly deploy missions that are well tailored to the context. The sharp distinctions between peacekeeping operations and special political missions should give way to a continuum of responses and smoother transitions between different phases of missions. The United Nations should embrace the term "peace operations" to denote the full spectrum of responses required and invest in strengthening the underlying analysis, strategy and planning that leads to more successful designs of missions. Sequenced and prioritized mandates will allow missions to develop over time rather than trying to do everything at once, and failing.
    - A stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnership is needed for the future
      - A stronger global-regional peace and security partnership is needed to respond to the more challenging crises of tomorrow. Common purpose and resolve must be established from the outset of a new operation and must be maintained throughout through enhanced collaboration and consultation. The United Nations system too must pull together in a more integrated manner in the service of conflict prevention and peace. All of those partnerships must be underpinned by mutual respect and mutual responsibilities.
    - The United Nations Secretariat must become more field-focused and United Nations peace operations must be more people-centred
      - There must be an awakening of United Nations Headquarters to the distinct and important needs of field missions, and a renewed resolve on the part of United Nations peace operations personnel to engage with, serve and protect the people they have been mandated to assist.
  - New approaches
    - Conflict prevention and mediation must be brought back to the fore
      - The prevention of armed conflict is perhaps the greatest responsibility of the international community, and yet it has not been sufficiently invested in. A decade ago, the World Summit stressed the need for a "culture of prevention". Since then a number of changes have been made but a prevention culture has not been embraced

by the Organization and its Member States. Member States have not sufficiently invested in addressing root causes of conflict nor has the United Nations generally been able to engage early enough in emerging crises.

  - The United Nations must invest in its own capacities to undertake prevention and mediation and in its capacity to assist others, particularly at the national and regional levels. The Security Council, supported by the Secretariat, should seek to play an earlier role in addressing emerging conflicts and must do so with impartiality. At the global level, the United Nations must mobilize a new international commitment to preventing conflict and mobilizing partnerships to support political solutions. It must find ways to draw upon the knowledge and resources of others beyond the United Nations system through civil society, including community, religious, youth and women groups, and the global business community.

- Protection of civilians is a core obligation of the United Nations, but expectations and capability must converge
  - Significant progress has been made in promoting norms and frameworks for the protection of civilians. And yet, on the ground, the results are mixed and the gap between what is asked for and what peace operations can deliver has widened in more difficult environments. The protection of civilians is a national responsibility and United Nations peace operations can play an important role in supporting Governments to execute that responsibility. United Nations missions and non-governmental actors have important unarmed and civilian tools for protecting civilians and working with communities.
  - The United Nations must rise to the challenge of protecting civilians in the face of imminent threat, and must do so proactively and effectively, but also with recognition of its limits. Protection mandates must be realistic and linked to a wider political approach. Closing the gap between what is asked of missions to protect civilians and what they can provide demands improvements across several dimensions: assessments and planning capabilities, timely information and communication, leadership and training, as well as more focused mandates.
  - The Secretariat must be frank in its assessments to the Security Council about what is required to respond to threats to civilians. In turn, Member States should provide the necessary resources and lend their influence and leverage to respond to threats against civilians. When a protection crisis occurs, United Nations personnel cannot stand by as civilians are threatened or killed. They must use every tool available to them to protect civilians under imminent threat. Each and every peacekeeper, whether military, police or civilian, must pass that test when crisis presents itself.
- Clarity is needed on the use of force and in the role of United Nations peace operations and others in managing armed conflict
  - While some missions are working to implement ceasefires or implement peace agreements, others are operating in environments with no peace to keep. They are struggling to contain or manage conflict and to keep alive the prospects for a resumption of a peace process. The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations believes that the United Nations may see more, not less, of those situations in the future. Its existing concepts, tools and capabilities for peace implementation do not always serve those missions well. For such situations there must be a new approach to mandating and resourcing missions, while also setting out the limits of ambition of what the United Nations can achieve in such settings. Every effort must be made to establish minimum conditions to ensure a mission's viability and to define "success" more realistically in such settings.

        - Where armed conflict is ongoing, missions will struggle to establish themselves, particularly if they are not perceived to be impartial. Although efforts are under way to strengthen capabilities, United Nations peacekeeping operations are often poorly suited to those operating environments, and others must come forward to respond. The Panel believes that there are outer limits for United Nations peacekeeping operations defined by their composition, character and inherent capability limitations. Peacekeeping operations are but one tool at the disposal of the Security Council and they should perform a circumscribed set of roles. In that regard, the Panel believes that United Nations troops should not undertake military counterterrorism operations. Extreme caution should guide the mandating of enforcement tasks to degrade, neutralize or defeat a designated enemy. Such operations should be exceptional, time-limited and undertaken with full awareness of the risks and responsibilities for the United Nations mission as a whole. Where a parallel force is engaged in offensive combat operations it is important for United Nations peacekeeping operations to maintain a clear division of labour and distinction of roles.
        - The Panel has heard many views on the core principles of United Nations peacekeeping. The Panel is convinced of their importance in guiding successful United Nations peacekeeping operations. Yet, those principles must be interpreted progressively and with flexibility in the face of new challenges, and they should never be an excuse for failure to protect civilians or to defend the mission proactively.
    - Political vigilance is needed to sustain peace
        - Peace processes do not end when a peace agreement has been signed or an election held. The international community must sustain high-level political engagement in support of national efforts to deepen and broaden processes of inclusion and reconciliation, as well as address the underlying causes of conflict. Peace operations, like other actors, must work to overcome deficits in supporting conflict-affected countries in sustaining peace, including supply-driven templates and an overly technocratic focus on capitals and elites, and the risk of unintentionally exacerbating divisions. Strong support for reconciliation and healing is also critical to preventing relapse into conflict.
        - Peace operations have a key role to play in mobilizing political support for reforms and resources for critical gaps in State capacity, as well as supporting others to revitalize livelihoods in conflict-affected economies. Engagement with affected communities should help build confidence in political processes and responsible State structures. Missions must focus first and foremost on creating political commitment and the space for others to address important elements in sustaining peace.
        - The security sector must be a particular focus, owing to its potential to disrupt peace in many countries, with the United Nations in a convening and coordinating role, if requested. A significant change in policing approaches is needed to better support national police development and reform. Those efforts should be linked to the whole “justice chain”, ensuring an integrated approach between human rights and rule of law capacities. In sustaining peace, the United Nations system must overcome structural and other impediments to working together, including through more innovative resourcing options. Missions must work closely with their national counterparts and United Nations and regional partners to ensure that the least disruption is caused when they transition and depart.
- Empowering the field and strengthening the foundations
    - Setting clear direction and forging common purpose

- It is essential that the United Nations develop more realistic and contextualized political strategies. They must be based on improved analysis, strategy and planning. Achievable mandates can be crafted through meaningful and effective consultations between the Security Council, Secretariat, regional actors and, when uniformed forces are required, with troop- and police-contributing countries. The Panel believes that the use of two-stage mandating should become a regular practice. Sequenced authorization of mandates will help design better-tailored missions with more focused and prioritized mandates. The Panel believes it is past time to institutionalize a framework to engage troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat to truly forge a common and realistic understanding of the mandate and what capabilities and standards are required to implement the mission.

- Improving the speed, capability and performance of uniformed personnel
  - The United Nations and its partners must overcome significant constraints to rapid deployment in response to crises. That should include a more robust framework of standby first responder capabilities that the Security Council can draw upon in response to the crises of the future as well as a modest United Nations rapid response capability to establish an initial mission presence and to reinforce missions in crisis. The United Nations has sustained for a decade high deployment levels in difficult environments. A new strategic force generation approach is being attempted and must be resourced and supported by stronger political efforts, including through greater consultation with current and potential contributors as well as a wider willingness to commit forces. Those efforts must be accompanied by internal changes in how the United Nations mobilizes, deploys and sustains its uniformed personnel. Innovative approaches are required to obtain specialized capabilities and to define a logistical support approach purpose-built to deliver greater tactical mobility. A more comprehensive medium-term framework for defining capabilities and performance improvement should be built from ongoing initiatives, along with a stronger global training partnership to address priority training requirements.
- Strengthening global and regional partnerships
  - The United Nations must play a leading role in forming a vision for a stronger global-regional partnership for peace and security to ensure that the Security Council is able to call upon a more resilient and capable network of actors in response to future threats. To that end, the United Nations should embrace a future role of not only working alongside regional organizations but also enabling them to share the burden in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In particular, the United Nations should deepen its strategic partnership with the African Union and on a case-by-case basis provide enabling support, including through more predictable financing, to African Union peace support operations when authorized by the Security Council, even as the African Union builds its own capacity and resources for that purpose.
- Putting policy into practice
  - The United Nations has still to put into practice many of its policy commitments, including improving the selection, preparation and accountability of senior mission leaders, through merit-based selection processes and increased appointment of women to senior leadership positions. The Panel proposes a number of ways to more effectively integrate women, peace and security and human rights throughout mission life cycles and across mandated tasks, including through strengthened backstopping and advice and promoting accountability for integrating gender and human rights at the senior mission leadership level, as well as by operationalizing the Secretary-General's Human Rights Up Front agenda. Vital for today's more insecure settings is

improving safety, security and crisis management systems and improved medical standards as well as ensuring that compensation and fatalities management are responsibly managed for the future. The impact and positive presence of missions should also be enhanced by better communications, both globally and locally, and improving the Organization's commitment to environmental impact. The United Nations should ensure effective uptake of field appropriate technology in support of its peace operations.

- Engaging with host countries and local communities
  - Engagement must increasingly be regarded as core to mission success. By shifting from merely consulting with local people to actively including them in their work, missions are able to monitor and respond to how local people experience the impact of peace operations. That helps the mission to ensure that it does no harm. Ongoing community engagement also helps the mission to design better protection strategies to ensure the mission is more effective in improving the lives of the people it is deployed to serve and protect.
- Addressing abuse and enhancing accountability
  - Ten years after the United Nations began systematically addressing it, sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations are continuing, to the enduring shame of the Organization, its personnel and the countries which provide the peacekeepers who abuse. The deplorable acts of a few must not be allowed to drag down the Organization, its staff and its troop- and police-contributing countries. It is in everyone's interest that accountability be improved and justice provided. Immunity does not apply to civilian personnel for sexual exploitation and abuse. Troop-contributing countries must vigorously investigate and prosecute national personnel. The Secretary-General should report on actions taken and not taken by individual Member States in follow-up to credible allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The United Nations should ensure that individual victims of sexual exploitation and abuse are compensated for the harm they suffer from United Nations personnel.
- Improving support systems to enable more responsive and accountable peace operations
  - The messages received from the field have been resounding: United Nations administrative procedures, particularly in the field of human resources, are failing missions and their mandates. The budgets of peace operations are more than four times larger than the rest of the United Nations Secretariat, and 55 per cent of all Secretariat staff serve in peace operations and most of those in hardship duty stations. And yet, United Nations field operations are tied to an administrative framework that treats their requirements as "exceptions" to Headquarters-focused policies, administrative procedures and practices. Delegations of authority must be reassigned to those who have the responsibility to deliver, and support policies and procedures must be reviewed to support more effective, efficient field operations. A more field-focused administrative framework must be matched by strong assurances of responsible and accountable management of resources.
- Supporting innovation and important resourcing requirements
  - The Panel encourages Member States to maintain the momentum of reform in the resourcing of United Nations peace operations and to explore further opportunities to improve both operational effectiveness and efficiency across missions, including through regional support approaches. The Panel encourages a more strategic and results-oriented focus in budget preparation and oversight, and innovations such as regional support and new approaches to delivering mandates through programmatic funding should be pursued. Essential to more successful prevention and mediation

efforts by the United Nations, as well as for more effective political missions on the ground, is the need to make progress on supporting the funding and backstopping arrangements of United Nations special political missions. In that regard, the Panel calls upon the General Assembly to support the proposals suggested in 2011 by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

- Improving Headquarters leadership, management and reform
  - The current Secretariat structures entrusted with supporting the peace and security endeavours of the United Nations are at times hampering the effective design and delivery of United Nations peace operations through insufficient strategic guidance, coordination and emphasis on political solutions. Previous efforts to solve those problems through coordination or other structures have failed to deliver meaningful change. The Panel believes the status quo must change. The Secretary-General should develop options for restructuring the Secretariat peace and security architecture, with a view to strengthening leadership and management and removing compartmentalized Headquarters approaches to ensure more effective field-oriented support to United Nations peace operations. The Secretary-General should consider the creation of an additional Deputy Secretary-General position responsible for peace and security; establish, from existing Secretariat resources, an analysis and planning capacity to support United Nations peace operations; and develop a proposal for a single “peace operations account” to finance all peace operations and their related backstopping activities in future.

High-level Panel on Women's Economic Empowerment

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** high-level panel (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: First Report – *Leave No One Behind: A Call to Action for Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment*; Second Report – *Leave No One Behind: Taking Action for Transformational Change on Women's Economic Empowerment*.
- **Dates:** First report released, 2016; Second report released, 2017; panel established, February 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - First Report – *Leave No One Behind: A Call to Action for Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment*
    - Governments:
      - Remove discriminatory legislation and provide a positive policy and legal environment that supports women's economic empowerment, including:
      - Establishing non-discrimination, adequate minimum wages, equal pay for work of equal value, maternity protection and paid parental leave.
      - Setting and enforcing effective laws to protect women from violence and exploitation at work.
      - Creating an enabling environment for decent work for all.
      - Adopt macroeconomic policies to boost short-term and long-term inclusive economic growth.
      - Deliver gender-smart employment and procurement practices.
      - Recognize women workers' organizations and create structures where they can be represented.
      - Ratify ILO Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) setting labour standards for domestic workers.
      - Provide adequate support to enable women to work productively, including by investing in quality public care services and decent care jobs, social protection for all, and infrastructure that supports women's safe access to economic opportunities.
      - Invest in norm change campaigns and support community-level norm change programmes, including through education.
      - Spearhead national processes for data collection and identification of national and local priorities.
    - Businesses:
      - Urgently address discrimination, implicit bias, abuse and health and safety issues in their workforce and ensure that suppliers do the same.
      - Create enabling environments for female employees to succeed in businesses through flexible work options, family-friendly policies, equal pay for work of equal value, as well as training, mentoring and sponsorship.
      - Invest in initiatives and mechanisms to reduce and redistribute unpaid care and work. These investments not only have major benefits for individuals and families but also major benefits for the economy, businesses and society at large.
      - Promote positive role-modeling of economically empowered women and leaders. Integrate and support women, women-owned enterprises and women's collective enterprises in supply chains.
      - Create products and services to meet the needs of underserved groups of women.

    - Work in partnerships with governments and civil society to achieve financial and digital inclusion for women.
    - Challenge stereotypes through advertising and media communications.
    - Map and monitor performance on gender equality in business operations, including throughout supply chains and share success stories to inspire others in a race to the top.
    - Adopt the Women's Empowerment Principles.
- Civil society: Women and their organizations:
    - Work with women, particularly the most marginalized, to amplify their voices and support representative organizations to negotiate with local and national government and other bodies.
    - Encourage women's participation and leadership in trades unions, organizations of informal workers, and employers' and business membership organizations.
    - Bring together women for networking and mentoring.
    - Take forward advocacy and strategic litigation to protect the rights of informal, or otherwise vulnerable, workers.
- International development institutions:
    - Establish and implement gender strategies, under the SDG framework, to ensure that:
    - Work on economic issues reflects the need for increased women's economic empowerment.
    - Technical support and resources are allocated for implementation of institutional strategies for women's economic empowerment.
    - Provide technical and financial support to women entrepreneurs.
    - Work together with governments to support women's rights organizations by ensuring women's right to organize, ensuring their representation in key policymaking spaces and providing support that is available and accessible to these groups.
    - Work together with governments to develop standards for, gather, use and disseminate national data on women's economic empowerment.
- Thought leaders and academics:
    - Expand and disseminate the evidence base on what works for women's economic empowerment.
    - Scan and identify risks and opportunities for women's economic empowerment in emerging trends, including global instability, climate change, demographic change and technological advances.
    - Develop programmes and initiatives to support women and girls in the fields of science, mathematics, engineering and new technologies.
    - The Panel calls on you to join in taking action on the seven drivers identified, and to create the global movement that is needed to change the lives of women across the world within the next 14 years.

❖ Second Report – *Leave No One Behind: Taking Action for Transformational Change on Women's Economic Empowerment*

- Enabling environment
    - Use macroeconomic policy levers to empower women including by devoting adequate budgetary resources to improve economic opportunities and facilitate the creation of decent work.
    - Enable a greater collective voice for women to shape economic policy.
- Norms and women's economic empowerment
    - Eliminate, prevent and respond to all forms of violence against women and girls.
    - End gender discrimination and change stereotypes gendering roles and abilities.

    - Eradicate the stigmatization of informal workers and support their organizations
- Ensuring legal protection and reforming discriminatory laws and regulations
    - Reform laws discriminating against women and enact legislation enabling gender equality
    - Expand social protection coverage for all.
    - Create an enabling legal environment for informal workers.
    - Increase women's access to justice, legal awareness and legal aid.
- Investing in care: Recognizing, reducing and redistributing unpaid work and care
    - Recognize, redistribute and reduce care work.
    - Ensure decent work for paid care workers, including migrant workers.
    - Foster social norm change to redistribute care from women to men and ensure that care is their equal right and responsibility.
- Building assets: Digital, financial, and property
    - Ensure women's equal access to and control over productive resources, including land, labor and capital.
    - Encourage stakeholders of a country to assess how women are progressing along the digital inclusion continuum.
    - Enable women's voice to shape digital, financial and property products, services and policies.
- Changing business culture and practice
    - Conduct an internal self-audit (on pay, employment, leadership, CSR and supplier engagement).
    - Incentivize frontline management to set and meet targets for gender inclusion
    - Set procurement targets for sourcing from women-owned enterprises.
    - Map value chains to ensure ethical sourcing and workers' rights.
- Improving public sector practices in employment and procurement
    - Promote gender equality in public sector employment by establishing gender targets or quotas for hiring and measuring progress.
    - Promote women-owned enterprises and women's collectives by considering establishing and tracking government-wide targets for women's participation in procurements.
    - Provide support for informal and agricultural workers by reforming procurement laws and regulations to allow collective enterprises to bid on public procurements.
- Strengthening visibility, collective voice and representation
    - Ratify and implement ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
    - Reform legal frameworks to protect informal workers and promote the formalization of their work in line with ILO Recommendation No. 204.

Independent Commission on Multilateralism

- **Convenors and/or authors:** International Peace Institute.
- **Type:** International commission (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Core report – *Pulling Together: The Multilateral System and Its Future*.
- **Dates:** Core report published, September 2016; commission established, September 2014.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting; global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - Armed Conflict: Mediation, Peacebuilding, and Peacekeeping
    - Develop a global agenda on prevention: A summit of world leaders should be convened to launch the development of a global agenda on prevention. This summit, organized by the president of the General Assembly with the support of the secretary-general and the help of independent experts, should be organized on the margins of the high-level segment of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly in 2017.
    - Produce a road map for implementing recommendations on the peacebuilding architecture: A road map for the implementation of the new joint Security Council/General Assembly resolution on the UN peacebuilding architecture should be drawn up. It should include modalities for predictable and sustainable financing for peacebuilding and mediation activities. Member states should lead the process and aim to produce a result by the seventy-second session of the General Assembly. The process should be initiated by the chair of the Peacebuilding Commission with the assistance of the Peacebuilding Support Office.
    - Support mediation at the multilateral, national, and local levels: The Department of Political Affairs should support the UN system in devising practical programs to help member states integrate prevention and mediation into the mainstream of national governance and development programs. It should develop a strategy to better take into account and support locally and nationally driven mediation processes. And it should work to include these processes in multilateral mediation and efforts at preventive diplomacy. It should also further engage civil society to create domestic constituencies supportive of negotiations. Finally, in consultation with key member states, the secretary-general should create more positions for senior mediators.
    - Carry forward the HIPPO's recommendations on peace operations: In consultation with key member states in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping, and the Fifth Committee, the secretary-general should appoint a small team within the executive office to propose ways to carry forward those HIPPO recommendations that were not taken up by the current secretary-general or on which member states remain undecided. These include: (1) restructuring the Secretariat entities entrusted with peace and security; (2) financing UN special political missions and Security Council–authorized AU peace support missions from assessed contributions; (3) changing UN administrative and budgetary decision-making processes to put a stronger emphasis on field operations; (4) revising the recruitment, development, and performance management of peace mission leadership teams, with due regard to gender equality; and (5) putting unarmed strategies at the center of efforts to protect civilians.
  - Women, Peace, and Security
    - Adopt a unified, holistic, and coherent approach: The UN and member states can break the women, peace, and security agenda out of its silo by integrating it with the development, human rights, humanitarian action, and peace and security agendas at large. In this respect,

the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development presents a significant opportunity. The inclusion of a target on eliminating all forms of violence against women within Goal 5 on gender equality, as well as Goal 16 on "peaceful and inclusive societies," can unify national and international efforts to improve women's security. They also send a clear signal that gender equality matters for both peace and development.

- Prioritize women's inclusion in multilateral processes: Amid widespread calls for a return to the foundational principle of "we the peoples," states and the organizations they create cannot ignore the priorities of the women who make up half their populations. Multilateral actors should evaluate whether people in conflict-affected communities are routinely consulted and their perspectives taken into account. They should continually reexamine their understanding and operational definitions of ownership and inclusivity in mediation, peace processes, and peacebuilding initiatives.
- Increase accountability for gender equality programming: Accountability for women's participation affects the legitimacy of the UN system as a whole, from headquarters to the community level. Special representatives of the secretary-general should be required to routinely report on issues related to women, peace, and security when addressing the Security Council, as the Global Study on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 and the HIPPO have recommended.
- Translate normative frameworks, both literally and culturally: From skilled civil servants in capitals around the world to religious leaders in traditional communities, many people still do not understand the agenda of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security or the actions it requires. Translating the policies and practices of the women, peace, and security agenda into accessible resources in many languages would allow them to reach a broader audience. Further, by interpreting the agenda according to local customs or through the lens of religious norms, community leaders can better harness the potential of the women, peace, and security framework in their work for progressive change.

- Terrorism and Organized Crime
  - Centralize leadership on terrorism and violent extremism: The secretary-general should appoint an under-secretary-general to lead and coordinate the UN's work on implementing its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the prevention of violent extremism.
  - Produce and communicate a counter-narrative: As part of a concerted multilateral approach to countering and preventing violent extremism, a new narrative needs to be produced to neutralize and dilute extremist ideologies. Such messages can be developed by a new taskforce or ad hoc committee comprising religious leaders, individuals from civil society and the private sector, and, above all, youth actors from around the globe. It should be led by an organization or institution that can provide adequate political space for such a discussion.
  - Clarify concepts related to terrorism and violent extremism: Member states and the UN Secretariat must step up efforts to clarify the core concepts at the heart of international and domestic strategies to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism. This would bring greater consistency and coherence to programming. Such clarification should include assurances that this programming fully conforms to international humanitarian and human rights law and avoids hampering principled humanitarian action.
  - Reaffirm norms and negotiate a "new compact": While a universal UN definition of terrorism remains elusive, a universal zero-tolerance norm, as adopted by the Security Council in 2011, should be more strictly implemented. Through an intergovernmental process, member states should reaffirm their political will to implement the zero-tolerance strategy and pledge not to engage in arming or supporting terrorist groups and networks.

- Devise a global crime control strategy: A global crime control strategy should be devised on the model of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Such a strategy would strengthen implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention) and its three protocols, enhance coordination among the relevant parts of the UN family, and enable member states to engage a broader spectrum of partners, including regional organizations, the private sector, and civil society.

- Humanitarian Engagements
  - Implement the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction: Member states, regional organizations, and international financial institutions should provide resources, and the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction should provide technical expertise, to enable countries to integrate disaster cost and risk analysis into core government planning and budgets. These should be separate from humanitarian programs and budgets, which should be reserved for crisis response. The private sector should be incentivized to engage in partnerships to diversify the funding basis for disaster risk reduction and to integrate it into its operations, research, and development.
  - Strengthen the UN's capacity to prevent and resolve conflict: The UN Secretariat should better integrate human rights monitoring into conflict risk analysis. Systematic violations of human rights should trigger the activation of conflict prevention or resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, ways should be identified to meaningfully engage with armed non-state actors that are or could become parties to armed conflicts or that have an impact on the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
  - Enhance compliance with international law: Member states should deliver on existing obligations by using all available means to ensure respect for international humanitarian, human rights, refugee, and criminal law. Furthermore, they should constructively engage in the process established by the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent aimed at establishing a complementary mechanism to enhance respect for international humanitarian law. Member states should avoid criminalizing engagement with non-state armed actors when done for strictly humanitarian purposes or to enhance their compliance with international humanitarian law.
  - Facilitate humanitarian access and delivery of humanitarian responses: Member states must fully respect existing rules of international humanitarian law on humanitarian relief operations, in particular those aimed at humanitarian access and the protection of humanitarian personnel. Moreover, they should embrace the diversity of humanitarian relief actors as an opportunity to maximize the delivery and impact of humanitarian responses to growing needs. At the same time, they should safeguard a distinct operational space for principled humanitarian action.
  - Support local crisis response: The UN and other international humanitarian actors should support rather than lead humanitarian responses. This can be encouraged by giving local crisis responders access to training, technology, technical assistance, direct funding, and humanitarian coordination mechanisms. At the same time, an effective international operational capacity must be maintained to respond where and when there is insufficient local capacity to deliver a comprehensive, principled, and adequate humanitarian response.
  - Integrate protection strategies into humanitarian response: Humanitarian actors should strengthen efforts to improve the protection of people affected by armed conflict or disaster by fully integrating protection strategies and respect for international law throughout humanitarian planning, programming, and budgeting.
  - Improve humanitarian financing: Member states and humanitarian actors should implement the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing to ensure long-term, flexible, and predictable funding.

- Forced Displacement, Refugees, and Migration
  - Comply with existing international legal obligations: In managing large-scale flows of people, particularly refugees, states should fully comply with their existing legal obligations. Any policy designed to tackle the challenges arising out of forced displacement and desperate migration should fully respect the human rights and dignity of the people affected by these policies. In particular, states should respect the principle of non-refoulement as enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and customary international law. This principle guarantees that individuals are not returned "in any manner whatsoever" to places where their life or freedom is threatened.
  - Strengthen and complement legal frameworks: Given today's challenging environment, the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees need to be better operationalized. Moreover, these legal frameworks should be complemented by a serious discussion on revisiting and strengthening normative frameworks and policies to protect other people on the move. The secretary-general should ensure resources to provide adequate support for the negotiation of a Global Compact for Safe, Regular, and Orderly Migration.
  - Address the root causes of forced displacement and desperate migration: If there were fewer conflicts, less persecution, greater socioeconomic equality, and better governance, people would be less inclined to leave their homes in order to survive. Moreover, full respect for international human rights and humanitarian law would go a long way in preventing both forced displacement and desperate migration. Therefore, there should be greater focus on preventing and mediating conflict, ensuring respect for international law, promoting sustainable development, and putting an end to systematic political oppression.
  - Provide more avenues for legal migration: If there were more ways to migrate legally, as called for in the 2030 Agenda, flows of people would be more orderly and safer. Therefore, member states should take practical steps like providing more seasonal visas and short- or medium-term work permits, facilitating family reunification, and creating educational or work exchange programs.
  - Change the narrative around migration: Politicians, the media, and other leaders should reduce fears about strangers in need, not fuel them. They should help demythologize and re-humanize refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons. They should also stress basic values of human dignity, solidarity, and empathy. Refugees and migrants should be provided the opportunity to learn the language and skills needed to fully integrate into host communities and become self-reliant rather than dependent on aid.
  - Fill the institutional gap on internally displaced persons: The secretary-general should appoint a special representative for internal displacement to foster closer cooperation among UN agencies, funds, and programs and to fill the current institutional gap in this area. The special rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons only covers one aspect of the challenges these people face. The new special representative would liaise with relevant stakeholders and advise the secretary-general on the full range of challenges related to internal displacement.
- Climate Change and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
  - Implement development and climate targets jointly: The 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement should be implemented jointly. Although these two outcomes have different international legal statuses and timeframes, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement's Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) should be jointly implemented at the national level to maximize synergies and reduce the risk of their working at cross-purposes.

- Adopt a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach: The holistic approach used in drafting the SDGs should be maintained in implementing them. Several member states are putting in place inter-ministerial arrangements to encourage integrated implementation of the 2030 Agenda at the government level. Involvement of ministries of finance is key to unlocking domestic resources. Bridging institutional divisions is a challenge not only for the UN but also at the national level.
- Bridge "siloed" structures: The 2030 Agenda recognizes that the UN can no longer work in separate silos. To that end, the work of the six committees of the General Assembly should be evaluated to reduce duplication, augment impact on the ground, and support the implementation of the new outcomes.
- UN top leadership must show the way: Implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement should be a top priority for the new secretary-general. The principle that "no agency owns any of the goals" is an important reminder that the seventeen SDGs are to be implemented systematically across the UN. The Chief Executives Board and the Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the 2030 Agenda and Climate Change have unique capacities to align the system toward effective implementation.
- Create a dynamic and inclusive follow-up to the 2030 Agenda: The High-Level Political Forum has the universal participation of all member states. It should also include participation of civil society and the private sector. The High-Level Political Forum should be the bridge between communities of policymakers and practitioners, for example to discuss the links between the SDGs and INDCs. This year, the first twenty-two countries have volunteered to present national reviews of their progress toward achieving the SDGs. By the end of the first cycle in 2019, all countries should have volunteered to review their progress.
- Review funding strategies: The UN's development work is largely dictated by the funding it receives. The lack of core and flexible funding in the UN development system has increased fragmentation and competition.15 Assessed contributions from member states should reflect greater balance between the three main pillars of the UN: peace and security, human rights, and development.

- Justice and Human Rights
  - Invest in prevention and the positive power of human rights: Member states should increase budgets for domestic and international prevention programs that strengthen human rights compliance and accountability mechanisms. They should also strengthen support for national and local human rights architectures and capacities, recognizing and reinforcing the important role played by civil society.
  - Integrate human rights into the other UN pillars: Member states, the UN, and civil society should integrate human rights into national development plans designed to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. To integrate human rights into peace and security, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, should train and instruct all UN-mandated mediators and negotiators on how to tackle human rights and justice in peace processes. The secretary-general should also establish a forum to exchange and document lessons learned from addressing these issues in peace processes.
  - Strengthen leadership on human rights: The secretary-general should exert strong leadership by proactively engaging member states on respect for international humanitarian and human rights law. The secretary-general should ensure the UN sets an example by implementing a zero-tolerance policy for all violations of international law by UN personnel and representatives. Moreover, he or she should make full use of the formal and informal tools provided by or derived from Articles 98 and 99 of the UN Charter. This would help ensure the UN system makes all necessary and feasible efforts to maintain

international peace and security by preventing and responding to large-scale violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
    - Commit to Human Rights Up Front: The UN secretary-general should maintain a dedicated team to lead and expand the Human Rights Up Front initiative and apply it more systematically. In collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, this team should train senior UN officials in advanced leadership and negotiation on operational human rights issues.
    - Systematically pursue justice: The Security Council should systematically urge states to investigate and prosecute international crimes over which they have jurisdiction and to cooperate with other states and the International Criminal Court (ICC) where the latter have jurisdiction. Upon the request of states or the ICC, the Security Council should impose appropriate travel bans and asset freezes on those subject to such investigations. Moreover, the Security Council should engage in a strategic dialogue with the ICC to address the challenges it faces. For example, an annual retreat could be held for Security Council members and key ICC staff. When it refers cases to the court, the Security Council should ensure the court has adequate resources to follow through. The Security Council should also adopt guidelines for ICC referrals that would decrease real or perceived selectivity. At the same time, states should be given the opportunity to adjust their response to human rights violations to avoid the need for a referral. In addition, the Security Council should build on existing proposals to constrain the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities.
    - Strengthen national and local justice capacity: Member states and the UN should invest both politically and financially in enhancing the capacity of national and local justice systems. Where the international system must step in, hybrid international-national mechanisms should be preferred. Such mechanisms should be designed to maximize transfer of knowledge and expertise to domestic professionals and institutions.
    - Support alternatives to criminal justice: Member states and the UN should ensure fact-finding commissions and commissions of inquiry have appropriate mandates, expertise, access, and political support. They should make better use of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission in contexts with serious and widespread violations of international humanitarian law.
- Social Inclusion, Political Participation, and Effective Governance
    - Deliver on existing commitments to accountable governance: In collaboration with heads of regional organizations, the secretary-general should develop an action plan to assist member states to deliver on their commitments to implement existing normative frameworks that prioritize accountable governance.
    - Engage civil society groups: The president of the General Assembly should find more regular mechanisms for seeking and receiving input from civil society groups and local actors as partners for peace.
    - Make more effective use of new technologies: The role of modern technological tools in transforming state-society relations should be better explored—from open government data, to the use of mobile phones for government service delivery, to citizen reporting on government abuses. The UN should commission a study to make sense of how new technology can enhance effective, inclusive, and legitimate governance and how it affects transparency and accountability.
    - Support “participatory governance” models: From online constitution-building platforms to online civic town halls, the Office of the Secretary-General should establish a project to catalogue models of online political participation. These models should be widely shared and used in the UN’s work.
- Fragile States and Fragile Cities

- Address fragility beyond the state level: Not only states but also cities need support. Although the UN is an inter-state organization, it must find ways to partner with local leaders such as mayors, community leaders, local academic institutions, and religious leaders.
- Review current funding structures: The UN is increasingly focused on post-conflict fragile states. In 2011, it spent more than $6 billion in development and humanitarian aid in twenty-five fragile states.18 However, aid flows to these countries are highly volatile. This further contributes to instability. International aid should put prevention into practice by investing in strategic policies that strengthen the long-term resilience of states and cities, including through disaster risk reduction and rule of law programming.
- Focus on implementing the 2030 Agenda: The implementation of the 2030 Agenda could be used as a framework to prevent fragility and help countries build resilience. The secretary-general, in cooperation with the administrator of the UN Development Programme, should develop an action plan to support implementation of the 2030 Agenda by leveraging peace and development advisers and UN global focal points in fragile states.
- Develop capacity to collect and analyze local-level data: To better understand the complexities of fragility in cities, the UN Development Programme, World Bank, and others working on this issue should increase their capacity to measure progress in cities.
- Accentuate the positive: Instead of focusing only on fragility, states and cities should be encouraged to envision a vibrant future that is resilient to shocks and can adapt to change in a managed way. As a follow-up to the SDGs (particularly Goal 16) and the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III), and consistent with a new culture of prevention, the debate on fragility should be transformed into policies that encourage sustainable peace and development.

- Impact of New Technologies on Peace, Security, and Development
  - Map UN venues dealing with new technologies: The UN Secretariat should map out the different venues within the UN system where new technologies are being used. By one count, ten different UN bodies have dealt with cyber issues since the 1990s.19 This mapping would identify good practices and needs, thereby helping streamline and consolidate efforts to more effectively use technology to achieve the UN's objectives.
  - Identify a UN focal point on cyber issues: With ongoing efforts to improve cybersecurity through regional bodies such as NATO, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Council of Europe, there is a risk of a plurality of regional initiatives without global standards. The appointment of a UN focal point on cyber issues would consolidate the UN's currently disjointed approach and make it a more credible player in an issue that demands greater multilateral engagement.
  - Ensure coherence among new mechanisms: The Technology Facilitation Mechanism for sustainable development, the technology bank for least-developed countries, and the Technology Framework for climate change share the common goal of facilitating access to and transfer of technology to developing countries. These new mechanisms need to be connected to one another to accelerate progress toward achieving the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement without duplicating efforts and competing for resources.
  - Establish a UN-guaranteed depository as a safe-keeper of big data: The UN could help collect, structure, and store data, especially from regions where the infrastructure is not safe or sufficient. Member states could give this mandate to a UN body through a multi-stakeholder process to create and implement safeguards for the data.

- Recognize cyberspace as a "global common good": The UN General Assembly should pass a resolution to declare that cyberspace should be used for "peaceful purposes" in the interests of humanity.

- The UN, Regional Organizations, Civil Society, and the Private Sector
  - Provide strategic vision on partnerships: The next secretary-general should produce a strategic vision document defining the UN's commitment to partnerships at all levels. It should acknowledge that, to be relevant and effective in the twenty-first century, the UN must be at the center of a wide and dynamic network of partnerships, including with regional organizations, civil society, and the private sector.
  - Study Chapter VIII of the UN Charter: Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (on regional arrangements) has been subject to relatively little scholarly attention. Since regional organizations have a largely untapped potential, an expert-level conference on Chapter VIII should be convened. It should study how this chapter has been interpreted in the past and how it can be better utilized for the maintenance of international peace and security.
  - Strengthen the AU-UN partnership: Much of the focus on partnerships between the UN and the African Union (AU) has been on peacekeeping. But the AU peace and security architecture and the AU governance architecture contain tools beyond peacekeeping. The UN Secretariat should convene a working group to explore how to strengthen cooperation between the UN and the AU in these other areas. Similarly, the AU and the UN should extend the joint framework for an enhanced partnership in peace and security, which was signed between the UN Office to the African Union and the AU Commission's Peace and Security Department. Extending this framework could help incorporate cooperation throughout the AU Commission and into relations with other arms of the UN system.
  - Collect lessons learned from regional arrangements: The UN Secretariat should systematically collect lessons learned from regional arrangements, like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in relation to preventing conflict and sustaining peace.
  - Review arrangements for consultation with NGOs: It has been twenty years since the approval of ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, which governs the relationship between the UN and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In that time, global civil society has grown substantially, as have the technological mechanisms through which international NGOs communicate and connect to the work of the UN. As a result, the ECOSOC president should convene a general review of the arrangements for consultation with NGOs with a view to updating ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 to modernize access for NGOs and improve mechanisms for UN partnerships with NGOs, civil society, and the private sector, among other things.
  - Foster partnerships through the SDGs: Implementation of the 2030 Agenda provides an excellent opportunity to foster partnerships among the UN, regional organizations, civil society, and the private sector. Civil society played a key role in designing the agenda, including through the precedent-setting Open Working Group on the SDGs and during the intergovernmental negotiations. Civil society will also have to play a critical role in implementing the SDGs, for example through the High-Level Political Forum. Successful implementation of the SDGs will also depend on the active engagement of the private sector. A good starting point would be to further develop the SDG Fund Private Sector Advisory Group's Framework for Action. In particular, action will need to be taken to identify particular SDG targets that can be matched with specific private sector actors at the country level and to facilitate their connection.
  - Scale up innovation labs: To better leverage private sector dynamism, the UN Innovation Network should establish a platform to connect and scale up the "innovation labs" currently

being developed by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), UN Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Global Pulse, and others. These labs connect corporate partners, universities, and NGOs to explore technological and design-based solutions to specific operational problems. These platforms could also improve connections between UN headquarters and field offices.

- Engaging, Supporting, and Empowering Global Youth
  - Implement structured affirmative action for youth at the UN: The UN Secretariat, agencies, funds, and programs should allocate a percentage of funding for young people and youth projects. Donors should enforce quotas on project proposals to ensure diversified youth representation in both the design and implementation stages.
  - Ensure access to education: Member states and UN agencies, funds, and programs should make greater efforts to ensure access to education in situations of conflict and protracted displacement.
  - Build bridges with youth: The president of the General Assembly should organize briefings for missions that include youth advisers on a regular rather than an ad hoc basis. These advisers can build bridges by bringing youth voices to the UN and bringing the UN view back to young people in their countries in a credible way.
  - Engage youth in implementing the SDGs: Youth will be instrumental to implementing the SDGs. Based upon the model of the SDG Youth Gateway, the UN Secretariat should facilitate peer-to-peer interactions among young people worldwide to achieve the targets of the SDGs.
  - Map UN engagement with youth: The secretary-general should solicit a public mapping of UN agencies to identify where and how each agency is engaging with youth to mobilize their comparative advantages and encourage a more collaborative approach.
  - Build regional hubs for youth: UN agencies, funds, and programs should work with regional organizations to build regional hubs for youth empowerment and employment, similar to the AU's Agenda 2063 with its focus on science and technology for youth.
  - Develop a youth-led framework for preventing violent extremism: A youth-led framework to prevent violent extremism by engaging the right groups locally should be developed. This framework should focus on positive messaging rather than counter-messaging, which can have a negative component. The narrative around youth in peace and security must not be limited to focusing on young people as a threat. At the same time, care should be taken not to put at risk individuals who are involved in counter-messaging. The multilateral system should support those who are already speaking out and be discrete about shedding light on new actors, as publicizing their identity might put them at risk.
- Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-proliferation and Disarmament
  - Ensure respect for the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguard system: Member states should provide the resources necessary for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to discharge its responsibilities under the NPT in the fields of nuclear safeguards, safety, and security. The broader IAEA mandate includes, among other areas, technical cooperation funded by voluntary contributions. Member states should consider including additional funding under the regular budget, in part to guarantee greater access to technical cooperation for developing countries.
  - Broaden nuclear discussions to include human rights and humanitarian issues: Including human rights and humanitarian issues in the discussions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation can make them more inclusive by incorporating the views of those potentially most affected by nuclear weapons policies.
  - Fund the UN Institute for Disarmament Research through assessed contributions: The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has provided member states and the

multilateral system with quality research. With sustainable and predictable funding, it would be better placed to carry out research pertaining to all member states and to civil society.
    - Reinstate the Department for Disarmament Affairs: While there were good reasons to change the Department for Disarmament Affairs to the Office of Disarmament Affairs in 2007, many would admit it has lost some of its clout in the process. Disarmament remains a high priority and deserves a dedicated department.
    - Engage the Security Council in nuclear disarmament: The secretary-general could encourage better use of multilateral institutions such as the Security Council to help resolve bilateral conflicts between nuclear-armed states. In June 1998, the Security Council took on this role by adopting Resolution 1172 condemning nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.
- Global Pandemics and Global Public Health
    - Follow up on the High-Level Panel Report: The secretary-general should follow up on the report of the High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises by examining areas it leaves out, especially the specific challenges of delivering healthcare in situations of armed conflict. The secretary-general should make concrete recommendations for an interagency framework to define strategies and policies to address these challenges.
    - Strengthen accountability in the delivery of public health: Accountability could be improved by more effectively using human rights instruments, holding citizens' hearings at the national and international levels, and giving a greater role to parliaments and parliamentarians. Furthermore, mechanisms are needed to hear local community voices when carrying out national and global responses, including to pandemics.
    - Convene a global health summit in 2018: The secretary-general should convene an inter-ministerial forum for addressing the future of the global health architecture, with a particular focus on issues of finance and accountability.
    - Strengthen partnerships with the private sector: There is great potential for public-private partnerships in health. These could include partnerships in research and development, such as of vaccinations, and with the transportation, airline, tourism, and insurance industries. To improve the existing model for partnerships, agencies must devise an incentive-driven approach.
    - Build the capacity of national healthcare systems: Member states and the UN system must work together to build robust national healthcare systems and promote better implementation of the International Health Regulations as a way to prevent health crises, including pandemics.
    - Reaffirm protection of patients and health professionals: Increasing attacks on medical facilities in situations of armed conflict are clear violations of international humanitarian law. It is essential to more effectively protect healthcare workers in dangerous environments. At a minimum, member states should follow the example of the Hippocratic oath and "do no harm."
    - Consider increasing assessed contributions: The lack of assessed contributions to UN agencies dealing with humanitarian and health crises hampers their ability to meet their mandate. The High-Level Panel's recommendation to increase assessed contributions to the World Health Organization by 10 percent should be given due consideration.
- Communication Strategy for the UN Multilateral System
    - Create a centralized website for integrated communication strategies: In order to eliminate communication silos and harmonize media cultures among UN agencies, the UN Department of Public Information should create a centralized UN website for information dissemination. Creating a pool of website- and content-development resources that are accessible to all agencies will make the UN system's messaging more efficient and coherent.

Furthermore, having all UN agencies collaborate under one overarching communication strategy will prevent compartmentalization of UN messaging and help shift from process-driven to content-driven dissemination of information.

- Simplify communications and reduce jargon: The UN should aim to demystify complex topics by providing context to its audience. As process often dictates outcome at the UN, it is essential that the UN engage in a kind of explanatory journalism to help news consumers better understand UN processes. Furthermore, all communications should limit the amount of unnecessary jargon and acronyms in order to communicate in a more straightforward way.
- Harness the power of social media: The UN's communication mechanisms should harness the power of social media to maximize projection and impact. All UN agencies, as well as the secretary-general, should strive to maintain active social media accounts, including on Twitter. Furthermore, the UN should increase its use of and reliance on podcasts, which are becoming an increasingly popular method of information dissemination.
- Devise a "listening" body: The UN should devise a unit to monitor and record feedback from individuals at the receiving end of UN programs. Such a unit could promote inclusivity and transparency by informing headquarters of discussions taking place on the ground. This would also enable the UN to better measure its impact.
- Prioritize quality over quantity: The UN should ensure constructive rather than spectacular stories are being told by involving civil society and web or media designers in the early stages of project development and negotiations. Furthermore, the UN should improve its accessibility to media, possibly inviting press officers on UN field visits and granting them access to cover stories in the field. This would help ensure the focus is not only on immediate headlines but also on quieter stories whose impact and potential are no less critical.

Independent Commission on Multilateralism: Women, Peace, and Security

- **Convenors and/or authors:** International Peace Institute.
- **Type:** International commission (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: *ICM Policy Paper: Women, Peace, and Security*.
- **Dates:** Paper published, October 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting; political violence.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - Reimagine Traditional Approaches to Peace and Security
    - Advancing the women, peace, and security agenda may require a fundamental rethinking of the traditional approach to peace and security in the multilateral system—from conceptions of peace and security to the identification of key actors and the goals of peace processes. To achieve progress in the security of women and of states, it may be necessary to shift the focus to a more holistic understanding of peace that goes beyond the absence of war and integrates the perceptions and priorities of those affected by peacemaking and peacekeeping who have previously been excluded.
    - As the Global Study on Resolution 1325 concluded, "there must be an end to the present cycle of militarization," and "armed intervention by the international community and Member States must only be the last resort." Instead, the focus should be on prevention and a recognition that sustainable peace requires sustainable development.
  - Achieve a Unified, Holistic, and Coherent Approach
    - Improving women's security and increasing women's participation in managing and resolving conflict depends on multiple, related elements—from shifts in social norms to improvements in education and increased women's representation in politics and policymaking. Yet women, peace, and security initiatives within multilateral institutions often struggle to incorporate this bigger picture and connect to other initiatives seeking to bring about these changes.
    - At UN headquarters, the women, peace, and security agenda may have a unique role to play as a strategic connector because of its cross-cutting nature. The agenda has achieved both normative and operational targets across the fragmented organs and departments of the UN system; it is meant to inform staffing and analysis in peace operations, human rights investigations and accountability, and strategies to prevent violent extremism, as well as to lay the foundations for sustainable development. 30 But if the agenda remains fragmented and siloed, continues to be implemented through a largely technical approach, and fails to engage sufficiently with men and movements outside of the multilateral sphere, progress is likely to stall.
    - In this respect, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals present a significant opportunity. The inclusion of a target on eliminating all forms of violence against women within the goal on gender equality and women's empowerment, as well as a goal on "peaceful and inclusive societies," could serve to unify national and international efforts to improve gender equality and send a clear signal that women's leadership and participation matters for both peace and development.
  - Build an Inclusive and Legitimate Multilateral System
    - Although international frameworks have advanced, the evidence linking gender equality and peace remains poorly understood among policymakers and society at large. Although many acknowledge that empowering women is good for societies, the specific impact this acknowledgment has on promoting and sustaining peaceful societies remains under-

explored. At the same time, there is little consensus on the best way to advance women's participation in policymaking and peacemaking.
    - A multilateral system built on exclusive states and exclusive structures is unlikely to overcome these challenges; nor is it sustainable. Amid widespread calls for a return to the foundational principle of "we the peoples," states and the organizations they create cannot ignore the priorities of half their populations. Women's empowerment and gender equality more broadly are necessary for a credible, legitimate, and effective multilateral system. Multilateral actors should evaluate whether the perspectives of people in conflict-affected communities are routinely consulted and taken into account; they should continually reexamine their understanding and operational definitions of ownership and inclusivity in mediation, peace processes, and peacebuilding initiatives.
    - The year 2015 marked notable anniversaries of two significant milestones in global initiatives for women's security and peace in society: the twentieth anniversary of the 1995 Platform for Action in Beijing and the fifteenth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. The increase in awareness and understanding of the need for women's empowerment, the nature of violence against women, and the links between inclusivity and development over the last two decades provided a unique moment to begin to tackle this global challenge with accelerated momentum and more strategic interventions at the multilateral level. On October 13, 2015, the Security Council convened a high-level review of women, peace, and security, where member states made new and renewed commitments to implement the agenda. On October 25, 2016, member states returned to the council to report on their efforts to implement these commitments one year on. Member states, the UN, regional organizations, and civil society should continue to bring attention to their achievements, gaps, and challenges in harnessing the full potential of gender equality.
- Move from Norm Setting to Implementation
    - In practice, resistance to implementing the women, peace, and security agenda within states and multilateral organizations is only partly explained by rational debates. Much of the resistance relates to who holds power and a reluctance to share it; this could be mitigated by a committed leadership and enlightened interpretation of social norms and values. A political push and technical tools are needed to accompany the normative advance. With progressive leadership, the issue can be moved beyond a normative framework to real implementation. And implementation should not only be measured through indicators and "box-ticking" exercises, but also through evidence of broader societal transformation.
    - While many multilateral tools are no longer "fit for purpose" to address current problems, the UN has entry points to take a holistic approach to peace and gender equality. Responses and programs should be linked up at headquarters. But even more importantly, peace operations, peacebuilding initiatives, development programs, and other multilateral responses should be linked to the effects of violence and insecurity on ordinary people.
- Apply the Agenda in a Coherent Way
    - The United Nations and its member states can locate synergies among the 2015 reports of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, the review of the UN peacebuilding architecture, and the Global Study on Resolution 1325. These synergies would help break the women, peace, and security agenda out of its silo by integrating it across development, humanitarian action, and peace and security agendas at large. The Global Study highlighted the following priorities: consistent implementation by the Security Council, strengthening the gender architecture of the UN system, removing obstacles and incentivizing greater participation of women in peace and security, and increasing financing and accountability

for women, peace, and security commitments. Women, peace, and security issues can be strategically linked to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as well as the sustaining peace framework adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council in April 2016, both key opportunities to elevate the debate on this agenda.

  - Proponents of women, peace, and security have advocated for a "field first" approach, in parallel to the call of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations for a people-centered approach. Still, there is a need for UN departments to work together to address implementation and encourage member states to take the lead by translating international norms into domestic legislation and policies. Member states, for their part, can advocate for coherence in the UN system and push for reforms that break down institutional silos. Across the world, critical operationalization takes place on the ground, and a key issue for the UN is how to empower special representatives of the secretary-general (SRSGs) to implement these commitments in their missions. Authority should be delegated from headquarters to field operations, alongside a vastly increased appointment of women SRSGs and special envoys.

- Increase Accountability and Risk Assessment
  - At UN headquarters and in their reporting to the Security Council, SRSGs still rarely report on women, peace, and security or gender issues. This has improved incrementally in 2016, after the Security Council established an informal expert group on women, peace, and security "to maximize information, monitoring and support capacity from the UN system as a whole," as recommended by the Global Study. Beyond the council, accountability for women's participation and broader social inclusion relates to the legitimacy of the UN system as a whole, from headquarters to the community level. If the system is built on exclusivity, its irrelevance will be underscored.
  - In addition to increased accountability for implementation of standing commitments, multilateral planning must assess possible unintended consequences of proposed programs on women and gender equality. When women are upheld as champions of equality in their countries, they may receive additional resources and support. However, they may also be put at risk, with negative impacts for their personal security. In other cases, postconflict funding, reparations programs, or demobilization packages leave women out entirely. This systematic exclusion of women from post-conflict recovery programs overlooks the diverse and important roles that they play in conflict and peacebuilding, as outlined above. Where these programmatic errors have negative consequences, the UN and multilateral actors should be accountable and seek to repair damage to women leaders and women's organizations.
- Translate Normative Frameworks Literally and Culturally
  - From skilled civil servants in capitals around the world to religious leaders in traditional communities, many people still do not understand the 1325 agenda or the actions it requires. There is a need to translate the women, peace, and security agenda into something comprehensible and to recognize the importance of strategic communication and messaging to create momentum.
  - By translating the policies and practices of the women, peace, and security agenda into accessible resources in many languages, a broader subset of global society can be reached. Further, by reinterpreting the agenda according to local customs or through the lens of religious norms, community leaders can harness the potential of the women, peace, and security framework in their work for progressive change.
- Engage and Encourage Male Champions of Equality
  - As noted above, in many societies, the principal actors in bringing change on gender equality will be men, who continue to hold the majority of positions in policymaking and the

public sector worldwide.The problem of masculinity as it is classically articulated cuts across regions and cultures. More research that examines masculinity is needed to ask how we can change psychologies and mindsets about an equitable space for women.

- Throughout the 2015–2016 campaign for secretary-general, there was a call for the United Nations to elect a woman—labeled the #She4SG campaign on social media. 33 Despite the candidacies of qualified women from Eastern Europe and elsewhere, on October 6, 2016, the Security Council selected António Guterres of Portugal to lead the UN for the next five years. As he prepares to take the UN's highest post, Guterres has pledged to be a male champion of gender equality, and his transition team makes good on that promise—the five-member team includes three women. The true test will be whether Guterres upholds this parity in his appointment of senior leaders and whether he encourages gender equality in key mission and field posts—from SRSGs and special envoys to peace and development advisers.

- Partner to Do Business Differently
  - Greater synergies can be drawn from connecting bottom-up and top-down efforts and uniting men and women in the search for gender equality through partnerships that help the UN do business differently. For example, gender-sensitive context analysis can help multilateral actors to identify leaders at the grassroots level and in other walks of life and support them as catalysts for change. Ideally, such tools can be participatory, bringing together diverse local actors to contribute knowledge and analysis. That approach, already pursued by some large peace and humanitarian NGOs, can be a peacebuilding initiative in itself by modeling political inclusion and a democratic process.
  - The practical tool of joint context and conflict analysis by various divisions of the UN, NGOs, and the private sector could map not only sources of violence and risk, but also peaceful actors and sources of resilience. Within the UN, there is great potential for analysis and planning for peace operations or peacebuilding that draws on UN Women's extensive networks of women peace actors in conflict countries. At the moment, the rich local knowledge that could be collected in UN field.
  - programs is overlooked and often not reported to mission leadership in the field or peacebuilding offices at headquarters. This leaves out information on the negative impacts of conflict on women and the critical roles they are playing to make and build peace.

Independent Commission on Multilateralism: Humanitarian Engagements

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- **Outputs(s)**: *ICM Policy Paper: Humanitarian Engagements*.
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- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting..
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - Member states and the UN should strengthen their capacity to implement the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.
    - Member states, regional organizations, and financial institutions should provide adequate resources, and the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) should provide adequate technical expertise, to enable countries—in particular those most affected—to carry out and integrate disaster cost and risk analysis into core government planning and budgets.
    - Member states should break down silos in national and local administrations (as has been done at the multilateral level). They should also mainstream national- and local-level disaster risk reduction planning and programming into development and climate change planning and programming, all of which should involve a variety of relevant ministries (e.g., those dealing with the interior, infrastructure, finance, budgeting, and telecommunications). In addition, they should integrate the budget for disaster risk reduction into core government budget planning and keep this budget separate from humanitarian budgets, which should be reserved for crisis response.
    - The UN and member states should develop effective communication strategies to mobilize public opinion, including by incentivizing the media to actively report on the cost-effectiveness of disaster risk reduction and the need for society as a whole to invest in long-term prevention efforts.
    - The UN and member states should incentivize the corporate sector to engage in partnerships that would diversify the funding base for disaster risk reduction (e.g., by demonstrating to insurance companies their stakes and interests). They should also explore innovative approaches such as forecast-based financing and engage in dialogue with the corporate sector on how it could integrate disaster risk reduction into the management of its own operations, research, and development.
    - Member states should adopt or strengthen national legislation and regulations to facilitate and regulate disaster response in line with international guidelines and commitments.
  - Member states and the UN should strengthen the UN's capacity for conflict prevention and resolution.
    - Member states and the UN should integrate human rights violations into risk analysis as a risk factor and early warning indicator, which should serve as a trigger for activating or establishing adequate conflict prevention or resolution mechanisms. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Human Rights Council's relevant special procedures mechanisms should regularly brief the Security Council, General Assembly, and Peacebuilding Commission on ongoing or potential human rights violations.
    - Member states and the UN should step up political and financial investment in bilateral, regional, and international mediation and other dispute resolution efforts. They should strengthen the UN architecture and increase the budget for conflict prevention and resolution, in particular for the Peacebuilding Commission. The Security Council should

make more efficient use of its powers under Article 34 to take and support initiatives to prevent and resolve conflicts before they evolve into large-scale humanitarian crises.
    - Member states and the UN should identify ways to meaningfully engage with non-state actors that are or could become parties to armed conflicts. They should also allow for a distinct operational space for peacebuilding actors or mechanisms to engage such nonstate actors as part of efforts to achieve lasting peace.
- Member states should deliver on existing commitments to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law.
    - Member states, both individually and collectively, should use all available and lawful means (legislative, administrative, diplomatic, economic, financial, coercive, etc.) to enhance compliance with international law. They should make full use of existing compliance mechanisms to ensure respect for international law. They should engage fully and constructively in the process aimed at establishing a complementary mechanism to enhance respect for IHL facilitated by Switzerland and the ICRC, pursuant to Resolution 2 adopted by the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in December 2015.
    - They should acknowledge and strictly adhere to the threshold of applicability of IHL in dealing with armed conflicts and other situations of violence.
    - They should systematically translate their obligations under international law into operational military and law enforcement practice, including operational guidance and rules of engagement.
    - They should implement and submit further concrete pledges and commitments for individual and collective action to increase compliance with IHL to the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and to the Platform for Action, Commitments and Transformation (PACT) set up following the World Humanitarian Summit.
- Member states and the UN should enable meaningful engagement with non-state parties to armed conflicts on compliance with IHL.
    - Member states should avoid criminalizing humanitarian actors engaging with non-state armed actors for humanitarian purposes and for the purpose of enhancing compliance with IHL, under either international or domestic law.
    - Member states should be aware that their own compliance with IHL and accountability for violations of IHL are critical to enhancing the compliance of non-state parties to armed conflicts.
    - They should further incentivize non-state armed actors to comply with IHL by ensuring that acts they commit that are lawful under IHL are not labeled as terrorist acts by domestic and international counterterrorism measures, and by committing to grant the amnesties in accordance with Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
    - They should increase ownership of IHL by considering ways to engage current or former non-state parties to armed conflicts in efforts to clarify or develop IHL.
- The UN secretary-general should exert strong leadership on respect for international law.
    - The secretary-general should prioritize compliance with international law, in particular IHL, when engaging with member states, both bilaterally and collectively.
    - The secretary-general should play a leading role in bridging the distance between the UN's respective centers of gravity on international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law (Geneva) and on peace and security (New York).
    - The secretary-general should ensure that the UN sets an example in complying with international humanitarian and human rights law. Toward that end, he should implement a zero-tolerance policy for violations by UN personnel and representatives, including but not limited to those involved in peace operations.

- Member states should enhance compliance with legal obligations and implementation of recommendations aimed at facilitating and protecting the delivery of principled humanitarian responses.
    - Member states—individually and collectively, including through the Security Council—should take all available measures to respect and ensure respect for existing rules of international law pertaining to humanitarian relief operations. They should particularly do so for laws facilitating humanitarian access to affected populations and protecting humanitarian relief operations in situations of armed conflict.
    - Member states and humanitarian actors should implement the concrete policy and operational recommendations put forth by the UN secretary-general and the ICRC in 2016 aimed at enabling safe and adequate delivery of healthcare in situations of armed conflict by enhancing protection of the wounded and sick and of healthcare facilities, personnel, and means of transportation.
    - Member states should fully operationalize and implement General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel more generally.
- Member states, the UN, and humanitarian actors should facilitate principled humanitarian action.
    - Member states and the UN should embrace the diversity of humanitarian relief actors as an opportunity to maximize the delivery and impact of humanitarian response to growing needs. At the same time, they should safeguard a distinct operational space for principled humanitarian action to ensure a comprehensive and impartial response to actual needs and allow for meaningful protection activities.
    - Humanitarian actors should be transparent about their intentions and capacity to implement all or some of the core humanitarian principles. When they cannot be impartial due to external constraints such as limited access, funding, or political pressure, they should acknowledge these constraints and call on states and relevant UN organs to address them.
    - Member states should allow and enable humanitarian actors on the ground to negotiate their access and operations in line with distinct and complementary approaches. They should also ensure that any Security Council action on humanitarian access or operations does not negatively interfere with or impact such efforts or otherwise affect the safety and efficiency of humanitarian personnel and operations on the ground.
- Member states and the UN should ensure that international and domestic laws and policies— in particular related to counterterrorism and countering/preventing violent extremism—do not criminalize or otherwise obstruct principled humanitarian assistance and engagement on protection concerns.
    - Member states and the UN should ensure humanitarian actors are able to engage with non-state armed actors to ensure safe access, address humanitarian concerns, and enhance compliance with international law.
    - They should obtain better evidence and analysis about the impact of policies on counterterrorism and countering/preventing violent extremism on humanitarian action, in particular on the ability to conduct protection activities.
    - They should ensure transparency about international and domestic counterterrorism norms and policies so that humanitarian actors are fully aware of applicable frameworks.
    - They should further explore the idea of humanitarian exemptions put forth by the High-Level Panel on Sanctions, including by reviewing opportunities, risks, and challenges for implementation.
- Member states, the UN, and humanitarian actors should strengthen logistical capacity and security risk management for humanitarian operations.

    - Member states and humanitarian actors should take, support, and incentivize innovative approaches and provide adequate resources to overcome logistical obstacles to reaching people in need and delivering humanitarian responses.
    - Humanitarian actors, including relevant UN agencies, should continue to review their security risk management systems to ensure proximity to affected populations on the ground and to avoid transferring risk to local partners. Effective security risk management is by nature context-specific. Therefore, while the general framework and guidance can be centralized, they should devolve day-to-day security management and technical details to teams on the ground as much as possible.
    - Member states and the UN should better share the risks of operating in insecure environments by adequately funding the security and logistics needed to sustain humanitarian operations in such contexts.
- International humanitarian actors and member states should enable affected populations and local responders to take an active part in, and where possible lead, humanitarian responses.
    - International humanitarian actors should systematically include affected populations in needs assessments, including through remote telecom surveys or other innovative means in hard-to-reach areas.
    - They should step up efforts to collect accurate, disaggregated, and comparable data on populations and needs and to analyze this data. This would enable evidence-based, needs-driven humanitarian action and facilitate monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian responses.
    - They should systematically and continuously map existing and lacking local response capacities for each crisis as a starting point for developing and maintaining a comprehensive humanitarian response.
    - Member states and donors should support and incentivize such initiatives.
- Member states, humanitarian actors, and donors should further strengthen efforts to improve the protection of people affected by armed conflicts and disasters.
    - Member states, humanitarian actors, and donors should fully integrate and fund protection strategies and respect for international law throughout humanitarian planning, programming, budgeting, and financing.
    - They should strengthen and fund specialized protection activities, in particular those tailored to the specific needs of vulnerable populations such as women and girls, children, adolescents, the elderly, persons with disabilities, and minorities.
- Rather than attempting to overhaul an elusive humanitarian “system,” the UN and member states should build on the diversity of humanitarian relief actors, and focus on continuing to transform the formal humanitarian sector to allow it to perform better in responding to humanitarian needs.
    - Where and to the extent possible, UN and other international humanitarian actors should take a step back and support rather than lead the humanitarian response by opening up access to training, technical assistance, and direct funding to local crisis responders (e.g., authorities, communities, NGOs, or the private sector, depending on the context).
    - At the same time, the international humanitarian sector, including the UN, should maintain and strengthen an effective operational capacity to step in where and for as long as there is no or insufficient local capacity to deliver a comprehensive, principled, and adequate humanitarian response.
    - Member states—including host countries and donors—should support and incentivize initiatives to implement the above two recommendations.
- Member states and the UN should ensure inclusivity in setting a global vision and agenda for humanitarian action.

    - Member states, the UN secretary-general, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and humanitarian actors should step up efforts to ensure all states engage in debates and decision making on humanitarian issues in multilateral fora. For example, they could more actively brief regional groups on humanitarian issues. Affected states should participate more actively and, wherever possible, take the lead in debates on humanitarian issues in multilateral fora (as is the case in development debates), rather than leaving those debates to donor states.
    - Member states and the UN should adjust humanitarian coordination mechanisms at the global and country levels, including the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and Humanitarian Country Teams—where relevant in light of specific contexts or issues—to allow for better inclusion of the perspectives and ideas of the diverse range of humanitarian actors, including local actors.
    - Member states and the UN should strengthen multi-stakeholder engagement (e.g., with civil society, regional organizations, the private sector, and academia) on humanitarian issues to tap into potential innovation and to mobilize funding and respect for international law.
- Member states, the UN, and humanitarian and development actors should make further efforts to bridge the humanitarian-development divide, in particular in protracted humanitarian crises, while acknowledging the essential role, distinctive approach, and inherent limits of humanitarian action.
    - Member states and the UN should revitalize and step up the presence and active involvement of development actors from an early stage to assist national and local authorities in addressing medium- and long-term needs.
    - In order to transcend the divide, the UN should further strengthen leadership at the country level to foster in-depth cross-sector consultations and coordination.
    - Where appropriate and possible without restricting humanitarian space and principled action, the UN should foster joint analysis and needs assessments and better alignment of humanitarian and development programs and activities, with priority placed on education, health, and urban infrastructure.
    - Member states and multilateral development banks should build on and strengthen innovative financing mechanisms, including the international financing platform proposed by the secretary-general in his Agenda for Humanity. These mechanisms would allow humanitarian and development actors to work together to deliver comprehensive responses in protracted humanitarian crises.
- Member states should take appropriate action to ensure that global humanitarian appeals are fully funded.
    - They should implement the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing's recommendations to ensure both emergency funding and long-term, flexible, and predictable funding to address the challenges of protracted crises.
    - Donors should facilitate access to direct funding for local crisis responders, in particular for disaster response, and prioritize funding for principled humanitarian actors.
    - Donors should harmonize and simplify reporting requirements and speed up disbursement of funding.
    - Donors should break down silos in national and local administrations that hamper international efforts to bridge the humanitarian-development divide by promoting development finance in protracted humanitarian crises in parallel to funding for principled humanitarian action.
    - All relevant actors should engage the private sector to commit resources for in-kind responses (e.g., assets, skills, capabilities).

- In order to address challenges and implement the above-mentioned recommendations, humanitarian actors should pursue innovation by tapping into the potential of technology, the corporate sector, and expertise from other sectors in a thoughtful manner so as to tailor that potential to the realities of conflict and disaster and to the principles that guide humanitarian action.

Independent Commission on Multilateralism: The New Primacy of Partnerships Between Regional Organizations, Civil Society, and the Private Sector

- **Convenors and/or authors:** International Peace Institute.
- **Type:** International commission (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: *ICM Policy Paper: The New Primacy of Partnerships Between Regional Organizations, Civil Society, and the Private Sector*.
- **Dates:** Paper published, April 2017.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting; global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - Secretary-General Guterres should produce a strategic vision document defining the UN's commitment to partnerships at all levels early in his first term. It should acknowledge that, to be relevant and effective in the twenty-first century, the UN must use its considerable comparative advantages as a universal, charter-based organization to place itself at the center of a wide and dynamic network of partnerships, including with regional organizations, civil society, and the private sector.
  - To improve operational partnerships during crises, the UN Secretariat and member states should study the outcomes of the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) lessons-learned exercise. This exercise highlighted the need to improve operational partnerships during emergencies, both within the UN system and with local actors. For example, engaging with local civil society and key stakeholders on the ground, including the private sector, from the outset of a crisis can improve long-term effectiveness of emergency responses.
  - A consortium of research institutions, in consultation with the UN Secretariat, should convene an expert-level conference on Chapter VIII. In comparison to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Chapter VIII has been subject to relatively little scholarly attention. This conference could help to better understand how it has been interpreted in the past and how it can be better utilized for the maintenance of international peace and security. The conference could consider questions such as: What specifically constitutes a "regional arrangement or agency" as defined by the UN Charter? What delimits "regional action" as referred to in Article 52(1)? What specific activities may a regional organization carry out under Articles 52(2–4) and 53? What is required for regional organizations to fulfill their duty to keep the Security Council "fully informed" of activities "in contemplation" of the maintenance of international peace and security?
  - The UN Secretariat should convene a working group to expand the UN-AU partnership beyond peacekeeping. While much of the focus on partnerships between the UN and the African Union has been on peacekeeping, the AU peace and security architecture and the AU governance architecture contain additional tools that should be explored for further partnerships. The working group could facilitate the development of such partnerships, including on joint analysis in the interest of long-term conflict prevention and sustaining peace.
  - The AU and the UN should extend the joint framework for an enhanced partnership in peace and security. This framework was signed between the UN Office to the African Union and the AU Commission's Peace and Security Department. Extending this framework could help incorporate cooperation across the AU Commission and into relations with other arms of the UN system.
  - The UN Secretariat should systematically collect lessons learned from regional arrangements, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union, in relation to preventing conflict and sustaining peace.
  - The president of ECOSOC should convene a general review of the arrangements for consultation with NGOs. It has been twenty years since the approval of ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, which

governs the relationship between the UN and NGOs. In that time, global civil society has grown substantially, as have the technological mechanisms through which international NGOs communicate and connect to the work of the UN. This review could aim to update Resolution 1996/31 to modernize access to NGOs and improve mechanisms for UN partnerships with civil society and the private sector, among other things.

- The concrete inclusion of civil society in formal discussions on sustainable development should be carried through to the follow-up and review of the SDGs in the High-Level Political Forum. Civil society played a key role in designing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including through the precedent-setting Open Working Group on the SDGs and during the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the agenda. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs will provide an excellent opportunity to foster partnerships between the UN and civil society.
- The private sector should be systematically engaged by member states in implementing the SDGs. In particular, implementing partners should identify SDG targets that can be matched with specific private sector actors at the country level. These efforts can build upon the 2015 SDG Fund framework for action.
- The UN Innovation Network, co-chaired by UNICEF and UNHCR, should establish a platform to connect and scale up “innovation labs.” These labs, which are currently being developed by UNHCR, UNICEF, Global Pulse, and others, connect corporate partners, universities, and NGOs to explore technological and design-based solutions to specific operational problems. This platform could also provide better connections between UN headquarters and the field (i.e., between the head and arms and legs of the UN system).

Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development

- **Convenors and/or authors:** London School of Economics, University of Oxford.
- **Type:** international commission (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Escaping the fragility trap*.
- **Dates:** Report published, April 2018; commission established, March 2017.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Political violence.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - 1. Help build government that is subject to checks and balances and works for common purpose
    - Accept that an escape from fragility is a gradual process of the state developing effective checks and balances on powerholders and developing a sense of common public purpose.
    - Therefore recognise that the building blocks of effective democracy – including checks and balances, rule of law, and protection of minorities – are more important than the actual event of holding a multiparty election.
    - Stop assuming that fragility can be ended by processes that simply replicate the OECD model of political governance through new constitutions and multi-party elections.
    - Promote the resolution of situations of open conflict by power-sharing rather than by a leap to winner-take-all elections.
    - Encourage constitutions and multiparty elections to consolidate these processes rather than to initiate them.
  - 2. Help build domestic security, including through a phase of international and regional security
    - Give greater priority to helping build domestic security.
    - Recognise that international peacekeepers only buy the time needed to build the capacity of domestic and regional security services to keep peace.
    - Ensure that new domestic security services are decisively subject to checks and balances that curtail abuse.
    - Work with all relevant local and regional parties to help them agree red lines, and reinforce commitments by linking them to the pressure points.
  - 3. Capitalise on pivotal moments
    - Accept that in fragile situations there will be long periods when outsiders have limited scope to support transformative change.
    - Identify and use pivotal moments when transformative change is possible, such as a change of leadership or major international, regional, or national events, to support local leadership.
    - Recognise that all transformational change depends on chosen actions by national leaders. Pivotal moments work by creating opportunities for leaders to take actions that signal new intentions, resetting citizen expectations, and building trust.
    - Don't use debt relief as an opportunity to impose donor priorities
    - Support leaders to take actions that signal new intentions, reset citizen expectations, and build trust in an inclusive way across the country.
  - 4. Establish limited and purposive long-term goals
    - Focus on citizens, not donors.
    - Use narratives, institutions, and actions coherently to achieve three difficult goals:
      - Shared identity needs to supplant identities that are fragmented or oppositional.
      - Distrust of government needs to be turned into conditional trust.
      - Opportunistic short-termism needs to be supplanted by a future orientation and a willingness to make sacrifices for a better future.

- 5. In the short-term, look for quick wins
  - Build legitimacy and confidence through small, easy steps that yield quick, visible wins on popular things. Focus on process as well as outcomes.
- 6. Focus on economic governance, not policies
  - Do not make international support conditional upon any specific policies.
  - Support governments financially and technically to implement their own programmes.
  - Governments in fragile states should have genuine choice of options, subject only to minimum standard of economic governance – honesty, realism, and inclusion.
- 7. Use aid to support private investment for job creation
  - Channel aid through development finance institutions (DFIs) to support pioneering firms.
  - DFIs and aid agencies should coordinate their financial and technical support for sectors prioritised as strategic.
  - DFIs should cooperate with each other to create standardised support so that investments that succeed can readily be offloaded.
  - DFIs should drop conventional environmental, social, and governance (ESG) requirements in fragile states, replacing them with simple and pertinent yardsticks such as job creation – particularly for key demographics such as young people.
- 8. Adopt distinctive international financial institution (IFI) policies for fragile states
  - In fragile states, the IMF should encourage donors to provide aid for the public investment necessary to emerge from political and economic fragility. An objective of 'reducing aid dependence' should explicitly be recognised as premature.
  - The IMF needs to commit to radical improvements in how programmes in fragile states are staffed.
  - The World Bank needs both a strategy for fragile states and an organisational structure for delivery of a strategy.
- 9. Use international means of building resilience
  - Build better surveillance capacity to anticipate economic shocks.
  - Ensure humanitarian interventions conducted in emergency situations contribute to long-term development plans, in line with national government priorities.
  - Support domestically-generated government initiatives that increase macro and micro resilience.
  - Develop forms of IFI lending that link debt service to observable risks to reduce both fragility and the exposure of IFIs to default.
- 10. Build institutions to support the private economy
  - Build legal capacity for regulation and contract enforcement
  - Build tax capacity to finance public investment.
  - Build the capacity to manage public investment.
- 11. Invest in urban infrastructure for energy and connectivity
  - Ensure firms have reliable power.
  - Invest in serviced urban electricity, water, sanitation, and road grids.
  - Ignite the private construction of affordable urban housing.
- 12. Use domestic means of building resilience
  - Build quick responses to household shocks.
  - Provide insurance against macroeconomic and environmental shocks.
  - Build resilience against avoidable policy shocks.

Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Kofi Annan Foundation, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
- **Type:** International commission (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single report – *Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide*
- **Dates:** Report published, September 2002; commission established, 2010.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Crisis of legitimacy; political violence.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - To promote and protect the integrity of elections, governments should:
    - build the rule of law in order to ensure that citizens, including political competitors and opposition, have legal redress to exercise their election-related rights;
    - create independent, professional and competent EMBs with full independence of action, including the assurance of timely access to the necessary finances to conduct elections and mandates to organize transparent elections that merit public confidence;
    - develop institutions, processes, and networks that deter election-related violence and, should deterrence fail, hold perpetrators accountable;
    - reform and design electoral systems and pursue policies to diminish winner-take-all politics;
    - remove barriers to the participation of women, youth, minorities, people with disabilities and other traditionally marginalized groups, and take affirmative steps to promote the leadership and broad participation of women, including through the judicious use of quotas; and
    - control political finance by regulating donations and expenditures, public financing of political campaigns, disclosure and transparency of donations and expenditures, and sanctions and penalties for non-compliance.
  - Citizen organizations should monitor government performance in meeting the challenges of electoral integrity through impartial and systematic election monitoring, in accordance with international principles; through civic action to prevent electoral violence; through monitoring media accountability, diversity, and independence; and through demanding that political parties are responsive to citizen needs.
  - Citizen election observers should commit to global standards for domestic election monitoring with the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors and adhere to its Declaration of Global Principles and code of conduct. Donors should invest in building the capacity and credibility of domestic election observation and support the Global Network and its members.
  - Governments should join with like-minded states and partner with their own civil society organizations to embrace specific commitments on electoral integrity, the financing of elections, and the protection of free media through the OGP, an international initiative that encourages governments to improve their performance on transparency, accountability, and inclusion.
  - National EMBs should organize and create a global certification process with which to evaluate and grade EMBs on their professionalism, independence, and competence—including developing a voluntary declaration of principles and a code of conduct for administering elections with integrity.
  - Foundations and democratic shareholders should create and fund a new transnational civil society organization—called Electoral Integrity International—that is dedicated to bringing global attention to countries that succeed or fail in organizing elections with integrity. Such an organization could be to electoral malpractice what Transparency International is to corruption.

It would fill a key niche in helping to promote accountability on electoral issues by providing information, analysis, and other avenues for increasing normative pressure on governments that fall short of elections with integrity.

- Donors should prioritize funding of the activities to promote and protect elections with integrity that we have highlighted in this report, with priority given to helping countries overcome the challenges of holding elections with integrity, and investing in building the capacity and effectiveness of domestic election observation. 8. High-level international and regional attention should be directed and appropriate measures taken to address the growing threat to democracy that is posed by the financing of political campaigns, parties and candidates by transnational organized crime.
- Democratic governments, regional organizations, and international organizations should stand up for electoral integrity before elections take place. To do so, they must be more proactive and engaged throughout the electoral cycle of countries with problematic elections. If mediation is needed, it should be undertaken well before voting takes place, and aim to ensure that in divided societies elections do not yield winner-take-all results. Follow-up should not focus solely on technical improvements to elections, but should seek to open the dialogue and citizen participation required for the democratic political process that elections with integrity both need and serve to create.
- Regional organizations should create and clearly communicate their 'red lines'—prohibitions of egregious electoral malpractice that, if violated, would trigger multilateral condemnation and sanction. These organizations must then take action if these lines are crossed.
- Long-term donor assistance should be explicitly linked to recommendations by election observers, starting at the beginning of the electoral cycle rather than shortly before new elections. It should become common practice that there is in-country, post-election dialogue among international and domestic observer groups, electoral authorities and political actors to identify areas for reform efforts, consider potential international assistance for such reforms, and enhance preparedness for the next elections. Subsequent electoral observation and revised recommendations can then form the basis for changes in assistance strategies to ensure that the fundamental principles of electoral integrity are being respected.
- Donors should better integrate democracy and the integrity of elections with development and security assistance. Development should contribute to building political pluralism, as well as modes of democratic governance and political culture that lower the stakes of elections in insecure environments. Donors and partner countries should give priority to strengthening the full range of political actors involved in a country's democratic process, including parliaments, political parties in opposition and government, independent media and independent EMBs. International security cooperation needs to adapt to give far greater consideration to policies and programmes that foster political pluralism and competition to sustain stability and democracy in the long run.
- As governments, international organizations, and civil society consider the post-2015 development framework, greater priority should be given to political freedom as a building block of development and the need to provide much greater scope and capacity for people everywhere to participate in the political decisions that affect them. The post2015 framework should include specific programmes and goals for delivering elections with integrity, with an emphasis on inclusion, transparency, and accountability

Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance

- **Convenors and/or authors:** The Hague Institute for Global Justice, Stimson Centre.
- **Type:** international commission (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document – *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*
- **Dates:** Report released, May 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** crisis of legitimacy; global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:** (summary of)
  - Strengthen the role of women in peace and security
    - Strengthen the role of women in peace processes
    - Learn and share lessons from implementing National Action Plans under SCR 1325
  - Prevent armed conflict
    - Improve conflict analysis and crisis warning
    - Focus on the Responsibility to Prevent
  - Develop greater consensus on R2P operations
    - Specify the responsibilities and objectives of R2P mission participants
    - Emphasize the principle of "no net harm" in R2P planning and deployments
    - Embed standards-monitoring and human rights teams in R2P-associated events
  - Strengthen UN military, police, and civilian response capacity for peace operations
    - Make designated Member State military units available for UN or regional peace operations on short notice
    - Enhance UN ability to rapidly deploy military planning and support teams to new and existing UN missions
    - Make designated Member State formed police units available for UN deployment on short notice
    - Establish a sizable standing and reserve capacity to support rapid and sustainable deployment of police to UN peace operations
    - Establish standing and reserve capacities to meet rapid deployment needs for civilian specialist skills
  - Improve capacity for restoring rule of law, transitional justice, and host state resilience
    - Focus G20 support on the New Deal for engagement in fragile states
    - Combat corruption to support effective rule of law
    - Augment current disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programming with greater emphasis on countering (preventing the rise of) violent extremism
    - Consider hybrid models of justice when transitioning to a modern state court system
    - Consider transformational justice as a postwar alternative that addresses not just the results but also the roots of violence
  - Global innovations in climate governance
    - Facilitate and strengthen linkages between the UNFCCC and other international regimes and organizations dealing with climate change
    - Give subnational and nonstate actors the opportunity to endorse climate rules more stringent than the UNFCCC process creates
    - Establish an International Carbon Monitoring entity
    - Establish a Global Climate Research Registry and Climate Action Clearinghouse
    - Establish a Climate Engineering Advisory Board and Experiments Registry
    - Engage the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and UNEP Environment Assembly on climate issues

- Build climate consciousness into the work of other key global entities
  - Make global and regional trade more climate-sensitive
  - Seek advisory opinions from the ICJ in climate change disputes
    "Green" the G20
- Climate adaptation needs better defined objectives and more financial support
  - Define one or more global climate adaptation goals and gauge their achievement in terms of measurable improvements in local human security
  - Structure climate finance to increase net support to climate adaptation
- Engage private enterprise on market-based incentives to reduce carbon emissions
  - Negotiate carbon subsidy reduction targets
  - Reduce emissions of short-lived climate pollutants
  - Institutionalize financial climate risk reporting
  - Establish a Green Technology Licensing Facility
- A new framework for global economic cooperation and crisis response
  - Create a G20+ to enhance coordination with the UN, Bretton Woods institutions, and related bodies
  - Strengthen the IMF 6.3.1.3 Bolster the FSB
  - Ensure labor rights and global economic governance for inclusive growth
  - Establish a system-wide UN Sustainable Human Development Network
- New tools to combat illicit financial flows and extremist financing
  - Promote the AEOI standard and transparency of corporate registries
  - Assess the effects of anti–money laundering policies on crime and terrorist groups
  - Use human rights norms and policy tools to curb illicit financial flows
  - Address IFFs in the Post-2015 Development Agenda
- Transform the EITI into EITI+ for effective governance of natural resources
  - Establish clear guidelines for reporting and sanctioning violations of EITI+ principles
  - Make EITI+ complementary to the post-2015 SDGs
- Secure the digital economy and promote Internet access in the Global South
  - 6.3.4.1 Expand norms and the rule of law in the digital marketplace
  - 6.3.4.2 Combat cybercrime through international cybercrime centers and an international cybercrime experts roster
  - 6.3.4.3 Promote fundamental good practice in cybersecurity globally
  - 6.3.4.4 Promote universal access and the protection of rights and freedom in the digital marketplace
- Revitalization of the UN General Assembly
  - Streamline the UNGA agenda and strengthen its president and committees
  - Create a Shadow Council in the General Assembly for Security Council oversight
  - Revisit the Uniting for Peace resolution
  - Lead the Post-2015 Development Agenda
  - Establish a UN Parliamentary Network
- Reform of the UN Security Council
  - Expand the membership and allow immediate reelection of nonpermanent members
  - Improve the working methods
  - Hold regular, structured consultations with civil society and business
- G20+ and a new framework for global economic cooperation
  - Facilitate multi-stakeholder, cross-disciplinary dialogue and policy solutions
  - Promote inclusive economic reform
  - Enable global economic crisis response

    - Convene the G20+ every two years at the UN
    - Establish a global economic cooperation liaison mechanism
    - Create a (virtual) G20+ secretariat composed mainly of seconded personnel from major global and regional economic bodies
    - Focus ECOSOC on delivering the Post-2015 Development Agenda
    - Facilitate development cooperation and humanitarian action through ECOSOC
- International courts and human rights bodies: Reform and strengthening
    - Strengthen and make full use of the ICJ
    - Enhance working relations between the UNSC and ICC
    - Streamline the global human rights architecture
- From Peacebuilding Commission to Peacebuilding Council
    - Create a stronger Peacebuilding Council to replace the Peacebuilding Commission
    - Entrust the new Peacebuilding Council with a conflict-prevention mandate
    - Improve integrated peacebuilding strategies and monitoring
- Modernization of the UN Secretariat
    - Improve the selection procedure for the next Secretary-General
    - Empower the Secretary-General with more discretion to manage the Secretariat
    - Further advance the Delivering as One UN Coherence Agenda through a second deputy secretary-general and additional incentives
- Introduce new social compacts
    - Develop new social compacts to support multi-stakeholder solutions to critical governance problems
    - Establish a repository for new social compacts
- Inaugurate a UN Global Partnership
    - Establish a UN Global Partnership
    - Strengthen civil society and business engagement
    - Encourage greater UN policy and programmatic attention to major civil society and private sector priorities
    - Further codify principles for UN, civil society, and business interactions and corporate social responsibility in global governance
- Bolster regional organizations as promoters of global security and justice
    - Promote regional courts to protect international human rights and to address particular issues
    - Explore ways to grant regional courts the right to request ICJ advisory opinions
    - Update the Cold War–based UN regional groups and strengthen the role of regional organizations
- Bring global cities and local communities into global governance
    - Create an official dialogue and institutional links between international, national, and local institutions
    - Bolster local capabilities to fulfill their expanded governance role
- Build Smart Coalitions to Mobilize Support and Sustain Reforms
- Reform Through Parallel Tracks (RPT)
- Convene a World Conference on Global Institutions (WCGI)
- Establish a Mechanism for Monitoring and Coordinating Reform

Commission on Africa

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Independent, at British initiative.
- **Type:** High-level panel (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Two reports – *Our Common Interest* (2005); *Still Our Common Interest* (2010).
- **Dates:** Final report published, 2010; first report published, 2005; panel established, 2004.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting (global governance reform; climate change; political violence).
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A (see "Making it happen" below).
- **Recommendations:** (final report only)
  - Governance
    - Donors should continue to provide external assistance to the African Union and to other regional organisations as appropriate and in line with the strategies of those organisations.
    - African leaders need to seize the initiative to push forward the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – to get more countries to sign up, to get countries to act upon the findings of reports and to move countries that have already been reviewed towards their second assessment.
    - African countries should ratify the 2007 Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and put in place a robust mechanism for monitoring its implementation. They should also take forward implementation of the 2001 Charter on Public Service.
    - It is essential that African governments build on recent progress and further strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, by ensuring that they are putting in place and enforcing appropriate tax regimes for all potential sources of revenue.
    - African governments should draw up comprehensive capacity-building strategies. Donor support should be fully aligned behind these strategies and donors should not pursue competing priorities or procedures.
    - Donors should urgently commit to providing at least $500 million to revitalise Africa's institutions of higher education over the next ten years.
    - It is essential that the African Ministerial Conference on Science and Technology (AMCOST) makes progress on developing priorities for funding to science and technology, while donors need to set up and provide funds to the African Science and Innovation Facility.
    - African governments need to take further steps to improve their statistical capacity – for example, by signing, ratifying and implementing the AU's Charter on Statistics – and donors should increase their investment to support these improvements.
    - Donors should support a fund that enables African governments to access the best legal and technical advice necessary to enable them to negotiate deals on the exploitation of their countries' natural resources that will be of greatest benefit to their population. Access to this fund should be linked to steps taken to promote transparency and effective use of revenues.
    - Other developed countries should follow the example of the US in making it mandatory for all oil, gas and mining companies listed on their stock exchanges to disclose what they pay to foreign governments for the right to extract natural resources and in making it an offence to import timber that has been illegally sourced.
    - All countries should ratify and implement the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), implement the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information, and continue to pursue steps to reduce all forms of illicit capital flight and to repatriate stolen assets. African governments should take all necessary steps to prevent capital flight.

- African and partner governments must take steps to ensure that the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and other transparency processes have 'teeth' and to ensure that deals involving natural resources are made in a transparent manner. All governments and extractive companies should adopt and implement the Natural Resource Charter
- African governments should take steps to increase transparency and accountability. Donors, including international NGOs, should provide appropriate support in these areas and to strengthen African civil society's ability to hold governments to account.
- African governments should ensure that the media have the space to operate effectively and support should be given to the newly launched Africa Media Initiative.

- Peace and security
  - To build on progress made in the region and to reduce the threat posed by climate change and other future risks to stability, the international community, the AU and Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) should continue to strengthen their focus on the prevention of violent conflict as well as ending ongoing conflicts.
  - It is vital that the AU and the RECs continue to embed their institutions for the prevention and resolution of violent conflict and that donors provide support to build their capacity to deliver.
  - The review of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) should consider the PBC's role in coordinating action to tackle the trade in conflict resources, and the PBC should take the appropriate action to improve international coordination on this issue.
  - Negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will take place over the next two years, starting in 2010. This report calls upon UN Member States to take full advantage of this historic opportunity to negotiate a strong and comprehensive ATT by 2012. Africa will be one of the main beneficiaries of a strong ATT and it is vital that it takes a leading role in these negotiations and in putting pressure on all members of the G20 to support the treaty. With donor support, African governments and regional organisations should strengthen e" orts to reduce the number of weapons already in circulation.
  - Donors need to step up the quality and quantity of their aid to conflict-affected, post-conflict and vulnerable countries, not just high-profile cases, and ensure that post-conflict countries get rapid access to debt relief. Donors should also take steps to improve the coherence of their responses to countries affected by violent conflict.
  - African governments and donors should take steps to ensure that increased aid to reach the MDGs and tackle climate change is used in a manner that is sensitive to the risks of exacerbating violent conflict.
  - The review of the PBC's work this year should aim to strengthen its performance in holding all partners to account on their commitments to support post-conflict countries. The review should also consider moving towards a more preventative role for the PBC.
  - All parts of the international community, including emerging donors, should work together to identify and pre-empt potential threats to security. Efforts to strengthen Africa's climate change monitoring capacity should include elements on monitoring the threats to peace and security.
  - It is vital that African governments continue to pursue not only political stability and sound economic management but also improvements in the provision of justice and basic security. It is also vital that donors improve the effectiveness of their support to this.
- Investing in people
  - All donors, both governments and foundations, should continue to increase their investments in African systems to deliver health, education and other basic services.
  - To encourage the kind of investment that will support the development of their own systems, African governments should provide the policy and strategic frameworks to meet

the MDGs. They must also raise the levels of investment of public resources in these services to at least the agreed targets of 20% for education, 15% for health and 0.5% of GDP to water and sanitation. Wherever possible, progress towards removing fees for health and education should continue, with the required donor support.

- Donors must enable continued increased investment in essential services and the achievement of the MDGs by meeting existing aid commitments and increasing their aid to Africa, as outlined in the resources section below. They need to commit to funding the gap between current aid levels and what is required to achieve the MDGs. Within this, they should ensure that they meet Africa's need for increased funding to health, education, water and sanitation, and other key services.
- Both African strategies and donor support urgently need to address shortage of trained health professionals. Member states should implement the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel adopted at the 63rd World Health Assembly in May 2010.
- African governments should ensure that they have strategies in place to eliminate gender disparity at all levels of education and that vital services are reaching and empowering women. Special attention must be given to ensuring that services reach rural areas and vulnerable and hard-to-reach communities, and African governments' strategies should identify steps to ensure this. They should also take into account the impact of climate change. These strategies must be translated into action.
- African governments must ensure effective implementation of steps to manage the processes of rapid urbanisation, population growth and movement that are set to take place. Ministerial level mechanisms to tackle issues of rapid urbanisation have been established within the AU and these should be supported, as should steps to promote lesson-learning between cities in Africa and their counterparts elsewhere in the world.
- Africa will only be able to seize the opportunities for further economic growth if its expanding labour force has the skills required to compete in the international economy. It is therefore high time that governments and donors heed the 2005 report's call to increase support to secondary, vocational and tertiary education.
- African governments must do more to improve the quality of basic education by recruiting and training more qualified teachers, increasing the volume of teaching and learning resources, and encouraging active learning to reduce the high repetition and dropout rates. More support needs to be given to literacy and reading skills in earlier grades.
- Donors should launch a Global Fund for Education in close partnership with governments of developing countries to all the funding gap required to reach the MDG goal of universal primary education. This should be done by reforming the governance and management of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), giving a stronger voice to developing countries in the process and reducing disbursement times for funding.
- Both African governments and donors should rapidly increase their investment in water and, in particular, sanitation to ensure that African countries are on track to meet the MDG targets. African governments should honour their commitment to invest at least 0.5% of GDP in water and sanitation.
- With sub-Saharan Africa still accounting for the overwhelming majority of all new HIV infections, national governments and donors must increase their focus on HIV prevention and increasing public knowledge of HIV/AIDs which currently remains low.
- With more than half of the population in sub-Saharan Africa still not receiving ARTs, more must be done to scale up access to treatment to reach the MDG target of achieving universal access to treatment and comprehensive care, which has already been missed for 2010. Pregnant women must be a key target group.

- African governments and donors should support an action plan on women's and children's health to accelerate progress against both these MDGs. African governments need to take the lead in developing integrated approaches to improve maternal and child health and donors must increase investment in support of these efforts. The Global Consensus on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH) estimates that, to achieve the MDGs, OECD donors will need to double their aid to MNCH from $4 billion to $8 billion annually. Through the Muskoka Initiative, the G8 recently committed to increase their support to the achievement of these MDGs by $1 billion a year. Donors should commit to providing the additional resources required.
- All governments in malaria endemic countries should honour the commitments they made to tackle malaria in Abuja in 2000, including achieving universal coverage of effective interventions, such as insecticide impregnated bed nets, by the end of 2010. Donors should provide the necessary support for this, and for further research into new insecticides, diagnostics and antimalarial medicines to protect against future resistance. The African Leaders Malaria Alliance should be full participants in every stage of the process.
- African governments should implement the AU's Social Policy Framework and donors should increase and coordinate their support behind governments to improve social protection. This might include programmes that provide direct payments to individuals and households. The focus should now be on developing and supporting long-term programmes.
- Promoting inclusive growth
- To promote growth, it is essential that African governments continue to take steps to improve the climate for doing business in their countries and to reduce regional barriers to trade. International business and donors should continue to support this by maintaining and increasing their support for the Investment Climate Facility and through all other appropriate means.
- African governments need to increase their investment in vital infrastructure and donors need to provide the additional finance required to support this. Strategies and investments must take account of the new and changing needs brought about by climate change and by population growth and movement.
- African countries should continue to strengthen regional institutions that will ensure that infrastructure contributes to regional prosperity and growth.
- A recent conference in London on 'Joining up Africa' produced a joint statement on improving regional integration in Africa and was signed by the AU, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Development Bank, African RECs, the EU, the WTO and the World Bank. Turning this statement into reality should be a priority for African countries, institutions and their partners.
- Doubling the amount of agricultural land under irrigation by 2015, as suggested by the Commission in 2005, will require a sharp increase in the amount of funding devoted to this, as well as prioritisation by African governments. Donors should reverse the decline in aid to agriculture and provide the resources required to implement the AU's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the individual strategies of African governments.
- African governments should develop strategies to create jobs and support small businesses. These strategies will need to target young people to improve levels of youth employment. Within and beyond these strategies, African governments must take steps to end employment discrimination against women to give them better access to paid employment and its benefits.

- African governments should take steps to ensure that they are leveraging domestic and international private sector investment in key areas vital to growth and development – including in the fields of infrastructure, clean energy technologies, agriculture and the social sectors.
- It is also vital that African governments set and enforce the standards to which those businesses operate and that all governments do more to tackle the negative behaviour of some companies that damages the livelihoods, health and safety of African people and their communities.

- Climate change
  - The AU and African governments must make urgent progress in developing strategies to tackle the impact of climate change on Africa, and donors should provide the support needed to implement these strategies as rapidly as possible.
  - Other governments should provide any necessary technical assistance requested to assist with the development of these strategies. Donors should also provide additional, predictable financing, estimated to be between $10 billion and $20 billion extra per year, to support implementation of Africa's strategies to adapt to climate change and to comply with the agreement on funding for adaptation and mitigation made in the Copenhagen Accord.
  - The relevance and accessibility of the Clean Development Mechanism for sub-Saharan Africa must be improved to make carbon market mechanisms more significant for the continent.
  - It is essential that the implementation of initiatives such as ClimDev-Africa are speeded up to help the mainstreaming of climate change and other environmental considerations into policies and practice. Support to improving Africa's ability to monitor climate change should be stepped up immediately.
  - The international community should also support innovative mechanisms to fund Africa's fight to tackle the effects of climate change, which are being considered by the High Level Panel on Climate Change Financing this year.
  - As part of the global effort to tackle climate change, donors should increase their support to Africa's efforts to make use of its natural resources to generate clean energy. Where necessary, African governments and regional organisations should be given support in developing schemes to produce clean energy and donors should provide support to these – either directly or by encouraging and facilitating private sector investment in them.
  - Trade
  - As the global economy recovers, there should be a renewed push to deliver the key 'development' elements of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), including reductions in agricultural subsidies, improved market access in goods and services of interest to African producers and adequate Special and Differential Treatment, to help stimulate African economies and support global recovery.
  - OECD countries that are looking to make cuts and reprioritise government spending should look to agricultural subsidies as a prime target.
  - In the absence of progress in the DDA, the G20 could revitalise the issue of preferential access by committing to broad-based, meaningful and time-bound preferences with simple rules of origin that facilitate trade to help increase the competitiveness of African and other low-income countries.
  - It is critical that the EU funds ways to address the problems and delays encountered in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations and that African countries find the political will to make their regional trade agreements a reality.
  - Donors should continue to support Africa's capacity to trade.

- Resources
  - Donors should deliver on the commitments they made in 2005. It is vital that donors 'lock in' promised aid for sub-Saharan Africa and honour their commitment of reaching 0.7% of GNI through, for example, domestic legislation. This should include further aid promises, ensuring that it becomes unacceptable to make a pledge without providing evidence of budgetary provision. Commitments on how to direct that aid should be proportional to need.
  - The G20 should take on the G8's previous role in making and monitoring commitments to supporting growth and development in Africa. This should include commitments to providing long-term aid, with those collective commitments made proportional to the GNI of those countries.
  - In that context, and in line with the recommendation of the 2005 report, the G20 should commit to increasing aid to Africa from 2010 onwards to a further $25 billion per annum by 2015.
  - African governments should determine how these funds should be spent, but this review indicates that key areas for investment should include infrastructure, agriculture, job creation and support to small businesses, water and sanitation, and irrigation. Health, education and basic services will continue to be priorities, with the focus on sustainable systems. To realise its potential growth, Africa will need to invest more in secondary and tertiary education as well as in primary education.
  - The process for debt relief, particularly the transition between decision and completion point, needs to be speeded up by making completion criteria more realistic and relevant to countries' circumstances and needs. Unless countries have severe governance problems, creditors should expedite promotion to post-completion status and, in the case of fragile states, donors should provide tailored assistance to help build institutions and help countries move towards completion.
  - Many countries are currently disqualified from the benefits of debt relief because they have managed their debts well, but they still have great internal demand for the resources that would be released through debt relief. Debt cancellation should therefore also be extended beyond countries currently eligible to include those – such as Kenya and Lesotho – where debt ratios are below the HIPC threshold.
  - African countries and their partners should take steps to avoid the re-accumulation of debt through cautious borrowing policies and strengthened public debt management; increased concessional lending from IFIs; the development of a binding charter on responsible lending, based on internationally recognised legal standards, to ensure that loan extensions are used for investments that focus on development needs; and the fair allocation of burden sharing between creditor and debtor in cases of irresponsible lending. This could be achieved through the establishment of a sovereign debt work-out mechanism, as has been called for by Southern governments.
  - Large multilateral and Paris Club creditors have provided their full share of debt relief. Such efforts must be replicated among smaller multilateral creditors, non-Paris Club bilateral official creditors and private creditors.
  - Donors should continue to consider and support innovative mechanisms for mobilising resources to fund increases in development assistance across a wide range of fields. These should focus on leveraging private sector investment as well as mobilising public resources.
  - To improve the effectiveness of aid, all development actors need to accelerate implementation of their commitments under the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action to meet the targets set at Accra ahead of the Third High Level conference in Korea in

2011. This includes recipient governments' commitment to ensuring that poverty reduction strategies are linked to annual budgets.
    - Improving the transparency of aid is essential to hold donors accountable for keeping their promises and for recipient governments' planning and accountability to their people. Partners to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) should ensure that they reach agreement on a code of conduct on publishing data on aid by March 2011 and that they implement their commitments in full.
    - African governments should improve their capacity to monitor and evaluate the impact of development programmes with appropriate support from donors.
- Making it happen
    - At a minimum, the IMF should introduce a further seat on the board for sub-Saharan Africa. However, the shareholders of both the World Bank and the IMF should also consider raising the voting share of developing countries to 50%, which would in turn increase their representation on the boards.
    - The IMF should take forward the recommendation by the committee that recently reviewed its governance that called for the creation of a decision-making council made up of political representatives of member countries. The World Bank should also consider such a step.
    - African governments and international partners should continue to support the African Development Bank in becoming the pre-eminent financing institution in Africa. They should also support UNECA in its ongoing efforts to enhance its role.
    - This report also calls upon the UN Security Council and UN member states to agree as soon as possible to increase African representation on the UN Security Council.
    - African governments should accelerate the implementation of mutual accountability mechanisms to assess the quality of donor assistance and coordination.
    - The Commission continues to welcome and endorse the work done by the Africa Progress Panel in holding both African governments and their partners to account for implementation of commitments made.

Africa Progress Panel

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Independent.
- **Type:** High-level panel (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Nine reports – *Making Progress Towards Attaining the Sustainable Development Goals in Africa* (2017); *Power, People, Planet: Seizing Africa's Energy and Climate Opportunities* (2015); *Grain, Fish, Money: Financing Africa's Green and Blue Revolutions* (2014); *Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa's Natural Resources for All* (2013); *Jobs, Justice and Equity: Seizing Opportunities in Times of Global Change* (2012); *The Transformative Power of Partnerships* (2011); *From Agenda to Action: Turning Resources into Results for People* (2010); *An Agenda for Progress at a Time of Global Crisis: A Call for African Leadership* (2009).
- **Dates:** Final report published, 2017; panel established, 2007.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting (global governance reform; climate change; political violence).
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (final report only)
    - Mobilize Financial Resources for Africa's Green and Blue Revolutions
        - Support inclusive finance
            - Only one in five Africans has access to formal financial institutions, with the poor, rural populations, and particularly women, facing the most significant barriers. While the majority of smallholder farmers are women, their lack of access to financial services reflects the social, cultural and legal norms and inequalities that continue to affect women disproportionately. More focus is needed to ensure that these individuals, who form an integral part of the agricultural and fishing value chains, have access to basic financial services. Farmers require access to finance — credit, savings, and insurance — to mitigate their risks, which are now compounded by the unpredictability of climate change. As noted in the 2014 APR, Grain, Fish, Money, the development of more inclusive financial systems is essential, and can be supported via mobile banking and e-commerce. Technology alone is not a solution, however, effective food security strategies have to include safety-net provisions both nationally and internationally through the development of effective social programmes.
        - Bolster multi-stakeholder initiatives to combat the plunder of Africa's oceans
            - Secrecy and the lack of regulation and enforcement allow organized illegal fishing to flourish across borders. The gravity of the situation requires traceability throughout the entire supply chain, from the fishing net to the plate. Even if African countries were to implement the appropriate policies in isolation, it is obvious that the sustainability and final success of these efforts critically depend on the strengthened collaboration of global stakeholders. This is particularly important if Africa is to make progress on SDG 14 - to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources. To combat the plunder of Africa's oceans, it is essential that all relevant stakeholders are held accountable for criminal activity. Since illegal fishing transcends national borders and waters, global collective action is needed to create a culture of transparency. Instruments such as the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI) bring a transformative multi-stakeholder approach to tackling corruption and lack of transparency in the fisheries sector. Indeed, the diversity of the different stakeholders participating in FiTI forms part of the instrument's strength. FiTI forms part of a movement to find new paradigms for global governance that allow for informed public debate - between government, the private sector, and civil society - on key issues. African countries have

taken the lead in this regard. A new era of transparency and participation in fisheries was launched in April 2017 through the adoption by five nations of the first FiTI Standard, with four of the five being African nations (Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, and the Seychelles). The G7 will also have a critical role to play in terms of mobilizing international support to combat the plunder of Africa's oceans. It is well known that the resources lost by Africa due to such operations are significantly higher than the financing that the 27 continent obtains through official development assistance (ODA). Approximately US$ 50 billion is drained out of the continent annually due to resource plunder. 20 In this respect, the G7 should play an active role in helping African countries in their fight against illicit transactions, particularly through offshore centers. Moreover, the G7 can use their influence to reorient international financial institutions towards more effective contributions to the development of Africa, particularly by deploying investment guarantee instruments, boosting private investment in Africa's agricultural and fisheries sectors, and in the meeting of its vital infrastructure needs. And finally, the necessary steps should be taken to bring an end to the underrepresentation of Africa in relevant global institutions.

    - Increase annual expenditure on agriculture and rural infrastructure development
        - At the 2003 AU summit meeting in Maputo, African leaders committed to allocate 10 per cent of their national budget to agriculture and rural development. The frequent disjuncture between policy and practice must end, it is time that African states honour their commitments. This will require political will - a factor that the African Development Bank (AfDB) has identified as an essential element to drive Africa's agricultural transformation. Investments are crucial to address the poor infrastructure, access to water and sanitation, lack of storage, insufficient research and development, and inadequate road networks that characterize far too many African countries. A recent World Bank study suggests that closing the infrastructure quantity and quality gap relative to the best performers in the world could increase growth of GDP per capita by 2.6 per cent per year. Africa's rural farmers are among those who stand to gain the most from such developments.
- Boost Investment in Africa's Energy Infrastructure
    - Push for innovation and investment
        - African governments must take primary responsibility for Africa's energy transformation, both as repositories of wealth and expertise, but also in their regulatory role. African governments have the potential to promote a vibrant private sector, attracting local and foreign investment, where much of the innovation and drive for transformation has already begun, and will continue. Financing of US$55 billion per year is required until 2030 if Africa is to succeed in attaining SDG 7. To meet this gap, African governments will need to spend 3 to 4 per cent of their GDP on energy development projects. Public spending could be supported by improvements in tax-to-GDP ratios, and transparency initiatives that rein in losses from illicit financial flows, which reached US$69 billion in 2012 alone. 38 But this injection of capital should also be maximized through the use of public-private partnerships and the fostering of a reliable and transparent regulatory environment that decreases risk and promotes local and international investment in sustainable energy development projects. Part of this transformation will require overhauling how Africa's existing utilities are regulated, with the creation of independent regulatory bodies that can hold these utilities to account, along with the establishment of new regulatory processes in line with the goal of creating a transparent regulatory environment for off-grid and mini-grid projects. Africa and the world stand to benefit from all Africans having access to reliable,

affordable and sustainable energy. 30 with the goal of creating a transparent regulatory environment for off-grid and mini-grid projects. Africa has the potential to lead the world as a hub for new sustainable technologies and innovative business models, with the continent's entrepreneurs and business leaders working closely with their governments and with investors and experts from the international community. But this will require an enabling, transparent and reliable regulatory environment, an innovative private sector, and increased international investment. Africa has the potential to lead the world as a hub for new sustainable technologies and innovative business models, with the continent's entrepreneurs and business leaders working closely with their governments and with investors and experts from the international community. But this will require an enabling, transparent and reliable regulatory environment, an innovative private sector, and increased international investment.

- Focus policy changes on benefitting the poor and disconnected
  - Investments in the power sector should not only focus on improving efficiency and creating profits, but also on bringing energy access to all at a speedy rate and supporting the broader development agenda. As it stands, the policy environment in many African countries largely benefits the rich at the expense of the poor. Governments should begin by cutting the US$10 billion spent every year on subsidizing kerosene and other oil-based products, and the US$11 billion spent to cover utilities losses, subsidies that benefit mainly urban citizens. 39 This money should be redirected to connections for the populations that lack access in rural areas.
- Invest in infrastructure to boost intra-regional energy trade
  - Political leaders should commit to developing significant regional energy markets in Africa. Where continental and sub-regional political commitments to boost regional infrastructure already exist, today's leaders must strive to show consistent leadership in promoting the agreed implementation agenda. Regional trade in electricity offers economies of scale and opens up larger markets, linking supply to demand, stimulating investment, and lowering the cost of electricity for Africa's people. But as it stands less than 8 per cent of power is traded across borders in sub-Saharan Africa. 40 Changing this will require streamlining investment and regulatory climates throughout the region, and significant investment in cross-border energy transmission infrastructure - efforts that could bring tremendous benefits. Some estimates suggest that an investment of US$17 billion in developing regional transmission lines could save Africa up to US$40 billion otherwise spent on increasing generation, simply through increased efficiency. 41 The International Energy Agency estimates that such efficiency gains could reduce average electricity costs by 8 per cent, with some regions seeing reductions of up to 60 per cent. Such integration could also provide opportunities for exploiting big hydropower, geothermal, wind, solar and biomass projects that require large and reliable commercial markets, and significant initial investment. With major players recognizing this potential, many such regional integration projects are in the pipeline, but efforts must be redoubled to make them a reality. The 15 energy-sector projects in the Priority Action Plan of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa, including the North-South Power Transmission Corridor, the West African Power Transmission Corridor, and the Inga III Hydro Project, must be under way by 2020. East and Southern Africa should look to the development of a regional gas grid, which will require careful and dedicated coordination, but could have a profound impact on reducing energy prices in the region, and curbing emissions. The Africa Clean Energy Corridor, developed by the International Renewable Energy Agency, is also a step in the right direction, but its scope must be widened. African leaders should also collaborate

strategically to harness the political will behind the new G20 Compact with Africa to help boost these initiatives.

- Fight Against Illicit Financial Activities and the Mismanagement of Africa's Resources
  - Adopt global transparency standards
    - G8 and G20 countries must act on past commitments to strengthen tax-disclosure requirements, take action to raise the standards of transparency for the extractive sector, and make progress toward common reporting standards for the industry. Promises made by the G8 and G20 to adopt beneficial ownership principles and ensure that law enforcement and tax authorities have access to such key information must be acted upon. All countries should cooperate to ensure that companies publish a full list of their subsidiaries, and information on global revenues, profits and taxes paid. Tax authorities, in Africa and abroad, should exchange information more systematically. It is vital that Australia, Canada and China, as major players in Africa, actively support the emerging global consensus on disclosure. It is time to go beyond the current patchwork of initiatives and develop a global common standard. The G8 should establish the architecture for a multilateral regime that facilitates tax transparency and closes down opportunities for tax evasion. To ensure that African concerns regarding the global financial industry, its regulations and its stability, are understood and taken on board, AU member states must take an active role in G20 processes.
  - African leaders must take bold steps in domestic regulation
    - When it comes to domestic regulation, African governments must shoulder responsibility. Ensuring Africa's resources are stewarded for the benefit of all requires that long-term national interest override short-term political gain, vested interests and corruption. Most African political leaders recognize that tackling illicit financial flows presents an opportunity that can help their countries develop sustainably. The High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, led by former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki, has undertaken notable measures to create awareness at the national level within the continent as well as internationally and also to initiate steps to strengthen institutions to counter these practices. Additionally, the AfDB, in its High 5s Agenda, has committed to doing more in the fight against illicit financial flows. The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), formed in 2009 with 36 member countries, has also ramped up its efforts to curb illicit financial flows. These initiatives are all commendable. African customs authorities, the police, central banks, the banking system and financial intelligence units should put into practice the recommendations and changes put forward by these initiatives. Yet the current capacity of these institutions is insufficient. The international tax regime, along with its emphasis on information sharing, should translate into real practical support to African countries through the ATAF to make real changes on the ground. Increased collaboration is needed to help the continent deal with this capacity gap.
  - Maximize efforts to increase domestic finances
    - Whilst it is important to stem the flow of illicit funds leaving the continent, it is equally important for African countries to manage their existing resources properly. Over the past 15 years, several African governments have made steady progress in improving the way they manage their countries. Africa's public finances now depend more on the continent's private sector and less on international aid. Continued progress will be critical for governments to finance the social and economic infrastructure needed to create jobs, sustain growth and improve basic services. Governments need to broaden the tax base, beginning by revoking inappropriate tax exemptions. They should also ensure that all financial transactions involving commitments by the state are

transparently published, centrally approved and prudently managed. Governments must also renew efforts to increase domestic finances. The Third International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Addis Ababa in 2015, introduced the Addis Tax Initiative, which aims to help countries across the world, especially developing countries, raise revenue substantially. So far, however, only 13 African countries have joined the initiative. More now need to sign up and put the right measures in place.

Pathways for Prosperity Commission on Technology and Inclusive Development

- **Convenors and/or authors:** University of Oxford.
- **Type:** International commission (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Two reports – *Digital Lives: Creating Meaning Connections for the Next 3 Billion* and *Charting Pathways for Inclusive Growth*)
- **Dates:** Reports published, October 2018; commission established, January 2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting.
- **Aspirations:** Medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A
- **Recommendations**:
  - *Digital Lives: Creating Meaningful Connections for the Next 3 Billion* (headline recommendations only)
    - Drive access to the poorest and others who are facing exclusion
    - Address the fundamental barriers that prevent take-up and effective usage
    - Encourage a dynamic domestic ecosystem of digital services
    - Push for transparent and trustworthy digital services
  - *Charting Pathways for Inclusive Growth* (conclusions)
    - First, many of the pathways rely on a deepening of globalisation to a greater or lesser extent, and in different ways. Allowing trade and investment flows is a fundamental prerequisite for development; whether it is exporting services online or letting international firms bring investments in new technology. The international community should continue to stand for a rule-based international trading system, maintaining the openness, predictability, and order required for developing countries to take advantage of new pathways.
    - Developing countries that have a clear and feasible national strategy to navigate technological upheaval should be a priority for international support. Developing countries may have a clear plan designed between industry and government. They may also have the institutions required to execute it. Donor agencies should look for opportunities to support countries embarking on these growth pathways.
    - Many decisions made by the international community will clearly affect how countries are able to pursue these growth pathways; some issues can only be resolved at international levels. Most of the pathways and policies depend on frameworks around intellectual property, cross-border taxation and accounting, regional trade, and competition. The digital information age and the technological advancements in transportation and logistics reduce the importance of geography, and lead to more and more interactions across borders. At the same time, we are seeing the rise of global mega-corporations with clout to rival nation states. In some areas, international co-ordination offers the only way to fully grasp the opportunities from technological advances, and to avoid a 'race to the bottom'. Developing countries will require a keen understanding of what they need from international frameworks to support their domestic policy efforts. The time is ripe for concerted international co-operation.

High-Level Panel on the Technology Bank for Least Developed Countries

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** high-level panel (UN).
- **Outputs:** Single document – *Feasibility Study for a United Nations Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries*.
- **Dates:** reports published, October 2015; panel established, November 2014.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** new technologies/access to technology.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term. NB: Technology Bank for LDCs inaugurated June 2018.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A – technocratic feasibility study.
- **Recommendations**:
  - "Take the necessary steps to launch and operationalize the Technology Bank and inform the UN General Assembly, including preparing a host country agreement; Feasibility study of the Technology Bank;
  - "Establish a Trust Fund with necessary flexibility to attract voluntary funding from Member States as well as other stakeholders including the private sector and foundations;
  - "Mobilize the UN system organizations and other international and regional organizations to support the launching and operationalization of the Bank, and its effective functioning;
  - "Encourage the principal stakeholders to extend generous support to the Bank during its initial phase and beyond."

Climate change

Global Commission on the Economy and Climate

- **Convenors and/or authors:** World Resources Institute
- **Type:** high-level panel (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Four reports – Reports: *Unlocking the Inclusive Growth Story of the 21st Century* [2018]; *The Sustainable Infrastructure Imperative* [2016]; *Seizing the Global Opportunity: Partnerships for Better Growth and Better Climate* [2015]; *Better Growth, Better Climate: The New Climate Economy Report* [2014]
- **Dates:** reports published, 2018, 2016, 2015 and 2014; panel established, 2013.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** climate change; ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** medium to long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A
- **Recommendations:** (2018 report)
  - First, governments should put a price on carbon and move toward mandatory climate risk disclosure for major investors and companies. Implemented together, these two actions would provide the strongest, clearest signal to market participants that policy-makers are committed to a new growth approach. They are important elements of the broader policy package to tackle climate change, including appropriate standards and regulations (e.g. on energy and fuel efficiency), investment in research and development (R&D), green public procurement, and labelling and information-based incentives.
    - The major economies, led by the G20, should put a price on carbon of at least US$40—80 by 2020, with a predictable pricing pathway to around US$50—100 by 2030, as recommended by the High-Level Commission on Carbon Pricing.
    - Lessons gained from successful carbon pricing and subsidy reforms in countries around the world should be utilised to help design reforms in order to address concerns about potential distributional and competitiveness impacts, as well as the challenges around vested interests.
    - As recommended by the Global Commission in 2016, companies and investors should be required, as a matter of good corporate practice, to disclose their climate-related financial risks and how their business strategy is compatible with the Paris Agreement, following the TCFD recommendations.
  - Second, all economies should place much greater emphasis on investing in sustainable infrastructure as a central driver of the new growth approach.
    - The first step is not about the money. Rather, it is to build stronger leadership and technical capacity to shape robust growth strategies, investment plans, and institutional structures that can align with sectoral policies and facilitate the flow of private investment to sustainable infrastructure. This includes better designed buildings, transport, energy and water systems, and cities but also investments in the natural infrastructure that underpins our economy, such as the forests and wetlands that purify water and provide valuable flood control.
    - MDBs and other DFIs need to double their collective investment in infrastructure and make sure it is sustainable, aiming to invest at least US$100 billion per year by 2020. DFIs should also aim to more than double their mobilisation of private sector investment, including from institutional investors. This will entail working closely with governments and private investors to unlock investment and scale up blended finance, as well as ensure a continued strong capital basis for the MDBs. This would include greater use of risk mitigation instruments and structures and country-led sector infrastructure plans and investment platforms. More broadly, the DFIs can play a critical role in accelerating this new growth

approach, but their portfoliowide activities will need to be aligned to support the sustainability transition.
    - Together with major private financial institutions, the G20 should continue its work on infrastructure as an asset class, on incorporating sustainability criteria into its core definitions, and on developing the tools needed to both support implementation and deepen the pools of green finance. A deeper recognition of the value of natural infrastructure, and effort to attract the finance to maintain and restore it, is needed.
    - Global and national-level platforms that pool expertise in project preparation for sustainable infrastructure investment should be scaled-up and replicated.
    - Developed countries should fulfil their commitment to mobilise US$100 billion per year in climate finance from public and private sources for developing countries by 2020, and the climate finance architecture must be strengthened to utilise these resources for maximum impact and leverage
- Third, the full power of the private sector and innovation needs to be harnessed. Many companies and investors are already demonstrating leadership, and others are ready to align around this agenda with the right policy signals.
    - By 2020, all Fortune 500 companies should have science-based targets that align with the Paris Agreement. Shifting their brand and marketing to products that are climate positive will engage consumers as active agents of the solution. For only the top ten global retail companies, this could translate into almost US$4 billion each day of purchasing power moving toward the low-carbon economy.
    - Companies and investors are ready to advance on this agenda, but they cannot get there on their own. Current regulations, incentives and tax mechanisms are a major barrier to implementing a low-carbon and more circular economy. For example, they slow-down the penetration of new building materials in construction activity. In agriculture, they subsidise the application of too much mineral fertiliser, diverting innovation activity away from more sustainable forms of farming. They make it cost-competitive to deploy single-use forms of plastic packaging, contributing to the plastics crisis we are now seeing in the oceans. They make it hard to design products in a way that maximises component reuse. Along with getting carbon pricing right, we also need to tackle a host of other policies which are protecting the old inefficient, polluting economy.
    - A big push on innovation is needed, with at least US$50 billion of new capital by 2020 committed to breakthrough climate challenges beyond the energy sector. Today's progress on renewable energy, energy storage and lowcarbon mobility is not an accident. It is at least in part the outcome of decades of investment by governments, universities, foundations and the private sector in mission-driven innovation. Recent technological developments (and new partnerships) have, for example, helped to advance the radical transparency and accountability necessary to achieve deforestation-free supply chains, although there is more to be done to achieve these in practice.
    - We need to put in place and capitalise private-public partnerships in each major sector to pilot, scale and share learning around the deployment of new low-carbon and climate-resilient technologies. We have plenty of examples about how to do this well (and badly). What is currently lacking is sufficient political and business leadership.
- Fourth, a people-centred approach is needed to ensure lasting, equitable growth and a just transition. It is good economics and good politics.
    - If managed well, the low-carbon transition offers the potential for new opportunities and more equitable growth. Active, targeted regeneration can support economic diversification and the delivery of quality jobs. In developing and emerging economies, the low-carbon

transition provides an opportunity to leap-frog the inefficient and polluting models of the past.
    - All governments should establish clear Energy Transition Plans to reach net-zero energy systems, and work with energy companies, trade unions, and civil society to ensure a just transition for workers and communities. Successfully diversifying local economies as we shift away from coal and eventually other fossil fuels will require multi-stakeholder dialogue, strategic assistance, re-training, and targeted social protection.
    - Diversification and regeneration funds should be targeted to affected areas. There are multiple examples of areas previously reliant on industrial or mining activities that are now seeing new growth as a direct result of repurposing the assets, networks and capabilities of the old economy.48 Better food and land use systems can deliver vital jobs, better incomes, and more inclusive growth to disadvantaged rural communities. Businesses, universities, and city governments can work with national governments, workers, and civil society to help revitalise and ensure prosperous communities.
    - Women will play a critical role in delivering this agenda in an inclusive and people-centred way. In countries where more women participate in political life, parliaments are more likely to set aside protected lands and ratify international environmental treaties, while ensuring their full participation in the economy could, by some estimates, boost global GDP by as much as US$28 trillion per year by 2025.
- **Recommendations:** (2016 report, headline recommendations only)
    - We must collectively tackle fundamental price distortions – including subsidies and lack of appropriate pricing especially for fossil fuels and carbon – to improve incentives for investment and innovation, to drastically reduce pollution and congestion, and to generate revenue that can be redirected, for instance, to support poor people.
    - We must strengthen policy frameworks and institutional capacities to deliver the right policies and enabling conditions for investment, to build pipelines of viable and sustainable projects, to reduce high development and transaction costs, and to attract private investment.
    - We must transform the financial system to deliver the scale and quality of investment needed in order to augment financing from all sources (especially private sources such as long-term debt finance and the large pools of institutional investor capital), reduce the cost of capital, enable catalytic finance from development finance institutions (DFIs), and accelerate the greening of the financial system.
    - We must ramp up investments in clean technology R&D and deployment to reduce the costs and enhance the accessibility of more sustainable technologies.
- **Recommendations:** (2015 report, short version)
    - 1. Accelerate low-carbon development in the world's cities: All cities should commit to developing and implementing low-carbon urban development strategies by 2020, using where possible the framework of the Compact of Mayors, prioritising policies and investments in public, non-motorised and low-emission transport, building efficiency, renewable energy and efficient waste management.
    - 2. Restore and protect agricultural and forest landscapes, and increase agricultural productivity: Governments, multilateral and bilateral finance institutions, the private sector and willing investors should work together to scale up sustainable land use financing, towards a global target of halting deforestation and putting into restoration at least 500 million ha of degraded farmlands and forests by 2030. Developed economies and forested developing countries should enter into partnerships that scale up international flows for REDD+, focused increasingly on mechanisms that generate verified emission reductions, with the aim of financing a further 1 Gt CO2e per year from 2020 and beyond. The private sector should commit to extending

deforestation-free supply chain commitments for key commodities and enhanced financing to support this.

- 3. Invest at least US$1 trillion a year in clean energy: To bring down the costs of financing clean energy and catalyse private investment, multilateral and national development banks should scale up their collaboration with governments and the private sector, and their own capital commitments, with the aim of reaching a global total of at least US$1 trillion of investment per year in low-carbon power supply and (non-transport) energy efficiency by 2030.
- 4. Raise energy efficiency standards to the global best: G20 and other countries should converge their energy efficiency standards in key sectors and product fields to the global best by 2025, and the G20 should establish a global platform for greater alignment and continuous improvement of standards.
- 5. Implement effective carbon pricing: All developed and emerging economies, and others where possible, should commit to introducing or strengthening carbon pricing by 2020, and should phase out fossil fuel subsidies.
- 6. Ensure new infrastructure is climate-smart G20 and other countries should adopt key principles ensuring the integration of climate risk and climate objectives in national infrastructure policies and plans. These principles should be included in the G20 Global Infrastructure Initiative, as well as used to guide the investment strategies of public and private finance institutions, particularly multilateral and national development banks.
- 7. Galvanise low-carbon innovation: Emerging and developed country governments should work together, and with the private sector and developing countries, in strategic partnerships to accelerate research, development and demonstration (RD&D) in low-carbon technology areas critical to post-2030 growth and emissions reduction.
- 8. Drive low-carbon growth through business and investor action: All major businesses should adopt short- and long-term emissions reduction targets and implement corresponding action plans, and all major industry sectors and value chains should agree on market transformation roadmaps, consistent with the long-term decarbonisation of the global economy. Financial sector regulators and shareholders should actively encourage companies and financial institutions to disclose critical carbon and environmental, social and governance factors, and incorporate them in risk analysis, business models and investment decision-making.
- 9. Raise ambition to reduce international aviation and maritime emissions: Emissions from the international aviation and maritime sectors should be reduced in line with a 2°C pathway through action under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to implement a market-based measure and aircraft efficiency standard, and through strong shipping fuel efficiency standards under the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
- 10. Phase down the use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs): Parties to the Montreal Protocol should approve an amendment to phase down the production and use of HFCs.

- **Recommendations:** (2014 report)
  - 1. Accelerate low-carbon transformation by integrating climate into core economic decision-making processes. This is needed at all levels of government and business, through systematic changes to policy and project assessment tools, performance indicators, risk models and reporting requirements.
  - 2. Enter into a strong, lasting and equitable international climate agreement, to increase the confidence needed for domestic policy reform, provide the support needed by developing countries, and send a strong market signal to investors.
  - 3. Phase out subsidies for fossil fuels and agricultural inputs, and incentives for urban sprawl, to drive more efficient use of resources and release public funds for other uses, including programmes to benefit those on low incomes.

- 4. Introduce strong, predictable carbon prices as part of good fiscal reform and good business practice, sending strong signals across the economy
- 5. Substantially reduce capital costs for low-carbon infrastructure investments, by expanding access to institutional capital and lowering its costs for low-carbon assets.
- 6. Scale up innovation in key low-carbon and climate-resilient technologies, tripling public investment in clean energy R&D and removing barriers to entrepreneurship and creativity.
- 7. Make connected and compact cities the preferred form of urban development, by encouraging better-managed urban growth and prioritising investments in efficient and safe mass transit systems.
- 8. Stop deforestation of natural forests by 2030, by strengthening the incentives for long-term investment and forest protection, and increasing international funding to around US$5 billion per year, progressively linked to performance.
- 9. Restore at least 500 million hectares of lost or degraded forests and agricultural lands by 2030, strengthening rural incomes and food security.
- 10. Accelerate the shift away from polluting coal-fired power generation, phasing out new unabated coal plants in developed economies immediately and in middle-income countries by 2025.

Business and Sustainable Development Commission

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Multiple partners (e.g. Australia, Sweden, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Unilever etc.); secretariat: SYSTEMIQ and UN Foundation.
- **Type:** international commission (non-UN).
- **Dates:** report published, January 2017; commission established, January 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** climate change; ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** medium to long term.
- **Theory of Change:** Value-creation incentives of sustainable investment.
- **Recommendations:** (aimed at business leaders)
  - Build support for the right growth strategy. The more business leaders who understand the business case for the Global Goals, the faster progress will be towards better business in a better world.
  - Incorporate the Global Goals into company strategy. That means applying a Global Goals lens to every aspect of strategy: appointing board members and senior executives to prioritise and drive execution; aiming strategic planning and innovation at sustainable solutions; marketing products and services that inspire consumers to make sustainable choices; and using the goals to guide leadership development, women's empowerment at every level, regulatory policy and capital allocation. Achieving the Global Goals will create 380 million new jobs by 2030. You need to make sure your new jobs and any others you generate are decent jobs with a living wage, not only in your immediate operations but across your supply chains and distribution networks. And you need to help investors to understand the scale of value that sustainable business can create.
  - Drive the transformation to sustainable markets with sector peers. Shifting whole sectors onto a sustainable footing in line with the Global Goals will unlock much bigger business opportunities. Consider food and agriculture. A global food and agriculture system in line with the Global Goals would deliver nutritious, affordable food for a growing world population, higher incomes – especially for the world's 1.5 billion smallholders, and help restore forests, freshwater resources and vital ecosystems. It would create new economic value of more than US$2 trillion by 2030. And it would be much more resilient to climate risk.
    - "Business as usual" will not achieve this market transformation. Nor will disruptive innovation by a few sustainable pioneers be enough to drive the shift: the whole sector has to move. Forward-looking business leaders are working with sector peers and stakeholders to map their collective route to a sustainable competitive playing field, identifying tipping points, prioritising the key technology and policy levers, developing the new skill profiles and jobs, quantifying the new financing requirements, and laying out the elements of a just transition. Over the next 15 years, driving system change in line with the Global Goals with sector peers will be an essential, differentiating skill for a world-class business leader. It means shaping new opportunities, pre-empting the risks of disruption, building new public private partnerships and renewing business's licence to operate.
  - Work with policy-makers to pay the true cost of natural and human resources. Sustainable competition depends on all the competitors facing prices that reflect the true costs of the way they do business – internalising the externalities, to use the jargon. The idea of pricing pollution at its true environmental and social cost has been around for a long time. But the need for strong carbon pricing is becoming ever more urgent to tackle the risk of runaway climate change.
    - Establishing prices for carbon as well as other environmental resources (especially water in many areas) fires the starting gun for a "race to the top". Businesses that choose to pay living wages and the full cost of their resources need to be certain that their competitors will do the same in the not too distant future if they are not to be at a cost disadvantage. Business leaders must therefore work openly with regulators, business and civil society to

shape fiscal and regulatory policies that create a level playing field more in line with the Global Goals. This could involve fiscal systems becoming more progressive through putting less tax on labour income and more on pollution and underpriced resources.

- Push for a financial system oriented towards longer-term sustainable investment. Achieving the Global Goals will likely require an estimated US$2.4 trillion a year of additional investment, especially for infrastructure and other projects with long payback periods. There is enough capital available. But in the world's uncertain circumstances, most investors are looking for liquidity and short-term gains. As soon as companies are paying "full" prices that reflect social and environment externalities, then their financial performance will be the main signal that investors need to understand companies' relative performance on the Global Goals. But achieving full prices across the economy will take time. Until then – and to help bring that day closer – business leaders can strengthen the flow of capital into sustainable investments by pushing for three things: transparent, consistent league tables of sustainability performance linked to the Global Goals; wider and more efficient use of blended finance instruments to share risk and attract much more private finance into sustainable infrastructure; and alignment of regulatory reforms in the financial sector with long-term sustainable investment.
- Rebuild the Social Contract. Trust in business has eroded so sharply since the global financial crisis, the social fabric is wearing thin. Many see business as reneging on its social contract. Business leaders can regain society's trust and secure their licence to operate by working with governments, consumers, workers and civil society to achieve the whole range of Global Goals, and adopting responsible, open policy advocacy.
    - Rebuilding the social contract requires businesses to pay their taxes transparently like everyone else and to contribute positively to the communities in which they operate. In total, there are over 700 million workers employed directly and indirectly in global supply chains. Treating them with respect and paying them a decent wage would go a long way to building a more inclusive society and expanding consumer markets. Investing in their training, enabling men and women to fulfill their potential, would deliver further returns through higher labour productivity. And ensuring that the social contract extends from the formal into the informal sector, through enacting the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, should be non-negotiable. There are still between 20-40 million people working in forms of modern slavery and over 150 million children working in the fields, mines, workshops, and rubbish dumps that underpin much of the global economy, unseen and unprotected. This is an unacceptable feature of 21st century capitalism – one that board-rooms, investors and consumers can no longer ignore. The more business leaders who take these actions, the faster the world economy will make the shift to an economic model where competition systemically drives sustainable, inclusive economic growth.

Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation

- **Convenors and/or authors:** International Renewable Energy Agency.
- **Type:** high-level panel (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single report – *A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation*
- **Dates:** Report released, January 2019; panel established, January 2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Climate change; ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** medium to long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** N/A (see throughout document).

Ecosystem collapse

High-level Panel on Global Assessment of Resources for Implementing the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
- **Type:** High-level panel (UN).
- **Output(s):** Two reports. First report (2013), and second/final report (2015) – *Resourcing the Aichi Biodiversity Targets: An Assessment of Benefits, Investments and Resource needs for Implementing the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020.*
- **Dates:** Final report published, 2015; first report published, 2013; panel established, May 2012.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** Short term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**:
  - All countries should continue to urgently assess financing baselines, needs and gaps, and the full range of potential financing sources, as well as identify opportunities for improving cost-effectiveness in national biodiversity expenditure; and use this information at the national level to understand where further action is needed and to help identify potential sources of finance. National experiences, including lessons learnt from the BIOFIN initiative should be documented, collected and shared, including through the CBD Clearing House Mechanism (CHM) and the NBSAP Forum, and support mechanisms to accelerate learning should be developed. Donors and Parties from developed countries should consider providing bilateral and multilateral support to countries to implement steps embodied in the BIOFIN approach.
  - Countries should develop strategies and policies to bridge the biodiversity finance gap with a broadened and diversified base of sustained and predictable sources of finance, including commitment of public funds through medium-term expenditure frameworks. Countries should substantially increase and complement domestic biodiversity budgets, for example, through new and innovative financial mechanisms as well as scaling-up current initiatives. The realignment of current expenditures must be the central part of the effort to bridge the gaps. There is also a strong role for governments to play in leveraging financing from the private sector, via incentives and economic instruments, by formulating and implementing necessary policies and enabling conditions, under appropriate safeguards.
  - Biodiversity investments in marine, freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems need to be understood, presented and recognised as solutions to wider problems and challenges. This requires better understanding and communication of the wider benefits of well-functioning ecosystems and the value of natural solutions in place of human-made alternatives. Countries and other stakeholders should make use of evidence from available studies, such as the High-level Panel regional assessments, to build the business case for investments in biodiversity from across different sectors, and to communicate the benefits and the costs of inaction and delayed investments, particularly for poor segments of society. This should be communicated with tailored advice by national conservation-related ministries, NGOs and other agencies, to relevant stakeholders including other national governmental agencies, multilateral and bilateral donor agencies and development banks, focusing on the role of biodiversity in delivering objectives that they are expected to deliver. This will help to support mainstreaming of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use objectives into national and regional development plans and budgets, and the required changes in practice across sectors. This evidence should also be integrated into NBSAPs and regional biodiversity strategy and action plans.
  - When developing international and national sustainable development goals and plans, countries should identify actions through which mainstreaming biodiversity can directly contribute to achieving such objectives and goals, in order to encourage biodiversity positive development

decisions. This includes the contribution it can make to, for example, food security, water security, disaster risk reduction, livelihoods and poverty reduction, and national security, as well as to national revenue. Countries should explore specific mechanisms for doing this such as ecosystem accounting under appropriate biodiversity and social safeguards, and identifying and facilitating specific shifts in public sector policy to remove biodiversity-harmful incentives and subsidies. Biodiversity action at the national and local levels should take account of distributional impacts, to ensure that benefits for poor and vulnerable people are secured.

- As part of broader mainstreaming efforts, countries should further enhance the links between climate change policies, projects and programmes and biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. This has the potential to secure substantial additional funding for biodiversity action. This would include the integration of biodiversity and ecosystem services into their National Climate Change Policy frameworks, and the development of ecosystem-based approaches to adaptation and mitigation. Such approaches can create sustainable and cost-effective solutions to the challenges posed by climate change.
- Governments should convene broad dialogue among governmental, private and civil society actors on the arguments for the integration of conservation and sustainable use principles into various sectors, and on practical options, to increase funding and to assist in mainstreaming conservation and sustainable use objectives. In ensuring a cross-sectoral approach to the revision and implementation of NBSAPs, countries should identify relevant roles and responsibilities for all relevant stakeholders including, in particular, planning and finance agencies. This approach is essential for achieving broadly supported resource mobilization plans for implementing key strategies and actions.
- The in-kind contributions of indigenous peoples and local communities' collective actions, efforts and knowledge on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and provisioning of ecosystem services and functions, should be respected and taken into account when designing, resourcing and implementing interventions. This should include clarifying and respecting the resource rights of indigenous peoples and local communities and enhancing their participation in the choice and operationalization of biodiversity-related policies and plans.
- Human and institutional capacity development programmes should include an increased focus on the sharing of practical knowledge and experience in developing effective policies and instruments for mainstreaming that support increased investment in conservation and sustainable use; and enhance the role of regional and south-south cooperation and support. Lessons at both the national and international levels should also be sought and drawn from existing partnership approaches, such as where there is a shared agenda across developed and developing countries including those being utilised by the Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) project, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), and country-specific approaches such as the Mother Earth Approach.
- Countries should integrate into training, education and capacity building programmes, awareness of the economic rationale for action for biodiversity and ecosystem services, and their role in achieving sustainable development. Relevant modules should be included in secondary and tertiary education curricula, and new and existing civil society and private sector training programmes. Those focused on business management are especially important.
- Countries should include robust and verifiable baselines and indicators on the status and trends of biodiversity, ecosystems and ecosystem services within their local and national sustainable development plans and NBSAPs that will help to track and evaluate the benefits of biodiversity investments and promote their uptake more broadly. In this respect, the High-level Panel recommends the use of natural capital mapping as an assessment tool of ecosystems and their services; community-based monitoring and information systems; further research in ecosystem

accounting and assessment of ecosystem resilience and thresholds; and the development and application of other appropriate methodologies. There is a strong role for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) to support these efforts.

- Investments should be made in improved knowledge generation regarding the insurance value of biodiversity and better learning processes for adaptive governance of ecosystems to avoid dangerous tipping points and regime shifts to cost-effectively increase the potential for sustainable development and well-being. This should be applied to policies and practices, including the use of appropriate financial measures that support various activities to protect biodiversity and ecosystem services, which are better guided by knowledge of the links between biodiversity and ecosystem function and the delivery of ecosystem services, and securing ecosystem resilience and the associated insurance values. They could be guided by methodologies such as ecosystem assessments, resilience assessments, Community Based Resilience Analysis (CoBRA) and Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs), including associated risk assessments with scenario analysis, as well as the application of the precautionary approach.

High-level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy

- **Convenors and/or authors:** World Resources Institute.
- **Type:** high-level panel (non-UN).
- **Dates:** report expected, 2020; panel established, September 2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** TBD.
- **Theory of Change:** TBD – catalyse solutions, establish new global contract on the sea, amplify the voices of vulnerable communities, highlight the value-creation potential of balancing gain with protection, harmonize the multiply the pact of existing initiatives.
- **Recommendations**: TBD

High-level Panel on Water

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN, World Bank.
- **Type:** high-level panel (UN).
- **Dates:** Report released, March 2018; panel established, April 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** Three-part approach – (1) build "foundations" for action (data, value-system, and water management institutions); (2) utilising the new "foundations", devise an "integrated agenda" addressing water delivery systems, disaster prevention, investment in water-related infrastructure, ecosystem maintenance, and sustainable cities; (3) promote innovation, build the partnerships and mobilise resources to enact the agenda.
- **Recommendations:** (headline recommendations below only)
  - Foundations for Actions:
    - Understand Water: "commit to making evidence-based decisions about water, and cooperate to strengthen water data, such as through the HLPW World Water Data Initiative."
    - Value Water: "Use the HLPW Principles on Valuing Water to sustainably, efficiently, and inclusively allocate and manage water resources and deliver and price water services accordingly."
    - Manage Water: "Implement integrated approaches to water management at local, national, and transboundary levels, strengthen water governance, and ensure gender equality and social inclusion."
  - Leading an Integrated Agenda:
    - Ensure Universal Access to Safe Water and Sanitation: "Address gaps in service delivery models, technology and behaviour change which limit access to sustainable drinking water and sanitation for all – including the needs of women, girls, people with disabilities, and communities in vulnerable situations, recognizing access to safe drinking water and sanitation services as a fundamental human right."
    - Build Resilient Societies and Economies, Reducing Disaster Risk: "Shift the focus of disaster management from response to preparedness and resilience." / "Create incentives for water users, including irrigators, to use water efficiently, to not pollute water, and to promote its reuse." / "Take action where water-related risks may exacerbate fragility, conflict, or forced displacement, and affect peace and security."
    - Increase Water Infrastructure Investment: "Improve the enabling environment for investment in sustainable water-related infrastructure and services, in order to at least double current levels of investment."
    - Nurture Environmental Water: "Value environmental contributions to water management, prevent degradation and pollution of watersheds, rivers, lakes and aquifers, and where necessary, restore and maintain acceptable environmental conditions and water quality."
    - Develop Sustainable Cities: "Implement an integrated approach to urban water management in line with the Habitat III New Urban Agenda, aiming at more adaptable and resilient infrastructure."
  - Catalysing Change, Building Partnerships and International Cooperation:
    - Promote Innovation: "Support programs, such as the HLPW Water Innovation Engine, which foster the uptake of new water-related business models and technologies."
    - Strengthen Partnerships: "Motivate all water use sectors to value water, embrace water stewardship, strengthen their collaboration, and participate in integrated water resource management."

- Increase Global Water Cooperation: “Strengthen the UN system’s support to member states and its coordination of water matters by establishing UN meetings on water at the highest possible level, consider a scientific panel on water and promote international cooperation. Using the UNGA Water Action Decade as a platform for policy dialogue, exchanges of best practices, and building global partnerships.”

Global High-level Panel on Water and Peace

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Geneva Water Hub (University of Geneva); Strategic Foresight Group.
- **Type:** High-level panel (non-UN).
- **Outputs:** Single document – *A Matter of Survival*
- **Dates:** Report released, September 2017; panel established, November 2015.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** ecosystem collapse; political violence.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** Two-part vision – prevent water-related conflicts, and promote water-management as an instrument of cooperation and peace. Four-part approach – (1) build legal foundations, by encouraging accession to existing UN conventions and by creating local instruments where lacking; (2) build institutional infrastructure, by supporting existing institutions and creating regional/local institutions where lacking; (3) mobilise financing; (4) mobilise political support.
- **Recommendations:** (Summary recommendations only, not structured per Theory of Change)
  - The Drama of Water (lightly trimmed)
    - "The nexus between water, peace and security has to be given urgent attention and a thorough consideration in the context of this rethinking."
    - "We recommend that the UN General Assembly convenes a Global Conference on International Water Cooperation with the aim of formulating a strategic framework for global water cooperation and a program of action defining specific priorities for the five-year period following the Global Conference."
  - Into the Abyss: Water in Armed Conflicts (lightly trimmed/edited)
    - UNSC should: recognise water as vital and emphasize that the protection of water resources and installations constitutes a vital element of the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, and must therefore not be used as a weapon of war.
    - UNSC should: strengthen the respect for and implementation of International Humanitarian Law and clarify that IHL principles.
    - UNSC should: encourage "water supply ceasefires" during armed conflicts and the inclusion of water cooperation in peace agreements.
    - UNSC should: have environmental protection included in ceasefires/peace agreements.
    - UNSC should: encourage the quick deployment of military water specialists in peace operations to rehabilitate and rebuild water supply systems.
    - UNSC should: include protection of water resources in peace operation mandates.
    - "States should be encouraged to develop the appropriate legislative frameworks for the protection of transboundary water infrastructures against terrorist acts."
    - Intl Community should consider: A body mandated to gather information about destruction and water supply cuts as well as to foster technical assistance during protracted armed conflicts.
    - Intl Community should consider: "A mechanism to monitor compliance with International Humanitarian Law and reparations to victims of violations."
    - Intl Community should consider: "A rapid reaction water engineering military capacity to restore basic water and sanitation services to civilian populations, and to sensitive sites such as hospitals and refugee camps, in particular."
  - An Ounce of Prevention: International Water law and Transboundary Water Cooperation (trimmed/edited)
    - We strongly recommend to all States sharing transboundary water resources to conclude transboundary water agreements.
    - States should adhere to the principles of International Water Law and promote their full implementation. The Panel calls for wide accession by States to the 1997 UN Watercourses

Convention and the 1992 UNECE Water Convention, now open for accession to all UN Member States.

- Quantity and Quality: Strengthening of Knowledge-Based and Data-Driven Decision Making and Cooperation (lightly trimmed/edited)
  - Existing mechanisms for water data collection, storage and access should be improved further and provide for better integration of spatial and disaggregated socio-political data.
  - "Particular attention needs to be paid to the proper understanding of asymmetries among countries and sectors of activity within river basins and to developing methodologies that will help the efforts of conflict prevention with timely and credible information."
  - States Parties to treaties establishing transboundary water cooperation systems should prioritize issues of water quality, pollution and contamination.
  - "The Panel recommends the systematic application of the relevant provisions of International Water Law and the existing international standards (WHO and FAO) and, as appropriate, the relevant regional standards."
  - "The existing data and knowledge bases administered by different UN agencies should be brought together into a coherent system."
  - "As a matter of a long-term vision, the Panel advocates the establishment of a strong global data system and monitoring mechanism... Its task should be to monitor and analyze water quality issues globally and especially in transboundary basins and aquifers."
- People's Diplomacy, Inter-Sectoral Water Management and Decision Making (trimmed)
  - Data should be transparent and shared among stakeholders, including civil society.
  - "States should include water education in their educational systems in order to build the necessary knowledge and awareness regarding water use as well as to build the capacity of citizens to participate in water policymaking."
  - There should be a repository of best practice and lessons learnt, with a view to developing global standards.
  - The UN Global Compact should facilitate the development of a Voluntary Code of Practice on Water Management.
- Financial Innovation for Water Cooperation (lightly trimmed)
  - "The international community should encourage riparian countries to undertake Joint Investment Plans."
  - The international financial sector should include transboundary water cooperation in ESG principles.
  - "An international task force should be established to assess the evolution of sustainable finance practices and their application to transboundary water cooperation."
  - "New instruments such as the Blue Fund should be created to provide preferential and concessional finance to subsidize interest, insurance and related ancillary costs of large infrastructure projects…"
- In Pursuit of Agency: New Mechanisms of Water Diplomacy (edited and trimmed)
  - "We recommend the establishment of the Global Observatory for Water and Peace (GOWP), an international facility of hydro-diplomacy with the aim of facilitating, promoting and energizing diplomatic efforts to leverage water for comprehensive peace."
  - The Observatory should aim to prevent/de-escalate conflict; should draw attention among political actors of the importance of water.

Global Ocean Commission

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Independent.
- **Type:** international commission (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Two reports – *The Future of Our Oceans: Next steps and priorities* (2016); *From Decline to Recovery: A Rescue Package for the Global Ocean* (2014).
- **Dates:** Reports published, 2016 and 2014.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Ecosystem stability.
- **Aspirations:** short, medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** N/A (see throughout document).

❖ *The Future of Our Oceans: Next steps and priorities* (2016)

- A UN SDG for the Ocean – Putting a living ocean at the heart of development
  - To accelerate progress towards reversing ocean degradation and drive the global system for ocean governance, the Commission calls upon UN Member States and all relevant stakeholders to agree a standalone Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) for the global ocean, thus putting the global ocean front and centre in the post-2015 UN development agenda.
  - Given the importance of the global ocean to issues of environmental sustainability, social justice, equity and governance, the Commission strongly supports and wishes to add its voice to the proposals made at the UN Open Working Group on SDGs, which are aimed at a stand-alone Ocean SDG.
- Governing the High Seas – Promoting care and recovery
  - Strengthening the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) through a new implementing agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond national jurisdiction in order to make it fit for purpose.
  - Universal ratification of UNCLOS and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) of 1995, and the establishment of an annual meeting of States Parties to UNFSA to provide a platform for greater accountability.
  - Regular independent assessment of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) to improve their performance.
  - Prompt entry into force and implementation of the FAO Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) of 2009.
  - The appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of a Special Representative for the Ocean, with a clear mission and sufficient resources to significantly improve ocean governance.
  - Creating Regional Ocean Management Organisations (ROMOs) to promote ecosystem-based management of the ocean.
  - The appointment of ocean envoys or ministers by Heads of State or Government
- No More Overfishing – Ending harmful high seas subsidies
  - It is imperative to address the main drivers of fishing vessel overcapacity, in particular, the issue of capacity-enhancing subsidies. The Commission asks WTO members to urgently adopt a three-step approach to dealing with this problem and so remove the negative financial incentives that maintain a global fishing fleet which has too many boats chasing an ever diminishing supply of fish.
  - Full transparency (disclosure) of fisheries subsidies.
  - Classification of fisheries subsidies in order to identify and distinguish those that are harmful.
  - Immediately capping and then phasing-out high seas fishing fuel subsidies within five years.

- Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing – Closing seas, ports and markets
    - Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing on the high seas has significant negative ecological, economic and social impacts, and disproportionately affects developing countries. To effectively combat IUU fishing, the illegality of the practice needs to be uniformly established, the likelihood of being caught needs to be increased and market access for IUU fish needs to be cut off. In order to combat, and end, IUU fishing:
    - The Commission calls on members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to require that the mandatory requirements for IMO numbers and tracking already in place for merchant vessels are extended to all fishing vessels fishing in the high seas.
    - The Commission furthermore calls upon States and RFMOs to ban the at-sea transhipment of fish.
    - All Commissioners are committed to using their influence and to act in order to help fast-track the entry into force of the PSMA by urging all States who are not yet Party to the Agreement to expedite their instruments of adherence or ratification.
    - The Commission calls on all stakeholders to work together to build a global information-sharing platform for real-time sharing of data on high seas fishing vessels and their activities so as to deter IUU fishing and promote traceability.
    - Seafood retailers and processors must commit to sourcing sustainable seafood, including by adopting effective traceability systems.
    - In order to support these goals, the Commission encourages civil society organisations to step up their role as independent RFMOs, flag States and Port States performance watchdogs, and calls upon local, national and international authorities to cooperate with such independent watchdogs.
- Plastics – Keeping them out of the ocean
    - Plastics are a major source of pollution on the high seas and a health threat to humans and the environment.
    - It is important to intensify efforts to address the variety of sources of marine pollution (persistent organic pollutants, hydrocarbons, heavy metals, nitrates, radioactive substances, marine debris, etc.). In particular, the Commission calls for coordinated action by governments, the private sector and civil society to eliminate plastics entering the global ocean including by:
    - Minimising single-use plastics by direct government intervention and consumer incentives;
    - Creating incentives to promote recycling, including single polymer products and extended producer responsibility;
    - Establishing time-bound, quantitative reduction targets;
    - Achieving improved waste management;
    - Promoting consumer awareness;
    - Replicating local initiatives to restrict or ban certain unsustainable uses of plastic materials (i.e. bans on disposable plastic bags, polyurethane packaging, etc.) and clean-up programmes;
    - Addressing lost and discarded fishing gear, in particular FADs, to avoid abandonment;
    - Encouraging XPRIZE-like innovation around substitution, waste avoidance, recycling and clean-ups;
    - Exploring taxation and other levies to establish a Global Marine Responsibility Fund to build waste management capacity, coordinate action to combat marine plastics, grow sustainability initiatives, and change the behaviour of industry and consumers.
- Offshore Oil and Gas – Establishing binding international safety standards and liability
    - The Commission supports efforts to adopt and improve international safety and environmental standards for offshore drilling on the continental shelf, including regional

protocols to establish and implement such standards, with provisions for response-preparedness and capacity-building in developing countries. In line with the polluter-pays principle, the Commission also supports the development of an international liability convention to cover damage to the marine environment from offshore oil and gas installations.

- Global Ocean Accountability Board – Monitoring progress towards a healthy ocean
  - The Commission recommends the establishment of an independent Global Ocean Accountability Board. This independent body would monitor and assess whether sufficient progress is being made towards achieving the proposals recommended by the Commission through which to reverse the degradation of, and then regenerate, the global ocean and to secure effective and equitable governance. The Board would benchmark, on a regular basis, the progress being made by the international community towards meeting the specific proposals contained in this report and make this information public.
- Creating a High Seas Regeneration Zone
  - We are convinced that our proposals, if implemented, would reverse the cycle of degradation. But there is a long history of good proposals not being implemented. If this happens, and the result is the continued decline of the high seas, it will impact the whole ocean and people and systems across the planet because of the specific regenerative capacity of the high seas.
  - We are concerned to ensure that if the health of the global ocean does not improve, then consequences should follow to save this vital natural resource. The Global Ocean Accountability Board should provide independent monitoring of progress. If it reports continued decline after a period of, say, five years or similarly short period of time, then the world community of States should consider turning the high seas – with the exception of those areas where RFMO action is effective – into a regeneration zone where industrial fishing is prevented. Such action would need to take account of RFMO functions within EEZs, and would need to include provision for the ban to be lifted as effective proposals for resource management are put in place for the conservation and management of living resources in the respective areas.

❖ *From Decline to Recovery: A Rescue Package for the Global Ocean* (2014) [See document for recommendations, closely mirror recommendations of final report].

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Independent Commission on Multilateralism: Weapons of Mass Destruction

- **Convenors and/or authors:** International Peace Institute.
- **Type:** International commission (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: *ICM Policy Paper: Weapons of Mass Destruction*.
- **Dates:** Paper published, March 2017.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** WMDs.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - The General Assembly should request that the secretary-general establish a Group of Governmental Experts to conduct a new comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. This study would assess: (1) the development of nuclear arsenals and stockpiles of weapons-usable materials since 1946 and their current size and capabilities; (2) trends in the technological development of nuclear-weapon systems; (3) the economic cost and implications for states of acquiring, maintaining, modernizing, and further developing nuclear weapons; and (4) the humanitarian effects of using nuclear weapons, including the potential climatic and physical effects of nuclear war and its socioeconomic consequences.
  - The secretary-general should consider rein - stating the Department for Disarmament Affairs. While there were good reasons to change the Department for Disarmament Affairs to the Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in 2007, many would admit it has lost some of its clout in the process. More than a cosmetic change, this would facilitate access to greater funding, resources, and capabilities to handle today's disarmament and non-proliferation challenges. It would also strengthen the mandate to develop policies and strategies for the secretary-general.
  - The secretary-general should request that UNODA—or the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—look into the management and doctrine of nuclear weapons. Through Groups of Governmental Experts, the General Assembly has already looked into past doctrines, but a nongovernmental study could update and focus UN discussions on these issues. Such a study could help non-nuclear-weapon states, think tanks, and civil society advance and support more inclusive and transparent discussions among the P5. It could also serve as a tool for controlling the quality and accuracy of information and for getting buy-in from the P5.
  - The secretary-general should propose strengthening UNIDIR's mandate and providing core funding. UNIDIR fulfills a unique role in providing member states and the multilateral system with quality research. With sustainable and predictable funding, it would be better placed to carry out research pertaining to all member states and civil society, helping bridge a growing gap in knowledge and participation. UNODA could then commission UNIDIR to play a more central role in discussions on nuclear weapons management and in reviewing security doctrines in light of current challenges.
  - The secretary-general should mandate UNODA to explore ways for nuclear-weapon states to bear a cost for retaining nuclear weapons. For example, nuclear-weapon states could subsidize measures by non-nuclear-weapon states to protect against the indiscriminate effects of nuclear weapons. This mandate could give UNODA a more practical role in coordinating such measures—perhaps as an Office of Disarmament and Protective Security—and compel a rethink of extended deterrence.
  - Member states should provide the resources necessary for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to discharge its responsibilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA's mandate includes promoting technical cooperation in the fields of nuclear safeguards, safety, and security, which is funded by voluntary contributions. Member states should consider

funding some of this work under the regular budget, in part to guarantee greater access to technical cooperation for developing countries.

- The IAEA should create a science and technology advisory board. This board could conduct research on nuclear safeguards, safety, and security in support of existing advisory groups and bilateral programs. It could also help share information among member states and with civil society
- UNODA should identify links between Resolution 1540 and other issues. In particular, it should explore links between Resolution 1540 (putting in place non-proliferation measures) and cybersecurity and terrorism to help address gaps and challenges in the non-proliferation regime (e.g., the potential for cyberattacks to turn nuclear power plants into WMD).
- Nuclear discussions should be broadened to include human rights and humanitarian issues. Including human rights and humanitarian issues in the discussion on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation can make them more inclusive by incorporating the views of those potentially most affected by nuclear weapons policies.
- The secretary-general, through UNODA, should build on Resolution 1540 to improve the UN's image. The diffusion of technology and the emergence of new actors have highlighted the need for increased regulatory controls that build on Resolution 1540. Supporting implementation of Resolution 1540 through broader outreach, capacity building, and cooperation with all stakeholders would also help increase awareness of the work of the UN multilateral system in supporting non-proliferation initiatives.
- The UN General Assembly should mandate the secretary-general to report on new technologies and WMD. New technologies have an important role to play in countering WMD, particularly in democratizing the process of countering proliferation. The UN should report on the impact of new developments of science and technology on international security, in particular WMD.
- The UN, through the IAEA and implementation of Resolution 1540, could help provide affordable access to counter-proliferation technologies. The UN can support efforts by low-income countries to counter threats from WMD. New technologies can also help expand opportunities for the private sector and individual citizens to mitigate dangers from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The goal would be to invest in innovation for good rather than feeding an arms race for new technology.
- The secretary-general should support NGOs in mobilizing funding through multiple sources. This would help strengthen the role of civil society in the disarmament machinery, help include underrepresented regions in debates, and legitimize the role of civil society at the UN.
- The secretary-general should consider creating a forum bringing together member states and NGOs working on disarmament and non-proliferation. While UNODA recognizes the key role of NGOs, the lack of a formal forum impedes NGOs from developing relationships and gaining exposure to all the work being done. Such a forum could serve as an alternative pathway channeling civil society's determination to overcome the gridlock on disarmament and nonproliferation.

International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Australia, Japan.
- **Type:** high-level panel (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document – *Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers*
- **Dates:** report published, 2009; panel established, September 2008.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** WMDs.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** ~ "The value added by this report will, we hope, be seen to follow from a number of factors. First, its timeliness: unlike most previous endeavours of this kind, we have had the sense that we are not so much resisting a tide as catching a wave. Second, the representativeness of the Commission's membership and the extent of our consultative outreach: this has been a genuinely global enterprise, in which we have done our best to expose ourselves directly to the widest possible range of interests, opinions and ideas. Third, the comprehensiveness of the report: whereas most previous commission reports of this kind have tended to focus mainly on one or other of the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation or peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we have tried to give more or less equal weight to all three, reflecting their close interdependence. Fourth, its realism: whereas writing on this subject can easily emerge as a rather idealistic wish-list, we have tried to match our own very strong idealism with pragmatic recognition that the real world is full of constraints that have to be acknowledged and somehow overcome. Fifth, its intended accessibility: policymakers and those who influence them, including the media, tend not to be specialists, and if a report is to be read, understood and have any impact it has to be written in a way that is not impenetrable to the uninitiated. The last, and in many respects most important, way in which we have tried to add value is to ensure that this report is very specifically action-oriented, with a clear sense of what priorities it would be most productive to pursue, and by whom, at each stage of a long, evolving policy process." See also 20th cluster below.
- **Recommendations**: (76 recommendations in 20 clusters. Clusters listed below only, except for 20th cluster.)
  - On Overall Disarmament Strategy
  - On Overall Non-Proliferation Strategy
  - On NPT Safeguards and Verification
  - On NPT Compliance and Enforcement
  - On Strengthening the IAEA
  - On Non-NPT Treaties and Mechanisms
  - On Extending Obligations to Non-NPT States
  - On Banning Testing
  - On Limiting the Availability of Fissile Material
  - On Nuclear Security
  - On Nuclear Energy Management
  - On Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
  - On Priorities for the 2010 NPT Review Conference
  - On Reducing Weapon Numbers: Bilateral and Multilateral Processes
  - On Nuclear Doctrine: No First Use, extended Deterrence, And Negative Security Assurances
  - On Nuclear Force Posture: Launch Alert Status and Transparency
  - ON North Korea and Iran
  - On Parallel Security Issues: Missiles, Space, Biological and Conventional Weapons
  - On Action Agendas: Short, Medium and Long Term

- On Mobilizing and Sustaining Political Will
  - “Sustained campaigning is needed, through both the traditional and new media and direct advocacy, to better inform policy-makers and those who influence them about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Capable non-governmental organizations should be appropriately supported by governments and philanthropic foundations to the extent necessary to enable them to perform this role effectively.
  - “There should be a major renewed emphasis on formal education and training about nuclear disarmament and related issues in schools and universities, focusing on the history of nuclear weapons, the risks and threats involved in their continued deployment and proliferation, and possible ways forward. An associated need is for more specialized courses on nuclear-related issues – from the scientific and technical to the strategic policy and legal – in universities and diplomatic-training and related institutions.
  - “Work should commence now on further refining and developing the concepts in the model Nuclear Weapons Convention now in circulation, making its provisions as workable and realistic as possible, and building support for them, with the objective of having a fully-worked through draft available to inform and guide multilateral disarmament negotiations as they gain momentum. Interested governments should support with appropriate resources the further development of the NWC.
  - “To help sustain political will over time, a regular “report card” should be published in which a distinguished international panel, with appropriately professional and broad-based research support, would evaluate the performance of both nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states against the action agendas identified in this report.
  - “Consideration should be given to the establishment of a new “Global Centre on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament” to act as a focal point and clearing house for the work being done on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament issues by many different institutions and organizations in many different countries, to provide research and advocacy support for both like-minded governments on the one hand, and civil society organizations on the other, and to prepare the “report card” described above.
  - “Such a centre might be constructed to perform functions at two levels:
  - a base of full time research and advocacy professionals, drawing directly on the resources of a wide international network of wellestablished associated research centres; and
  - a superstructure, in the form of a governing or advisory board drawn from distinguished global figures of wide-ranging experience, giving their imprimatur as appropriate to the centre’s published reports, policy initiatives and campaigns.”

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Sweden, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.
- **Type:** international commission (non-UN).
- **Dates:** Report released, June 2006; commission established, December 2003.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** WMDs.
- **Aspirations:** medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:**
  - All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty need to revert to the fundamental and balanced non-proliferation and disarmament commitments that were made under the treaty and confirmed in 1995 when the treaty was extended indefinitely.
  - All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should implement the decision on principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process, and the resolution on the Middle East as a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, all adopted in 1995. They should also promote the implementation of 'the thirteen practical steps' for nuclear disarmament that were adopted in 2000.
  - To enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, all Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear-weapon states parties should accept comprehensive safeguards as strengthened by the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol.
  - The states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should establish a standing secretariat to handle administrative matters for the parties to the treaty. This secretariat should organize the treaty's Review Conferences and their Preparatory Committee sessions. It should also organize other treaty-related meetings upon the request of a majority of the states parties.
  - Negotiations with North Korea should aim at a verifiable agreement including, as a principal element, North Korea's manifesting its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accepting the 1997 Additional Protocol, as well as revival and legal confirmation of the commitments made in the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: notably, that neither North nor South Korea shall have nuclear weapons or nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. Fuel-cycle services should be assured through international arrangements. The agreement should also cover biological and chemical weapons, as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, thus making the Korean peninsula a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.
  - Negotiations must be continued to induce Iran to suspend any sensitive fuel-cycle-related activities and ratify the 1997 Additional Protocol and resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to avoid an increase in tensions and to improve the outlook for the common aim of establishing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The international community and Iran should build mutual confidence through measures that should include: reliable assurance regarding the supply of fuel-cycle services; suspending or renouncing sensitive fuel-cycle activities for a prolonged period of time by all states in the Middle East; assurances against attacks and subversion aiming at regime change; and facilitation of international trade and investment.
  - The nuclear-weapon states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should provide legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclearweapon states parties. The states not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that possess nuclear weapons should separately provide such assurances.
  - States should make active use of the IAEA as a forum for exploring various ways to reduce proliferation risks connected with the nuclear fuel cycle, such as proposals for an international

fuel bank; internationally safeguarded regional centres offering fuel-cycle services, including spent-fuel repositories; and the creation of a fuel-cycle system built on the concept that a few 'fuel-cycle states' will lease nuclear fuel to states that forgo enrichment and reprocessing activities.

- States should develop means of using low-enriched uranium in ships and research reactors that presently require highly enriched uranium. The production of highly enriched uranium should be phased out. States that separate plutonium by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel should explore possibilities for reducing that activity.
- All states should support the international initiatives taken to advance the global clean-out of fissile material. Such support should encompass the conversion of research reactors from highly enriched to low-enriched uranium fuel, storing fissile material at centralized and secure locations, and returning exported nuclear materials to suppliers for secure disposal or elimination.
- All Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon states that have not yet done so should ratify the protocols of the treaties creating regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. All states in such zones should conclude their comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and agree to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol.
- All states should support continued efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as a part of the overall peace process. Steps can be taken even now. As a confidencebuilding measure, all states in the region, including Iran and Israel, should for a prolonged period of time commit themselves to a verified arrangement not to have any enrichment, reprocessing or other sensitive fuel-cycle activities on their territories. Such a commitment should be coupled with reliable assurances about fuel-cycle services required for peaceful nuclear activities. Egypt, Iran and Israel should join the other states in the Middle East in ratifying the CTBT.
- India and Pakistan should both ratify the CTBT and join those other states with nuclear weapons that have declared a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons, pending the conclusion of a treaty. They should continue to seek bilateral détente and build confidence through political, economic and military measures, reducing the risk of armed conflict, and increasing transparency in the nuclear and missile activities of both countries. Eventually, both states should become members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as parties to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements under the terms of the 1997 Additional Protocol.
- States must prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons or fissile material. To achieve this, they must maintain fully effective accounting and control of all stocks of fissile and radioactive material and other radiological sources on their territories. They should ensure that there is personal legal responsibility for any acts of nuclear terrorism or activities in support of such terrorism. They must expand their cooperation through inter alia the sharing of information, including intelligence on illicit nuclear commerce. They should also promote universal adherence to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
- All states possessing nuclear weapons should declare a categorical policy of no-first-use of such weapons. They should specify that this covers both pre-emptive and preventive action, as well as retaliation for attacks involving chemical, biological or conventional weapons.
- All states possessing nuclear weapons should review their military plans and define what is needed to maintain credible non-nuclear security policies. States deploying their nuclear forces in triads, consisting of submarine-launched missiles, ground-based intercontinental ballistic

missiles and long-range bombers, should abandon this practice in order to reduce nuclear-weapon redundancy and avoid fuelling nuclear arms races.

- Russia and the United States should agree on reciprocal steps to take their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert and should create a joint commission to facilitate this goal. They should undertake to eliminate the launch-on-warning option from their nuclear war plans, while implementing a controlled parallel decrease in operational readiness of a large part of their strategic forces, through:
  - reducing the number of strategic submarines at sea and lowering their technical readiness to launch while in port;
  - storing nuclear bombs and air-launched cruise missiles separately from relevant air fields;
  - storing separately nose cones and/or warheads of most intercontinental ballistic missiles or taking other technical measures to reduce their readiness.
- Russia and the United States should commence negotiations on a new strategic arms reduction treaty aimed at reducing their deployments of strategic forces allowed under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty by at least half. It should include a legally binding commitment to irreversibly dismantle the weapons withdrawn under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. The new treaty should also include transparent counting rules, schedules and procedures for dismantling the weapons, and reciprocal measures for verification.
- Russia and the United States, followed by other states possessing nuclear weapons, should publish their aggregate holdings of nuclear weapons on active and reserve status as a baseline for future disarmament efforts. They should also agree to include specific provisions in future disarmament agreements relating to transparency, irreversibility, verification and the physical destruction of nuclear warheads.
- All states possessing nuclear weapons must address the issue of their continued possession of such weapons. All nuclear-weapon states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must take steps towards nuclear disarmament, as required by the treaty and the commitments made in connection with the treaty's indefinite extension. Russia and the United States should take the lead. Other states possessing nuclear weapons should join the process, individually or in coordinated action. While Israel, India and Pakistan are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they, too, have a duty to contribute to the nuclear disarmament process.
- Russia and the United States should proceed to implement the commitments they made in 1991 to eliminate specific types of non-strategic nuclear weapons, such as demolition munitions, artillery shells and warheads for short-range ballistic missiles. They should agree to withdraw all non-strategic nuclear weapons to central storage on national territory, pending their eventual elimination. The two countries should reinforce their 1991 unilateral reduction commitments by developing arrangements to ensure verification, transparency and irreversibility.
- Every state that possesses nuclear weapons should make a commitment not to deploy any nuclear weapon, of any type, on foreign soil.
- Any state contemplating replacement or modernization of its nuclearweapon systems must consider such action in the light of all relevant treaty obligations and its duty to contribute to the nuclear disarmament process. As a minimum, it must refrain from developing nuclear weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions. It must not adopt systems or doctrines that blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons or lower the nuclear threshold.
- All states possessing nuclear weapons, notably Russia and the United States, should place their excess fissile material from military programmes under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. To facilitate the reduction of stocks of highly enriched uranium, states possessing such stocks should sell uranium blended to enrichment levels suitable for reactor fuel to other Non-Proliferation Treaty states or use it for their own peaceful nuclear energy needs.

- All states possessing nuclear weapons should adopt strict standards for the handling of weapons-usable fissile material deemed excess to military requirements or recovered from disarmament activities, as exemplified in the US stored-weapon and spent-fuel standards.
- The Conference on Disarmament should immediately open the delayed negotiations for a treaty on the cut-off of production of fissile material for weapons without preconditions. Before, or at least during, these negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament should establish a Group of Scientific Experts to examine technical aspects of the treaty.
- To facilitate fissile material cut-off negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, the five Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon states, joined by the other states possessing nuclear weapons, should agree among themselves to cease production of fissile material for weapon purposes. They should open up their facilities for such production to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards inspections, building on the practice of Euratom inspections in France and the UK. These eight states should also address the issue of verifiable limitations of existing stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials.
- All states that have not already done so should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty unconditionally and without delay. The United States, which has not ratified the treaty, should reconsider its position and proceed to ratify the treaty, recognizing that its ratification would trigger other required ratifications and be a step towards the treaty's entry into force. Pending entry into force, all states with nuclear weapons should continue to refrain from nuclear testing. Also, the 2007 conference of Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty signatories should address the possibility of a provisional entry into force of the treaty
- All signatories should provide financial, political and technical support for the continued development and operation of the verification regime, including the International Monitoring System, the International Data Centre and the secretariat, so that the CTBTO is ready to monitor and verify compliance with the treaty when it enters into force. They should pledge to maintain their respective stations and continue to transmit data on a national basis under all circumstances.
- All states possessing nuclear weapons should commence planning for security without nuclear weapons. They should start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint practical and incremental measures that include definitions, benchmarks and transparency requirements for nuclear disarmament.
- All states not yet party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should adhere to the Convention. The states parties to the Convention should launch a campaign to achieve universal adherence by the time of the Seventh Review Conference, to be held in 2011.
- To achieve universal adoption of national legislation and regulations to implement the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention completely and effectively, the states parties should offer technical assistance and promote best-practice models of such legislation. As a part of the confidence-building process and to promote transparency and harmonization, all states parties should make annual biological weapon-related national declarations and make them public.
- States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should enhance the investigatory powers of the UN Secretary-General, ensuring that the Secretary-General's office can rely upon a regularly updated roster of experts and advice from the World Health Organization and a specialist unit, modelled on the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, to assist in investigating unusual outbreaks of disease and allegations of the use of biological weapons.
- States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should establish a standing secretariat to handle organizational and administrative matters related to the treaty, such as Review Conferences and expert meetings.

- Governments should pursue public health surveillance to ensure effective monitoring of unusual outbreaks of disease and develop practical methods of coordinating international responses to any major event that might involve bioweapons. They should strengthen cooperation between civilian health and security-oriented authorities, nationally, regionally and worldwide, including in the framework of the new International Health Regulations of the World Health Organization. Governments should also review their national biosafety and biosecurity measures to protect health and the environment from the release of biological and toxin materials. They should harmonize national biosecurity standards.
- At the Sixth Review Conference, in 2006, the states parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should reaffirm common understandings reached at previous review conferences and take action on all subjects addressed at Convention meetings since 2003. They should also establish a work programme on additional topics for future meetings. States parties should ensure more frequent reassessment of the implications of scientific and technological developments and reaffirm that all undertakings under Article I of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention apply to such developments. This Review Conference should reaffirm that all developments in the life sciences fall within the scope of the Convention and that all developments in the life sciences for hostile purposes are prohibited by the Convention.
- States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention must provide adequate resources to ensure that there are no undue delays in the agreed destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles.
- The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should continue their efforts to secure universal adherence to the Convention. States parties should fully implement the rules on trade and transfer of chemicals that are precursors to chemical-weapon agents. They should further develop regulations regarding the trade and transfer of chemicals that can be used to produce chemical weapons. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and states parties should continue to offer states positive incentives, including technical assistance, to join and implement the Chemical Weapons Convention. When providing such assistance or transferring relevant technologies, they should consider steps to ensure safe and responsible handling by the recipient.
- States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should confirm that, like the use of riot control agents, the use of toxic chemical agents for purposes of law enforcement is banned as a method of warfare. Accordingly, each state party must declare any such agent under Article III.
- States parties should ensure that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has the resources, experience and legal rights needed to carry out challenge inspections in a timely and effective manner, including for the taking of samples and removal of samples for testing.
- Through their domestic laws and policies, all states should prohibit the production, possession and use of toxic chemicals and technologies for purposes that are banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention. States should ensure security in and for chemical facilities through legislation and agreement with industry. States should also develop national means to monitor that security standards are met.
- States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should use the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as a coordinating centre in the development of global standards for a chemical industry security culture. The Organisation should offer evaluation and security assistance at declared sites. States parties should also strengthen the capacity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to provide practical assistance against chemical weapons, for instance detection equipment, alarm systems and medical antidotes.
- MTCR member states should make new efforts to better implement and expand export controls on relevant materials and technology. States subscribing to the Hague Code of Conduct should

extend its scope to include cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. They should establish a multilateral data exchange centre, based on the Russian-US initiatives for the exchange of data on missile launches from early-warning systems. Regional and international nonproliferation measures should include information exchanges, launch notification, and restrictions or bans on specific items or capabilities.

- States should not consider the deployment or further deployment of any kind of missile defence system without first attempting to negotiate the removal of missile threats. If such negotiations fail, deployments of such systems should be accompanied by cooperative development programmes and confidence-building measures to lower the risk of adverse effects on international peace and security, including the risk of creating or aggravating arms races.
- All states should renounce the deployment of weapons in outer space. They should promote universal adherence to the Outer Space Treaty and expand its scope through a protocol to prohibit all weapons in space. Pending the conclusion of such a protocol, they should refrain from activities inconsistent with its aims, including any tests against space objects or targets on earth from a space platform. States should adapt the international regimes and institutions for space issues so that both military and civilian aspects can be dealt with in the same context. States should also set up a group of experts to develop options for monitoring and verifying various components of a space security regime and a code of conduct, designed inter alia to prohibit the testing or deployment of space weapons.
- A Review Conference of the Outer Space Treaty to mark its 40th year in force should be held in 2007. It should address the need to strengthen the treaty and extend its scope. A Special Coordinator should be appointed to facilitate ratifications and liaise with nonparties about the reinforcement of the treaty-based space security regime.
- All states should conduct audits of their export control enforcement agencies (customs, police, coastguard, border control and military) to ensure that they can carry out their tasks effectively. States should seek to establish a universal system of export controls providing harmonized standards, enhanced transparency, and practical support for implementation. Members of the five export control regimes should promote a widening of their membership and improve implementation in view of current security challenges, without impeding legitimate trade and economic development.
- The G8 Global Partnership should expand the geographical and functional scope of its non-proliferation assistance. The G8 should guarantee full funding for the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) programme. Potential donors should consider how technical assistance, training, equipment and financing could be brought to bear to help states of all regions implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
- Companies engaged in activities relevant to weapons of mass destruction have the ability and responsibility to help prevent the proliferation of such weapons and an interest in demonstrating that they are fulfilling that responsibility, including full compliance with national and international obligations and public transparency. Trade associations should promote such objectives.
- States, international organizations and professional associations should encourage the appropriate academic and industrial associations to adopt and effectively implement codes of practice and codes of conduct for science and research in weapons of mass destruction-relevant fields.
- Governments possessing any weapons of mass destruction should keep their parliaments fully and currently informed of their holdings of such weapons and their activities to reduce and eliminate them. Parliaments should actively seek such information and recognize their

responsibility in formulating policies relevant to weapons of mass destruction issues. Greater inter-parliamentary cooperation on weapons of mass destruction issues is needed.

- States should assist Non-Governmental Organizations to actively participate in international meetings and conferences, and to inform and campaign in the weapons of mass destruction field. Private foundations should substantially increase their support for such organizations that are working to eliminate global weapons of mass destruction threats.
- Organizations with security-relevant agendas should re-examine the 2002 United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, and should consider ways in which they could foster and support such education and an informed public debate. Governments should fund student internships at multilateral institutions working on weapons of mass destruction issues.
- As the strengthened safeguards system adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency through the Additional Protocol should become standard for parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supplier states should make acceptance of this standard by recipient parties a condition for contracts involving nuclear items.
- Governments should instruct their intelligence authorities to assist international inspection agencies by providing relevant information without compromising the independence of the inspection systems.
- The UN Security Council should establish a small subsidiary unit that could provide professional technical information and advice on matters relating to weapons of mass destruction. At the request of the Council or the Secretary-General, it should organize ad hoc inspections and monitoring in the field, using a roster of well-trained inspectors that should be kept up-to-date.
- International legal obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction must be enforced. International enforcement action should be taken only after credible investigation and authoritative finding of noncompliance with legal obligations.
- In order for the Conference on Disarmament to function, it should be able to adopt its Programme of Work by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the members present and voting. It should also take its other administrative and procedural decisions with the same requirements.
- The United Nations General Assembly should convene a World Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, to meet after thorough preparations. This World Summit should also discuss and decide on reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN disarmament machinery.
- The United Nations Security Council should make greater use of its potential to reduce and eliminate threats of weapons of mass destruction – whether they are linked to existing arsenals, proliferation or terrorists. It should take up for consideration any withdrawal from or breach of an obligation not to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Making use of its authority under the Charter to take decisions with binding effect for all members, the Council may, inter alia:
    - require individual states to accept effective and comprehensive monitoring, inspection and verification;
    - require member states to enact legislation to secure global implementation of specific rules or measures; and
    - decide, as instance of last resort, on the use of economic or military enforcement measures. Before UN reform has made the Security Council more representative of the UN membership, it is especially important that binding decisions should be preceded by effective consultation to ensure that they are supported by the membership of the UN and will be accepted and respected.

New Technologies

Independent Commission on Multilateralism: The Impact of New Technologies on Peace, Security, and Development

- **Convenors and/or authors:** International Peace Institute.
- **Type:** International commission (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: *ICM Policy Paper: The Impact of New Technologies on Peace, Security, and Development*.
- **Dates:** Paper published, May 2017.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** New technologies.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - The secretary-general should identify a UN focal point on cyber issues. With ongoing efforts to improve cybersecurity through regional bodes such as NATO, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Council of Europe, there is a risk of a plurality of regional initiatives without global standards. The appointment of a clear UN focal point on cyber issues would consolidate the UN's currently disjointed approach and make it a more credible player on an issue that demands greater international engagement
  - The UN Secretariat should map UN venues dealing with new technologies. By one count, ten different UN bodies have dealt with cyber issues since the 1990s, not including bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council that have started to address cyber issues in their specific area of work. 92 This piecemeal approach is confusing and spreads decision making and consultation throughout the system while excluding outside partners. Mapping the venues where new technologies are being used could identify good practices and needs, thereby helping streamline and consolidate efforts to more effectively use technology to achieve the UN's objectives.
  - The UN Secretariat should ensure coherence among new mechanisms. The Technology Facilitation Mechanism for sustainable development, the Technology Bank for Least Developed Countries, and the Technology Framework for climate change share the common goal of facilitating access to and transfer of technology to developing countries. These new mechanisms need to be connected to one another to accelerate progress toward achieving the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement without duplicating efforts and competing for resources.
  - The UN Secretariat should create a "cyber and innovation compact" with the private sector and civil society. Nowhere is there a greater need to fully recognize the role of civil society and the private sector in the multilateral system than in the area of technological innovation. Inputs and expertise from these actors should be accorded far greater pride of place across the multilateral system. A formal forum for cooperation with the UN would be a step in the right direction.
  - Member states should recognize cyberspace as a global public good. This could be done through a General Assembly resolution declaring that cyberspace should be used for "peaceful purposes" in the interests of humanity.
  - Member states should establish a UN-guaranteed depository as a safe-keeper of big data. Member states could mandate this body to help collect, structure, and store data, especially from regions where the infrastructure is not safe or sufficient. Establishment of this body should involve a multi-stakeholder process to create and implement safeguards for the data, incentivize the private sector to partner with the UN, identify ways to overcome firewalls, agree on protocols for extracting and sharing data as needed, and enable data philanthropy.
  - The UN Secretariat should consolidate and build its analytical capacity. The UN could help provide greater analytical and statistical capacity when member states lack it. This could

facilitate economic and social development and contribute to gathering and analyzing necessary data on climate change. This capacity already exists but is currently spread throughout the system.

- The UN Secretariat and member states should support and integrate confidence-building measures. Based on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on cybersecurity, the UN Secretariat, through its focal point on cyber issues, should work with member states to develop a strategic approach to implement these measures. This approach could focus on putting in place confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels to ensure the security and sustainability of cyberspace.

EU Global Tech Panel

- **Convenors and/or authors:** EU.
- **Type:** International commission (non-UN).
- **Dates:** outputs expect, TBA; commission established, mid-2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** new technologies/access to technology.
- **Aspirations:** medium to long term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:** TBA
  - Workstreams:
    - Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and their regulation in respect of human rights and international law;
    - Boosting digital jobs and skills for human development;
    - The global ethics of applied machine learning in surveillance, justice and security;
    - Future frontiers in cyber security.

EU High-level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence

- **Convenors and/or authors:** EU.
- **Type:** International commission (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: In progress – *Draft Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI*. More TBD.
- **Dates:** Report released, March 2018; panel established, April 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** New technologies.
- **Aspirations:** N/A.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (summary of draft ethics guidelines only)
  - Key Guidance for Ensuring Ethical Purpose:
    - Ensure that AI is human-centric: AI should be developed, deployed and used with an "ethical purpose", grounded in, and reflective of, fundamental rights, societal values and the ethical principles of Beneficence (do good), Non-Maleficence (do no harm), Autonomy of humans, Justice, and Explicability. This is crucial to work towards Trustworthy AI.
    - Rely on fundamental rights, ethical principles and values to prospectively evaluate possible effects of AI on human beings and the common good. Pay particular attention to situations involving more vulnerable groups such as children, persons with disabilities or minorities, or to situations with asymmetries of power or information, such as between employers and employees, or businesses and consumers.
    - Acknowledge and be aware of the fact that, while bringing substantive benefits to individuals and society, AI can also have a negative impact. Remain vigilant for areas of critical concern.
  - Key Guidance for Realising Trustworthy AI:
    - Incorporate the requirements for Trustworthy AI from the earliest design phase: Accountability, Data Governance, Design for all, Governance of AI Autonomy (Human oversight), Non-Discrimination, Respect for Human Autonomy, Respect for Privacy, Robustness, Safety, Transparency.
    - Consider technical and non-technical methods to ensure the implementation of those requirements into the AI system. Moreover, keep those requirements in mind when building the team to work on the system, the system itself, the testing environment and the potential applications of the system.
    - Provide, in a clear and proactive manner, information to stakeholders (customers, employees, etc.) about the AI system's capabilities and limitations, allowing them to set realistic expectations. Ensuring Traceability of the AI system is key in this regard.
    - Make Trustworthy AI part of the organisation's culture, and provide information to stakeholders on how Trustworthy AI is implemented into the design and use of AI systems. Trustworthy AI can also be included in organisations' deontology charters or codes of conduct.
    - Ensure participation and inclusion of stakeholders in the design and development of the AI system. Moreover, ensure diversity when setting up the teams developing, implementing and testing the product.
    - Strive to facilitate the auditability of AI systems, particularly in critical contexts or situations. To the extent possible, design your system to enable tracing individual decisions to your various inputs; data, pre-trained models, etc. Moreover, define explanation methods of the AI system.
    - Ensure a specific process for accountability governance. - Foresee training and education, and ensure that managers, developers, users and employers are aware of and are trained in Trustworthy AI.

    - Be mindful that there might be fundamental tensions between different objectives (transparency can open the door to misuse; identifying and correcting bias might contrast with privacy protections). Communicate and document these trade-offs.
    - Foster research and innovation to further the achievement of the requirements for Trustworthy AI.
- Key Guidance for Assessing Trustworthy AI
    - Adopt an assessment list for Trustworthy AI when developing, deploying or using AI, and adapt it to the specific use case in which the system is being used.
    - Keep in mind that an assessment list will never be exhaustive, and that ensuring Trustworthy AI is not about ticking boxes, but about a continuous process of identifying requirements, evaluating solutions and ensuring improved outcomes throughout the entire lifecycle of the AI system.

High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** high-level panel (UN).
- **Dates:** report expected c. April 2019; panel established, July 2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** new technologies/access to technology.
- **Aspirations:** TBD.
- **Theory of Change:** "Current means and levels of international cooperation are not commensurate with the scale and rapidity of changes brought about by digital technologies…The report is expected to: 1) raise awareness about the transformative impact of digital technologies across society and the economy, 2) identify policy, research and information gaps as well as ways to improve interdisciplinary action on digital technologies, and 3) present concrete proposals to strengthen cooperation in the digital space in an effective and inclusive manner"
- **Recommendations**: TBD.

High-level African Union Panel on Emerging Technologies

- **Convenors and/or authors:** AU.
- **Type:** international commission (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Three reports – *Gene Drives for Malaria Control and Elimination in Africa*; *Drones on the Horizon: Transforming Africa's Agriculture*; *Micro-Grids: Empowering Communities and Enabling Transformation in Africa*.
- **Dates:** report published, November 2015; panel established, December 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** new technologies/access to technology, global health/pandemics,
- **Aspirations:** medium to long term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:**
  - *Gene Drives for Malaria Control and Elimination in Africa*
    - Given the potential for rapid developments in this technology space and the potential for misuse and improper trials, researchers and developers should establish a network of Africa-based scientists and developers to register their studies, self-regulate, share information regarding their technology, and peer-review all ongoing developments and field testing of the technology on the continent. They should also adopt a 'co-development' approach that emphasises collaboration between the partners in the teams, from research design to the creation of standard operating procedures.
    - Regulation of gene drive technology should take into account the value propositions and potential risks. Thus, regulators should facilitate and adopt essential guidelines and frameworks and, where necessary, enact enabling legislation for the development and adjudication of the technology.
    - Member states should encourage interaction between different agencies mandated to regulate emerging technologies including genetically modified organisms and related technologies.
    - AU Agenda and RECs should facilitate development, coordination and harmonization of regulations and guidelines for regulating the development, approval and use of the final product.
    - Member States should obtain support for Public-Private-Partnerships, funding, laboratory infrastructure and international partnerships and ensure they provide budgetary support to research, development and public engagements.
    - Researchers and developers, member states and the AU, NEPAD Agency and RECs should adopt a regional approach to the harmonization of policies and implementation of the gene drive technology across African countries.
    - Member states should provide support for the conduct of laboratory, field and semi-field studies to verify the potential of the technology for various African settings; and to support essential research for optimization of the technology. These studies should include the modelling of potential risks of gene-drive technology and mitigation of same.
    - Support for bio-banking and data archiving, as well as the safeguarding of intellectual property associated with all trials on gene drive is essential to maximize local impact and help expedite future evaluations and approvals.
    - Governments have a central role to play in harnessing emerging technologies for Africa's development. In addition, the AU High Level Panel calls for a more proactive involvement of financial institutions, Foundations and private sector investors, as well as philanthropic associations, to name but a few examples. Banks and other financial institutions are

generally profit oriented; however, they want to see the products developed as well as the profits generated.
    - The Panel calls for the development of strategies that should address challenges of availability of African skills, the issue of regulation and ethics, education and awareness creation for the public, targeting young people, in order to prepare them for their future role as decision-makers.
    - Early engagement with stakeholders is critical for the development of emerging technologies in order to ensure that the technologies meet their expectations and therefore, have great chance to be accepted and supported.
    - The Panel calls for advocacy and support of policy makers for emerging technologies for economic development for instance, liaising with Ministers of Health in the field of gene drive against malaria.
- *Drones on the Horizon: Transforming Africa's Agriculture*
    - Assess the opportunity cost of UAV technology including external factors and balance it against expected outcomes such as food security, improved health and the potential for drones to make agriculture attractive to the youth.
    - Ensure that stakeholders are engaged in all aspects related to the development of UAV technology so that potential resistance is understood and dealt with systematically.
    - Conduct public awareness and capacity building around UASs and their civil applications to clearly distinguish between civil and military uses. This approach will thereby improve public acceptance. Safety, security and privacy concerns need to be addressed as part of this process.
    - Address cost and technical barriers to the adoption of the technology through either subsidies, licensed SMEs or cooperatives, and build a supportive framework for drone governance and regulation to facilitate adoption (including licensing and registration).
    - Encourage and support public-private partnerships for UAV technology uptake.
    - Ensure that appropriate national UAV regulations are put in place. Suitable regulations should strike a balance between competing public security concerns on one hand and the need to encourage innovation, economic development and youth entrepreneurship, on the other. In this context, encourage National Civil Aviation Authorities to establish enabling regulatory frameworks for UAV technology to be deployed and up-scaled to serve precision agriculture.
    - Allocate financial resources for research and development (cost & benefits) and capacity building to form critical mass in all aspects of drone technology – licensed pilots, scientists, regulators and relevant stakeholders.
    - In the context of smallholder farmers, support crop intensification through stimulating the planting of the same crops simultaneously in contiguous areas to form larger holdings which could reap the benefits of UAV technology for precision agriculture.
    - Develop continental regulatory framework for the use of UAVs in Africa, and harmonize policies across countries and regions (regional economic communities)
    - Enhance South-South, triangular and regional collaborations, partnerships, networks and knowledge-exchanges to facilitate upscaling and use of drone technology.
- *Micro-Grids: Empowering Communities and Enabling Transformation in Africa*
    - Micro-grid implementation should be adapted and contextualised for Africa, taking into account factors such as site selection, the expected number of connections per site, the demand and willingness to pay and the expected return per connection. The Panel further recommends that contextualisation should be based on the prevailing natural resources to determine optimal selection of the underlying energy source (solar, wind, biomass or thermal).

- Skills and capacities for addressing under-served communities and the “informal sector” to support micro-grid implementation must be developed. This would mitigate against cases cited in some countries where micro-grid installations have suffered from not being properly operated or maintained, leaving communities unable to derive the intended benefits.
- Harmonised regulatory frameworks for micro-grid development which would focus, among other things, on investment laws and PPPs, sustainable tariff structures and cross-border interconnection must be put in place. The Panel further recommends the development of smart regulation leveraging on emerging trends in the use of ICTs.
- Micro-grid implementation should be based on multi-sectorial collaboration since interventions in agriculture, health, education, water and sanitation, social welfare and other sectors all have potential implications for energy projects.
- Stimulate bankability of micro-grid projects, a robust framework of incentives should be developed to stimulate private investment. The Panel further recommends the decentralisation of regulatory and support processes to local government level to enable mobilisation of domestic resources and faster, tailored responses to micro-grid deployment in under-served communities.
- Projects should aim to increase women’s participation in the energy sector through procurement allocation policies, and by promoting employment of women in technical aspects of operation and maintenance. Projects should also encourage women to participate actively as business leaders and entrepreneurs, providing value-added productive services including producing and distributing new energy technologies and services. The Panel therefore recommends the promotion and strengthening of participation along entire micro-grid value chain by women and the youth.
- Higher education and research institutions should be supported to start implementing programmes that focus on renewable energy, micro-grids and associated generation, storage and distribution technologies. This should be employed simultaneously with the strengthening of intellectual property regimes, as well as increased awareness of how to license and use existing IP.

Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Various; secretariat: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, East West Institute
- **Type:** international commission (non-UN).
- **Output(s)**: Single report – *Norm Package*.
- **Dates:** Report released, November 2018; commission established, December 2003.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** new technologies/access to technology.
- **Aspirations:** long term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:** (headline norms only)
  - Norm to Avoid Tampering
  - Norm Against Commandeering of ICT Devices into Botnets
  - Norm for States to Create a Vulnerability Equities Process
  - Norm to Reduce and Mitigate Significant Vulnerabilities
  - Norm on Basic Cyber Hygiene as Foundational Defense
  - Norm Against Offensive Cyber Operations by Non-State Actors

Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanisms

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), World Economic Forum.
- **Type:** high-level panel (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** *Towards a Collaborative, Decentralized Internet Governance Ecosystem*
- **Dates:** report published, May 2014; panel established, c. December 2013.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** new technologies/access to technology.
- **Aspirations:** short, medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**:
  - "Coalesce and support broad multistakeholder alliances:
    - "to promote global IG based on the NETmundial Principles
    - "to engage and support the participation of private sector, governments, civil society, technical community, and academia, representing all regions in the world in the collaborative IG ecosystem with a specific focus on cooperation and development
    - "to promote capacity development that facilitates (or enables) broader representation and participation in a collaborative IG ecosystem
    - "to operationalize the Enablers outlined in section III (forums and dialogues, expert communities, capacity development, and toolkits)
    - "to promote creation of regional Internet Governance Practices forums
    - "to gather from participants the governance issues they want (help) to address and foster national and regional multistakeholder structures to share best practices of the multistakeholder model in the national, regional, and global spheres
    - "to increase global cooperation and investment – to "grow the Internet" – providing more Internet for more people.
  - "Develop new and strengthen existing IG mechanisms:
    - "to embrace NETmundial recommendations to enhance the IGF
    - "to map issues to existing DG groups and provide assistance in the implementation of existing DG groups' solutions
    - "to address issues that do not have current solutions
    - "to ensure that all DG groups adhere to the adopted NETmundial Principles
    - "to raise awareness globally through education campaigns (that includes education on multistakeholder frameworks and culture)
    - "to enable and improve cooperation and collaboration between relevant stakeholders and DG groups to ensure efficiencies and synchronization of solutions at the local, national, regional, and global levels
    - "to encourage the development of sustainable, searchable databases and observatories so that existing processes and potential partners are more easily discoverable by those seeking to address a problem
  - "Evolve collaborative decision-making through research and analysis:
    - "to improve collaborative decision-making by leveraging the practices of the multistakeholder governance
    - "to develop a set of guidelines and checklist on best practices for how a DG group operates to define the concepts of accountability in the multistakeholder model
    - "to define the concepts of accountability in the multistakeholder model to better define the role of stakeholders in each of the elements of IG
  - "Establish urgently needed sustainable funding and resource models to enable IG evolution and to strengthen and operationalize the collaborative IG ecosystem.

- “Support ICANN accountability and IANA globalization:
    - “In addition, and consistent with the Panel’s earlier submission to NETmundial, the Panel wishes to support and encourage broad and global participation in ICANN’s two public dialogues on ICANN accountability and the transition of the U.S. government’s stewardship of the IANA functions to the global community. In line with the NETmundial Roadmap, the Panel recommends that the global community contribute to a successful conclusion by September 2015.”

Global Commission on Internet Governance

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Centre for International Governance Innovation; Chatham House.
- **Type:** high-level panel (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Six reports.
- **Dates:** Reports published, 2016-2017.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** New technologies; global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** short, medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**: N/A (see reports).

Global Commission on the Future of Work

- **Convenors and/or authors:** ILO.
- **Type:** High-level panel (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Work for a brighter future*.
- **Dates:** Report published, January 2019; panel established, April 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Cross-cutting.
- **Aspirations:** short, medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (summary recommendations only)
  - Increasing investment in people's capabilities
    - A universal entitlement to lifelong learning that enables people to acquire skills and to reskill and upskill. Lifelong learning encompasses formal and informal learning from early childhood and basic education through to adult learning. Governments, workers and employers, as well as educational institutions, have complementary responsibilities in building an effective and appropriately financed lifelong learning ecosystem.
    - Stepping up investments in the institutions, policies and strategies that will support people through future of work transitions. Young people will need help in navigating the increasingly difficult school-to-work transition. Older workers will need expanded choices that enable them to remain economically active for as long as they choose and that will create a lifelong active society. All workers will need support through the increasing number of labour market transitions over the course of their lives. Active labour market policies need to become proactive and public employment services need to be expanded.
    - Implementing a transformative and measurable agenda for gender equality. The world of work begins at home. From parental leave to investment in public care services, policies need to foster the sharing of unpaid care work in the home to create genuine equality of opportunity in the workplace. Strengthening women's voice and leadership, eliminating violence and harassment at work and implementing pay transparency policies are preconditions for gender equality. Specific measures are also needed to address gender equality in the technology-enabled jobs of tomorrow.
    - Providing universal social protection from birth to old age. The future of work requires a strong and responsive social protection system based on the principles of solidarity and risk sharing, which supports people's needs over the life cycle. This calls for a social protection floor that affords a basic level of protection to everyone in need, complemented by contributory social insurance schemes that provide increased levels of protection.
  - Increasing investment in the institutions of work
    - Establishing a Universal Labour Guarantee. All workers, regardless of their contractual arrangement or employment status, should enjoy fundamental workers' rights, an "adequate living wage" (ILO Constitution, 1919), maximum limits on working hours and protection of safety and health at work. Collective agreements or laws and regulations can raise this protection floor. This proposal also allows for safety and health at work to be recognized as a fundamental principle and right at work.
    - Expanding time sovereignty. Workers need greater autonomy over their working time, while meeting enterprise needs. Harnessing technology to expand choice and achieve a balance between work and personal life can help them realize this goal and address the pressures that come with the blurring of boundaries between working time and private time. It will take continued efforts to implement maximum limits on working time

alongside measures to improve productivity, as well as minimum hour guarantees to create real choices for flexibility and control over work schedules.
    - Ensuring collective representation of workers and employers through social dialogue as a public good, actively promoted through public policies. All workers and employers must enjoy freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, with the State as the guarantor of those rights. Workers' and employers' organizations must strengthen their representative legitimacy through innovative organizing techniques that reach those who are engaged in the platform economy, including through the use of technology. They must also use their convening power to bring diverse interests to the table.
    - Harnessing and managing technology for decent work. This means workers and managers negotiating the design of work. It also means adopting a "human-in-command" approach to artificial intelligence that ensures that the final decisions affecting work are taken by human beings. An international governance system for digital labour platforms should be established to require platforms (and their clients) to respect certain minimum rights and protections. Technological advances also demand regulation of data use and algorithmic accountability in the world of work.
- Increasing investment in decent and sustainable work
    - Incentives to promote investments in key areas for decent and sustainable work. Such investments will also advance gender equality and can create millions of jobs and new opportunities for micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises. The development of the rural economy, where the future of many of the world's workers lies, should become a priority. Directing investment to high-quality physical and digital infrastructure is necessary to close the divides and support high-value services.
    - Reshaping business incentive structures for longer-term investment approaches and exploring supplementary indicators of human development and well-being. These actions can include fair fiscal policies, revised corporate accounting standards, enhanced stakeholder representation and changes in reporting practices. New measures of country progress also need to be developed to account for the distributional dimensions of growth, the value of unpaid work performed in the service of households and communities and the externalities of economic activity, such as environmental degradation.

Global Health and Pandemics

High-level Panel on Access to Medicines

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** high-level panel (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document – *Promoting innovation and access to health technologies*
- **Dates:** report released, September 2017; panel established, November 2015.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** global health/pandemics.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** Restructure incentives and channel resources to reward innovation in medicines/health technology. "The High-Level Panel's mandate is focused on one aspect of a complex challenge: the incoherencies between international human rights, trade, intellectual property rights and public health objectives."
- **Recommendations:**
  - Intellectual property laws and access to health technologies:
    - "World Trade Organization (WTO) Members must make full use of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) flexibilities as confirmed by the Doha Declaration to promote access to health technologies when necessary."
    - "WTO Members should make full use of the policy space available in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement by adopting and applying rigorous definitions of invention and patentability that are in the best interests of the public health of the country and its inhabitants. This includes amending laws to curtail the evergreening of patents and awarding patents only when genuine innovation has occurred."
    - "The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) should cooperate with one another and with other relevant bodies with the requisite expertise to support governments to apply public health-sensitive patentability criteria."
    - "These multilateral organizations should strengthen the capacity of patent examiners at both national and regional levels to apply rigorous public health-sensitive standards of patentability taking into account public health needs."
    - "Governments should adopt and implement legislation that facilitaes the issuance of compulsory licenses. Such legislation must be designed to effectuate quick, fair, predictable and implementable compulsory licenses for legitimate public health needs, and particularly with regards to essential medicines. The use of compulsory licensing must be based on the provisions found in the Doha Declaration and the grounds for the issuance of compulsory licenses left to the discretion of governments.
    - "WTO Members should revise the paragraph 6 decision in order to find a solution that enables a swift and expedient export of pharmaceutical products produced under compulsory license. WTO Members should, as necessary, adopt a waiver and permanent revision of the TRIPS Agreement to enable this reform."
    - "Governments and the private sector must refrain from explicit or implicit threats, tactics or strategies that undermine the right of WTO Members to use TRIPS flexibilities. Instances of undue political and commercial pressure should be reported to by the WTO Secretariat during the Trade Policy Review of Members. WTO Members must register complaints against undue political and economic pressure which includes taking punitive measures against offending WTO Members."
    - "Governments engaged in bilateral and regional trade and investment treaties should ensure that these agreements do not include provisions that interfere with their obligations to fulfil the right to health. As a first step, they must undertake public health impact

assessments. These impact assessments should verify that the increased trade and economic benefits are not endangering or impeding the human rights and public health obligations of the nation and its people before entering into commitments. Such assessments should inform negotiations, be conducted transparently and made publicly available."

- "Public funders of research must require that knowledge generated from such research be made freely and widely available through publication in peer-reviewed literature and seek broad, online public access to such research."
- "Universities and research institutions that receive public funding must prioritize public health objectives over financial returns in their patenting and licensing practices. Such practices may include publication, non-exclusive licensing, donations of intellectual property and participation in public sector patent pools, among others. Sufficient incentives must be in place in these practices to make it attractive for developers to underwrite the cost of bringing a product to market at affordable prices that ensure broad availability."
- "Universities and research institutions that receive public funding should adopt policies and approaches that catalyse innovation and create flexible models of collaboration that advance biomedical research and generate knowledge for the benefit of the public."

- New incentives for research and development of health technologies:
  - "It is imperative that governments increase their current levels of investment in health technology innovation to address unmet needs."
  - "Stakeholders, including governments, the biomedical industry, institutional funders of healthcare and civil society, should test and implement new and additional models for financing and rewarding public health research and development (R&D), such as the transaction taxes and other innovative financing mechanisms."
  - "Building on current discussions at the WHO, the United Nations Secretary-General should initiate a process for governments to negotiate global agreements on the coordination, financing and development of health technologies. This includes negotiations for a binding R&D Convention that delinks the costs of research and development from end prices to promote access to good health for all. The Convention should focus on public health needs, including but not limited to, innovation for neglected tropical diseases and antimicrobial resistance and must complement existing mechanisms."
  - "As a preparatory step, governments should form a Working Group to begin negotiating a Code of Principles for Biomedical R&D. The principles would apply to public R&D funds and should also be adopted by private and philanthropic funders, product development partnerships, universities, the biomedical industry and other stakeholders. Governments should report annually on their progress in negotiating and implementing a Code of Principles as a preparatory step to negotiating the Convention in the United Nations General Assembly."
- Governance, accountability and transparency:
  - "Governments must review the situation of access to health technologies in their countries in light of human rights principles and States' obligations to fulfil them, with assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and other relevant United Nations entities. The results of these assessments should be made publicly available. Civil society should be financially supported to submit their own shadow reports on innovation and access to health technologies. Such national reviews should be repeated at regular intervals."
  - "Governments should strengthen national level policy and institutional coherence between trade and intellectual property, the right to health and public health objectives by establishing national inter-ministerial bodies to coordinate laws, policies and practices that

may impact on health technology innovation and access. Appropriate member/s of the national executive who can manage competing priorities, mandates and interests should convene such bodies. The deliberations and decisions of such groups should operate with a maximum of transparency. Civil society should be financially supported to participate and submit their shadow reports on innovation and access to health technologies."

- "The United Nations Secretary-General should establish an independent review body tasked with assessing progress on health technology innovation and access. Challenges and progress on innovation and access to health technologies under the ambit of the 2030 Agenda, as well as progress made in implementing the recommendations of this High-Level Panel, should be monitored by this body. Membership should comprise of governments, representatives from United Nations and multilateral organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector."
- "The United Nations Secretary-General should establish an inter-agency taskforce on health technology innovation and access. This taskforce, operating for the duration of the SDGs, should work toward increasing coherence among United Nations entities and relevant multilateral organizations like the WTO. The taskforce, charged with overseeing the implementation of the High-Level Panel's recommendations should be coordinated by the United Nations Development Group and report annually to the United Nations Secretary-General on progress made in enhancing United Nations system-wide coherence on innovation and access to health technologies."
- "The United Nations General Assembly should convene a Special Session, no later than 2018, on health technology innovation and access to agree on strategies and an accountability framework that will accelerate efforts towards promoting innovation and ensuring access as set out in the 2030 Agenda. Civil society should be financially supported to participate and submit their reports on innovation and access to health technologies at this Special Session."
- "Biomedical private sector companies involved in health technology innovation and access should report, as part of their annual reporting cycle, on actions they have taken that promote access to health technologies. Private sector companies should have a publicly available policy on their contribution to improving access to health technologies setting out general and specific objectives, timeframes, reporting procedures and lines of accountability and a governance system that includes direct board-level responsibility and accountability on improving access to health technologies."
- "Governments should require manufacturers and distributors of health technologies to disclose to drug regulatory and procurement authorities information pertaining to: (1) the costs of R&D, production, marketing and distribution of health technology being procured or given marketing approval with each expense category separated; and (2) any public funding received in the development of the health technology, including tax credits, subsidies and grants."
- "Building on the Global Price Reporting Mechanism (GPRM), V3P and others, WHO should establish and maintain an accessible international database of prices of patented and generic medicines and bio-similars in the private and public sectors of all countries where they are registered."
- "Governments should require that the unidentified data on all completed and discontinued clinical trials be made publicly available in an easily searchable public register established and operated by existing mechanisms such as the WHO Clinical Trials Registry Platform, clinical trials.gov or in peer reviewed publications, regardless of whether their results are positive, negative, neutral or inconclusive."

- "To facilitate open collaboration, reconstruction and reinvestigation of failures, governments should require that study designs and protocols, data sets, test results and anonymity-protected patient data be available to the public in a timely and accessible fashion. Those undertaking clinical trials must not prevent researchers from publishing their findings."
- "Governments should establish and maintain publicly accessible databases with patent information status and data on medicines and vaccines. This information should be periodically updated and consolidated by WIPO in collaboration with stakeholders to develop an international, easily searchable database which should include: (1) standard international common names for biological products; (2) international non-proprietary names for products, either as known at the time of application or after the granting of a patent; and (3) dates of grant and expiry."

High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** high-level panel (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **Dates:** report published, February 2016; panel established, April 2015.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** global health/pandemics.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** Problem – weak monitoring systems, weak response capacities. Solutions – "By building on existing mechanisms, the Panel's recommendations will strengthen global capacity to monitor risks, detect outbreaks early, and rapidly deploy a fully resourced, effective response. In addition, the Panel's proposals to dedicate resources to research and development on prioritized pathogens will ensure the greater availability of critical vaccines and treatments when they are most needed."
- **Recommendations**: (headline recommendations/goals only)
  - National level
    - "By 2020, States parties to IHR, with appropriate international cooperation, are in full compliance with the IHR core capacity requirements." (Involves preparedness and response, surveillance, research, and human resources capacities.)
    - "Governments increase investment in the training of health professionals and establish community health worker systems that are appropriate to country circumstances."
    - "Governments and responders strengthen and streamline their community engagement and promote local ownership and trust."
    - "Outbreak preparedness and response efforts should take into account and address the gender dimension."
  - Regional and subregional levels
    - "Regional and subregional organizations develop or strengthen standing capacities to monitor, prevent and respond to health crises, supported by WHO."
  - International level
    - "WHO strengthens its periodic review of compliance with the IHR core capacity requirements."
    - "WHO immediately strengthens its leadership and establishes a unified, effective operational capacity."
    - "In the event of a Grade 2 or Grade 3 outbreak that is not already classified as a humanitarian emergency, a clear line of command will be activated throughout the United Nations system."
    - "The Secretary-General initiates the integration of health and humanitarian crisis trigger systems."
  - Cross-cutting issues (development and health; R&D; financing)
    - "The international community must fulfil the commitments towards the Sustainable Development Goals, with a particular emphasis on health-sector goals."
    - "Partners sustain their official development assistance to health and direct a greater percentage to strengthening health systems under an agreed-upon government-led plan."
    - "WHO works closely with development actors to ensure that development programming supports health systems and thereby helps to improve universal and equitable access to quality health."
    - "WHO coordinates the prioritization of global research and development efforts for neglected diseases that pose the greatest threat of turning into health crises."

- "Urgent measures are taken to ensure universal access to and affordability of medicines, vaccines and other life-saving products"
- "WHO convenes its member States to renegotiate the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework with a view to including other novel pathogens, making it legally binding, and achieving an appropriate balance between obligations and benefits, in accordance with the principles of the 2010 Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity."
- "WHO leads efforts to assist developing countries in building research and manufacturing capacities for vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics, including through South-South cooperation."
- "The Director-General of WHO leads urgent efforts, in partnership with the World Bank, regional development banks, other international organizations, partners, foundations and the private sector, to mobilize financial and technical support to build the IHR core capacities."
- "The WHO member States increase their assessed contributions to the WHO budget by at least 10 per cent."
- "Ten per cent of all voluntary contributions to WHO — beyond programme support costs — are mandatorily directed to support the centre for emergency preparedness and response."
- "Member states finance the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies with at least $300 million by the end of 2016."
- "The World Bank rapidly operationalizes the pandemic emergency financing facility."
- "WHO oversees the establishment and management of an international fund of at least $1 billion per annum to support the research and development of vaccines, therapeutics and rapid diagnostics for neglected communicable diseases."
- "The IHR Review Committee considers developing mechanisms to rapidly address unilateral action by States and others that are in contravention of temporary recommendations issued by WHO as part of a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) announcement."
- "WTO and WHO convene an informal joint commission of experts to study possible measures to strengthen coherence between IHR and the WTO legal frameworks regarding trade restrictions imposed for public health reasons"
- "Countries and partners comply with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership agreement, particularly with regard to the alignment of support, the harmonization of efforts and mutual accountability."

- Follow-up and implementation
  - "The United Nations General Assembly immediately creates a high-level council on global public health crises to ensure that the world is prepared and able to respond to public health crises."
  - "A summit on global public health crises is convened in 2018 to focus on preparedness and response to health crises."

The Lancet-University of Oslo Commission on Global Governance for Health

- **Convenors and/or authors:** University of Oslo, The Lancet.
- **Type:** international commission (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document – *The Political Origins of Health Inequity: Prospects for Change*
- **Dates:** reports published, February 2014; commission established, December 2011.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** global health/pandemics; global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** short, medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** Absent. "Any proposal for reforming or creating new global institutions is likely to face the same barriers and dysfunctions that have been identified in this report... The voices of the people and the imperative of the cause must ultimately be what drive change and hold national and global leaders accountable. Healthy people are as important as a healthy planet, and steps must be taken to overcome the most important limitations of absent or nascent institutions, weak accountability, and inadequate policy space. This process will require agents of change and readiness for change, both within the UN, among the political leaders of the world, within social movements, and in the private sector."
- **Recommendations**: (verbiage lightly trimmed)
  - A UN Multistakeholder Platform on Global Governance for Health
    - "Policies, regulations, and actions with major implications for health are now compartmentalised across various institutions and processes in the global governance system, with insufficient attention paid to the ways in which they are interconnected and interact… The Platform should derive its legitimacy from the UN and serve as a policy forum (not a funding platform) that provides space for diverse stakeholders to frame issues, set agendas, examine and debate policies in the making that would have an effect on health and health equity, and identify barriers and propose solutions for concrete policy processes. It will share and review information, influence norms and opinions, and shape action by making recommendations to the decision-making bodies of participating state, intergovernmental, market, and civil society actors. In so doing, the Platform can respond to the challenge of weak accountability mechanisms at the global level by creating a public arena in which actors are expected to be answerable for the health consequences of their actions… The Platform would be independent of the regular health governance processes of WHO and its partners in the health architecture (such as the public-private partnerships for health), but would include WHO in its member ship and benefit from the normative guidance and leadership that WHO can provide as the UN agency responsible for health."
  - An Independent Scientific Monitoring Panel on Global Social and Political Determinants of Health
    - "The Panel will deploy the best minds to investigate the complex interaction of forces that lead to health outcomes, the risk factors for adverse health outcomes, and the varying effectiveness of different global governance arrangements for enabling and protecting health. Competing or conflicting interests among stakeholders and continuing debates about methods for analysis make the case for an independent global monitoring mechanism. The Panel will call for, receive, assess, analyse, debate, and communicate multiple lines of independent evidence— across disciplines—and provide independent and transparent strategic information to the UN and other actors that affect global governance for health… The first task for the Panel should be to propose a monitoring framework that is able to track progress in overcoming the social and political determinants of adverse health outcomes. Analogous institutions have already been created, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the newly established Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, to assess the latest research into the state of the planet's fragile ecosystems… Several options should be explored for the establishment of

the Independent Scientific Monitoring Panel on Global Social and Political determinants of Health. The basis needs to be a UN mandate and a scientific, independent role. It could be created by governments or by non-state actors such as academic institutions, and should have a strong contribution from civil society. Situating the Panel in initiatives established by universities themselves, such as global consortia or associations of academic institutions or knowledge centres, could be an attractive option.

- Health equity impact assessments
  - "… international institutions could be mandated to do health equity impact assessments of all their policies and practices. Such assessments could call attention to health threats, provide much-needed evidence to decision makers, and change views on policy, especially when combined with political mobilisation.263 For example, the IMF, World Bank, WTO, WHO, and the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations could all be required to assess their advice and policies with respect to their effects on the social determinants of health, drawing on coordination and advice from the Independent Scientific Monitoring Panel and the UN Multistakeholder Platform."
- Strengthen the use of human rights instruments for health
  - "…The opportunity should now be taken to seek improved recognition of health as a human right, integrated with other social, economic, political, and civil rights in the agenda of global governance. Calling attention to violations of agreed human rights standards by state and non-state actors is crucial. The mandate, reports, and recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health can be better used to inform policies and strategies that affect health, including by having the Special Rapporteur report to the World Health Assembly. Governments and other actors should work to strengthen links between the existing international human rights system to make better use of existing surveillance capacities, with reports and guidance taken into account in multilateral arenas such as the IMF, the UN Security Council, WHO, the World Intellectual Property Organization, WTO, and the World Bank. Governments on the UN Human Rights Council should expand the mandates for the Special Rapporteurs to include human rights audit of the decision-making processes of international organisations. This issue of expanded mandates is relevant to all policy areas discussed in this report, and could be important for both of the proposed institutions—ie, the UN Multistakeholder Platform and the Independent Scientific Monitoring Panel."
- Strengthen mechanisms for sanctions
  - "To strengthen weak accountability at the transnational level, stronger mechanisms for sanctions are needed. Sanctions can lead to punishment of those actors who violate agreed-upon standards, or to remedy for harms committed, whether in the form of an apology, commitment not to repeat, policy changes, or reparations. Although national courts can play an important part in sanctioning violations, when they are unable or unwilling to try specific cases, international courts might be needed. In view of the many global power imbalances that can limit the effectiveness of national courts, the international judicial system is an important backstop to national systems and could offer a useful mechanism for strengthened transnational accountability. The state-based international judicial system should, however, be strengthened to encompass a broader range of non-state actors and to enforce sanctions against a broader range of violations. The existing patchwork of international courts has wide gaps, especially for cases in which non-state actors are potential plaintiff s or defendants. For example, the ICC does not accept cases brought by non-state actors such as minority groups or civil society organisations, and transnational corporations cannot be brought before the ICC, since its mandate is restricted to prosecuting human beings. Furthermore, the ICC covers only a short list of violations. An

expansion of eligible violations could involve standards directly related to the social determinants of health, such as environmental pollution, corruption, abuse of labour rights, and collusion in gross human rights violations. Recognising the many challenges involved in broadening the formal mandate of the ICC, we suggest as a first step the creation of a regularly scheduled forum at which civil society organisations could present reports on alleged violations requiring greater attention from the court."

- Strengthen and transform mechanisms for global solidarity and shared responsibility
  - Global governance for health must be rooted in commitments to global solidarity and shared responsibility… Such commitments include contributing a fair share to development assistance for health, based on ability to pay, through both traditional and innovative means. This vision and commitment, spearheaded by the African Union Roadmap on Shared Responsibility and Global Solidarity for AIDS, TB and Malaria,265 has been offered by the AIDS movement… and should be further explored… The Commission believes that there is an urgent need for a framework for international financing that is broader than what is currently defined as official development assistance to ensure the financing of a more universal agenda for socially sustainable development. We also note the need for further attention to binding instruments and compulsory, assessed contributions from all states according to ability to pay, as proposed by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health… Strengthened and transformed mechanisms for global solidarity and shared responsibility based in financing models beyond traditional development assistance are highly relevant and need priority attention. Examples include health research that meets the needs of poor people and mechanisms for global social protection transfers… One of the options is a treaty under which countries would commit to finance research and development in accordance with their ability to pay, while the research would be oriented towards the most important global public health needs. This proposal would have the effect of mandatory financial transfers—albeit indirect—from wealthy countries to poorer countries (which would benefit most from the research). If a binding treaty is not politically feasible, an alternative model could be the non-binding assessed contribution scheme used for the replenishments of the International Development Association (the arm of the World Bank that provides grants and soft loans to low-income countries)… Whether a single global social health protection fund92 would be better than the present patchwork of thousands of bilateral and multilateral global social protection transfers remains a controversial issue, but these are important questions that need to be further explored and debated."

EAT-Lancet Commission on Healthy Diets from Sustainable Food Systems

- **Convenors and/or authors:** The Lancet.
- **Type:** international commission (non-UN).
- **Dates:** report published, January 2019.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** medium to long term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:** (headline recommendations only)
  - Strategy one: seek international and national commitment to shift towards healthy diets
  - Strategy two: reorient agricultural priorities from producing large quantities of food to producing healthy food
  - Strategy three: sustainably intensify food production, generating high-quality output
  - Strategy four: strong and coordinated governance of land and oceans
  - Strategy five: at least halve food loss and waste, in line with global SDGs

University College London-Lancet Commission on Migration and Health

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UCL, The Lancet.
- **Type:** international commission (non-UN).
- **Dates:** report published, January 2019.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** global health/pandemics.
- **Aspirations:** medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:** (headline recommendations only)
  - 1. Dedicate political capital, financial, and human resources to fulfil global commitments to secure healthy migration and improve the security and wellbeing of mobile groups, especially the most marginalised.
    - States need to commit strong leadership to meet their commitments to the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, and fulfil the health objectives of the Global Compact for Migration, the Global Compact on Refugees, and other relevant global agreements. We advocate for clarity in leadership at the global level and for support to national actors (public health workforce and civil society). We urge the Secretary General of the UN to appoint a Special Envoy on Migration and Health, regional bodies to appoint a regional representative, and national governments to have country-level focal points for migration and health
    - International and regional bodies need to use existing agreements, such as the Global Compacts and the WHO Action Plan, to prioritise the health, rights, and security of migrating populations. Decision makers should allocate sufficient funding to create equitable health protection mechanisms for mobile groups, such as joint health insurance or social safety net schemes, mutual health accords, and other mechanisms to integrate these groups into health systems.
    - Multilateral funding organisations should have clear mechanisms to include migrants into national and regional proposals. Ultimately the inclusion of migrants into existing health systems, within the scope of universal health coverage, should improve such systems to benefit nationals and migrants.
    - States and the international community should urgently develop policy links that recognise the integral connections between environmental conditions and anthropogenic climate change, migration, and health. Decision makers should join forces to predict and respond to the effects of climate change on population mobility. Investments are needed in sustainable health infrastructure models that respond to migrants' health protection needs, including Disaster Risk Reduction mechanisms.
    - States should go beyond rhetoric to tackle modern slavery by recognising the exploitation of migrant workers, especially in informal labour, and trafficking of individuals and families displaced by conflict, natural disasters, and environmental degradation.
  - 2. Re-balance policy making in migration, trade and environment, and foreign affairs to give greater prominence to health. Foster cross-sector, complementary decision making that integrates health considerations across policies and services that determine the health of migrants
    - International and regional bodies and states should create a prominent place for health representatives at high level policy making forums for migration-related sectors (eg, immigration, trade, labour, environment, security, education). Health leaders should assert their rights to participate in these policy forums. Conversely, high level representatives from other sectors should be encouraged to participate in similar health policy making forums.

    - Health leaders and practitioners should fully engage in policy dialogues that affect migration, including the macroeconomic forces that affect population mobility. They should participate in multisector budgeting and programme planning for migrants.
    - Migrants and their advocates should have a voice in strategies that affect their health.
- 3. Confront urgently, vigorously, and persistently divisive myths and discriminatory rhetoric about migrants.
    - Political leaders and elected officials should resoundingly and consistently condemn misinformation and disinformation about migrants, especially xenophobia proffered by divisive and populist voices. Fact-checking, promoting truth, and vociferous objections should not be left to migrants and their advocates alone.
    - Governments, international agencies, and civil society should stay ahead of developments in social media and digital technology to shut down anti-migrant abuse and promote fact-based portrayals of global migration, particularly the widespread reliance on migrants for economic development, health services, educational institutions, and cultural richness.
- 4. Advocate for and improve the rights of migrants to ensure safe and healthy educational and working conditions that includes freedom of movement with no arbitrary arrest.
    - States, regional bodies, and the international community should use policies, laws, and resources to improve the rights of migrants. States and businesses should ensure workplace health and safety measures, employment conditions, and implement inspections and monitoring tools targeted to protect migrant workers. Migrants should be assured easy-to-access, equitable health care and worker compensation entitlements. Transparent reporting using an agreed upon framework should occur.
    - Policy makers should guarantee migrants' rights and inclusion across sectors that affect the health of migrants, including workers, internally displaced people, asylum seekers, and refugees, and empower migrants to assert their rights to the underlying social, political, economic, and cultural determinants of physical and mental health.
    - Social and health sector leaders and educational institutions should offer training to promote cultural competency, cultural mediation, and migrant-sensitive services, including outreach programmes for hard-to-reach individuals and groups.
    - States should abolish arbitrary arrest and the detention of all migrants, especially children and adolescents. They should remove health restrictions on entry, stay, and residence and the deportation of individuals with specific health conditions. These measures should be codified in international agreements and included in national law.
- There is an urgent need to ensure adequate monitoring, evaluation, and research to support the implementation of the Global Compacts
    - States, coordinating with the global community and relevant local professionals (eg, health, refugee services, labour, civil society), should put into place robust monitoring frameworks and independent reporting mechanisms to ensure accountability in the delivery of the Global Compact for Migration and Global Compact on Refugees. Strategies should include transparent and easy to compare monitoring frameworks and mechanisms to report how regions and countries are adhering to the policy principles and implementation components on migration and health.
    - The Commission, therefore, recommends that a Global Migration and Health Observatory is established to develop evidence-based indicators and measurement methods, and to ensure improved reporting, transparency, and accountability on the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. The Observatory should also monitor the progressive inclusion of migrants within universal health coverage country plans and achievements.

Global Commission on Drug Policy

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Independent.
- **Type:** high-level panel (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Eight reports. *Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs* (2018); *The World Drug PERCEPTION Problem: Countering Prejudices About People Who Use Drugs War on Drugs* (2017); *Advancing Drug Policy Reform: a new approach to decriminalization* (2016); *The Negative Impact of Drug Control on Public Health: the global crisis of avoidable pain* (2015); *Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies that Work* (2014); *The Negative Impact of the War on Drugs on Public Health: The Hidden Hepatitis C Epidemic* (2013); *The War on Drugs and HIV/AIDS* (2012); *War on Drugs* (2011).
- **Dates:** Report publics, 2011-2018; panel established, 2011.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global health/pandemics.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - *War on Drugs* (2011)
    - Break the taboo. Pursue an open debate and promote policies that effectively reduce consumption, and that prevent and reduce harms related to drug use and drug control policies. Increase investment in research and analysis into the impact of different policies and programs.
      - Political leaders and public figures should have the courage to articulate publicly what many of them acknowledge privately: that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that repressive strategies will not solve the drug problem, and that the war on drugs has not, and cannot, be won. Governments do have the power to pursue a mix of policies that are appropriate to their own situation, and manage the problems caused by drug markets and drug use in a way that has a much more positive impact on the level of related crime, as well as social and health harms.
    - Replace the criminalization and punishment of people who use drugs with the offer of health and treatment services to those who need them.
      - A key idea behind the 'war on drugs' approach was that the threat of arrest and harsh punishment would deter people from using drugs. In practice, this hypothesis has been disproved – many countries that have enacted harsh laws and implemented widespread arrest and imprisonment of drug users and low-level dealers have higher levels of drug use and related problems than countries with more tolerant approaches. Similarly, countries that have introduced decriminalization, or other forms of reduction in arrest or punishment, have not seen the rises in drug use or dependence rates that had been feared.
      - In the light of these experiences, it is clear that the policy of harsh criminalization and punishment of drug use has been an expensive mistake, and governments should take steps to refocus their efforts and resources on diverting drug users into health and social care services. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that sanctions should be removed altogether – many drug users will also commit other crimes for which they need to be held responsible – but the primary reaction to drug possession and use should be the offer of appropriate advice, treatment and health services to individuals who need them, rather than expensive and counterproductive criminal punishments.
    - Encourage experimentation by governments with models of legal regulation of drugs (with cannabis, for example) that are designed to undermine the power of organized crime and safeguard the health and security of their citizens.
      - The debate on alternative models of drug market regulation has too often been constrained by false dichotomies – tough or soft, repressive or liberal. In fact, we are all seeking the same objective – a set of drug policies and programs that minimize health and social harms,

and maximize individual and national security. It is unhelpful to ignore those who argue for a taxed and regulated market for currently illicit drugs. This is a policy option that should be explored with the same rigor as any other.

- If national governments or local administrations feel that decriminalization policies will save money and deliver better health and social outcomes for their communities, or that the creation of a regulated market may reduce the power of organized crime and improve the security of their citizens, then the international community should support and facilitate such policy experiments and learn from their application.
- Similarly, national authorities and the UN need to review the scheduling of different substances. The current schedules, designed to represent the relative risks and harms of various drugs, were set in place 50 years ago when there was little scientific evidence on which to base these decisions. This has resulted in some obvious anomalies – cannabis and coca leaf, in particular, now seem to be incorrectly scheduled and this needs to be addressed.

❖ *The War on Drugs and HIV/AIDS: How the Criminalization of Drug Use Fuels the Global Pandemic* (2012)

- Acknowledge and address the causal links between the war on drugs and the spread of HIV/AIDS, drug market violence and other health (e.g., hepatitis C) and social harms.
- Respond to the fact that HIV risk behavior resulting from repressive drug control policies and under-funding of evidence-based approaches is the main issue driving the HIV epidemic in many regions of the world.
- Push national governments to halt the practice of arresting and imprisoning people who use drugs but do no harm to others.
- Replace ineffective measures focused on the criminalization and punishment of people who use drugs with evidence-based and rights-affirming interventions proven to meaningfully reduce the negative individual and community consequences of drug use.
- Countries that under-utilize proven public health measures should immediately scale up evidence-based strategies to reduce HIV infection and protect the health of persons who use drugs, including sterile syringe distribution and other safer injecting programs. Failure to take these steps is criminal.
- The public and private sectors should invest in an easily accessible range of evidence-based options for the treatment and care for drug dependence, including substitution and heroin-assisted treatment. These strategies reduce disease and death, and also limit the size and harmful consequences of drug markets by reducing the overall demand for drugs.
- All authorities – from the municipal to international levels – must recognize the clear failure of the war on drugs to meaningfully reduce drug supply and, in doing so, move away from conventional measures of drug law enforcement "success" (e.g., arrests, seizures, convictions), which do not translate into positive effects in communities.
- Measure drug policy success by indicators that have real meaning in communities, such as reduced rates of transmission of HIV and other infectious diseases (e.g., hepatitis C), fewer overdose deaths, reduced drug market violence, fewer individuals incarcerated and lowered rates of problematic substance use.
- Call for public health bodies within the United Nations system to lead the response to drug use and related harms and to promote evidence-based responses. Other bodies, including the International Narcotics Control Board, should be subjected to independent external review to ensure the policies they promote do not worsen community health and safety.
- Act urgently: The war on drugs has failed, and millions of new HIV infections and AIDS deaths can be averted if action is taken now.

❖ *The Negative Impact of the War on Drugs on Public Health: The Hidden Hepatitis C Epidemic* (2013)

- Governments should publicly acknowledge the importance of the hepatitis C epidemic and its significant human, economic and social costs, particularly among people who use drugs.
- Governments must acknowledge that drug policy approaches dominated by strict law enforcement practices perpetuate the spread of hepatitis C (as well as HIV and other health harms). They do this by exacerbating the social marginalisation faced by people who use drugs, and by undermining their access to essential harm reduction and treatment services.
- Governments should therefore reform existing drug policies – ending the criminalisation and mass incarceration of people who use drugs, and the forced treatment of drug dependence.
- Governments must immediately redirect resources away from the 'war on drugs' and into public health approaches that maximise hepatitis C prevention and care, developed with the involvement of, the most affected communities.
- Drug policy effectiveness should be measured by indicators that have real meaning for affected communities, such as reduced rates of HIV and hepatitis transmission and mortality, increased service coverage and access, reduced drug market violence, reduced human rights violations, and reduced incarceration.
- Governments must remove any legal or de facto restrictions on the provision of sterile injection equipment and other harm reduction services, as well as opioid substitution therapy, in line with World Health Organisation guidance. It is critical that these services are delivered at the scale required to impact upon hepatitis C transmission – both in the community but also in prisons and other closed settings.
- Governments should ensure that people who use drugs are not excluded from treatment programmes, by establishing national hepatitis C strategies and action plans with the input of civil society, affected communities, and actors from across the HIV, public health, social policy, drug control and criminal justice sectors.
- Governments must improve the quality and availability of data on hepatitis C, strengthening surveillance systems and better evaluating prevention and control programmes. This will, in turn, help to raise political and public awareness of the epidemic.
- Governments should enhance their efforts to reduce the costs of new and existing hepatitis C medicines – including through negotiations with pharmaceutical companies to ensure greater treatment access for all those in need. Governments, international bodies and civil society organisations should seek to replicate the successful reduction in HIV treatment costs around the world, including the use of patent law flexibilities to make them more accessible.
- The Global Commission calls upon the United Nations to demonstrate the necessary leadership and commitment to promote better national responses and achieve the reforms listed above.
- Act urgently: The 'war on drugs' has failed, and significant public health harms can be averted if action is taken now.

❖ *Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies that Work* (2014)

- Putting health and community safety first requires a fundamental reorientation of policy priorities and resources, from failed punitive enforcement to proven health and social interventions.
    - Both the stated goals of drug control policies, and the criteria by which such policies are assessed, merit reform. Traditional goals and measures – such as hectares of illicit crops eradicated, amounts of drugs seized, and number of people arrested, prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated for drug law violations – have failed to produce positive outcomes. Far more important are goals and measures that focus on reducing both drug-related harms such as fatal overdoses, HIV/ AIDS, hepatitis and other diseases as well as prohibition-related harms such as crime, violence, corruption, human rights violations, environmental

degradation, displacement of communities, and the power of criminal organizations. Spending on counterproductive enforcement measures should be ended, while proven prevention, harm reduction and treatment measures are scaled up to meet need.

- Ensure equitable access to essential medicines, in particular opiate-based medications for pain
  - More than eighty per cent of the world´s population carries a huge burden of avoidable pain and suffering with little or no access to such medications. This state of affairs persists despite the fact that the avoidance of ill health and access to essential medicines is a key objective and obligation of the global drug control regime. Governments need to establish clear plans and timelines to remove the domestic and international obstacles to such provision. They also should allocate the necessary funding for an international program – to be overseen by the World Health Organization (WHO) and developed in partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) – to ensure equitable and affordable access to these medicines where they are unavailable.
- Stop criminalizing people for drug use and possession – and stop imposing "compulsory treatment" on people whose only offense is drug use or possession.
  - Criminalization of drug use and possession has little to no impact on levels of drug use in an open society. Such policies do, however, encourage high risk behaviours such as unsafe injecting, deter people in need of drug treatment from seeking it, divert law enforcement resources from focusing on serious criminality, reduce personal and government funds that might otherwise be available for positive investment in people's lives, and burden millions with the long-lasting negative consequences of a criminal conviction. Using the criminal justice system to force people arrested for drug possession into 'treatment' often does more harm than good. Far better is ensuring the availability of diverse supportive services in communities. This recommendation, it should be noted, requires no reform of international drug control treaties.
- Rely on alternatives to incarceration for non-violent, low-level participants in illicit drug markets such as farmers, couriers and others involved in the production, transport and sale of illicit drugs.
  - Governments devote ever increasing resources to detecting, arresting and incarcerating people involved in illicit drug markets – with little or no evidence that such efforts reduce drug-related problems or deter others from engaging in similar activities. Community-based and other non-criminal sanctions routinely prove far less expensive, and more effective than criminalization and incarceration. Subsistence farmers and day laborers involved in harvesting, processing, transporting or trading and who have taken refuge in the illicit economy purely for reasons of survival should not be subjected to criminal punishment. Only longer-term socioeconomic development efforts that improve access to land and jobs, reduce economic inequality and social marginalization, and enhance security can offer them a legitimate exit strategy.
- Focus on reducing the power of criminal organizations as well as the violence and insecurity that result from their competition with both one another and the state.
  - Governments need to be far more strategic, anticipating the ways in which particular law enforcement initiatives, particularly militarized 'crackdowns', may exacerbate criminal violence and public insecurity without actually deterring drug production, trafficking or consumption. Displacing illicit drug production from one locale to another, or control of a trafficking route from one criminal organization to another, often does more harm than good. The goals of supply-side enforcement need to be reoriented from unachievable market eradication to achievable reductions in violence and disruption linked to the trafficking. Enforcement resources should be directed towards the most disruptive,

problematic and violent elements of the trade – alongside international cooperation to crack-down on corruption and money laundering. Militarizing anti-drug efforts is seldom effective and often counterproductive. Greater accountability for human rights abuses committed in pursuit of drug law enforcement is essential.

- Allow and encourage diverse experiments in legally regulating markets in currently illicit drugs, beginning with but not limited to cannabis, coca leaf and certain novel psychoactive substances.
    - Much can be learned from successes and failures in regulating alcohol, tobacco, pharmaceutical drugs and other products and activities that pose health and other risks to individuals and societies. New experiments are needed in allowing legal but restricted access to drugs that are now only available illegally. This should include the expansion of heroin-assisted treatment for some long-term dependent users, which has proven so effective in Europe and Canada. Ultimately the most effective way to reduce the extensive harms of the global drug prohibition regime and advance the goals of public health and safety is to get drugs under control through responsible legal regulation.
- Take advantage of the opportunity presented by the upcoming UNGASS in 2016 to reform the global drug policy regime.
    - The leadership of the UN Secretary-General is essential to ensure that all relevant UN agencies – not just those focused on law enforcement but also health, security, human rights and development – engage fully in a 'One-UN' assessment of global drug control strategies. The UN Secretariat should urgently facilitate open discussion including new ideas and recommendations that are grounded in scientific evidence, public health principles, human rights and development. Policy shifts towards harm reduction, ending criminalization of people who use drugs, proportionality of sentences and alternatives to incarceration have been successfully defended over the past decades by a growing number of countries on the basis of the legal latitude allowed under the UN treaties. Further exploration of flexible interpretations of the drug treaties is an important objective, but ultimately the global drug control regime must be reformed to permit responsible legal regulation.

❖ *The Negative Impact of Drug Control on Public Health: the global crisis of avoidable pain* (2015)

- States and UN bodies must utilize the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs in 2016, to both acknowledge and begin to forcefully address the major gap in access to controlled medicines, particularly opioids for pain relief. More than 75 percent of the world's population has little or no access to such medicines, leading to the avoidable pain and suffering of millions. There must be an admission that the international drug control system represents a barrier to accessing controlled medicines.
- States must recognize they have an obligation under international law to ensure access to controlled medicines for their populations. This obligation is implied in the cornerstone treaty of the international drug control system, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and is firmly rooted in the right to the highest attainable standard of health in international human rights law.
- UN drug control bodies and States must recognize that drug policies at both national and international levels are imbalanced, with emphasis on preventing diversion of controlled substances holding primacy over ensuring their access for medical use. This has profound implications for public health and human rights around the world.
- A high priority must be given to the treatment of physical and mental pain by ensuring access to controlled medicines, including opiates, for pain relief, palliative care, anesthesia, dependency, and all other forms of suffering. While States have the obligation to ensure the production and/or import of sufficient quantities of such medicines—especially those that are on WHO's

Model List of Essential Medicines—WHO, UNODC, and INCB must provide governments with the necessary technical and financial support.

- Governments should provide the necessary funding for a renewed international program to be overseen by WHO, in partnership with UNODC and the INCB, to ensure adequate and affordable access to controlled medicines where they are unavailable.
- Priority must be given to expanding the spectrum of treatment for opioid dependence, while respecting human dignity and offering the possibility of prescription of controlled medicines such as methadone and buprenorphine (included in WHO's Model List of Essential Medicines) or diamorphine. This can be done in line with the WHO-UNODC-UNAIDS Technical Guide: for countries to set targets for universal access to HIV prevention, treatment and care for injecting drug users. States and the relevant UN bodies must work together to address the failure of many countries to adequately implement opioid substitution therapy (OST) for opioid-dependent people.
- Governments should establish clear plans to remove the barriers to ensuring access to controlled medicines, including: national drug policies anchored in a criminal justice approach, rather than a public health and human rights approach; burdensome domestic regulatory frameworks; stigmatized societal attitudes driving a fear of prescribing opioids for pain relief and the treatment of opioid dependence; poor knowledge of these medicines by health professionals and regulators; and overpricing.
- The INCB must take more assertive steps in working with countries that consistently fail to ensure adequate access to controlled medicines, and should work increasingly with governments and national health authorities to ensure they provide evidence-based estimates of the need for controlled medicines.
- Governments and UN drug control bodies should acknowledge and address the gaps and lost opportunities in relation to the medical use of, and medical research into, controlled substances, including cannabis. They should review the 1961 and 1971 drug conventions' schedules in light of scientific evidence and prioritize exploring the medical benefits of controlled substances, based on WHO's Expert Committee on Drug Dependence recommendations.
- The United Nations and the international community must urgently address inadequate access to controlled medicines as a global health priority. Demand for these medicines is driven not by political expediencies, but by the universal human susceptibility to illness and pain. It is not acceptable to wait for a consensus from States on broader drug policy reform. It is time for action.

❖ *Advancing Drug Policy Reform: a new approach to decriminalization* (2016)

- States must abolish the death penalty for all drug-related offenses.
- States must end all penalties—both criminal and civil—for drug possession for personal use, and the cultivation of drugs for personal consumption. Millions of people around the world use drugs and do so without causing any harm to others. To criminalize people who use drugs is ineffective and harmful, and undermines the principle of human dignity and the rule of law.
- States must implement alternatives to punishment, such as diversion away from the criminal justice system, for all low-level, non-violent actors in the drug trade, such as those engaging in social supply, drug couriers, user-dealers, and cultivators of illicit crops. States must recognize that a number of people engage in these acts out of economic marginalization and implement alternatives to criminalization that uphold international human rights standards.
- UN member states must remove the penalization of drug possession as a treaty obligation under the international drug control system.
- States must eventually explore regulatory models for all illicit drugs and acknowledge this to be the logical next step in drug policy reform following decriminalization.

❖ *The World Drug PERCEPTION Problem: Countering Prejudices About People Who Use Drugs* (2017)

- Policy makers must aim to change current perceptions of drugs and people who use them by providing reliable and consistent information.
    - Good leadership strives to influence public opinion for the better. Political leaders are instrumental in shaping what the public believes, and have a moral responsibility to provide evidence-based and accurate information. Leaders must be bold when disputing perceptions about drugs which are not grounded in facts and which may be discriminatory towards people who use drugs, and stand their ground in the face of public opinion. When political leaders choose to stoke fears about drugs and drug use in order to retain or intensify prohibition, they are indirectly causing serious hardship to some of their most vulnerable citizens. When political leaders instead choose to challenge some of the current perceptions about drugs and people who use them, they can make a real difference. In the last two decades, principled actions from some political leaders in Europe and Latin America have already led to changes in attitudes towards drug control which have in turn led to harm reduction, decriminalization and regulation becoming public policy, and to improvements in public health in their countries.
- Opinion leaders must live up to their responsibility in shaping public opinions and perceptions on drugs, and promote the use of non-stigmatizing and non-discriminatory language.
    - Media, religious leaders, intellectuals, celebrities and other influencers have the potential to be powerful allies in correcting misinformation surrounding drug use and reducing the stigma towards people who use drugs. In particular, the use of degrading and inappropriate language – such as “junkies,” “zombies,” and “fix rooms” – should be addressed and corrected. They must restrain from further propagating misinformed beliefs which can potentially result in disastrous situations for people who use drugs, their communities, and the most vulnerable parts of society.
- Take part in the debate, sustain activism and advocacy, and keep governments, parliaments, the judiciary, mayors, media, healthcare and social professionals accountable.
    - Ordinary citizens have the capacity to transform this debate. Activism must be sustained, to develop the ability of civil society to hold governments, the media and other stakeholders accountable. The creation of national and regional networks of people who use drugs must be promoted to enable them to stand up effectively for their rights in every community. Other civil society actors in the areas of human rights, infectious diseases, criminal justice and non-communicable diseases need to come together to overturn the negative perceptions in society and reduce stigma, as well as denounce current drug policies and promote evidence-based reforms to the law. Some civil society groups have already developed a global vision to address the negative impacts of prohibition, and they have opened the debate within the health, criminal justice, security and enforcement, social justice and human rights sectors. Groups of citizens have been successful in influencing the global advocacy for drug policy reform and in coordinating and strengthening capacities at the global, national and local levels. This advocacy must be sustained.
- Stop acts of harassment based on negative perceptions of people who use drugs.
    - Law-enforcement agents must stop acts of harassment against people who use drugs, such as intimidation, unwarranted searches, unwarranted seizure of property and racial profiling. Instead they should focus on the social role of law enforcement by directing them towards health and social services if they need it, and simply issue warnings for those who do not experience problematic drug use but have disturbed public order by using drugs in the public sphere. The judiciary system must consider drug dependence or problematic drug use as a mitigating factor in sentencing petty crime cases, instead of considering them as an aggravating factor. Incarcerating people that need medical and social support only

exacerbates social ills and does not prevent them. Law enforcement plays a central role in the general population's perception of people who use drugs. In collaboration with other drug policy stakeholders, they can address the perception-based character of criminalization and ensure the rule of law.

- Putting health and safety first requires the medical community and healthcare professionals to be vocal in promoting evidence-based prevention, treatment, and harm reduction services, and to urgently address perception-based stigma in healthcare settings.
    - Doctors, nurses, and other healthcare workers who are in contact with people who use drugs have a major role to play in changing the perceptions on drugs. They are often the first point of contact with people who use drugs, and can be influential in feeding evidence back to the public. As they are in a position of trust, they must play an important advocacy role in improving the provision of services for people with problematic drug use. In particular, experienced healthcare professionals must be vocal in defending the usefulness of treatments that have proven effective – by speaking up in support of opioid substitution treatment, for example, which is still stigmatized by large portions of society.
- Take advantage of the opportunity presented by the upcoming UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs' Ministerial Segment in 2019 to review the use of language in international documents and in negotiations.
    - Member States must review their use of language and their prejudices while negotiating international political agreements on drug control. The UN Secretary-General must ensure the UN system provides a consistent, people-centered language when addressing drugs, in line with the sustainable development agenda. UN entities must continue providing evidence-based publications and panels in order to inform diplomats, policy makers and citizens the world over on the facts and aim to change existing perceptions. To date, the UN political declarations and plans of action on drug policy have perpetuated demeaning and harmful language, referring to people as "drug users," and calling to "counter" and "fight" drugs. They also failed to include services that provide evidence-based tertiary prevention and risk mitigation, such as "harm reduction." Meanwhile, other international mechanisms have made more progress in providing better language and descriptions of drugs and people who use them. Those texts were for the most part not negotiated by Member States, but rather produced by UN entities such as specialized agencies, Funds and Programs.

❖ *Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs* (2018)

- How Regulation can get Drugs Under Control
    - Currently prohibited drugs should be regulated. The process of legal regulation must be cautious, incremental and evidence-based, guided at all times by the principles of protecting and promoting human rights, public health, sustainable development, and peace and security. The development and implementation of regulation should engage key civil society expertise and communities most affected by punitive approaches, including people who use drugs, young people, and small-scale actors in the illegal market. Particular attention should be paid to the tensions between public health and commercial interests. Lessons learned from existing legal markets for potentially risky substances should be used to mitigate the threats of over-commercialization. Any regulation that is implemented must be accompanied by multidisciplinary scientific monitoring and evaluation, to assess its effectiveness and respond to any unforeseen negative impacts.
    - Policymakers should seek evidence on the legal regulation of drugs, and must open local and national participatory processes to shape the reforms. Political leaders, at all levels of government, have a responsibility to initiate wide-ranging and inclusive national debates on major societal issues, including the responsible legal regulation of currently illicit drugs.

National and local governments have a duty to collect evidence that they can use to analyze and compare the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of prohibition and regulation. They must then provide this evidence to their constituents and open national participatory processes where evidence and options are discussed. Policymakers should take citizens' preferences into account as they move towards regulation models that are appropriate to local and national contexts.

- The Challenges of Implementing Regulation
  - States should consider experimenting with the incremental regulation of lower-potency drugs. Each country must identify pathways to regulation that are suited to its particular context and constraints, and its institutional, social and cultural frameworks. Low- and middle-income economies or fragile institutions must not be considered obstacles to exploring regulation. By reducing the corrosive impacts of the illegal trade, the regulation of drug markets can foster development and create space for the strengthening of institutions. Priority for legal regulation could be given to substances with the highest prevalence of use in a national context; to plant-based drugs such as cannabis, coca leaf or opium; or to other substances that have some form of historic or traditional use, or are part of a cultural heritage.
  - Policymakers must not leave behind people and communities most affected by prohibition when legally regulating drug markets. In any transition towards the regulated production, trade and distribution of drugs, priority must be given to the interests of individuals and communities pushed into non-violent illegal activities by poverty, marginalization or lack of opportunities, and to those who were most harmed by punitive drug-enforcement efforts.
- Regulation can Disempower Organized Crime
  - States must maximize the development opportunities offered by regulation of drug markets. This requires redeploying resources to mitigate anticipated changes in organized crime activity. Governments must deploy institutional mechanisms against money laundering, corruption and transnational crime as part of wider efforts to strengthen rule of law, reform law-enforcement practices, and build institutional capacity. Criminal organizations are already active in illegal activities other than drug trafficking, thus the potential displacement of organized crime from drugs to other forms of criminality should not be overstated. Regulation holds the promise of substantially undermining the power and influence of organized crime, as well as liberating resources to counter its root causes and other forms of criminality.
- Modernizing the International Drug Control System
  - UN Member States should urgently consider the different options for modernizing the international drug control regime, in order to meet the needs of everyone with a stake in drug policy. Member States, civil society and the scientific community should begin formal and informal dialogues in key multilateral forums to plot a pathway to reforms and bring the world closer to the goal of the drug conventions of protecting the "health and welfare of humankind". If the international drug control framework is to be efficient, it must move away from the current repressive paradigm and better reflect the emerging focus on health, human rights and sustainable development. Crucially, reforms must introduce the possibility for member states to regulate drugs. Until this happens, reform-minded member states should consider options that allow domestic and international progress on this issue, while respecting the core tenets of the UN charter and remaining mindful that dialogue and collective action constitute the most productive approach.
  - The UN Secretary-General should take the lead on reforming the governance of the international drug control regime. Such a reform should aim at using existing international

mechanisms more effectively to protect human rights and public health, promote sustainable development, and prevent corruption, money laundering and organized crime.

HISTORICALLY SIGNIFICANT REFORM PROPOSALS

A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System ("The Jackson Report")

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Standalone report (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System*.
- **Dates:** Published, 1969.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** N/A.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** N/A (see report/book).

Commission on International Development

- **Convenors and/or authors:** World Bank.
- **Type:** Standalone report (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development*
- **Dates:** Report published, 1969; panel established, 1968.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** N/A.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** N/A (see report/book).

World Commission on Environment and Development

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** high-level panel (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Our Common Future*.
- **Dates:** Report published in December 1987; panel established in December 1983.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** N/A (see throughout document esp. Ch. 12).

Renewing the United Nations System

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart).
- **Type:** Standalone report (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document.
- **Dates:** Published in 1994.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - The Process of Reform
    - 1. Governments must be far more conscious that many weaknesses in the UN system can only be corrected by improving the quality of the people they appoint to lead it.
    - 2. Care should be taken not to confuse mechanistic shuffling of units with installing the ability to generate teamwork and to coordinate through intellectual authority.
    - 3. Care should also be taken to avoid decisions made out of dissatisfaction with the present leadership of an organization of the system which, on all other criteria, should be given a new responsibility.
    - 4. In every reform or reorganization care must be taken to stipulate and provide for necessary changes in senior job descriptions, and for as thorough retraining of staff as is the norm in reorganizations in the private sector.
    - 5. Choosing between improvement and restructuring is vital. It will not help to restructure where the need can be well met by wise managerial improvements. Equally, to avoid restructuring by palliative reforms will not solve weaknesses that simply are structural.
    - 6. In all proposed reform or restructuring, governments should stipulate the lines of responsibility that will strengthen coordination between organizations or units, and access by officials to the resources within a secretariat or the wider system) that they will need to do their redesigned work. Experience indicates that, for the most human of reasons, it is not wise to leave such stipulations to the civil service heads.
    - 7. Arguments about the existing 'comparative advantages' of a given organization need careful scrutiny. Responsibilities and resources should be placed where they will best be implemented in the interests of the full world community. Governments must then guard against nullifying such reform by their subsequent resource allocations.
    - 8. The General Assembly should adopt a standard discipline that before voting on any reform package it will obtain an independent 'Reform Impact Report'. This report should recall the weaknesses that were to be addressed, and advise the Assembly to what extent the negotiated reform will meet them; where it will not do so; and any serious lacunae in it as to structure, designation of responsibility, access to capacities, or budgetary provisions. This report function could be entrusted to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).
    - 9. The ACABQ should be requested to maintain a fully comprehensive data bank of all significant reform and restructuring decisions by the Secretary-General and/or the General Assembly since 1960. The data should be in computer memory, accessible to 188 Delegations and the public. The data bank should also store mandatory follow-up reports.
    - 10. For each of the three years following any reform or restructuring decision the ACABO should issue an independent report on implementation to the General Assembly, clearly identifying delays or inadequate implementation, and their causes and loci of responsibility. ACABQ should recommend adjustments in light of experience, but otherwise clearly state the impact of further delay.

- 11. At the end of not more than five years after a significant reform/restructuring measure, the ACABQ should commission an independent evaluation of its impact, with recommendations.

- A Common Seat of the United Nations System
  - 1. A detailed study of how a common Seat of the United Nations System might be established should be commenced in 1995 under authority derived from the Charter (Article 581 and the headquarters clauses in the Special Agreements between the UN and the Specialized Agencies.
  - 2. It should be carried out by a representative independent panel of intergovernmental and non-governmental experts, appointed at the request of the General Assembly by the Secretary-General, in consultation with other executive heads.
  - 3. The following should be included in the terms of reference:
  - a. The evident practical limitations of the present site of United Nations headquarters as a common Seat of the United Nations System.
  - b. The concept of twin locations (i.e. New York/Geneva) is less and less desirable. Earlier assumed divisions between work on peace, security and political affairs, and economic-social and humanitarian problems are increasingly exposed as unreal and even counter-productive.
  - c. The criteria for selection of a site for a common Seat should include those suggested in 1945.
  - d. The panel's review should neutrally cover all present host countries as well as others for the common Seat of the United Nations System. It should consider the longer term evolution of international relations and avoid short-term geo-political and other considerations.
  - e. First location at a common Seat would encompass:
    - i. All global level elements of the UN Secretariat including the UN development and humanitarian funds (after amalgamation and decentralization as recommended);
    - ii. The five major Specialized Agencies, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNIDO and WHO;
    - iii. IFAD, a reconstituted IMF, and a properly constituted International Trade Organization (ITO).
  - f. Air, marine, and electronic communications, climate and intellectual property rights play increasingly sensitive roles. The early accommodation of ICAO, IMO, ITU, WIPO and WMO should be fully taken into account.
  - g. The panel should include adequate provision for a UN Parliamentary Assembly, and far better accommodation for non-governmental organizations.
  - h. The panel should also commission technical studies to ensure that the Common Seat should benefit from the full range of contemporary communications technology, under the control of the United Nations, with outstanding facilities for world media and a unified UN System Public Information Department (as originally recommended).
- An Intergovernmental Board of the UN System
  - 1. The General Assembly, acting under Articles 22 and 58, should establish a new 'United Nations System Consultative Board'.
  - a. Its purpose should be to engender a greater multi-sectoral involvement of governments in the work of the United Nations, and to provide a mechanism for joint monitoring of the coherence and efficacy of the system.
  - b. The Board should comprise the respective Bureaus of ECOSOC, of the executive governing bodies of the major Specialized Agencies, and a representative of the bureaus of other Agencies. It should be assisted by the ACC.
  - c. The General Assembly should elect the Board Chairperson.

- d. The Board should meet every other year immediately after the substantive session of ECOSOC, holding a one-day consultation with the Council to begin its work.
- e. The Board should report through ECOSOC to the General Assembly under Article 58; dissent from its reports should be recorded, with explanation.
- 2. The General Assembly should establish its own standing capacity to monitor and evaluate its discharge of United Nations responsibilities for coordination of the policies and activities of the Agencies under Article 58.
- a. The General Committee should constitute a body of itself of appropriate size for such a task. It should have the means to commission outside independent assistance.
- b. The Committee should report annually to Plenary on progress in and obstacles to the full implementation of Article 58 (with stated consequences), with appropriate recommendations. c. In this work the Committee should consult the Secretary-General and the heads of the Agencies, but its report should be independent.

- Making the Special Agreements Work
  - 1. The Secretary-General should carry out an in-depth study of the performance of all UN-Agency agreements on reciprocal representation, by a senior veteran of the UN system familiar with these processes. The terms of reference of the study should include:
  - a. How reciprocal representation can be improved by the UN and by Agencies to
    - i. enhance delegations' dialogue on major global issues, their formulation of multi-disciplinary strategies, and their governance of the system;
    - ii. improve inter-secretariat relations at senior and professional working levels;
    - iii. improve the quality and timeliness of UN and Agency secretariat services to intergovernmental bodies, including responses to delegations' ongoing needs;
    - iv. reduce delays in moving decisions through the system.
  - b. An analysis with recommendations for the adjustments that could be made in reciprocal representation at a common headquarters location.
  - c. Recommendations for improved seating arrangements for Agencies at meetings of UN organs.
  - d. Recommendations for the future monitoring and periodic evaluation of reciprocal representation by an appropriately neutral means, to guard against slippage.
  - 2. The heads of the Agencies should be thoroughly consulted, in order to assemble their considered views on all aspects of such representation. Heads should be asked to stipulate as precisely as possible:
  - a. The working value they attach, both for system coherence and for their individual agencies, to each of their proposals to improve or add to current representation practices.
  - b. Their suggestions for adjustments of the organization of work of UN organs and their subsidiary bodies that would, in their view, make representation of their agencies more useful.
  - c. Their frank evaluations of current UN practices in its representation at meetings of their agencies' bodies, in terms of coverage, level, content of presentations, and accuracy of reporting.
  - 3. UN officials should be consulted on the same issues.
  - 4. Member-governments should be consulted on a representative basis for their equivalent views of current reciprocal representation practices, and how these should be improved.
  - 5. Even in 1994 the total size of the system's budgets is not at all too large to defy their consolidation and rationalization, as was originally envisaged. The total funding is much less than that of many national budgets.
  - 6. The General Assembly should decide, under Article 17.3, to establish an intergovernmental working group of experts in programme planning and budgeting to

recommend the recasting of procedures for these purposes. Here again, governments will have to accept their responsibility to apply this decision through their delegations in all other governing bodies of the System.

- 7. The working group should be tasked to propose the procedures, and time-frames, that can enable the General Assembly to receive proposed budgets from throughout the system, and to rationalize and consolidate these with the UN budget, so that governments can adopt in one place at one time a comprehensive forward programme and budget for the UN system.
- 8. The same working group should be given the task of carefully reviewing and making recommendations on the viability of the present six-year Medium-Term planning cycle. It should be requested to take into account the adoption of synchronous single terms of office of seven years for the Secretary-General and heads of all major Agencies of the System as already recommended by the authors.
- 9. The proposed new Consultative Board of the UN System would oversee the development of the consolidated budget as one of its priority functions.

- Strengthening Inter-Secretariat Bonds
  - 1. Acknowledging the contributions of the Administrative Committee on Coordination to the work of the UN system under the leadership of the United Nations; Recognizing the importance of building a more dynamic and coherent system to address increasingly complex and multi-disciplinary global problems;
  - 2. Decides to rename the ACC as the Executive Committee of the United Nations System, responsible for developing and proposing to member-governments all necessary measures to enhance coherence and dynamic response to global problems within its members' competences, and for the prompt and thorough implementation of all decisions engaging the UN and one or more Agencies;
  - 3. Decides that such decisions, being adopted in UN organs by the common membership of governments in the System, shall be treated as paramount by all other governing bodies, and requests all Member-States to act accordingly;
  - 4. Decides under Article 58 of the Charter that the Executive Committee, comprising elected heads of the organizations of the System, shall be responsible to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council for the effective secretariat-level implementation of all such decisions by UN organs;
  - 5. Decides that, to improve consultation towards these ends, the Executive Committee shall, in addition to the reports of the Secretary-General as chair, assist the United Nations System Consultative Board in the discharge of its functions.
  - 6. Decides to invite members of the Executive Committee, in rotation, to present to the Plenary of the General Assembly at each of its Sessions their analyses of global problems within their respective fields and, in addition, Requests each member to notify the President of the Assembly of any serious emerging situation in its field of competence that, in its judgment, warrants especially addressing the Assembly in a year when not scheduled to do so.
  - 7. Decides that the United Nations System Consultative Board shall be the overseeing and liaison body of the System with the Executive Committee, empowered to monitor its effective decision-making on all matters requiring the actions referred to in paragraph 2, including the work of the revised IACSD (recommended later in this chapter).
  - 8. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures for the fullest substantive collaboration between the UN and Agencies both in the preparation and the presentation of reports for UN organs encompassing their competences. Further requests the Secretary-General to ensure substantive UN participation in all important agency meetings.

- Ensuring United Nations Leadership in International Economic Cooperation
  - 1. The post of Deputy Secretary-General for International Economic Cooperation and Sustainable Development should be established in the UN Secretariat as a matter of urgency by General Assembly resolution. The resolution should stipulate that the rank of the post should be one level below the Secretary-General and one level above all other officers in the UN system.
  - 2. The Deputy would be the senior responsible for all United Nations economic and social research, analysis, policy development and programming, and thus in line overall responsibility for DESIPA, DPCSD, DDSMS, UNCTAD, relevant UN research institutes, and the operational funds and programmes. The Deputy's Office would have overall responsibility for Policy Coordination presently assigned to DPCSD, and for all substantive economic and social reports. (See later recommendation headed 'Documentation'.)
  - 3. The resolution should stipulate that the future of the UNCTAD secretariat should be determined in relation to the constitution of the 'World Trade Organization' as a full Specialized Agency of the UN System, responsible to ECOSOC and the General Assembly.
  - 4. A comprehensive job description for the Deputy Secretary-General should be issued. Appointment by the Secretary-General should be confirmed by the General Assembly. The Assembly should actively use its confirmatory prerogative to assist the Secretary-General in appointing a dynamic figure of world repute in economic and social issues. A poor appointment will be worse than none.
  - 5. The authorizing General Assembly resolution should itself place the Deputy in line responsibility over all economic and social, and operational development departments and other entities in the United Nations as noted in paragraph 2.
  - 6. The resolution should also stipulate that the authorized UN Secretariat posts in the Deputy's immediate Office have gazetted, individualized job descriptions and be filled with high-calibre professionals of appropriate background.
  - 7. These posts should form the core of a joint UN-system staff in the Deputy's office, the balance of which should be made up of carefully subject-identified secondments from Agencies of the UN system. The General Assembly resolution should also provide for these secondments, stipulating that the seconded officials should bring to the office the expertise and perspectives of their organizations, but should be responsible to the Deputy, and would not formally represent their Agencies
  - 8. The functions of the joint staff should be:
  - a. To serve as the focal point for global analysis and watch, and formulation of policy options for the Secretary-General on behalf of the UN system;
  - b. To assist the Deputy in the synthesis and rationalization of reports for ECOSOC and the General Assembly on socio-economic and sustainable development matters, actively drawing on all sources in the system and outside it;
  - c. To act as the secretariat of the re-mandated ACC's Advisory Board on International Economic Cooperation and Sustainable Development (see hereunder);
  - d. To serve as a system-wide planning bureau for the elaboration, on the basis of general policies and priorities laid down by ECOSOC, of short- and medium-term plans to serve as guidelines for the programmes of individual organizations.
  - 9. The Sustainable Development Committee UACSDI of the ACC should be reconstituted as the Inter-Agency Board for International Economic Cooperation and Sustainable Development.
  - 10. The Board's priority focus should be to maintain global watch and advisory flows, and develop coherent policy proposals for the Secretary-General on equitable trade, money,

financial flows, debt and intellectual property rights, and the linkages between these factors and sustainable development.

- 11. The Board should be chaired on behalf of the Secretary-General by the proposed Deputy Secretary-General for International Economic Cooperation and Sustainable Development. Its members should be the executive heads of the Specialized Agencies including the Executive Directors of the IMF and, if remaining part of the UN system, the World Bank. The executive head of a properly constituted new International Trade Organization, brought into full relationship with the United Nations, would also be a member. Heads of other UN-system entities should participate according to agenda.
- 12. The Board would be served by the joint planning staff of the Deputy Secretary-General's office. The Board should adopt a substantive work programme; should not meet purely pro forma; and should set the highest intellectual standards for its papers. It should not establish standard subsidiary machinery but, instead, should specifically task working parties of the most qualified staff among its members, with the ability to co-opt top-quality assistance from outside the system, both individual and institutional. All such working parties should have rigorous work-plans and should be dissolved on completion of each task.
- 13. The work of such a Board would be immeasurably enhanced by the establishment of a common headquarters Seat of the UN System.
- 14. The UN Secretariat needs an office responsible for the creative management of economic and social reports, under an official with over-riding authority to make tough decisions, reporting to the Deputy Secretary-General. The office should listen once to the departmental and divisional drafters of reports and then come to firm decisions that will hold. Equally, of course, if a decision is a poor one, the office must accept full responsibility.
- 15. Far more than mere editing, the office must have the intellectual capability to understand the work and product of all sources of such reports. It should have this capability,
- a. To exert intellectual leadership in the planning of substantive proposal papers for delegations; in understanding what they seek in reports that they have already requested; and thus perceiving in advance how to provide them with material that will help them in their responsibility for overall UN leadership;
- b. The office must include in its work creative and sensitive planning for UN-Agency collaboration on reports, overseeing these processes to conclusion in order to avoid any deterioration during drafting;
- c. The office must also have the managerial capacity to know of all precedent documentation, for source-reference in order to help delegates avoid requesting reports; and to run a drafting-to-distribution monitoring system that will end delays in their receipt of documents;
- d. Such an office must have the intellectual capability to correlate the drafting of all papers, so that what delegations finally receive is economical in total volume, avoids all jargonized padding or redundancies, contains important new insights or evaluations, and has multi-disciplinary integrity.

- The Bretton Woods System
  - 1. The Secretary-General should make as one of his highest priorities for the 1995 50th Anniversary the assembly by eminent international experts of a paper analysing the present deterioration of the full world economy, and the instruments of multilateral management urgently needed to avert a North-South crisis that could lead to major instability.
  - 2. The Secretary-General should not be intimidated in this by shortage of funds. A courageous call by him, for a group of the world's independent (or government-loaned)

international economists to offer their services to the international community through the UN for these urgent purposes, would not go unheeded if he exerts the leadership many of them have long awaited from the United Nations.

- 3. The Secretary-General should request that this team include specific action recommendations for the reform and completion of the three missing specialized agencies of the UN system-an equitably governed low-interest capital lending facility; an equitably governed monetary fund including a clearing union, working integrally with a similarly governed universal trade organization. Recommendations should also be made for secretariat functions in trade analysis, monitoring, and policy development, and for thus determining the future of the UNCTAD secretariat.
- 4. The paper should form the basis for the Secretary-General to mobilize international support for the convening of a high-level United Nations Monetary, Financial and Trade Conference as an early sequel to the 50th Anniversary. This must be a full-scale United Nations World Conference, convened by the Secretary-General, to bring about the development of the three agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 above.

- Operational Development Activities
  - 1. Governments should adopt a clear decision in the General Assembly that there shall be only one United Nations System Office in any developing country. Each should be headed by a United Nations Coordinator appointed by the Secretary-General, after consultation with the host Government, as a UN Secretariat staff member. This official should have no responsibility for the management of anyone development fund or programme, and should be responsible only for Operational Activities for Development, humanitarian emergency assistance as and when this may arise, the present roles of representation of Agencies, and UN-system public information.
  - a. No fund or agency should have any predominant claim to fill these posts; they should be advertised world-wide with a full and rigorously demanding job description.
  - b. The Coordinator would head a resident professional team whose precise composition should be designed without any preconceived model, but against each country's forward needs of advice and material support from the system. There being no operational experience of such an approach, it should be gradually introduced, first in a representative number of countries whose governments are agreeable, and in the remainder as soon as first experience is available to make any needed adjustments.
  - c. The new country teams should be designed on a fully multi-disciplinary basis, not merely reflecting present funds and/or agencies of the system. In the balance of countries hosting the single Office the interim team should comprise Deputies for UNDP and UNICEF, and Senior Advisers from such other funds and/or agencies as the forward needs of the country so indicate, reporting to their respective organizations through the Coordinator.
  - 2. The recently decided 'country strategy note' of the system, and harmonization of programming cycles, should be quickly replaced by the development of a single country programme incorporating the present separate UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF country programmes and all other multi-year assistance inputs from whatsoever part of the system.
  - 3. Member-Governments must recognize that substantive coordination and multi-disciplinary programming require discrete staff resources which should be provided to each country Coordinator.
  - 4. The General Assembly should request ECOSOC to plan and adopt a total reorganization of the Regional Commissions, to become the regional research and operational-support arms of the UN system. The Commissions should be organized in these two branches. Appropriate sub-regional centres of the Commissions should be planned where these can provide better services to countries. Each Commission should be reorganized in relation to

the particular needs of its region, and to support, not duplicate, the intergovernmental and non-governmental research and other entities that have been established in that region. Each Commission should develop active access for and mutually supportive working relations with the region's NGOs.

- 5. The General Assembly should recall its Resolution 32/197 and categorically decide that all regional offices of the system shall be incorporated in the structures of the reorganized Commissions, with the same undertaking of Members to make this uniform in all governing bodies.
- 6. The General Assembly should further request ECOSOC to decide that the regional bureaus and divisions of UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and all other regional operational programming units under its authority shall be decentralized into the operational activities branches of the Commissions.
- 7. The Executive Secretary of each Commission should have a deputy for research and analysis, and a deputy for operational activities, the latter's appointment to be in consultation with the Committee described hereunder. The Secretary-General should prepare, for ECOSOC approval, fresh job descriptions for the posts of Executive Secretary and of the deputies, and with ECOSOC support should ensure the highest-quality appointments strictly in accordance with job descriptions. All relocated regional staff should be full staff members of the commissions.
- 8. The operational activities branch of each Commission should be organized on the same multi-disciplinary basis as the selected country Offices described in 1.c. above. Provision should be made for country-support advisory posts, according to the forward specialized needs indicated by the country Offices in each region. Each Commission's operational activities branch should include a mobile multi-disciplinary advisory team of appropriate composition to assist countries on their request.
- 9. The governance of UN operational activities should be decentralized as recommended later in this chapter.
- 10. The Secretary-General should use his authority under Article 97 to bring all UN funds under the working responsibility of the Deputy Secretary-General for International Economic Cooperation and Sustainable Development proposed above.
- 11. The Secretary-General should appoint an Operational Activities Committee of the ACC's Inter-Agency Board for International Economic Cooperation and Sustainable Development (recommended above). Chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General or deputy, its members must comprise the present heads of UN funds as well as representatives of Specialized Agencies. This Committee's functions should be:
- a. To advise the Secretary-General on the country and regional level reorganizations for Operational Activities; to organize and consider their monitoring and evaluation.
- b. To advise the Secretary-General on appointment of the country-level Coordinators and the deputies for Operational Activities in the Regional Commissions, and to act as a continuing personnel panel charged with raising the overall quality of all staff engaged in operational activities, in terms of recruitment, promotion, and training.
- 12. The General Assembly should decide upon and request ECOSOC to formulate a plan for the establishment of a single UN Development Authority consolidating all present UN development funds, leaving their identities solely for purposes of fund-raising.
- a. The headquarters secretariat of the Development Authority should be under the Deputy Secretary-General with a senior deputy eminently qualified in multidisciplinary development planning and programming, absorbing the post of Administrator of UNDP. This senior deputy's principal working-level aides would be the Operational Activities deputies in

each Regional Commission, (absorbing some of the funds' senior headquarters posts) and the country UN Coordinators.
    - b. The secretariat of the Authority should be staffed, including agency secondments, to support and not duplicate the operational activities branches of the Regional Commissions, and only for substantive overview, strategy and accountability support to the new decentralized regional and country-level machinery.
    - c. Pending a review of voluntary funding the Authority should also have staff to maintain the identities of funds solely for the purpose of mobilizing their financing. It should be supported by a special unit in the UN Department of Public Information.
    - 13. ECOSOC should carry out an in-depth review of the financing of Operational Activities in the UN system by an independent panel to determine the maximum future funding by an assessment formula.
- Human Rights
    - 1. Initially by its powers under Article 22, and in the next Charter revision process by amendment of Chapters XII and XIII to reformulate the Trusteeship Council, the General Assembly should establish a United Nations Council on Diversity, Representation and Governance (indicative title).
    - a. The Council should have composition and method of election similar to that for ECOSOC, but Member-States should nominate experts in one or more of the disciplines involved in its mandates.
    - b. The Council should have an exploratory and dialogue function without attempting the formulation of universal policies:
        - i. To obtain from relevant specialists throughout the world the widest range of analyses and recommendations on means of peaceably accommodating cultural and ethnic aspirations; providing adequate domestic and international expression to groups hitherto treated as minorities within nation-states but aspiring to such expression; adjusting exogenously established boundaries; and creative options for the transition of societies from traditional centralist nation-state structures.
        - ii. In this function the Council should invite learned papers and dialogue with a wide range of specialists and non-governmental wise persons in all disciplines and experiences related to cultural diversity, representation and governance. Its rules of procedure should facilitate such dialogue in the most open and congenial manner.
        - iii. The Council should publish papers and, as it may judge, schema of options that may assist individual member-states and, as necessary the relevant organs of the UN system, in the peaceable resolution of problems and transitions in these areas.
    - c. In a second function the Council should act as a forum of resort and petition by groups seeking accommodation relative to one or more of these widely experienced problems. It would have to be guaranteed under the relevant Human Rights instruments of the United Nations that no harm shall befall them for having made such representation. It would equally be recognized that a member-state or states facilitating such petition would be demonstrating exceptional bona fides in its human rights obligations, and contributing to the general increase in understanding of these common problems in the international community. The Council may refer such petitions to the relevant human rights body for further investigation and action, or to the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
    - d. The Council would continue to carry out such functions under the present Trusteeship mandates of the UN as remain needed.
    - e. In those exceptional instances where a collapsed state, by the ascertained wishes of its communities and their intact leadership systems, should be temporarily administered under

a UN authority, the Council would establish the guidelines, oversee the administration, and decide its termination.
    - 2. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights should be established at the rank of Deputy Secretary-General, to be appointed by and be responsible to the Secretary-General.
    - a. The functions of this post were outlined in Chapter VI. They should include an annual report on the state of world human rights (economic and social as well as civil and political), which should be the occasion for direct dialogue between the Commissioner and the General Assembly.
    - b. The Commissioner should be assisted by a deputy who would be the head of the Centre for Human Rights, and four others drawn from other regions who would be assigned coordinating responsibilities in the UN's human rights machinery.
    - c. The post should always have a publicly circulated job description. d. The High Commissioner should make creative efforts to build better relationships between the UN's human rights machinery and NGDs concerned with human rights, and should recommend improvements in their access to and participation in such bodies.
    - 3. The General Assembly should appoint an independent Ombuds-Panel (or equivalent title) on the Human Rights Performance of the United Nations System.
    - a. The Panel should comprise one full-time Chief for this work, with an independent office serviced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner, and a viable list of persons willing to serve on ready call, chosen on a representative basis.
    - b. The Panel should monitor, intermediate, and regularly report on the compliance of all major entities of the UN System with all Human Rights instruments. The Panel should present independent reports on such compliance to the General Assembly, the relevant executive head having the option of submitting a Note of Comment.
    - c. On every major UN field Mission comprising military and/or police units, one Ombudsman (with staff as may be needed) should independently monitor its work in relation to necessary human rights standards; intervene when and if necessary; report on incidents, report overall at appropriate intervals during long Missions, and report on their termination.
    - 4. Member-States must meet the responsibilities inherent in the onerous Human Rights mandates they have adopted for the United Nations, and equip its Centre with suitable staff and other capacities including communication and public information without delay.
- Humanitarian Emergency Machinery
    - 1. After many unsuccessful rounds of reform Member-States should recognize that the continued scattering of humanitarian emergency response capacities among separate funds does not and cannot enable the coordination that they have agreed is needed.
    - 2. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) should be organized into two Divisions: one for prevention, data assembly, early warning, needs assessment and joint appeals and other resource matters; a second as an operations organization.
    - a. The emergency food aid capacities of WFP should be transferred into OHA to become the sole humanitarian emergency logistics arm of the UN system (the food-for-development work of WFP should be transferred into the consolidated Development Authority earlier recommended, thus enabling the closing of WFP).
    - b. The emergency capacities and functions of UNICEF should also be transferred into OHA.
    - c. The emergency relief capacities and functions of UNHCR should be transferred into DHA, liberating the High Commission to concentrate on its original mandates in legal protection for a now enormous number of displaced persons.
    - d. The identities of these funds should be managed as separate 'windows' by DHA pending a study by intergovernmental experts appointed by the General Assembly as to whether such separate identities need to be maintained for resource-mobilization.

- 3. ECOSOC should establish a single Governing Council for Humanitarian Assistance as the responsible intergovernmental authority for the funds and operations thus consolidated in DHA.
- 4. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs should be headed by a Deputy Secretary-General. The head of the new DHA Operations branch must be an internationally reputed veteran in emergency operations.
- 5. The Deputy Secretary-General should take special care to ensure that this consolidation of capacities at the headquarters level is accompanied by vigorous decentralization in operations. Close teamwork with senior officials in development and in political affairs and peace-keeping should be organized in order to provide the best assistance to the Secretary-General in coordinating.
- 6. The Deputy Secretary-General should undertake an independent system-wide assessment of the quality and other aspects of staffing for humanitarian emergency work.
- 7. The Secretary-General should prepare detailed recommendations to the General Assembly for the establishment, in consultation with the Security Council, of a new United Nations Humanitarian Security Police as a distinctive force to protect UN and NGO emergency personnel, their transport, and their supplies,
- a. This force would consist of contributed volunteering national police agreed by their authorities to be on standby for rapid formation and deployment to emergencies whether or not UN military forces may be deployed.
- b. The transport and in-country costs of Humanitarian Security Police should be met from humanitarian emergency funds.
- c. Units should be trained in humanitarian security work, in special courses prepared in consultation with humanitarian relief NGOs, and with NGO as well as UN staff assisting the trainers.
- d. The Police should have specially established rules of engagement, with a graduated range of weapons including armored transport, able to act without the presence of UN military forces.
- e. The Police must be deployed with capability to communicate effectively and sensitively with local populations. The Secretary-General must establish guidelines and ensure an active policy for gender balance in the Police.
- f. A basic Protocol for protection of NGO personnel, transport and warehouses should be elaborated with a representative consortium of humanitarian emergency NGOs.

- The Deliberative Machinery
  - 1. The matters coming before the deliberative bodies of the UN constitute an integral flow of business. Past attempts at 'streamlining' etc. have failed to no small extent because
  - a. They have been piecemeal per organ or other body.
  - b. They have almost invariably taken as given the traditional, highly compressed annual calendar of sessions.
  - c. They have frequently been clouded with suspicion of attempts to acquire majority powers for a minority of member-states.
  - 2. The General Assembly should establish an intergovernmental expert group (preferably under its Committee on Conferences) to review the entire flow of business through the machinery as one integral process.
  - a. This expert group should be assisted by an international team of top-quality professional legislative managers to 'plot' the total flow in detail for a given year, and recommend how to overcome bottlenecks and other present irrationalities.
  - b. The review should be entirely open as regards annual working calendars. The most efficient as well as economical durations of annual sessions, and their proper spacing in

relation to each other, can only be determined once the total flow is expertly analysed with its real pressures on each body.

- c. Governments, however, should be more open to the likelihood that work calendars established decades ago, for a UN with a very much smaller agenda and less than a third its present membership, will have to be extended.
- d. Governments should instruct the expert group that it can assume as agreed the following elements:
  - i. The Committees of the General Assembly, as now consolidated.
  - ii. The Economic and Social Council with its present membership, but its annual High-Level Segment 'open-ended'.
  - iii. The establishment of the United Nations System Consultative Board (recommended above).
  - iv. The assumption by the General Assembly and ECOSOC of their originally mandated functions in the formulation of global macro-economic policies, and the full implementation of their Charter mandates under Articles 58 and 63.
  - v. The institution of 'Question Times' in the Committees of the General Assembly (recommended hereunder).
  - vi. The decentralization of governance of operational development activities (as above), and the ultimate consolidation of funds in a Development Authority.
  - vii. The consolidation of governance of all UN-system humanitarian assistance activities (recommended above) together with the dissolution of the World Food Programme and elimination of its governance burdens.
  - viii. The prospective establishment and development of a UN Parliamentary Assembly (see hereunder).
- e. The expert group should be requested to consult Member-States on, and examine the idea of making the present General Debate in the General Assembly biennial, with theme debates in the off-year. The group should locate General Assembly special debates and ECOSOC high-level sessions on the annual calendar in such a way as to allow time for their content to inform the subsequent work.
- f. In recommending the spacing of meetings the expert group should be instructed to take careful account of the special disadvantages experienced by delegations of lower-income countries in the numbers of qualified staff they can deploy to cover the deliberative and negotiating work of the UN.
- 3. The General Assembly should recommend to ECOSOC under Article 66.1 that it hold annual High-Level Theme meetings to which the relevant sectoral Ministers of the Council's current member-governments should be expressly invited. Papers for these meetings should always be joint UN-Agency products. The relevant agency head(s) should be present on the rostrum.
- 4. 'Question Times' should be instituted as standard periods in the annual calendar of each General Assembly Committee. Delegations should submit written Questions in advance to the Secretary-General on any subject in the competence of a Committee, for obligatory response, with supplementary oral questions on an agreed formula. These regular proceedings should be published in the public UN records of the Committees.
- 5. There should be one integral unit in the UN for secretariat services to all parts of the deliberative machinery dealing with economic and social affairs. This office should be led by a civil servant highly qualified in managing this work. The expert group (2 above) should also be advised to make its recommendations on this basis.
- 6. Concomitant with the decentralization of programming and other functions of operational development activities, their governance should be decentralized to each

region. This has been totally neglected in the recent changes. Member-States should adopt structures and processes of governance of these activities that achieve three goals: adequate oversight and accountability; governance of programming as close to the place of its implementation as possible; and liberation of the global machinery from the present inordinate time expended on funds totalling only some $3.5 billion p.a. in order to address structural problems that prevent developing countries from earning over $500 billion p.a.

- a. A single governing body for all operational development activities in each region should meet annually at the seat of the UN Regional Commission to deal with that region's inter-country and country programmes and relevant detail in accountability matters.
- b. The reports of these regional bodies should be synthesized at UN headquarters and examined only every three years by a single global governing body for Operational Activities. It should meet periodically to deal with global and inter-regional programmes, review reports from the regional bodies, and provide overall global policy guidance and accountability, with its report being submitted to ECOSOC.
- c. ECOSOC should render a report to the General Assembly on these governance documents. Unless so recommended by ECOSOC for urgent special policy consideration, every five years the General Assembly should review and debate overall global, inter-regional, regional and country policies in operational development programmes, and aggregate oversight and accountability matters.
- 7. The General Assembly should decide, with effect in all organs and subsidiary bodies, on a standard discipline that no resolution or decision can be adopted without its stipulating the desirable length of any study or report it requests. One member of the Bureau of each organ or subsidiary body should be assigned responsibility for Documents Planning to ensure this discipline.
- 8. The Secretary-General should instruct that documents prepared by the Secretariat be rendered in ordinarily intelligible language, without Latin phrases (except where prerequisite in treaty and other legally specialized documents) or other arcane terminology.
- 9. The working meeting rooms should be equipped with now low-cost computer hardware and software, to enable delegates to have immediate access, on individual monitors, to precedent documents and resolutions, and drafts being discussed with ongoing amendments.
- 10. The Secretary-General on one hand, and Delegations on the other, share responsibility to curtail very sharply the now prevalent practice of lobbying by UN-system civil servants on behalf of their particular fund, department, or agency. Fresh directives should be issued, and civil service heads should be held accountable for infringements. The organization of work and of a more realistic calendar of intergovernmental bodies should allow adequate time for secretariat consultation with and briefing of all delegations.

- Finance and Management
  - 1. Member-Governments must improve their management of their own financial responsibilities to the United Nations and the system. It should not be acceptable for any member-state to use its assessed contribution to keep the organization in near bankruptcy.
  - 2. Member-Governments share responsibility for correctly informing citizens of the real level of investments made on their behalf in the system. By any reckoning they are modest, and should not be represented otherwise by responsible authorities.
  - 3. Budgets should be made more intelligible and also expressed in annual terms for public understanding. Intelligibility will continue to be difficult until governments fulfill their own original commitments for one consolidated budget of the system.
  - 4. The recommendations in the Ogata-Volcker Report to the Secretary-General for prompt and stable financing should be adopted as the minimum needed measures. The proposal for

a United Nations Special Drawing Right ISDRI as the currency of contributions should be re-examined.

- 5. Member-Governments using arguments based upon the notion of 'contributing most' and 'more' to the UN should cease to do so. Such argument is antithetical to the Charter as well as to basic concepts of democratic revenue-raising. It has provoked difficulty in providing their due share in the countries where such language circulates, and dangerous tension in the UN body politic.
- 6. The present formula for assessments should be reviewed to develop a formula based on no member-state contributing more than 10 to 12 per cent of the regular UN budget. The difference should be redistributed among capable members, with correction of some untenable under-contributions, and without over-burdening low-income member governments which would only perpetuate their arrearages.
- 7. Voluntary financing should be exhaustively reviewed. At a minimum, the administrative budgets of all entities of the system should be financed by assessment.
- 8. Additional and alternative sources of financing the UN system's work should be carefully developed both to increase its resources and to afford citizens a greater sense of involvement.
- 9. The UN's staff resources for peacekeeping and its logistical support must be significantly strengthened for all purposes including reducing instances of waste and possible abuse of funds. Governments must expect problems to arise in the other principal area of potential abuse, humanitarian assistance, until they decide to put coherence into this machinery by consolidating all such functions in the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
- 10. The thoroughly inadequate staffing of the Internal Audit Division and Central Evaluation Unit must at last be corrected. An Inspector-General attached to the Office of the Secretary-General but able to report directly to the General Assembly may additionally help, but only if carefully reconciled with the functions of the External Auditors, which must be preserved and indeed strengthened. The incumbent should not be drawn from any country that is a major beneficiary of contracts and other UN procurements.
- 11. The Joint Inspection Unit IJIUJ should be retained. Its work can be maintained at the high standards of numbers of its reports only if member-states, which appoint the Inspectors, strictly adhere to the criteria for appointment which they themselves adopted in the General Assembly's Statutes for the Unit.
- 12. The personal financial responsibilities of staff, especially those managing significant sums, should be thoroughly clarified and conveyed to such staff on their assignment. Staff holding any managerial position involving assistance to outside institutions must undertake not to accept employment by them for five years after leaving the service.

- The International Civil Service
  - 1. An independent commission of eminent civil servants should be appointed to review and recommend all necessary measures to strengthen a now seriously debilitated international civil service.
  - 2. The commission should screen the staff for genuine 'deadwood', and relevant governments should work with secretariats to achieve replacements with their best talents. Staff presently not showing significant value to the system should be reviewed for reassignment, retraining, or termination.
  - 3. For these and all other needs the long-shelved proposal for a common UN System Staff College network, economically using existing teaching and training institutions in member-countries, should be adopted. The Secretary-General should seek the assistance of an outside institution to carry out a high-quality feasibility study towards this end.

- 4. The staff need intellectual enrichment. The Secretary-General should adopt an affirmative programme to draw upon and engage the world intellectual and scientific community, with far more staff participation in outside 'think tank' and similar activities. The UN should have Fellowships for distinguished professionals in relevant disciplines.
- 5. The system of permanent staff contracts should include a recertification point at which the Secretary-General can terminate, with compensation, either to change the mix of disciplines or because of palpable unsuitability. An oral and written requalifying examination should also be mandatory at this point to strengthen career development and make best use of valued talents.
- 6. High priority must now be given to maintaining, and mandatorily using a roster that fully responds to the requirement of top quality and to geographical distribution. To qualify for UN service a candidate must demonstrate, not merely that qualifications meet the job description but that the person is especially suitable to serve.
- 7. Every post, including all senior posts, should have a full Job Description, published before the post can be filled. Executive heads should never simply accept the nomination of one or a group of governments to a senior post.
- 8. The Secretary-General should be encouraged in his pledge to achieve gender parity in policy-making posts by 1995. This must extend to all top positions. Implementation of Article 8 of the Charter must be a performance criterion for departmental and division heads. The recruitment roster's gender balance must be assured and separately audited; the international women's network should be enlisted to help.
- 9. Member-Governments should recognize that they have allowed UN-system salaries to fall behind to the point where the service is no longer able to attract 'only the best' from many countries. Member-Governments must adopt consistent personnel remuneration policies, including between the main UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions.
- 10. The independent commission should recommend an entirely improved system of administrative justice for staff, providing adequate counsel and protection in due process.
- 11. Member-Governments should make the 50th Anniversary in 1995 the occasion for two critically important reforms affecting the international civil service:
- a. The adoption of proper procedures, with synchronous single terms, for their selection of executive heads in the system;
- b. A solemn reaffirmation of Charter Article 100.2 which binds them to desist from pressure or other influence on the Secretary-General and the staff.

- “We, The Peoples…”
  - 1. The community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) now faces the consequences of its own recent successes, in an enormous expansion of the number of NGOs seeking greater access to UN-system deliberative bodies, and other facilities. For the open-ended review process now decided by ECOSOC, the community should make an initial presentation and then seek a deferment of the review for, perhaps, two years, in order to sort out the following questions among NGOs:
  - a. The optimum places of NGO influence on governmental decision-making in the system, as between pressure and advocacy within member-countries, lobbying key delegations at UN organs or other bodies, and representation to the total intergovernmental community including at UN world conferences;
  - b. How NGOs working in a given issue-area can best consolidate their analyses and proposals in order to mount an effective representation, given that they outnumber by many thousands the number of Delegations at any UN body;
  - c. What facilities of the Secretariat itself must NGOs, in their now greatly increased numbers, minimally seek, and how they can propose these in the most cogent manner;

- d. How the NGO community can more generally help to build bridges of communication between the citizens whom they variously but not electorally represent, and the member-governments in the UN system.
- 2. Since NGOs cannot. in their nature, fully and adequately represent 'We, the peoples of the United Nations', it is time to advance on an idea which was not considered 'woolly' by a hard-headed British Foreign Secretary at the very inception of the UN-a UN Parliamentary Assembly. The following principles to guide this development are recommended:
- a. The fundamental means for choosing peoples' representatives in such an assembly must be democratic and by universal adult franchise, even if for a while this may prove difficult in member-countries with limited experience in democratic elections.
- b. The objective should be to enable the citizens of member-countries to have their own representatives in a specific organ of the United Nations that can
  - express citizens' views on major international problems and crises, and UN action on them;
  - influence governments' formulation of UN policies;
  - watch over the management and financing of the UN;
  - enhance the collective accountability of its member-governments as its actual decision-makers and governors.
- c. These functions must not, of course, abridge or confuse the UN's intergovernmental processes. But a peoples' assembly must have genuinely useful roles in those processes, complementing the knowledge and perspectives brought to intergovernmental organs by governments' delegations.
- d. The assembly must have legal status as a United Nations body, for its political legitimacy, budget, and members.' access to the Seat of the UN. It must be entitled to issue its own official reports and communications, distributed as UN documents.
- e. The assembly must have a regular budget adequate to finance the remuneration of its Members, their attendance at its sessions, and research and evaluation activities under its own authority.
- f. It should adopt its own programme of work, which should not be limited to its functions in relation to intergovernmental business but include its own original activities to develop policy and programme proposals for the UN.
- 3. Member-States should welcome and accept the offer of Canada's House of Commons to host a first exploratory meeting in 1995 towards the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA). The following principal elements in the progressive development of such an Assembly are recommended:
- a. The General Assembly can create such a Parliamentary Assembly initially under Article 22 of the Charter; its due establishment as a distinct Organ can follow at a next Charter amendment process.
- b. The establishment should follow the evolution of bodies like the European Parliament, in three phases:
  - i. First, with the parliaments of member-countries electing their representatives to the UNPA;
  - ii. The new Assembly then constituting itself the constituent body to work out rules and procedures for full-scale national elections of representatives to it, for submission to the General Assembly;
  - iii. The General Assembly adopts the proposed rules and creates the new Principal Organ.
- c. To ensure an Assembly of workable size governments of very populous countries may need to accept a sliding-scale formula requiring increasing numbers of citizens for each

additional representative. Small island states might agree to combined representation through prior multi-national elections.

- 4. The powers and functions of a UN Parliamentary Assembly have been suggested in some detail in Chapter XI of this study. The essence of the progressive evolution of this dramatic addition to the capacities of the United Nations would be to give it serious work and real oversight functions on behalf of all citizens, as a complement to the continued central functions of executive government in the existing organs.
- 5. The reform and strengthening of the United Nations system deserves the concentrated attention of Parliaments throughout the world in 1995 as their contribution to the 50th Anniversary.

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document.
- **Dates:** Published June 1992.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform; political violence.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (N/A – see throughout document).

Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*
- **Dates:** Published January 1995.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform; political violence.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (N/A – see throughout document).

An Agenda for Development

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *An agenda for development*.
- **Dates:** Published December 1993.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (N/A – see throughout document).

An Agenda for Democratization

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *An Agenda for Democratization*.
- **Dates:** Published 1996.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (N/A – see throughout document).

Commission on Global Governance

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Ad hoc international arrangement, at German initiative.
- **Type:** high-level panel (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Our Global Neighborhood*.
- **Dates:** Report published, 1995; panel established, April 1992.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** See 'Chapter Seven: A Call to Action'.

Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

- **Convenors and/or authors:** Australia, Japan.
- **Type:** high-level panel (non-UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document.
- **Dates:** report published, August 1996; panel established, November 1995.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** WMDs.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:**
  - Taking nuclear forces off alert: "Nuclear weapon states should take all nuclear forces off alert status and so reduce dramatically the chance of an accidental or unauthorised nuclear 12 weapons launch. In the first instance, reductions in alert status could be adopted by the nuclear weapon states unilaterally."
  - Removal of warheads from delivery vehicles: "The physical separation of warheads from delivery vehicles would strongly reinforce the gains achieved by taking nuclear forces off alert. This measure can be implemented to the extent that nuclear forces can be reconstituted to an alert posture only within known or agreed upon timeframes."
  - Ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons: "The nuclear weapon states should unilaterally remove all non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites to a limited number of secure storage facilities on their territory."
  - Ending nuclear testing: "Pending universal application of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty all states should observe at once the moratorium it imposes on nuclear testing."
  - Initiating negotiations to further reduce United States and Russian nuclear arsenals: "The United States and Russia must continue to show leadership in reversing the nuclear accumulations of the Cold War. Their purpose should be to move toward nuclear force levels for all the nuclear weapon states which would reflect unambiguously the determination to eliminate these weapons when this step can be verified with adequate confidence."
  - Agreement amongst the nuclear weapon states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states: "The nuclear weapon states should agree and state that they would not be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against each other and that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in any conflict with a non-nuclear weapon state. Such an agreement should be brought into operation as soon as possible."
  - Action to prevent further horizontal proliferation: "The problem of nuclear proliferation is inextricably linked to the continued possession of nuclear weapons by a handful of states. A world environment where proliferation is under control will facilitate the disarmament process and movement toward final elimination, and vice versa. The emergence of any new nuclear weapon state during the elimination process would seriously jeopardise the process of eliminating nuclear weapons. Action is needed to ensure effective non-proliferation controls on civil and military nuclear activities, and to press for universal acceptance of non-proliferation obligations."
  - Developing verification arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world + Cessation of the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes:
    - "Effective verification is critical to the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapon free world. Before states agree to eliminate nuclear weapons they will require a high level of confidence that verification arrangements would detect promptly any attempt to cheat the disarmament process whether through retention or acquisition of clandestine weapons, weapons components, means of weapons production or undeclared stocks of fissile

material. Formal legal undertakings should be accompanied by corresponding legal arrangements for verification. To maintain security in a post-nuclear weapon world the verification system must provide a high level of assurance as to the continued peaceful, non-explosive use of a state's nuclear activity. A political judgement will be needed on whether the levels of assurance possible from the verification regime are sufficient. All existing arms control and disarmament agreements have required political judgements of this nature because no verification system provides absolute certainty."

- "A key element of non-proliferation arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world will be a highly developed capacity to detect undeclared nuclear activity at both declared and undeclared sites. Progressive extension of safeguards to nuclear activity in the nuclear weapon states, the undeclared weapon states and the threshold states will be needed with the end point being universal application of safeguards in all states. Systems will be needed to verify that nuclear warheads are dismantled and destroyed, and their fissile material content safeguarded to provide maximum confidence that such material cannot be reintroduced to weapons use."
- "The political commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons must be matched by a willingness to make available the resources needed for nuclear disarmament including effective verification. States must also be confident 14 that any violations detected will be acted upon. In this context, the Security Council should continue its consideration of how it might address, consistent with specific mandates given to it and consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, violations of nuclear disarmament obligations that might be drawn to its attention. This should demonstrate that the collective security system enshrined in the Charter will operate effectively in this field."
- "Further United States/Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) and nuclear confidence building measures should establish a receptive international climate for negotiations on global reduction of nuclear arms. The United States and Russia could commence a process for bringing the United Kingdom, France and China into the nuclear disarmament process. Further early steps could be for the US and Russia to prepare the ground for verification of nuclear weapon states reductions by sharing information and expertise on START verification, on weapons dismantlement and on verification and control of fissile material from dismantled weapons. US/Russian experience on nuclear confidence building might be extended to the other nuclear weapon states and new measures developed which involve them"

Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UNDP and others.
- **Type:** high-level panel (UN).
- **Output(s):** Single document – *The United Nations in its Second Half-Century*
- **Dates:** report published, 1995; panel established, 1993.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** crisis of legitimacy; strengthening global governance.
- **Aspirations:** medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations**:
  - "Providing Security From the Source of Violence
    - "Expand the membership of the Security Council to a total of not more than 23 Members, taking into consideration the principles of participation and equity in a universal organization. Not more than five new Members would be Permanent Members.
    - "Limit the use of the veto to issues related to Chapter VII or to other decisions entailing the use of military personnel.
    - "Articulate a clear mandate for all peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, collective security and custodianship operations.
    - "Establish an ad hoc military authority for each Article 42 enforcement operation which is directly under UN command.
    - "Establish a UN Rapid Reaction Force capable of immediate deployment upon the decision of the Security Council.
    - "Establish a joint General Assembly-Security Council Working Group to promote progress toward global disarmament starting at the regional level, and to limit arms transfers.
    - "Establish a Security Assessment Staff, drawn from existing departments and agencies, to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and the three Councils to protect and promote human security.
  - "Promoting Economic Betterment
    - "Establish an Economic Council as a principal organ of the United Nations system. The Economic Council would seek to integrate the work of all UN agencies and international institutions, programs and offices engaged in economic issues. It would also promote the harmonization of the fiscal, monetary and trade policies of Member States and encourage international cooperation on issues such as transfers of technology and resources, indebtedness, and the functioning of commodity markets.
    - "Its Members, approximately 23 in number, should be chosen on a rotating basis by the General Assembly, taking into consideration geographic representation, population, and a balance between national economies of different size.
    - "The Economic Council should have a standing Advisory Committee, composed of distinguished and talented individuals drawn from various disciplines and professional fields, and from the private sector.
    - "Representatives of UN specialized agencies, financial institutions and nonstate actors would provide input to the Economic Council's deliberations.
  - "Protecting the Social Fabric
    - "Establish a Social Council as a principal organ of the United Nations system. The Social Council should integrate UN activities relating to issues of social development, such as the protection of the environment, education, health care, population and migration; the promotion of human rights and freedom of cultural expression; and the coordination of efforts to rebuild weakened societies under stress.

    - “Its Members, not more than 23 in number, should be chosen on a rotating 53 basis by the General Assembly with due regard for geographic representation and a balance between countries with larger and smaller populations
    - “The Social Council should also have a standing Advisory Board composed of distinguished individuals drawn from various disciplines, professional fields, and other groups involved in social and human rights policies.
    - “Representatives of UN specialized agencies, regional organizations and non-state actors would provide input to the Social Council's deliberations and implementation of policy.
    - “The Social Council should strengthen and rationalize the Centre for Human Rights.
- “Leadership, organization and Resources
    - “The Organization needs to eliminate redundancy by transforming, rationalizing or abolishing certain units. The three-Council arrangement recommended here would provide such an opportunity. The Secretary-General should convene a committee of permanent representatives and senior staff to consider reforms.
    - “The financial crisis of the Organization needs to be addressed by securing the commitment of Member States to pay their assessments; re-evaluating the assessment formulae; and making more efficient use of existing resources. For the future, new and predictably recurring sources of finance will be needed. An expert group should examine the options for other public sources of revenue, such as designated levies on the global commons.”

Panel on United Nations Peace Operations

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** International commission (UN).
- **Outputs:** Single document – *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000). Executive summary available separately.
- **Dates:** Report published, 2004; panel established, 2003.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** Short, medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - 1. Preventive action:
    - The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council's second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to "all who are engaged in conflict prevention and development — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and civil society organizations — [to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion";
    - The Panel supports the Secretary-General's more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension, and stresses Member States' obligations, under Article 2(5) of the Charter, to give "every assistance" to such activities of the United Nations.
  - 2. Peace-building strategy:
    - A small percentage of a mission's first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team's resident coordinator;
    - The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments;
    - The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict;
    - The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.
  - 3. Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy: once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.
  - 4. Clear, credible and achievable mandates:
    - The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines;

    - The Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements, including peace-building elements, from Member States;
    - Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort;
    - The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates, and countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission's use of force.
- 5. Information and strategic analysis: the Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), which would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
- 6. Transitional civil administration: the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international legal experts, including individuals with experience in United Nations operations that have transitional administration mandates, to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending the reestablishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity.
- 7. Determining deployment timelines: the United Nations should define "rapid and effective deployment capacities" as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.
- 8. Mission leadership:
    - The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission leaders, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners, and their deputies and other heads of substantive and administrative components, within a fair geographic and gender distribution and with input from Member States;
    - The entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled at Headquarters as early as possible in order to enable their participation in key aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings on the situation in the mission area and to meet and work with their colleagues in mission leadership;
    - The Secretariat should routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation, and whenever possible should formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership.
- 9. Military personnel:
    - Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution

establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations;
    - The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation, once it appeared likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations, might be reached;
    - The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy;
    - The Panel recommends that a revolving "on-call list" of about 100 military officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days' notice to augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained to create a mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation.
- 10. Civilian police personnel:
    - Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;
    - Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools, to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations;
    - Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations;
    - The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days' notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an early date;
    - The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial "rule of law" teams.
- 11. Civilian specialists:
    - The Secretariat should establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-selected civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice. The field missions should be granted access to and delegated authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on fair geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat;
    - The Field Service category of personnel should be reformed to mirror the recurrent demands faced by all peace operations, especially at the mid- to senior-levels in the administrative and logistics areas;
    - Conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff should be revised to enable the United Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates, and to then offer those who have served with distinction greater career prospects;
    - DPKO should formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, outlining, among other issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel on 72 hours' notice to facilitate mission startup, and the divisions of responsibility among the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for implementing that strategy.

- 12. Rapidly deployable capacity for public information: additional resources should be devoted in mission budgets to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation's message out and build effective internal communications links.
- 13. Logistics support and expenditure management:
  - The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines proposed and corresponding to planning assumptions established by the substantive offices of DPKO;
  - The General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should include rapidly deployable communications equipment. These start-up kits should then be routinely replenished with funding from the assessed contributions to the operations that drew on them;
  - The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to US$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, once it became clear that an operation was likely to be established, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) but prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution;
  - The Secretariat should undertake a review of the entire procurement policies and procedures (with proposals to the General Assembly for amendments to the Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), to facilitate in particular the rapid and full deployment of an operation within the proposed timelines;
  - The Secretariat should conduct a review of the policies and procedures governing the management of financial resources in the field missions with a view to providing field missions with much greater flexibility in the management of their budgets;
  - The Secretariat should increase the level of procurement authority delegated to the field missions (from $200,000 to as high as $1 million, depending on mission size and needs) for all goods and services that are available locally and are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts.
- 14. Funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations:
  - The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements in full;
  - Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements for this purpose should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennial programme budget of the Organization;
  - Pending the preparation of the next regular budget submission, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the Support Account to allow immediate recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in DPKO.
- 15. Integrated mission planning and support: Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), with members seconded from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, should be the standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support. IMTFs should serve as the first point of contact for all such support, and IMTF leaders should have temporary line authority over seconded personnel, in accordance with agreements between DPKO, DPA and other contributing departments, programmes, funds and agencies.
- 16. Other structural adjustments in DPKO:
  - The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured, moving the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain. Consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser;

- The Military Adviser's Office in DPKO should be restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military field headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured;
- A new unit should be established in DPKO and staffed with the relevant expertise for the provision of advice on criminal law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in the United Nations peace operations;
- The Under-Secretary-General for Management should delegate authority and responsibility for peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement functions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period;
- The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially enhanced and moved into a revamped DPKO Office of Operations;
- Consideration should be given to increasing the number of Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO from two to three, with one of the three designated as the "Principal Assistant Secretary-General" and functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General.

- 17. Operational support for public information: a unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations should be established, either within DPKO or within a new Peace and Security Information Service in the Department of Public Information (DPI) reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information.
- 18. Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs:
  - The Panel supports the Secretariat's effort to create a pilot Peace-building Unit within DPA, in cooperation with other integral United Nations elements, and suggests that regular budgetary support for this unit be revisited by the membership if the pilot programme works well. This programme should be evaluated in the context of guidance the Panel has provided in paragraph 46 above, and if considered the best available option for strengthening United Nations peace-building capacity it should be presented to the Secretary-General within the context of the Panel's recommendation contained in paragraph 47 (d) above;
  - The Panel recommends that regular budget resources for Electoral Assistance Division programmatic expenses be substantially increased to meet the rapidly growing demand for its services, in lieu of voluntary contributions;
  - To relieve demand on the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) and the executive office of DPA, and to improve support services rendered to smaller political and peacebuilding field offices, the Panel recommends that procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all such smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).
- 19. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: the Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with funding partly from the regular budget and partly from peace operations mission budgets.
- 20. Peace operations and the information age:
  - Headquarters peace and security departments need a responsibility centre to devise and oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy and training for peace operations, residing in EISAS. Mission counterparts to the responsibility centre should also be appointed to serve in the offices of the special representatives of the Secretary-General in complex peace operations to oversee the implementation of that strategy;
  - EISAS, in cooperation with the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD), should implement an enhanced peace operations element on the current United Nations Intranet and link it to the missions through a Peace Operations Extranet (POE);

- Peace operations could benefit greatly from more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology, which quickly integrates operational information with electronic maps of the mission area, for applications as diverse as demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring and reconstruction;
- The IT needs of mission components with unique information technology needs, such as civilian police and human rights, should be anticipated and met more consistently in mission planning and implementation;
- The Panel encourages the development of web site co-management by Headquarters and the field missions, in which Headquarters would maintain oversight but individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content that conforms to basic presentational standards and policy.

High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** High-level panel (UN).
- **Outputs:** Single document.
- **Dates:** Report published, 2004; panel established, 2003.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** Short, medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - 1. All States must recommit themselves to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development.
  - 2. The many donor countries which currently fall short of the United Nations 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) for official development assistance (ODA) should establish a timetable for reaching it.
  - 3. World Trade Organization (WTO) members should strive to conclude the Doha development round of multilateral trade negotiations at the latest in 2006.
  - 4. Lender Governments and the international financial institutions should provide highly indebted poor countries with greater debt relief, longer rescheduling and improved access to global markets.
  - 5. Although international resources devoted to meeting the challenge of HIV/AIDS have increased from about $250 million in 1996 to about $2.8 billion in 2002, more than $10 billion annually is needed to stem the pandemic.
  - 6. Leaders of countries affected by HIV/ AIDS need to mobilize resources, commit funds and engage civil society and the private sector in disease-control efforts.
  - 7. The Security Council, working closely with UNAIDS, should host a second special session on HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security, to explore the future effects of HIV/AIDS on States and societies, generate research on the problem and identify critical steps towards a long-term strategy for diminishing the threat.
  - 8. International donors, in partnership with national authorities and local civil society organizations, should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild local and national public health systems throughout the developing world.
  - 9. Members of the World Health Assembly should provide greater resources to the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to increase its capacity to cope with potential disease outbreaks.
  - 10. States should provide incentives for the further development of renewable energy sources and begin to phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, especially for fossil fuel use and development.
  - 11. We urge Member States to reflect on the gap between the promise of the Kyoto Protocol and its performance, re-engage on the problem of global warming and begin new negotiations to produce a new long-term strategy for reducing global warming beyond the period covered by the Protocol (2012).
  - 12. The Security Council should stand ready to use the authority it has under the Rome Statute to refer cases of suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court.
  - 13. The United Nations should work with national authorities, international financial institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to develop norms governing the management of natural resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict.

- 14. The United Nations should build on the experience of regional organizations in developing frameworks for minority rights and the protection of democratically elected Governments from unconstitutional overthrow.
- 15. Member States should expedite and conclude negotiations on legally binding agreements on the marking and tracing, as well as the brokering and transfer, of small arms and light weapons.
- 16. All Member States should report completely and accurately on all elements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the Secretary -General should be asked to report annually to the General Assembly and Security Council on any inadequacies in the reporting.
- 17. A training and briefing facility should be established for new or potential special representatives of the Secretary -General and other United Nations mediators.
- 18. The Department of Political Affairs should be given additional resources and should be restructured to provide more consistent and professional mediation support.
- 19. While the details of such a restructuring should be left to the Secretary-General, it should take into account the need for the United Nations to have:
    - (a) A field-oriented, dedicated mediation support capacity, comprised of a small team of professionals with relevant direct experience and expertise, available to all United Nations mediators;
    - (b) Competence on thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations, such as the sequencing of implementation steps, the design of monitoring arrangements, the sequencing of transitional arrangements and the design of national reconciliation mechanisms;
    - (c) Greater interaction with national mediators, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations involved in conflict resolution;
    - (d) Greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of important voices from civil society, especially those of women, who are often neglected during negotiations.
- 20. National leaders and parties to conflict should make constructive use of the option of preventive deployment of peacekeepers.
- 21. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament:
    - (a) They must honour their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non - Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments;
    - (b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.
- 22. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons.
- 23. The Security Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear weapon State.
- 24. Negotiations to resolve regional conflicts should include confidence-building measures and steps towards disarmament.
- 25. States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia.

- 26. All chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012.
- 27. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry.
- 28. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today's standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non - proliferation and safeguards standards.
- 29. Negotiations should be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Articles III and IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users.
- 30. While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without surrendering the right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to construct uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, voluntarily institute a time -limited moratorium on the construction of any further such facilities, with a 82 A/59/565 commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates.
- 31. All States should be encouraged to join the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative.
- 32. A State's notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should be withdrawn.
- 33. The proposed timeline for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert highly enriched uranium reactors and reduce HEU stockpiles should be halved from 10 to five years.
- 34. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should negotiate a new bio - security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of such a gents.
- 35. The Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the production of highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as weapons purposes.
- 36. The Directors-General of IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice -yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- 37. The Security Council should consult with the WHO Director-General to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.
- 38. The United Nations, with the Secretary-General taking a leading role, should promote a comprehensive strategy against terrorism, including:
    - (a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, including through promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and democratic reform; working to end occupations and address major political grievances; combating organized crime; reducing poverty and unemployment; and stopping State collapse;
    - (b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through education and fostering public debate;
    - (c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and human rights, including in the areas

of law enforcement; intelligence-sharing, where possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls;
    - (d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations;
    - (e) Control of dangerous materials and public health defence.
- 39. Member States that have not yet done so should actively consider signing and ratifying all 12 international conventions against terrorism, and should adopt the eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-supported Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering and the measures recommended in its various best practices papers.
- 40. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a process for reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions claiming to have been wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists.
- 41. The Security Council, after consultation with affected States, should extend the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to act as a clearing house for State -to -State provision of military, police and border control assistance for the development of domestic counter-terrorism capacities.
- 42. To help Member States comply with their counter-terrorism obligations, the United Nations should establish a capacity-building trust fund under the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate.
- 43. The Security Council should devise a schedule of predetermined sanctions for State non-compliance with the Council's counter-terrorism resolutions.
- 44. The General Assembly should rapidly complete negotiations on a comprehensive convention on terrorism, incorporating a definition of terrorism with the following elements:
    - (a) Recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity;
    - (b) Restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; and restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols;
    - (c) Reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004);
    - (d) Description of terrorism as "any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act".
- 45. Member States that have not signed, ratified or resourced the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols, and the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption should do so, and all Member States should support the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in its work in this area.
- 46. Member States should establish a central authority to facilitate the exchange of evidence among national judicial authorities, mutual legal assistance among prosecutorial authorities and the implementation of extradition requests.
- 47. A comprehensive international convention on money -laundering that addresses the issues of bank secrecy and the development of financial havens needs to be negotiated, and endorsed by the General Assembly.

- 48. Member States should sign and ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and parties to the Protocol should take all necessary steps to effectively implement it.
- 49. The United Nations should establish a robust capacity-building mechanism for rule-of-law assistance.
- 50. The Security Council must ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced:
    - (a) When the Security Council imposes a sanctions regime — including arms embargoes — it should routinely establish monitoring mechanisms and provide them with the necessary authority and capacity to carry out high-quality, in-depth investigations. Adequate budgetary provisions must be made to implement those mechanisms;
    - (b) Security Council sanctions committees should be mandated to develop improved guidelines and reporting procedures to assist States in sanction s implementation, and to improve procedures for maintaining accurate lists of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions;
    - (c) The Secretary -General should appoint a senior official with sufficient supporting resources to enable the Secretary -General to supply the Security Council with analysis of the best way to target sanctions and to assist in coordinating their implementation. This official would also assist compliance efforts; identify technical assistance needs and coordinate such assistance; and make recommendations on any adjustments necessary to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions;
    - (d) Donors should devote more resources to strengthening the legal, administrative, and policing and border-control capacity of Member States to implement sanctions. Capacity -building measures should include efforts to improve air-traffic interdiction in zones of conflict;
    - (e) The Security Council should, in instances of verified, chronic violations, impose secondary sanctions against those involved in sanctions-busting;
    - (f) The Secretary -General, in consultation with the Security Council, should ensure that an appropriate auditing mechanism is in place to oversee sanctions administration.
- 51. Sanctions committees should improve procedures for providing humanitarian exemptions and routinely conduct assessments of the humanitarian impact of sanctions. The Security Council should continue to strive to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions.
- 52. Where sanctions involve lists of individuals or entities, sanctions committees should establish procedures to review the cases of those claiming to have been incorrectly placed or retained on such lists.
- 53. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations should be neither rewritten nor reinterpreted, either to extend its long-established scope (so as to allow preventive measures to non-imminent threats) or to restrict it (so as to allow its application only to actual attacks).
- 54. The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which States are concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the Council work better than it has.
- 55. The Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.
- 56. In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Security Council should always address — whatever other considerations it may take into account — at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy:

- (a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large -scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended?
- (b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved?
- (c) Last resort. Has every non -military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed?
- (d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
- (e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction?

- 57. The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be embodied in declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly.
- 58. The developed States should do more to transform their existing force capacities into suitable contingents for peace operations.
- 59. Member States should strongly support the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Unite d Nations Secretariat, building on the important work of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305 - S/2000/809), to improve its use of strategic deployment stockpiles, standby arrangements, trust funds and other mechanisms in order to meet the tighter deadlines necessary for effective deployment.
- 60. States with advanced military capacities should establish standby high readiness, self-sufficient battalions at up to brigade level that can reinforce United Nations missions, and should p lace them at the disposal of the United Nations.
- 61. The Secretary -General should recommend and the Security Council should authorize troop strengths for peacekeeping missions that are sufficient to deter and repel hostile factions.
- 62. The United Nations should have a small corps of senior police officers and managers (50-100 personnel) who could undertake mission assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations, and the General Assembly should authorize this capacity.
- 63. Special representatives of the Secretary -General should have the authority and guidance to work with relevant parties to establish robust donor-coordinating mechanisms, as well as the resources to perform coordination functions effectively, including ensuring that the sequencing of United Nations assessments and activities is consistent with Government priorities.
- 64. The Security Council should mandate and the General Assembly should authorize funding for disarmament and demobilization programmes from assessed budgets for United Nations peacekeeping operations.
- 65. A standing fund for peacebuilding should be established at the level of at least $250 million that can be used to finance the recurrent expenditures of a nascent Government, as well as critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration.
- 66. All combatants must abide by the Geneva Conventions. All Member States should sign, ratify and act on all treaties relating to the protection of civilians, such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and all refugee conventions.
- 67. The Security Council should fully implement resolution 1265 (1999) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
- 68. The Security Council, United Nations agencies and Member States should fully implement resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

- 69. Member States should support and fully fund the proposed Directorate of Security and accord high priority to assisting the Secretary -General in implementing a new staff security system in 2005.
- 70. Members of the General Assembly should use the opportunity provided by the Millennium Review Summit in 2005 to forge a new consensus on broader and more effective collective security.
- 71. Member States should renew efforts to enable the General Assembly to perform its function as the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. This requires a better conceptualization and shortening of the agenda, which should reflect the contemporary challenges facing the international community. Smaller, more tightly focused committees could help to sharpen and improve resolutions that are brought to the whole Assembly.
- 72. Following the recommendation of the report of the Panel on Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations (see A/58/817), the General Assembly should establish a better mechanism to enable systematic engagement with civil society organizations.
- 73. Reforms of the Security Council should meet the following principles:
    - (a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically — specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to the voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of contribution;
    - (b) They should bring into the decision -making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world;
    - (c) They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council;
    - (d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body.
- 74. A decision on the enlargement of the Council, satisfying these criteria, is now a necessity. The presentation of two clearly defined alternatives, of the kind described below as models A and B, should help to clarify — and perhaps bring to resolution — a debate which has made little progress in the last 12 years.
- 75. Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four major regional areas, which we identify, respectively, as “Africa”, “Asia and Pacific”, “Europe” and “Americas”. We see these descriptions as helpful in making and implementing judgements about the composition of the Security Council, but make no recommendation about changing the composition of the current regional groups for general electoral and other United Nations purposes. Some members of the Panel, in particular our Latin American colleagues, expressed a preference for basing any distribution of seats on the current regional groups.
- 76. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two -year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas. Model B provides for no new permanent seats, but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable -term seats and one new two -year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas.
- 77. In both models, having regard to Article 23 of the Charter, a method of encouraging Member States to contribute more to international peace and security would be for the General Assembly, taking into account established practices of regional consultation, to elect Security Council members by giving preference for permanent or longer-term seats to those States that

are among the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping missions.

- 78. There should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, including, in this context, a review of the contribution (as defined in paragraph 249 of the main report) of permanent and non -permanent members from the point of view of the Council's effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old threats to international peace and security.
- 79. The Panel recommends that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto.
- 80. A system of "indicative voting" should be introduced, whereby members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed action.
- 81. Processes to improve transparency and accountability in the Security Council should be incorporated and formalized in its rules of procedure.
- 82. The Security Council, acting under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and after consultation with the Economic and Social Council, should establish a Peacebuilding Commission.
- 83. The core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to identify countries that are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary.
- 84. While the precise composition, procedures and reporting lines of the Peacebuilding Commission will need to be established, they should take account of the following guidelines:
    - (a) The Peacebuilding Commission should be reasonably small;
    - (b) It should meet in different configurations, to consider both general policy issues and country-by-country strategies;
    - (c) It should be chaired for at least one year and perhaps longer by a member approved by the Security Council;
    - (d) In addition to representation from the Security Council, it should include representation from the Economic and Social Council;
    - (e) National representatives of the country under consideration should be invited to attend;
    - (f) The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the President of the World Bank and, when appropriate, heads of regional development banks should be represented at its meetings by appropriate senior officials;
    - (g) Representatives of the principal donor countries and, when appropriate, the principal troop contributors should be invited to participate in its deliberations;
    - (h) Representatives of regional and subregional organizations should be invited to participate in its deliberations when such organizations are actively involved in the country in question. (265)
- 85. A Peacebuilding Support Office should be established in the Secretariat to give the Peacebuilding Commission appropriate Secretariat support and to ensure that the Secretary - General is able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations.
- 86. In relation to regional organizations:
    - (a) Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations;

- (b) Consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement, covering such issues as meetings of the heads of the organizations, more frequent exchange of information and early warning, co -training of civilian and military personnel, and exchange of personnel within peace operations;
- (c) In the case of African regional and subregional capacities, donor countries should commit to a 10-year process of sustained capacity -building support, within the African Union strategic framework;
- (d) Regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping should place such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;
- (e) Member States should agree to allow the United Nations to provide equipment support from United Nations-owned sources to regional operations, as needed;
- (f) The rules for the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United Nations the option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council with assessed contributions.

- 87. The Economic and Social Council should provide normative and analytical leadership in a time of much debate about the causes of, and interconnections between, the many threats we face. To that end, the Economic and Social Council should establish a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats.
- 88. The Economic and Social Council should provide an arena in which States measure their commitments to achieving key development objectives in an open and transparent manner.
- 89. The Economic and Social Council should provide a regular venue for engaging the development community at the highest level, in effect transforming itself into a “development cooperation forum”. To that end:
  - (a) A new approach should be adopted within the Economic and Social Council agenda, replacing its current focus on administrative issues and programme coordination with a more focused agenda built around the major themes contained in the Millennium Declaration;
  - (b) A small executive committee, comprising members from each regional group, should be created in order to provide orientation and direction to the work of the Economic and Social Council and its interaction with principal organs, agencies and programmes;
  - (c) The annual meetings between the Economic and Social Council and the Bretton Woods institutions should be used to encourage collective action in support of the Millennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Consensus;
  - (d) The Economic and Social Council, with inputs from its secretariat and the United Nations Development Group, should aim to provide guidance on development cooperation to the governing boards of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies;
  - (e) The Economic and Social Council should provide strong support to the efforts of the Secretary -General and the United Nations Development Group to strengthen the coherence of United Nations action at the field level and its coordination with the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors.
- 90. Membership of the Commission on Human Rights should be made universal.
- 91. All members of the Commission on Human Rights should designate prominent and experienced human rights figures as the heads of their delegations.
- 92. The Commission on Human Rights should be supported in its work by an advisory council or panel.

- 93. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights should be called upon to prepare an annual report on the situation of human rights worldwide.
- 94. The Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission should request the High Commissioner for Human Rights to report to them regularly on the implementation of all human rights -related provisions of Security Council resolutions, thus enabling focused, effective monitoring of those provisions.
- 95. To assist the Secretary-General, an additional Deputy Secretary-General position should be created, responsible for peace and security.
- 96. The Secretary-General should be provided with the resources he requires to do his job properly and the authority to manage his staff and other resources as he deems best. To meet the needs identified in the present report, the Panel recommends that:
    - (a) Member States recommit themselves to Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter of the United Nations;
    - (b) Member States review the relationship between the General Assembly and the Secretariat with the aim of substantially increasing the flexibility provided to the Secretary -General in the management of his staff, subject always to his accountability to the Assembly;
    - (c) The Secretary-General's reform proposals of 1997 and 2002 related to human resources should now, without further delay, be fully implemented;
    - (d) There should be a one -time review and replacement of personnel, including through early retirement, to ensure that the Secretariat is staffed with the right people to undertake the tasks at hand, including for mediation and peacebuilding support, and for the office of the Deputy Secretary-General for peace and security. Member States should provide funding for this replacement as a cost-effective long -term investment;
    - (e) The Secretary-General should immediately be provided with 60 posts — less than 1 per cent of the total Secretariat capacity — for the purpose of establishing all the increased Secretariat capacity proposed in the present report.
- 97. In addition to any amendment of Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations required by proposed reform of the Security Council, the Panel suggests the following modest changes to the Charter:
- 98. Articles 53 and 107 (references to enemy States) are outdated and should be revised.
- 99. Chapter XIII (The Trusteeship Council) should be deleted.
- 100. Article 47 (The Military Staff Committee) should be deleted, as should all references to the Committee in Articles 26, 45 and 46.
- 101. All Member States should rededicate themselves to the purposes and principles of the Charter and to applying them in a purposeful way, matching political will with the necessary resources. Only dedicated leadership within and between States will generate effective collective security for the twenty-first century and forge a future that is both sustainable and secure.

Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** high-level panel (UN).
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- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** crisis of legitimacy; strengthening global governance.
- **Aspirations:** medium to long term.
- **Theory of Change:** n/a.
- **Recommendations:**
  - *Proposal 1*. In exercising its convening power, the United Nations should emphasize the inclusion of all constituencies relevant to the issue, recognize that the key actors are different for different issues and foster multi-stakeholder partnerships to pioneer solutions and empower a range of global policy networks to innovate and build momentum on policy options. Member States need opportunities for collective decision-making, but they should signal their preparedness to engage other actors in deliberative processes.
  - *Proposal 2*. The United Nations should embrace an array of forums, each designed to achieve a specific outcome, with participation determined accordingly. The cycle of global debate on an issue should include:
    - Interactive high-level round tables to survey the framework of issues
    - Global conferences to define norms and targets
    - Multi-stakeholder partnerships to put the new norms and targets into practice
    - Multi-stakeholder hearings to monitor compliance, review experience and revise strategies.
  - *Proposal 3*. The Secretariat should innovate with networked governance, bringing people from diverse backgrounds together to identify possible policy breakthroughs on emerging global priorities. It should experiment with a global Internet agora to survey public opinion and raise awareness on emerging issues. The Secretary-General should initiate multi-stakeholder advisory forums on selected emerging issues and feed their conclusions to appropriate intergovernmental forums.
  - *Proposal 4*. The United Nations should retain the global conference mechanism but use it sparingly to address major emerging policy issues that need concerted global action, enhanced public understanding and resonance with global public opinion. The participation of civil society and other constituencies should be planned in collaboration with their networks.
  - *Proposal 5*. The Secretariat should foster multi-constituency processes as new conduits for discussion of United Nations priorities, redirecting resources now used for single-constituency forums covering multiple issues. The Secretariat, together with other relevant bodies of the United Nations system, should convene public hearings to review progress in meeting globally agreed commitments. Being technical and concerned with implementation rather than the formulation of new global policies, such hearings could be convened by the Secretary-General on his own authority. Proceedings should be transmitted through the Secretary-General to the relevant intergovernmental forums.
  - *Proposal 6*. The General Assembly should permit the carefully planned participation of actors besides central Governments in its processes. In particular, the Assembly should regularly invite contributions to its committees and special sessions by those offering high-quality independent input. The participation arrangements should be made in collaboration with the relevant constituency networks. The Secretariat should help to plan innovative and interactive sessions linked to but outside the formal meetings.
  - *Proposal 7*. In order to mainstream partnerships, the Secretary-General should, with the approval of Member States and donor support:

- Establish a Partnership Development Unit headed by a high-level staff member to help incubate and decentralize the partnership approach, guide the needed management shifts, ensure sound evaluations and provide support services throughout the United Nations
- Identify partnership focal points throughout all United Nations organs and agencies
- Review partnership issues in such coordination forums as the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination and its High-Level Committee on Programmes
- Ensure systematic learning from partnership efforts by creating a multistakeholder Partnership Assessment Forum that includes United Nations staff, Governments, civil society organizations and others
- Provide training in partnership development to Governments, civil society and other constituencies, as well as to United Nations staff
- Periodically review the effectiveness of those efforts

- *Proposal 8*. The proposed Partnership Development Unit should ensure that lessons of practice are fully internalized in operational and management approaches, conduct rigorous evaluations to learn about the full costs and impact on development of multisectoral partnerships and inform the debate about the institutional implications of the approach.
- *Proposal 9*. The Secretariat should strengthen its relationship with actors in the private sector by:
  - Incorporating the Global Compact into the proposed Office of Constituency Engagement and Partnerships (see proposal 24)
  - Engaging with small and medium-sized businesses and their national associations and helping to build the capacity and competitiveness of microbusinesses and small enterprises
  - Strengthening the Global Compact's capacity for and contribution to enhancing corporate responsibility
- *Proposal 10*. The United Nations Development Group should ensure that the rhetoric of country leadership, coordination and partnership is put into effective practice to open space for all constituencies to contribute to the goals of the United Nations. This entails:
  - Enhancing the capacity of the United Nations resident coordinators' offices to identify, convene and broker the partnerships needed to meet the main challenges and build consensus on country-specific goals (see proposal 11)
  - Conveying systematic messages to country staff about learning from and providing support to civil society and other actors, using the rubric of the Millennium Development Goals and other globally agreed goals as reference points
  - Ensuring that United Nations country-level staff work with the regional commissions to inject the experience of country-level actors into regional and global deliberative processes
  - Identifying and rewarding participation pioneers within the United Nations system by establishing, with donor support, a global fund to support innovations in partnership development at the country level
  - Identifying and disseminating lessons learned from innovative partnerships and countries where cooperation with non-State actors is strongest
  - Assessing partnership qualities in the annual performance appraisals of resident coordinators and other country-level staff
  - Persuading donors to support the extra cost of being an effective networking organization, including the greater investment in coordination that this requires
- *Proposal 11*. The resident coordinators and United Nations Development Group agencies at the country level should undertake the necessary restructuring, coordination and investment to enable the United Nations to meet the networking challenges by:
  - Initially appointing local constituency engagement specialists in 30 to 40 countries, with facilitation skills and knowledge of civil society in the country (see proposal 25)

    - Reviewing the effectiveness of current country-level information and communication resources, redirecting them to support strategies and partnerships to achieve globally agreed goals
    - Establishing civil society advisory groups as a pilot project in a range of countries to guide United Nations strategy; similar advisory groups could be considered for business and other constituencies
- *Proposal 12*. Security Council members should further strengthen their dialogue with civil society, with the support of the Secretary-General by:
    - Improving the planning and effectiveness of the Arria formula meetings by lengthening lead times and covering travel costs to increase the participation of actors from the field. United Nations country staff should assist in identifying civil society interlocutors
    - Ensuring that Security Council field missions meet regularly with appropriate local civil society leaders, international humanitarian NGOs and perhaps others, such as business leaders. United Nations Headquarters and field staff should facilitate the meetings
    - Installing an experimental series of Security Council seminars to discuss issues of emerging importance to the Council. Serviced by the Secretariat, these would include presentations by civil society and other constituencies as well as United Nations specialists, such as special rapporteurs
    - Convening independent commissions of inquiry after Council-mandated operations. A global public policy committee connecting national foreign affairs committees could serve as such a commission (see proposal 15)
- *Proposal 13*. The United Nations should routinely encourage national parliaments to hold debates on major matters coming up in the United Nations and to discuss those matters with the relevant ministers. Relevant documents, including those in progress achieved on the Millennium Development Goals and other globally agreed goals, should be made available to parliaments when they are transmitted to Governments. The Secretary-General should seek the cooperation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and parliamentarian associations. Member States should regularly consult members of Parliament on United Nations matters and debrief them after major United Nations meetings.
- *Proposal 14*. Member States should more regularly include members of Parliament in their delegations to major United Nations meetings, while taking care to avoid compromising their independence. The Secretariat should test opportunities for members of Parliament to contribute as parliamentarians, including in debates before a General Assembly meeting on a major topic. Members of Parliament specializing in a subject could also be invited to speak in relevant committees and special sessions of the Assembly, particularly when they are reviewing progress achieved in meeting the Millennium Development Goals and other agreed global goals.
- *Proposal 15*. Member States should make way for an enhanced role for parliamentarians in global governance. They should instruct the Secretariat to work with national parliaments and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, as appropriate, to convene one or more experimental global public policy committees to discuss emerging priorities on the global agenda. These committees would comprise parliamentarians from the most relevant functional committee in a globally representative range of countries. In an experimental five-year period, different organizational arrangements could be tested and, through periodic review, refined over time.
- *Proposal 16*. The Secretary-General should form a small Elected Representatives Liaison Unit:
    - To provide a dedicated information service for parliaments and associations of parliamentarians, including a dedicated web-based information service for members of parliament
    - To encourage greater attention to United Nations processes in national parliaments

    - To help to create more effective opportunities for members of parliament to take part in United Nations forums
    - To organize global public policy committees to work closely with national parliaments, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, specialized agencies and other organizations as appropriate
    - To foster debate within the United Nations system about new or improved strategies for engaging parliaments and parliamentarians
- *Proposal 17*. The General Assembly should debate a resolution affirming and respecting local autonomy as a universal principle.
- *Proposal 18*. The Elected Representative Liaison Unit (see proposal 16) should liaise with local authorities and their new world association and disseminate lessons of good practice. The United Nations should regard United Cities and Local Governments as an advisory body on governance matters. The Secretary-General should require United Nations bodies with a national presence to build close contacts with local authorities and their national and regional associations. Specifically, resident coordinators should interact regularly with local authorities to inform them of United Nations programmes and processes and to encourage partnerships with them.
- *Proposal 19*. The United Nations should realign accreditation with its original purpose, namely, it should be an agreement between civil society actors and Member States based on the applicants' expertise, competence and skills. To achieve this, and to widen the access of civil society organizations beyond Economic and Social Council forums, Member States should agree to merge the current procedures at United Nations Headquarters for the Council, the Department of Public Information and conferences and their follow-up into a single United Nations accreditation process, with responsibility for accreditation assumed by an existing committee of the General Assembly.
- *Proposal 20*. Member States should shift the task of reviewing applications to the Secretariat so as to reduce time inefficiencies and increase the technical focus of the review. An Accreditation Unit should be established within the General Assembly secretariat, incorporating staff now responsible for accreditation in various departments (therefore it would be budget-neutral). The Unit would help to set up an advisory body that would offer guidance on whether applications should be recommended or not. A designated General Assembly committee would decide on accreditation based on that guidance. The Secretariat should ensure increased use of information technologies to manage the accreditation process. The SecretaryGeneral should encourage the United Nations agencies, country offices and others to cooperate in the system-wide effort.
- *Proposal 21*. The Secretary-General should foster enhanced coordination and support for the accreditation process by:
    - Instructing national and regional offices of the United Nations to facilitate applications
    - Using the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination processes to foster closer coordination among United Nations agencies, funds, programmes and regional commissions
    - Ensuring wider availability of information on the rights and responsibilities related to accreditation (e.g., through booklets aimed at civil society and United Nations staff)
- *Proposal 22*. The Secretary-General should initiate a consultative review, to be finished within three years, whereupon proposals would be submitted to the General Assembly for revising the accreditation categories to align them better with today's practices and priorities.
- *Proposal 23*. The Secretariat should encourage the main constituencies that the United Nations works with to form broad networks to help it with selection and quality assurance. But the United Nations should not demand this or stipulate how it is to be done. Such networks would

be encouraged to advise secretariats and bureaux on the participation of their constituencies in intergovernmental processes and to help monitor practices and revise strategies, perhaps leading to their evolution into recognized advisory groups. The Secretariat should discuss with those groups possible codes of conduct and self-policing mechanisms to heighten disciplines of quality, governance and balance.

- *Proposal 24*. With the approval of Member States, the Secretary-General should appoint an Under-Secretary-General in charge of a new Office of Constituency Engagement and Partnerships. This office would be responsible for formulating and implementing the strategy for United Nations engagement with all constituencies beyond the formal membership of central Governments. It would monitor engagements throughout the United Nations system and provide advice and lessons of good practice. It could comprise the following:
  - A Civil Society Unit, to absorb the Non-Governmental Liaison Service
  - A Partnership Development Unit, to absorb the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships
  - An Elected Representatives Liaison Unit
  - The Global Compact Office
  - The secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
- *Proposal 25*. With the approval of Member States, the Secretary-General should initiate a programme to appoint 30 to 40 constituency engagement specialists in offices of resident coordinators to help the United Nations and the wider system enhance engagement with a diversity of constituencies. He should invite contributions from bilateral donors and foundations to a trust fund to finance those appointments for a trial period of four years.
- *Proposal 26*. The Secretary-General should make redressing North-South imbalances a priority in enhancing United Nations–civil society relations. He should enlist donor support for enhancing the capacity of the United Nations to identify and work with local actors, establishing a fund to build Southern civil society capacity to participate and ensuring that country-level engagement feeds into the global deliberative processes.
- *Proposal 27*. The United Nations should establish a fund to enhance the capacity of civil society in developing countries to engage in United Nations processes and partnerships. The Secretariat should seek contributions from Governments, foundations, United Nations sources and elsewhere, and it should establish an administrative and governance structure for the fund that puts maximum emphasis on decision-making at the country level.
- *Proposal 28*. The Secretary-General and other top United Nations managers should frequently take the opportunity to convey to staff the importance they ascribe to constituency engagement and partnership. These issues should feature prominently in all human resources processes, including recruitment, promotion and annual appraisal. Staff throughout the system, including managers, should be given training in such matters.
- *Proposal 29*. The Secretary-General should use his capacity as chairman of the United Nations system coordination mechanism to encourage all agencies, including the Bretton Woods institutions, to enhance their engagement with civil society and other actors and to cooperate with one another across the system to promote this aim, with periodic progress reviews.
- *Proposal 30*. Member States should encourage, through the forums of the United Nations, an enabling policy environment for civil society throughout the world and expanded dialogue and partnership opportunities in development processes. The Secretariat leadership, resident coordinators and governance specialists should use their dialogues with Governments to similar effect.

In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*.
- **Dates:** Published March 2005.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (Annex: For decision by Heads of State and Government)
  - Freedom from want
    - In order to reduce poverty and promote global prosperity for all, I urge Heads of State and Government to:
    - Reaffirm, and commit themselves to implementing, the development consensus based on mutual responsibility and accountability agreed in 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa. Consistent with that historic compact, centred on the Millennium Development Goals:
      - Developing countries should recommit themselves to taking primary responsibility for their own development by strengthening governance, combating corruption and putting in place the policies and investments to drive private-sector led growth and maximize domestic resources to fund national development strategies;
      - Developed countries should undertake to support these efforts through increased development assistance, a more development-oriented trade system and wider and deeper debt relief;
    - Recognize the special needs of Africa and reaffirm the solemn commitments made to address those needs on an urgent basis;
    - Decide that each developing country with extreme poverty should by 2006 adopt and begin to implement a comprehensive national strategy bold enough to meet the Millennium Development Goals targets for 2015;
    - Undertake to ensure that developed countries that have not already done so establish timetables to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for official development assistance by no later than 2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006 and reaching at least 0.5 per cent by 2009;
    - Decide that debt sustainability should be redefined as the level of debt that allows a country to both achieve the Millennium Development Goals and reach 2015 without an increase in its debt ratios; that, for most HIPC countries, this will require exclusively grant-based finance and 100 per cent debt cancellation, while for many heavily indebted non-HIPC and middle-income countries it will require significantly more debt reduction than has yet been on offer; and that additional debt cancellation should be achieved without reducing the resources available to other developing countries and without jeopardizing the long-term financial viability of international financial institutions;
    - Complete the World Trade Organization Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations no later than 2006, with full commitment to realizing its development focus, and as a first step

provide immediate duty-free and quota-free market access for all exports from the least developed countries;

- Decide to launch, in 2005, an International Financial Facility to support an immediate front-loading of official development assistance, underpinned by commitments to achieving the 0.7 per cent ODA target no later than 2015; and to consider other innovative sources of finance for development to supplement the Facility in the longer term;
- Decide to launch a series of "quick win" initiatives so as to realize major immediate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals through such measures as the free distribution of malaria bednets and effective antimalaria medicines, the expansion of home-grown school meals programmes using locally produced foods and the elimination of user fees for primary education and health services;
- Ensure that the international community urgently provides the resources needed for an expanded and comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS, as identified by UNAIDS and its partners, and full funding for the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria;
- Reaffirm gender equality and the need to overcome pervasive gender bias by increasing primary school completion and secondary school access for girls, ensuring secure tenure of property to women, ensuring access to reproductive health services, promoting equal access to labour markets, providing opportunity for greater representation in government decision-making bodies, and supporting direct interventions to protect women from violence;
- Recognize the need for significantly increased international support for scientific research and development to address the special needs of the poor in the areas of health, agriculture, natural resource and environmental management, energy and climate;
- Ensure concerted global action to mitigate climate change, including through technological innovation, and therefore resolve to develop a more inclusive international framework for climate change beyond 2012, with broader participation by all major emitters and both developing and developed countries, taking into account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities;
- Resolve to establish a worldwide early warning system for all natural hazards, building on existing national and regional capacity;

- Freedom from fear
  - In order to provide effective collective security in the twenty-first century, I urge Heads of State and Government to pledge concerted action against the whole range of threats to international peace and security, and in particular to:
  - Affirm and commit themselves to implementing a new security consensus based on the recognition that threats are interlinked, that development, security and human rights are mutually interdependent, that no State can protect itself acting entirely alone and that all States need an equitable, efficient and effective collective security system; and therefore commit themselves to agreeing on, and implementing, comprehensive strategies for confronting the whole range of threats, from international war through weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, State collapse and civil conflict to deadly infectious disease, extreme poverty and the destruction of the environment;
  - Pledge full compliance with all articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention in order to further strengthen the multilateral framework for non-proliferation and disarmament, and in particular:
    - Resolve to bring to an early conclusion negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty;
    - Reaffirm their commitment to a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to the objective of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty;

    - Resolve to adopt the Model Additional Protocol as the norm for verifying compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
    - Commit themselves to expediting agreement on alternatives, consistent with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons principles of the right to peaceful uses and the obligations for non-proliferation, to the acquisition of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities;
    - Commit themselves to further strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;
    - Urge all chemical-weapon States to expedite the scheduled destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles;
- Develop legally binding international instruments to regulate the marking, tracing and illicit brokering of small arms and light weapons; and ensure the effective monitoring and enforcement of United Nations arms embargoes;
- Affirm that no cause or grievance, no matter how legitimate, justifies the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants; and declare that any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, constitutes an act of terrorism;
- Resolve to implement the comprehensive United Nations counterterrorism strategy presented by the Secretary-General to dissuade people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; deny terrorists access to funds and materials; deter States from sponsoring terrorism; develop State capacity to defeat terrorism; and defend human rights;
- Resolve to accede to all 12 international conventions against terrorism; and instruct their representatives to:
    - Conclude a convention on nuclear terrorism as a matter of urgency;
    - Conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly;
- Commit themselves to acceding, as soon as possible, to all relevant international conventions on organized crime and corruption, and take all necessary steps to implement them effectively, including by incorporating the provisions of those conventions into national legislation and strengthening criminal justice systems;
- Request the Security Council to adopt a resolution on the use of force that sets out principles for the use of force and expresses its intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of force; such principles should include: a reaffirmation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations with respect to the use of force, including those of Article 51; a reaffirmation of the central role of the Security Council in the area of peace and security; a reaffirmation of the right of the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and security, including in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity; and the need to consider — when contemplating whether to authorize or endorse the use of force — the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the proposed military action, whether means short of the use of force might reasonably succeed in stopping the threat, whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand and whether there is a reasonable chance of success;
- Agree to establish a Peacebuilding Commission along the lines suggested in the present report, and agree to establish and support a voluntary standing fund for peacebuilding;
- Create strategic reserves for United Nations peacekeeping; support the efforts by the European Union, the African Union and others to establish standby capacities as part of an

interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities; and establish a United Nations civilian police standby capacity;

- Ensure that Security Council sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced, including by strengthening the capacity of Member States to implement sanctions, establishing well resourced monitoring mechanisms, and ensuring effective and accountable mechanisms to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions.

- Freedom to live in dignity
  - I urge Heads of State and Government to recommit themselves to supporting the rule of law, human rights and democracy — principles at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To this end, they should:
  - Reaffirm their commitment to human dignity by action to strengthen the rule of law, ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and promote democracy so that universally recognized principles are implemented in all countries;
  - Embrace the "responsibility to protect" as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and agree to act on this responsibility, recognizing that this responsibility lies first and foremost with each individual State, whose duty it is to protect its population, but that if national authorities are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect civilian populations, and that if such methods appear insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter, including enforcement action, if so required;
  - Support the 2005 treaty event, focusing on 31 multilateral treaties, and encourage any Government that has not done so to agree to ratify and implement all treaties relating to the protection of civilians;
  - Commit themselves to supporting democracy in their own countries, their regions and the world, and resolve to strengthen the United Nations capacity to assist emerging democracies, and to that end welcome the creation of a Democracy Fund at the United Nations to provide funding and technical assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen their democracy;
  - Recognize the important role of the International Court of Justice in adjudicating disputes among countries and agree to consider means to strengthen the work of the Court.
- The imperative for collective action: strengthening the United Nations
  - To make the United Nations a more effective and efficient instrument for forging a united response to shared threats and shared needs, I urge Heads of State and Government to:
  - Reaffirm the broad vision of the founders of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, for it to be organized, resourced and equipped to address the full range of challenges confronting the peoples of the world across the broad fields of security, economic and social issues, and human rights, and in that spirit to commit themselves to reforming, restructuring and revitalizing its major organs and institutions, where necessary, to enable them to respond effectively to the changed threats, needs and circumstances of the twenty-first century;
  - Revitalize the General Assembly by:
    - Instructing their representatives to adopt, at its sixtieth session, a comprehensive package of reforms to revitalize the General Assembly, including by rationalizing its work and speeding up the deliberative process, streamlining its agenda, its committee structure and its procedures for plenary debates and requesting reports, and strengthening the role and authority of its President;

- Resolving to give focus to the substantive agenda of the General Assembly by concentrating on addressing the major substantive issues of the day, such as international migration and the long-debated comprehensive convention on terrorism;
- Establishing mechanisms enabling the Assembly to engage fully and systematically with civil society;

- Reform the Security Council to make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole and the geopolitical realities of today, and to expand its membership to meet these goals, by:
  - Supporting the principles for the reform of the Council and considering the two options, models A and B, proposed in the present report, as well as any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either model;
  - Agreeing to take a decision on this important issue before the summit in September 2005. It would be far preferable for Member States to take this vital decision by consensus. If, however, they are unable to reach consensus, this must not become an excuse for postponing action;
- Reform the Economic and Social Council by:
  - Mandating the Economic and Social Council to hold annual ministerial-level assessments of progress towards agreed development goals, particularly the Millennium Development Goals;
  - Deciding that it should serve as a high-level development cooperation forum, reviewing trends in international development cooperation, promoting greater coherence among the development activities of different actors and strengthening the links between the normative and operational work of the United Nations;
  - Encouraging it to convene timely meetings, as required, to assess threats to development, such as famines, epidemics and major natural disasters, and to promote coordinated responses to them;
  - Deciding that the Council should regularize its work in post-conflict management by working with the proposed Peacebuilding Commission;
- Agree to replace the Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights Council, as a principal organ of the United Nations or subsidiary body of the General Assembly, whose members would be elected directly by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting;
- Reform the Secretariat by:
  - Endorsing the Secretary-General's request that the General Assembly review all mandates older than five years to see if the activities concerned are still genuinely needed or whether resources assigned to them can be reallocated in response to new and emerging challenges;
  - Agreeing to provide the Secretary-General with the authority and resources to pursue a one-time staff buyout so as to refresh and realign the staff to meet current needs;
  - Deciding that Member States should work with the Secretary-General to undertake a comprehensive review of the budget and human resources rules under which the Organization operates;
  - Endorsing the package of management reforms that the Secretary-General is undertaking to improve accountability, transparency and efficiency within the Secretariat;
  - Commissioning a comprehensive review of the Office of Internal Oversight Services with a view to strengthening its independence and authority, as well as its expertise and capacity;

- Ensure stronger system-wide coherence by resolving to coordinate their representatives on the governing boards of the various development and humanitarian agencies so as to make sure that they pursue a coherent policy in assigning mandates and allocating resources throughout the system;
- Commit themselves to protecting humanitarian space and ensuring that humanitarian actors have safe and unimpeded access to vulnerable populations; resolve to act on proposals to accelerate humanitarian response by developing new funding arrangements to ensure that emergency funding is available immediately; and support the Secretary-General's effort to strengthen the inter-agency and country-level responses to the needs of internally displaced persons;
- Recognize the need for a more integrated structure for environmental standard-setting, scientific discussion and monitoring, and treaty compliance that is built on existing institutions, such as UNEP, as well as the treaty bodies and specialized agencies, and that assigns environmental activities at the operational level to the development agencies to ensure an integrated approach to sustainable development;
- Support a stronger relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, including by, as a first step, developing and implementing a 10-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union, and by ensuring that regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping consider the option of placing such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;
- Decide to eliminate the references to "enemy States" contained in Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter of the United Nations; to delete Article 47 on the Military Staff Committee and the references to the Committee contained in Articles 26, 45 and 46; and to delete Chapter XIII on The Trusteeship Council.

Mandating and delivering: analysis and recommendations to facilitate the review of mandates

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN.
- **Type:** Strategy/framework (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Mandating and delivering: analysis and recommendations to facilitate the review of mandates*
- **Dates:** Report released, March 2018; panel established, April 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Global governance reform.
- **Aspirations:** Short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (N/A – see throughout document).

STANDALONE REPORTS

Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325

- **Convenors and/or authors:** UN Women.
- **Type:** Standalone report (UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single document – *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*
- **Dates:** Report released, March 2018; panel established, April 2016.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Political violence.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:**
  - Women's Participation and a Better Understanding of the Political
    - The UN should:
    - Include a specific responsibility drafted into the Terms of Reference of every mediator and envoy, every SRSG and Deputy SRSG, to advance women's engagement in national decision-making processes, and specifically all aspects of conflict resolution, power-sharing, national dialogue and reconciliation.
    - Ensure that UN-appointed mediators and special envoys report on their consultations and outreach to women's groups in line with Security Council resolution 2122 (2013).
    - Member States, the UN, and the international community should:
    - Ensure that all actors, mediators, Friends Groups, and parties to the conflict guarantee that women's participation in talks is equal and meaningful, and barriers to their participation, whether these exist in law or in practice, are completely eliminated.
    - Desist from any use of observer status as a substitute for real and effective participation. Women should not be on the sidelines observing, but an integral part of negotiations and decision-making on the future of their country.
    - Invest in developing tools that examine the gendered impacts of various outcomes of peace talks, whether they be federalism, constitution-making, transitional justice, power sharing, or cease fire provisions.
    - Commit to mediate between women's organizations and dominant national political leaders to encourage national political actors, including leaders of belligerent parties, to include women in their delegations and to address women's concerns in their negotiations. Member states in contact groups supporting specific peace processes could offer the negotiating parties various incentives to do this—training, logistical support, or adding delegate seats for example.
    - Commit to include agenda items on women's participation in meetings with Groups of Friends and other facilitators of national dialogue, including organizing meetings between representatives of national women's organizations and the Member States making up Groups of Friends.
    - For each process, develop and fund a strategy of long-term support to build the capacity of women's networks to engage in political dialogue, strengthen the gender awareness of mediators, facilitators and conflict parties, address practical issues that may limit women's engagement – from granular details such as procedures for circulation of agenda and materials to bigger issues like the use of local languages, and protect women activists from potential backlash.
    - Advocate for and support inclusive and transparent selection criteria for women at negotiations or beyond, including for example ensuring women's participation in the leadership committees of peace talks, national dialogues, and consultative forums; and creating formal mechanisms to transfer women's demands to the negotiation table.

- Support women's engagement and participation not just in peace talks, but in preventive diplomacy and the monitoring and implementation of agreements. This should be extended to both the preparatory and implementation phases of peace processes and political transitions, rather than limited to a given round of negotiations or national dialogue.
- On the part of Member States, increase the number of women in their Foreign Service and national security establishments, and take steps to ensure that women diplomats are engaged in leadership roles in conflict resolution.
- Mediators and Special Envoys should:
- Assume a specific responsibility to advise all parties to dialogue/peace talks/constitutional reform about the value of temporary special measures to increase the numbers of women on negotiating parties. At the same time, the mediator/envoy's office must advise national women's organizations of the range of temporary special measures available and their effectiveness in other contexts.
- Commit to meet with representatives of a cross-section of women's organizations within the first 30 days of any deployment, and to follow this with periodic (at least four times a year), scheduled, and minuted meetings. These meetings will be used not only to hear women's perspectives on conflict resolution, but also to provide women's groups with information about opportunities to engage in upcoming dialogue, donor conferences, and informal and formal peace processes.
- Commit to raise, as a matter of course and routine, specific gender issues for inclusion in ceasefires and peace talks, such as the prevention of sexual violence, justice for gender crimes, temporary special measures for women's political engagement, specific gender quotas in the leadership of post-conflict commissions to implement the peace accord, and gender-specific provisions in administrative and economic recovery arrangements (including women's land access and property rights). For example, military power sharing should focus not just on merging armies and command structures, but also putting in place rights protections, civilian and democratic accountability, and ensuring women's representation throughout. Territorial power-sharing should include protection for women's rights and participation at the sub-national level, with attention paid to the relationship between women's rights and local customary and traditional laws.
- Commit to include a gender advisor on the mediation team as well as to include women who are experts in political analysis and other areas covered by the team.
- Recognize that women's participation does not mean that they are solely responsible for women's issues, but that they are allowed to participate and be decision-makers on the full range of issues involved in the peace process.
- Commit to ensure that technical experts on a mediators' team are trained on the gender-related aspects of their technical area.
- Ensure that they themselves have the relevant technical knowledge on the impact of women's participation and the skills to support effective inclusion.

- Protecting and Promoting the Rights and Leadership of Women and Girls in Humanitarian Settings
  - Member States should:
  - Remove discriminatory laws and regulations that impede full equality in accessing basic rights and services during and after conflict – including the rights to life, health, education, property and livelihood – and remove discriminatory laws and regulations that impede full equality in accessing basic rights and services, including the right to nationality.
  - Member States and the UN should:

- Ensure that preparations for and outcomes of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit have gender equality and women's human rights as a focus area as well as integrated throughout the other themes.
- Donors, including Member States and private foundations, should:
- Expressly mandate that all programmes adopt and apply the Gender Marker and relevant IASC guidance on gender and gender-based violence interventions in humanitarian settings throughout the entire project cycle and require it in all funding applications.
- Increase current levels of targeted funding for women's and girls' programming to a minimum of 15 per cent. Current levels of approximately 1 per cent funding for local women's organizations, including women's human rights defenders, should be increased until they reach at least 5 per cent in the next three years, before setting progressively more ambitious targets in the following years. Funding for core operations, advocacy and capacity building should match funding for projects.
- Fund the establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism run by women's civil society groups and women's human rights defenders to track the compliance of humanitarian assistance with normative frameworks and standards and international human rights law as well as performance on gender equality - from the collection of sex-disaggregated data and gender-sensitive analysis to the systematic application of the Gender Marker and the engagement of local women.
- Invest in translating all relevant tools on sexual and reproductive health and prevention and response to sexual and gender-based violence into local languages to ensure local engagement and sustainability. Translations and long-term capacity building should be prioritized over the repetitive production of new tools, strategies, guidelines and advocacy campaigns from capitals in donor countries.
- The UN and NGOs should:
- Commit to create a humanitarian workforce that is 50 per cent women and 100 per cent trained in gender equality programming and the protection of women's human rights.
- The UN should:
- Ensure that UN Women is a member of all relevant high-level inter-agency forums on peace and security and humanitarian response, including the IASC and the Senior Advisory Group on peace and security, to ensure a gender perspective is mainstreamed throughout the UN's response in conflict and emergencies.
- All relevant actors, including Member States, the UN, donors, and civil society, should:
- Ensure that all global humanitarian and local healthcare workers are trained in basic life-saving sexual and reproductive health care, in accordance with international human rights standards, as well as emergency response for survivors of domestic and sexual violence, including emergency contraception and abortion/post-abortion services. Increased investment must be made in local health systems' ability to provide quality sexual and reproductive health and care for survivors and to put in place referral pathways to specialist care in all fragile settings.
- Ensure that women affected by humanitarian crises, including refugees, internally displaced and stateless women, are supported to participate meaningfully and equally in community decision-making, in leadership roles and in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian interventions. Obstacles to their participation should be addressed within programme design.

- Toward an Era of Transformative Justice
  - Member States, the UN and civil society should:
  - Adopt a transformative justice approach to programming for women's access to justice, including by developing interventions that support legal orders to challenge the underlying

socio-cultural norms and contexts of inequality that perpetuate discrimination against women, and enable conflict-related violations to occur.
    - Ensure that accountability mechanisms mandated to prevent and respond to extremist violence have the necessary gender expertise to do so, in light of the escalating rate of deliberate attacks on women's rights, including SGBV, by extremist groups.
    - Collaborate on the design and implementation of legal empowerment initiatives that build women's confidence and access to legal systems, and enable women to be active participants in navigating them.
    - Support grassroots women to lead and engage with traditional justice mechanisms.
    - Member States and the UN should:
    - Invest in strengthening national justice systems to investigate and prosecute international crimes, including SGBV, in accordance with the principle of complementarity. This includes:
        - Supporting legal frameworks that incorporate definitions and elements of SGBV crimes, procedures for victim and witness support, and provisions for reparations, in line with international standards, including the Rome Statute;
        - Working together and providing expertise to ensure States have the technical capacity to investigate and prosecute conflict-related SGBV.
    - Civil society should:
    - Advocate for State ratification and domestic implementation of the Rome Statute; and adoption of national legislation in line with international standards on women's rights, including specific legislation on SGBV crimes.
    - Member States and the UN should:
    - Invest in the design and implementation of gender-sensitive transitional justice measures that recognize and respond to women's experiences of conflict, and their justice and accountability needs.
    - Prioritize the design and implementation of gender-sensitive reparations programmes with transformative impact, including through implementing the Guidance Note of the Secretary General on Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.
    - Institute specific measures to ensure the active participation of women and civil society organizations in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of transitional justice mechanisms, so as to guarantee that women's experience of the conflict is included, their particular needs and priorities are met, and all violations suffered are addressed.
    - Invest in gender-responsive capacity building of the justice sector by:
        - Providing gender-sensitive training for all justice sector actors—especially those involved in justice-related service delivery including traditional leaders, health professionals and police; and
        - Supporting increasing the participation of women at all levels in justice service delivery, across both formal and informal systems, through measures that can include quotas and support to women's legal education, including scholarships.
    - Member States should:
    - Ensure constitutional equality guarantees apply to all laws and justice systems, in line with international law.
- Keeping the Peace in an Increasingly Militarized World
    - Member States should:
    - Set specific targets for the improved recruitment, retention, and promotion of women in their armed forces and the leadership of security institutions.
    - Ensure that every soldier they deploy is thoroughly vetted, trained, and held accountable for their actions, including when they abuse or exploit women and girls.

- Commit to doctrines and planning that takes into account the impact on women and girls of every military deployment and operation, and that considers the use of unarmed military protection as a preferable or complementary protection method, where appropriate.
- The UN, in collaboration with Member States, should:
- Encourage Member States to deploy more female military officers to UN peacekeeping missions by adopting financial incentives, such as a gender-balance premium.
- Ensure gender-responsive budgeting and financial tracking of investments on gender equality in missions by requesting peacekeeping budget experts and planning officers, along with gender-responsive budget experts, to review mission budgets and make a recommendation on methodology and capacity needed.
- Ensure that all UN peacekeepers are provided scenario-based training on issues related to gender equality—from gender mainstreaming in peace operations to preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence—by calling on Member States to invest in the capacity of national peacekeeping training centers from the largest troop contributing countries, so that they become permanent features in their pre-deployment training curriculum.
- Address impunity and lack of assistance for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by fully implementing the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and the Secretary-General's recent annual report on sexual exploitation and abuse. In addition:
  - Countries that repeatedly fail to live up to their written assurances to investigate and prosecute their soldiers should not be allowed to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions.
  - If the United Nations has obtained prima facie evidence of misconduct, the home country of the alleged perpetrator should be under the obligation to prosecute, and if they don't, they should be obligated to provide a detailed explanation of their findings.
  - The United Nations should empower an independent commission of inquiry to conduct a broad-based investigation on sexual exploitation and abuse and the handling of allegations by both member states and the UN itself, including the failure to systematically apply many of the powers that it already has to hold individuals accountable for their actions.
  - Consider engaging with States in support of establishing an international tribunal with jurisdiction to try UN staff and all categories of peacekeepers that have allegedly committed serious crimes, including sexual abuse.
  - Make concrete proposals on the ground about how to fund Victims Assistance Mechanisms and render them operational, including from pooled funds in each country similar or from the operating budget of the entities that employ the accused.
- Take steps to improve regulation and oversight of all private contractors hired by the United Nations with regards to sexual exploitation and abuse. The UN should revise and fully implement guidelines to regulate these companies, including through permanent or temporary debarment of companies from further contracts and keeping a centralized register of companies whose staff have repeatedly been linked to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.
- Promote women's empowerment and non-violent means of protection, and taking into account the whole range of women's protection issues and the interventions to address them—including women's leadership and women's empowerment—in mission planning, implementation, and reporting, as well as in policy discussions on the protection of civilians in the context of peace operations.

- Scale up their support to unarmed civilian protection (UCP) in conflict-affected countries, including working alongside peace operations.

- Building Peaceful and Inclusive Societies in the Aftermath of Conflict
  - Member States and the UN should:
  - Ensure that all local level peacebuilding efforts are preceded by mapping exercises to ascertain what programmes are relevant for communities affected by war, and which will most effectively empower women. There should not be a one-size-fits-all policy.
  - Member States should:
  - Consult with local women leaders, including women's human rights defenders, on concessions agreements negotiated as part of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and ensure a minimum level of 30 per cent women's representation in all decision-making bodies with regards to the country's natural resources.
  - Incorporate a gender-sensitive approach in SSR and DDR, ensuring that not only are these responsive to women's particular experience of conflict, but that women fully participate, and their rights and perspectives are adequately addressed.
  - Develop and implement strategies to increase participation and leadership of women within armed forces, police services, defense institutions, the penal system and the judiciary.
  - Ensure that security sector reform fosters family-friendly and non-discriminatory work environments free of all forms of harassment and violence within the security sector, in order to increase the participation, retention and promotion of female personnel.
  - Vet candidates for new or re-forming armed and police services for crimes of sexual violence and other violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, giving particular attention to confidentiality and protection of victims of sexual violence.
  - The UN should:
  - Design programmes for economic recovery that target women's empowerment, challenge rather than entrench gender stereotypes, and are forward looking on the transformative role women can play in an economy for the future.
  - Design programmes with meaningful participation and end-benefit in mind for rural women, widows, and female heads of households.
  - Develop and use gender-sensitive tools that would map and analyze local contexts and markets to implement livelihood activities that are locally relevant, conflict sensitive, and that empower women instead of further pushing them into poverty.
  - Develop guidance on post-conflict macroeconomic policies that take into account gender dimensions, and prioritize public expenditure to reconstruct vital services for women.
  - Design economic recovery programmes and macroeconomic policies in a gender-responsive manner and evaluate their impact on women's economic security and human rights.
  - Continue to ensure that technical assistance to post-conflict elections includes advice on temporary special measures. Elections basket funds should allocate a minimum of 15 per cent of their funding to women's participation. Elections bodies should be supported to develop capacity in gender-sensitive data collection and the management of sex-disaggregated data.
  - Provide technical assistance to public administration reform, to assist governments to implement schemes to achieve gender parity in civil service.
  - Facilitate grassroots women's organizations and women human rights defenders' access to participate in the planning and delivery of basic services in crisis contexts, taking into consideration the implications for women's security and their often disproportionate burdens of care.
  - Include gender analysis and full consideration of women's human rights in SSR /DDR planning and implementation, so that entry requirements do not inhibit women's access,

and that reintegration opportunities do not further entrench harmful gender stereotypes and gender-based discrimination, or violate women's human rights.
    - (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) Should ensure gender-responsive DDR/SSR are integrated in mission planning with dedicated funding, gender expertise, and regular reporting on gender-responsive DDR and SSR in mission reports and briefings to the Security Council.
    - Ensure female uniformed personnel in all UN peace missions participate in the implementation of DDR/ SSR programs, as they can play a key role in confidence-building, especially in screening activities and providing security in demobilization sites.
    - Member States and the UN should:
    - Make effective and meaningful participation of women in decision-making and planning a condition of any UN-supported economic recovery programme.
    - Design, implement and monitor economic recovery programmes and macroeconomic policies in a gender-responsive manner, and evaluate them for their impact on women's economic security.
    - Provide leadership capacity-building opportunities to national and local women leaders.
    - Facilitate the participation of women leaders and organizations in all stages of DDR/SSR. Engagement should be with the entire spectrum of actors involved in SSR, including customary and religious leaders, private military and security companies, security sector oversight actors and the penal system. They should also engage men and boys to strengthen gender equality within DDR and SSR processes, and prevent and respond to human rights violations, including sexual abuse.
    - Post-Conflict Member States should:
    - Adopt legislative and policy measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country, and to ensure that women have equal opportunities to participate in the new, post-conflict structures of governance. This includes the adoption of temporary special measures to accelerate achievement of gender equality in all decision-making posts.
    - Establish quotas for women of a minimum of 40 per cent of service delivery employment opportunities at local level.
    - Provide women and girls with identity documents as a matter of priority during and after conflict, in order to register to vote, access land and avail themselves of social services and benefits, including education and health services.
    - Adopt service delivery measures that specifically target women and take into account the often-disproportionate burden that women face in caregiving responsibilities, including child grants for households; education incentives for girls; free and accessible healthcare of good quality, including sexual and reproductive health, for pregnant mothers and young children; and other measures designed to alleviate the burden of unpaid work and family care.
    - The UN and other service providers should:
    - Ensure reintegration processes respond to trauma and improve the availability and quality of psychosocial support services.
    - Member States, parties to conflict and mediation teams should:
    - Include capacity on gender and DDR/SSR in the negotiation of formal peace negotiations to ensure women's participation in DDR programmes.
- Preventing Conflict: Peaceful Solutions to Operational and Structural Challenges
    - Member States should:

- As a part of States Parties' obligations to implement the Arms Trade Treaty's provision on gender-based violence (Art. 7(4)), require arms producing corporations to monitor and report on the use of their arms in violence against women.
- Meet all Sustainable Development Goals—including goal 5 on gender equality, goal 10 on reducing inequalities within and among countries, and goal 16 on peaceful inclusive societies—ensuring that women and girls benefit equitably from achievement, and prioritizing their consultation and participation in the implementation, monitoring and accountability of programmes relating to the sustainable development agenda.
- Adopt gender-responsive budgeting practices, including through consultation with civil society, as a strategy to address, highlight and mitigate militarized state budgets and their destabilizing impact on international peace and security and women's rights.
- Work with civil society to develop or revise national action plans for the implementation of resolution 1325 to, as relevant, address the role of climate-related resource scarcity and natural disaster response in exacerbating conflict, and provide inclusive solutions to climate and resource-related insecurity.
- Develop gender-sensitive natural resource management policies.
- Member States, the UN and civil society should:
- Provide financial, technical and political support to encourage educational and leadership training for men, women, boys and girls, which reinforces and supports non-violent, non-militarized expressions of masculinity.
- Devise educational strategies that lead to a culture of non-violent resolution of conflict in the home and in public spaces.
- Work with the private sector to develop and use new technologies which increase women's physical security and strengthen conflict prevention.
- Support the collection of data on the gender digital divide, and the factors inhibiting and promoting women and girls' access to ICTs, particularly in conflict-affected and fragile settings.
- Collaborate, including through financial, technical and political support, to strengthen the capacity of women's civil society to organize and play a greater role in national and community-led election monitoring and electoral violence prevention, dispute resolution and mediation initiatives.
- Work in partnership with affected women and girls when designing, implementing and monitoring climate-change and natural resource-related strategies, in order to harness their local knowledge and community-level networks for information-sharing.
- Civil Society should:
- Produce benchmark tools, with a gender perspective, for monitoring the initiatives taken by arms producing corporations on responsibility for the use of arms.
- Member States, the UN, regional and international organizations should:
- Include women's participation, gender-responsive indicators and sexual and gender-based violence related indicators (including conflict-related sexual violence) in all early-warning processes, conflict prevention and early-response efforts, with links to official channels for response at the local, national, regional and international level.
- Support further collection of data and awareness-raising on causalities between gender inequalities, levels of violence against women and the potential for violent conflict.
- The UN should:
- Fully implement the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations pertaining to mediation, ensuring consultation with civil society and women and girls in conflict-affected areas.

    - Develop new strategies to include the women, peace and security agenda more systematically in its wider preventive diplomacy work, including in early warning mechanisms, insider mediation, and building infrastructure for peace.
- Countering Violent Extremism while Respecting the Rights and Autonomy of Women and their Communities
    - Member States, the UN and regional organizations should:
    - Detach programming on women's rights from counter-terrorism and extremism, and all military planning and military processes. Any effort at empowering them should be through civilian assistance to the women themselves or to development and human rights agencies.
    - Protect women's and girls' rights at all times and ensure that efforts to counter violent extremism strategies do not stereotype, instrumentalize or securitize women and girls.
    - Work with local women and institutions to engage women at all levels, and allow local women autonomy and leadership in determining their priorities and strategies in countering extremism.
    - Member States, the UN, regional organizations and civil society should:
    - Build the capacity of women and girls, including mothers, female community and religious leaders, and women's civil society groups to engage in efforts to counter violent extremism in a manner tailored to local contexts. This can include the provision of specialized training; facilitating; training of women religious leaders to work as mentors in their communities; increasing women's access to secular and religious education to amplify their voices against extremist narratives; and supporting mother's schools. All this capacity building should again be through civilian agencies and with women peacebuilders deciding the priorities and the content of their programmes.
    - Invest in research and data collection on women's roles in terrorism including identifying the drivers that lead to their radicalization and involvement with terrorist groups; and the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on their lives. This should include the impact of counter-terrorism laws and regulations on the operation of women's civil society organizations, and their access to resources to undertake activities relating to countering violent extremism.
    - Ensure gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluation of all counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism interventions. This should specifically address the impact on women and girls, including through use of gender-related indicators and collection of sex-disaggregated data.
    - Member States and the UN should:
    - Develop gender-sensitive disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration programs that address the specific needs of women and girls. Draw upon the lessons learned from disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) initiatives under the women, peace and security agenda.
    - The UN should:
    - Ensure accountability mechanisms and processes mandated to prevent and respond to extremist violence have the necessary gender expertise to fulfill their mandates.
- Key Actors: Member States
    - All relevant actors—Member States, civil society, donors, and multilateral agencies—should:
    - Document best practices, and promote and adopt global standards for the design, monitoring and implementation of high-impact NAPs, and other women, peace and security domestication tools, building on lessons learned across the areas of: a) leadership and coordination, b) inclusion and collaboration with civil society, c) costing and financing; d) monitoring and evaluation, and e) flexibility and adaptability of plans.

- Strengthen national and global reporting mechanisms for monitoring progress in the development and implementation of NAPs, to enhance transparency and facilitate exchange of learning, and scale up good practice.
- Member States should:
- Support and invest in participatory processes, social accountability tools and localization initiatives to link global, national and local efforts and ensure the voices of the most affected and marginalized populations inform and shape relevant responses and monitoring of progress.
- Provide capacity building and support the development, financing, implementation and monitoring of NAPs in conflict-affected countries that lack the resources to initiate and sustain a NAP development and implementation process, through partnerships, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation, and with civil society.
- The UN should:
- Facilitate the establishment, by the UN Standing Committee on Women, Peace and Security, of a comprehensive and accessible database of NAPs to share good practices, lessons learned, and ensure transparency and accountability.
- Ensure the proposed new Assistant Secretary-General for Crisis and Conflict role at UN Women includes a specific focus on monitoring and reporting on NAPs.

- Key Actors: Regional Organizations
  - Member States should:
  - Ensure adequate funding and political will to effectively implement regional policies and action plans on women, peace and security, as well as other interrelated policies, sector-specific action plans and strategies.
  - Regional organizations should:
  - Appoint high-level women, peace and security representatives to drive implementation at the regional level, building on the experience of the AU and NATO.
  - Establish channels for women leaders and civil society organizations to systematically contribute to the conflict-prevention and peacebuilding work of regional organizations, including by establishing regional advisory bodies of women peace leaders.
  - Build regional capacity for monitoring and reporting on progress in the implementation of the WPS agenda.
  - Increase engagement and interaction with international and regional human rights mechanisms to ensure full consideration of women's human rights, a central component of the WPS agenda.
  - Establish a network of women's human rights and gender advisors and focal points to further mainstream gender perspectives across all work streams.
  - Regional organizations and the UN should:
  - Collaborate to establish avenues for cross-learning and information exchange on gender-sensitive priorities and concerns pertaining to the implementation of the WPS agenda, including by integrating these issues in joint dialogues and intergovernmental meetings on cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in the areas of peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding—such as the regularly scheduled meetings between the UN Security Council and AU and EU.
- Key Actors: the United Nations
  - Harmonize, strengthen and refine existing monitoring and accountability frameworks (specifically strategic frameworks and indicators) on women, peace and security and humanitarian action by:

- Building on monitoring experience to date and taking into account new developments in gender statistics, information management systems and emerging priorities.
- Eliminating duplication and focusing on issues of outmost relevance to achieving commitments.
- Ensuring measurability of indicators, feasibility of data collection, and attaching to each indicator jointly agreed methodological guidelines that are in line with international statistical standards.
- Designing and setting up clear reporting mechanisms and enforcing periodic reporting requirements from key actors.
- Integrating system-wide women, peace and security commitments into policies, strategies, planning documents and monitoring and evaluation tools of all UN entities working in conflict and post-conflict settings.
- Strengthening financial and technical capacity of UN entities—including in field missions and country teams—to regularly collect, analyze and report women, peace and security statistics in coordination with national statistical systems where relevant, and to use women, peace and security statistics to inform reports, statements, programme planning, budgeting and implementation.
- Sharing gender-specific information in code cables, periodic updates, data reporting mechanisms and early warning systems amongst all key actors, including UN field missions and country teams in a timely manner.
- Accelerate action to reach the Organizations staffing gender parity goal at all levels, by:
- Removing obstacles to the recruitment, promotion and retention of women staff in all categories and levels, and—with the support of Member States— investing in the implementation of recommendations put forward in previous reviews and in reports of the Secretary-General on the improvement in the status of the representation of women in the UN system.
- Integrating gender-balance targets as an indicator of individual performance in all compacts with senior management. The gender-balance targets in the HRM scorecard should be reviewed every quarter at the senior level by mission and country teams.
- Investing in making mission life and spaces more friendly and safe for women (e.g. special family or leave arrangements for women, adequate and appropriate mission facilities for women, from accommodation quarters and sanitary facilities to welfare and recreational spaces and activities, special medical and gynecological care), and making contract benefits better known to potential women candidates, as well as improving outreach and communications activities regarding life and work in peacekeeping missions.
- Facilitating women's representation among national staff contracts in missions through better childcare policies and facilities, and revising experience requirements in countries where women have limited education opportunities or access to the workforce.
- Actively mentor and groom women in P2-P4 posts to promote career advancement and prepare them for management positions.
- Introducing greater flexibility in some requirements until parity is reached: for example, allowing for current P5s to be directly eligible for D2 positions if they are eligible for D1 positions, and for D1s to be eligible to apply for ASG positions; reconsidering the non-reversion policy, by which staff at the D2 level are asked to relinquish their right to return to their parent UN organization when assuming head and deputy head of mission positions for a limited duration.
- Auditing missions who have remained stagnant or regressed, instituting a system of sanctions and rewards for performing and under-performing missions, and holding leaders accountable for progress or lack of progress with regards to gender targets.

- Since many of the women that leave the organization may have partners but no children, providing full consideration to adding a third category of duty stations that are conducive for couples without children, or staff with healthy adult dependents.
- Ensuring all review processes integrate a gender perspective, and appoint more women to High-Level Reviews and panels.
- Make senior leadership accountable for implementing women, peace and security commitments, including recommendations put forward in this Study, through:
- Inclusion of concrete performance measures in senior managers' Compacts between the Secretary-General and his/her Special Envoys, Representatives, Advisors and other Senior Managers, and revision of senior managers' Terms of Reference to reflect women, peace and security as a key priority. This should include Resident Coordinators in conflict-affected countries
- Full compliance with the UN-SWAP commitments demonstrated by marked progress across all indicators by the 2017 deadline.
- Routine inclusion of gender, conflict and crisis analysis in thematic and country-specific briefings and reports to the Security Council and other key UN bodies.
- Ensure the presence of gender expertise in missions at the senior decision-making level and all relevant substantive units, by placing Senior Gender Advisors in all peace operations missions, from the outset and for the whole duration of missions, situated directly in the office of the SRSG, supported by hybrid gender expertise in each of the technical units of the mission (e.g. rule of law, human rights, DDR, SSR, elections).
- (Member States should) invest in DPKO and DPA gender units at HQ, to increase the resources, seniority and number of staff, ensuring a minimum number of posts are included in the regular budget and giving due consideration to the placement of these units in the Office of the USG.
- (Member States should) invest in strengthened UN Women country offices in conflict-affected contexts to further inter alia support to women's organizations, women's leaders, and strengthen the UN's implementation of women, peace and security commitments.
- Strengthen the UN's gender architecture to promote women's full participation in efforts to advance peace and security by expanding the support base for gender work within the missions, and maximize the impact of existing resources, by establishing a formal cooperation arrangement between DPKO, DPA, UN Women so that existing missions have access to UN Women's technical, political and policy expertise. Through this arrangement, UN Women would bring its existing resources, capacities, expertise, and staffing as the lead on women, peace and security to support the relevant components of peace operations missions.
- Pilot in two future missions: UN Women's more effective integration into missions—including in the strengthening of rosters, joint selection of staff, training, support through communities of practice, surge capacity and rapid deployments and technical support. The final say on recruitment would rest with the SRSG as well as accountability—there would be a single line of reporting to the SRSG with access to UN Women for information sharing, and gender staff should be backed technically and have a link to the entity responsible for gender equality. The model would carefully monitored and assessed on challenges and successes after 2 years.
- (The Secretariat should) explore the possibility of joint rosters with UN Women for rapid and targeted deployment of technical gender expertise, and open new avenues for using existing rosters managed by agencies, funds, and programmes.
- Establish the position of Assistant Secretary-General, with a dedicated budget, at UN Women, with responsibility for work in the area of conflict, crises and emergencies, under

the guidance of UN Women's Executive Director. This ASG would drive the implementation of the recommendations of this Study, help scale up the programming good practice described, and strengthen UN Women's field presence in conflict and emergency settings, with the support of Member States and partners.

- Key Actors: The Media
  - Media outlets should:
  - Commit to accurately portray women and men in all their diverse roles in conflict and post-conflict settings, including as agents of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding;
  - Increase women's representation and voice in newsrooms, in decision-making and leadership roles.
  - Monitor media content, including information which may harm or stigmatize victims of sexual violence in conflict, and take into account special protection measures when covering stories on women and children.
  - Create a code of ethics drafted by media personnel for media personnel as guidance with regard to sensitive issues.
  - Member States should:
  - Protect, when threatened, the reputations and lives of women and men human rights defenders and journalists by strengthening legal frameworks, providing security, and addressing impunity of perpetrators.
  - Develop and enforce laws and mechanisms to prevent, investigate and punish harassment, threats and hate speech published on internet and mobile platforms.
  - Appoint more women in state-owned media structures, and allocate funding to increase women's participation and leadership of media initiatives, including community radio, in fragile, conflict and post-conflict contexts.
  - All actors should:
  - Support initiatives to increase training on gender-sensitive reporting and how to use, produce and disseminate media materials, taking into consideration that some women have limited access to assets and ICT, and restrictions on mobility.
- Key Actors: Civil Society
  - The UN, regional organizations and their Member States should:
  - Institutionalize the participation and consultation of civil society and conflict-affected women, including from the grassroots, in local, national and global decision-making processes, including the development, implementation and monitoring of national action plans.
  - Ensure meaningful consultation and direct participation of women in peace processes, and ensure funding and security for their attendance at negotiations.
  - Establish, finance and support knowledge-sharing mechanisms to ensure timely and transparent sharing of information between civil society and government, with special efforts made to reach and engage local communities.
  - Create and maintain, in law and in practice, a safe and enabling environment ensuring access to justice, accountability, and end of impunity for human rights violations against civil society advocates and women human rights defenders, so they are able to operate free from hindrance and insecurity, and exercise fully their rights to freedom of opinion and expression, association and peaceful assembly.
  - Women's civil society organizations and movements should:
  - Build strategic alliances across civil society networks to strengthen constituencies and impact on emerging global, regional and national issues regarding human rights, sustainable development, and peace and security
  - Develop joint advocacy strategies.

- Broaden engagement with the multi-lateral system, in particular the Universal Periodic Review and treaty body mechanisms, to draw attention to implementation of the WPS agenda and the human rights elements that underpin it.

- Key Actors: Data and Statistics
  - International entities working on women, peace and security should:
  - Review and revise existing women, peace and security monitoring frameworks to eliminate overlap and enhance the measurability and relevance of indicators.
  - Establish, under the auspices of the UN Standing Committee on Women, Peace and Security, a partnership comprising international, regional and national data producers for the creation of an on-line gender, conflict and crisis database to bring together and disseminate available data.
  - Utilize the gender, conflict and crisis database to inform programming and to facilitate sharing of knowledge and good practice.
  - Further disseminate data through the use of an on-line repository.
  - Focus women, peace and security monitoring efforts towards measuring outcomes and impact on the ground by:
    - Providing technical and financial support to national statistical systems and civil society organizations working in coordination with these systems for the production of women, peace and security statistics;
    - Enhancing collaboration with existing statistical coordination mechanisms at the international level, including those within the auspices of the UN Statistical Commission and in preparation for SDG monitoring; and
    - Engaging statistical experts within relevant organizations.
  - National governments should:
  - Prioritize the production of national women, peace and security statistics, including by allocating sufficient financial, technical and human resources, integrating them into existing statistical efforts and ensuring their use for policy formulation.
  - Ensure relevant national statistics are systematically disaggregated by sex and other key variables and timely reported to the international statistical system.
  - Include gender statistics in work programmes of existing statistical coordination mechanisms working on issues related to governance, peace and security.

- The United Nations Security Council
  - The Security Council should:
  - Establish an informal expert group to maximize information, monitoring and support capacity from the UN system as a whole. Initially the Group should be focused on 3-4 countries. This would allow for a comprehensive and targeted approach to monitoring consistent implementation by the Council of resolution 2122, including ensuring that women, peace and security information is part of all briefings and reports to the Council and that questions are asked consistently of senior leaders on these issues.
  - Increase the channels for flow of information from the Human Rights Council and related bodies, including from mandate holders with conflict-relevant mandates, Commissions of Inquiry and other fact finding bodies, to provide important sources of information for Council deliberations and outcomes. More consistent approaches, including regular Arria-formula meetings between the Security Council and the Human Rights Council-established Commissions of Inquiry on countries of concern should be established.
  - Invite regular civil society briefings, including women's organizations in particular, not only on thematic but on country-specific deliberations.
  - Ensure greater and more effective capacity for gender analysis in conflict-affected countries (see UN Actors).

- Increase the reporting of dedicated high-level leadership within the UN system on women, peace and security from specific country contexts (see UN Actors).
- Ensure that senior mission leadership consistently includes women, peace and security analysis in all reports and regular briefings, in line with resolution 2122.
- Consistently incorporate a gender perspective in TORs for visiting missions, and give it priority at the outset of the visit.
- Expand ownership of the women, peace and security agenda within the Council beyond one 'penholder' or lead, to include a co-lead role with an elected member.
- Ensure that Council members who are also members of the General Assembly's Fifth Committee facilitate approval of resources required to implement gender components of Council mandates.
- Periodically request SRSGs to present on an ad hoc basis country reports on implementation of the women, peace and security mandate. This could provide opportunities for collective review, focus and action at the country level while providing the Council with more in depth and substantive information on specific context.
- Strengthen its work in the sanctions committees by:
  - Using existing sanction regimes more effectively to enforce thematic priorities—in line with the high-level sanctions review—including women, peace and security, and consider adopting thematic sanctions regimes in addition to country-specific sanctions to address global threats such as sexual violence in conflict, human trafficking, and gross violations of women's rights.
  - Expanding the designation criteria in other relevant sanctions regimes where sexual and gender-based crimes and specific attacks against women are persistently perpetrated.
  - Calling for information-sharing between the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN Women as appropriate, and all relevant sanctions committees and associated expert groups.
  - Formally requiring expert groups assisting sanctions committees to include gender experts as part of the composition of such expert groups, and in line with the recommendations of the High Level Review on Sanctions, requesting the General Assembly to make additional resources available to provide the requisite technical, language and substantive skills needed to strengthen capacity of sanctions bodies and their expert groups.
  - Including respect for the rights of women as delisting criteria in sanctions regimes that target political spoilers that may eventually need to be part of a political solution.
  - Ensuring that specific information about the gendered effects of sanctions is systematically included in all reporting on the implementation of relevant sanctions regimes.

- Linkages between Human Rights Mechanisms and the Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security
  - Member States should:
  - Ratify, remove reservations to, and fully implement CEDAW, and report on the implementation of obligations relating to women, peace and security in regular reporting to the CEDAW Committee and other treaty bodies.
  - Report on the implementation of obligations relating to women, peace and security in the UPR; participate in the review of other States undergoing review by asking about their implementation of these obligations; and establish national mechanisms of reporting and follow-up of recommendations emanating from the UPR and other human rights mechanisms.

- Encourage civil society to submit independent parallel reports, and provide financial support to enable their participation in the UPR process and other human rights treaty body reviews.
- Provide multilateral and bilateral assistance, and ensure the political support and independence of regional and national human rights mechanisms to address violations of women's rights in conflict-affected contexts, and fully implement the judgments and recommendations of these institutions.
- Civil Society should:
- Submit parallel reports to treaty bodies and the UPR highlighting State obligations relating to women, peace and security.
- Work with women and girls affected by conflict who wish to submit complaints of individual rights violations to treaty bodies and regional, sub-regional and national human rights mechanisms.
- The CEDAW Committee (and, where relevant, other human rights treaty bodies) should:
- Question countries under review on the implementation of their obligations under the Convention relating to women, peace and security.
- Encourage and support civil society to submit country-specific information for State party reporting, including State obligations relating to women, peace and security.
- Consider expanding the extraordinary reporting function, and holding special sessions to specifically examine conflict countries and their implementation of General Recommendation 30.
- Human Rights Council Special Procedures, commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions should:
- Include conflict and gender analysis in their work in conflict-affected countries, including in the mandates of commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions.

- Financing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda
  - Member States, the United Nations and regional organizations should:
  - Set specific numerical targets such as the UN target of allocating 15 per cent of peacebuilding funds to projects whose principal objective is to address women's specific needs and advance gender equality.
  - Establish systems across all financing actors to promote transparency and accountability, by tracking whether financial allocations further gender equality in a fully comparable manner, including in peace, security and emergency contexts. To achieve this, build the capacity of all actors to monitor and evaluate the impact of funding.
  - Increase predictable, accessible and flexible funding for women's civil society organizations working on peace and security at all levels, including through dedicated financing instruments such as the new Global Acceleration Instrument on Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action.
  - Support women's participation in donor conferences to ensure interventions appropriately target the needs of women on the ground.
  - Build the capacity of national governments in fragile and conflict-affected settings to undertake genderresponsive budgeting and ensure coherence of national planning with gender equality objectives.
  - Undertake participatory gender and conflict risk analysis (including vulnerability analysis) to inform the design, costing and implementation of all interventions in conflict-affected contexts.
  - Donor States and groups should:

- Adopt the UN's 15 per cent gender-funding target for peacebuilding interventions within their own aid flows to conflict-affected contexts, with this percentage being the first, not final, target.
- Improve coordination of donors' aid activities to ensure a more even distribution of gender equality-focused aid across all fragile states and economies.
- Significantly increase allocations to dedicated financial mechanisms that promote gender equality, women's human rights and empowerment, such as the UN Fund for Gender Equality, the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women, the UN Fund for Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict (UN Action) and the new Global Acceleration Instrument on Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Engagement.
- Revise the structure of budgeting from being "project" based to be aimed at long term capacity building, not only of State entities but also of non-State entities.
- The UN should:
- Accelerate efforts to attain and then surpass the Secretary-General's 15 per cent 'gender marker' for financing to peacebuilding approaches that promote gender equality. Its achievement should be written into the Secretary-General's performance compacts with senior UN leaders on the ground, in mission and non-mission settings, and backed up with an enhanced system for monitoring and tracking achievement.
- Allocate US 100 million or a symbolic 1 per cent of the value (whichever is higher) of the total budget for peace operations to the Peace Building Fund; and further ensure that, of this contribution, a minimum of 15 per cent is allocated to peacebuilding approaches that promote gender equality.

The Next Production Revolution: A Report for the G20

- **Convenors and/or authors:** OECD.
- **Type:** Standalone report (non-UN).
- **Outputs(s)**: Single report.
- **Dates:** Published, 2017.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** New technologies.
- **Aspirations:** short to medium term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations:** (key messages:)
  - The technologies considered in this report, from information and communication technologies (ICTs) and robots to new materials, have more to contribute to productivity than they currently do. Often, their use is predominantly in larger firms. And even in larger firms, many potential applications are underused. Unexploited opportunities exist throughout manufacturing.
  - While new technologies will create jobs through many channels, and productivity-raising technologies will benefit firms and the economy overall, the associated adjustments could be significant. Hardship could affect many if rapid labour displacement were to occur in a major sector, or in many sectors simultaneously. Policymakers need to monitor and actively manage the adjustments.
  - Compared to earlier industrial revolutions, induced by steam and electrification, the creation and international spread of inventions that can transform production will occur quickly. But it could take considerable time for new technologies, once invented, to diffuse throughout the economy and for their productivity effects to be fully realised. Moreover, the duration of this period is uncertain. The past has seen unrealistic enthusiasm regarding timelines for the delivery of important production technologies.
  - Diffusion of the technologies must include not only the hardware, but also the complementary intangible investments and know-how needed to fully exploit the technologies, ranging from skills to new forms of business organisation. Here, among other things, the efficient deployment and reallocation of human and financial resources is essential. Aligning framework policies that promote product market competition, reduce rigidities in labour markets, remove disincentives for firm exit and barriers to growth for successful firms is critical. New firms will introduce many of the new production technologies.
  - Effective institutions dedicated to technology diffusion can help. Especially among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), a major challenge will be the digital transformation of firms which were not born digital. Many entrepreneurs do not fully understand the uses and implications of technologies such as the IoT. Institutions with specific remits to aid diffusion, such as technical extension services (which provide information and outreach, especially for SMEs), tend to receive low priority in innovation policy overall. But such institutions can be effective if properly designed, incentivised and resourced.
  - Data will be central to 21st-century production. Policy should encourage investments in data that have positive spillovers across industries. Obstacles to the reuse and sharing of data should be examined carefully, and coherent data governance frameworks should be developed. The quality of digital infrastructure, including access to high-powered computing, will be critical for firms in many sectors.
  - Rapid technological change could challenge the adequacy of skills and training systems. Some new production technologies raise the importance of interdisciplinary education and research. Greater interaction between industry and education and training institutions is often required, and this need may grow as the knowledge content of production rises. Effective systems for life-long learning and workplace training are essential, such that skills upgrading can match the pace

of technological change and retraining can be accessed when needed. Digital skills, and skills which complement machines, are vital. Also important is to ensure good generic skills – such as literacy, numeracy and problem solving – throughout the population, in part because generic skills are the basis for learning fast-changing specific skills.

- Sound science and R&D policies are important. The technologies addressed in this report have arisen because of advances in scientific knowledge and instrumentation emanating from both the public and private sectors. Most firms and countries are technology users. But some will be technology developers. Many of the research challenges critical to the NPR are multidisciplinary. Evaluation metrics for research programmes should properly incentivise multidisciplinary research, research scale-up (such as through test-bed demonstration) and linkages across stakeholders.
- Public understanding and acceptance of new production technologies also matter. Policymakers and institutions should voice realistic expectations about technologies. Science advice should be demonstrated to be unbiased and trustworthy. And public deliberation can help to build understanding between scientific communities and the public.
- Better anticipating trends through technology foresight could assist policy and the allocation of research funds. Foresight processes can bring benefits in themselves, such as strengthened stakeholder networks. They can also encourage policy co-ordination and organisational innovation and help direct policies for science and R&D.
- Long-term thinking is essential. Leaders in business, education, unions and government must be ready to frame policies and prepare for developments beyond typical election cycles. Reflection is also required on how policy priorities might need to evolve, driven for instance by technological change itself. For example, major challenges to the intellectual property (IP) system could soon arise from the emerging ability of machines to create (at least one machine-derived invention has already been patented).
- While the NPR will present challenges to developed countries, it could be especially testing for developing countries. New production technologies could erode the low-wage advantage of some developing economies, leading to shifts in global value chains (GVCs). But this scenario might be mitigated by several factors, including rapidly declining costs of some technologies and improved channels of knowledge diffusion. The NPR also creates new exigencies for developing countries aiming to market themselves as attractive investment locations.
- In conclusion, the more governments understand how production could develop in the near future, the better placed they will be to prepare for the risks and reap the benefits. The NPR raises multiple complex policy challenges. But through judicious policy, the opportunity exists to influence the NPR now.

Creating a Sustainable Food Future: A Menu of Solutions to Feed Nearly 10 Billion People by 2050

- **Convenors and/or authors:** World Resources Institute, World Bank, UNEP, UNDP.
- **Type:** Standalone report (UN & non-UN).
- **Dates:** Published, December 2018.
- **GCRs and/or risk or solution multipliers:** Ecosystem collapse.
- **Aspirations:** Medium and long term.
- **Theory of Change:** N/A.
- **Recommendations**: (headline recommendations only)
  - Course 1: Reduce growth in demand for food and other agricultural products
    - Reduce food loss and waste
    - Shift to healthier and more sustainable diets
    - Avoid competition from bioenergy for food crops and land
    - Achieve replacement-level fertility rates
  - Course 2: Increase food production without expanding agricultural land
    - Increase livestock and pasture productivity
    - Improve crop breeding to boost yields
    - Improve soil and water management
    - Plant existing cropland more frequently
    - Adapt to climate change
  - Course 3: Protect and restore natural ecosystems and limit agricultural land-shifting
    - Link productivity gains with protection of natural ecosystems
    - Limit inevitable cropland expansion to lands with low environmental opportunity costs
    - Reforest abandoned, unproductive, and liberated agricultural lands
    - Conserve and restore peatlands
  - Course 4: Increase fish supply
    - Improve wild fisheries management
    - Improve productive and environmental performance and aquaculture
  - Course 5: Reduce greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural production
    - Reduce entrenic fermentation through new technologies
    - Reduce emissions through improved manure management
    - Reduce emissions from manure left on pasture
    - Reduce emissions from fertilizers by increasing nitrogen use efficiency
    - Adopt emissions-reducing rice management and varieties
    - Increase agricultural energy efficiency and shift to nonfossil energy sources
    - Focus on realistic options to sequester carbon in soils.